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Abstract 
In recent years, many governments in developed and developing economies have implemented 
reforms to decentralize tax raising powers, the supply of public services, and other functions 
previously delivered by central governments, with the aim of achieving greater government 
accountability and more efficient and effective public services. In this thesis, I examine 
empirically the effects of fiscal decentralization on several key areas of public policy, including: 
poverty and income distribution (chapter 3), public healthcare and public education (chapter 4), 
and citizen trust in government (chapter 5). In order to examine the effects of fiscal 
decentralization I produce a fiscal decentralization dataset comprising of a range of indicators 
for tax and spending decentralization; subnational government autonomy; local government 
accountability and local government size (land area and population). Using this dataset, I 
produce the following findings. First, in chapter 3 tax and spending decentralization can help 
reduce income inequality in high income countries, and increase absolute poverty in low and 
middle income countries. Furthermore, fiscal decentralization appears to be more beneficial for 
the poor when the average size of local jurisdictions is smaller.  Second, in chapter 4 I find that 
there is no clear relationship between fiscal decentralization and the level of public healthcare 
and public education provided. Instead, fiscal decentralization appears to improve vaccination 
coverage over time, when subnational governments have autonomy over expenditure, and when 
there is a higher level of public spending on healthcare.  Third, in chapter 5 I find that fiscal 
decentralization has no clear effect on citizen trust in government; however, tax and spending 
decentralization has contrasting effects depending on the number of tiers of government 
(government structure) and the average population size of local jurisdictions. The main 
conclusion is that fiscal decentralization can have an impact on the key areas of public policy 
examined in my research, however these effects are often not observed through tax and spending 
decentralization, but rather other aspects of fiscal decentralization, including the closeness of 
local government to local citizens, local government autonomy and accountability. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the course of the last 30 years there has been a gradual move towards more decentralized 
government, particularly in developing countries.  Dillinger (1994) notes that in a sample of 75 
developing and transitional economies, all but a dozen have embarked on some form of 
decentralization.  Faguet (2004) comments that government decentralization is a part of broad 
reforms for development in Asia, Africa and Latin America.  In practice, decentralization reforms 
present themselves as increases in subnational government spending and local government 
accountability.  For example, Stein (1998) observes a small, but steady increase in subnational 
government share of total government spending – roughly 4% between 1985 and 1995.  This 
increase in spending has also been accompanied by political autonomy reforms, particularly in 
Latin America, where local government executives (mayors) that were at one time appointed by 
the central government, are now elected by local citizens. 
Yet, despite the apparent trend towards government decentralization in developing 
countries, they are still far behind their developed counterparts. Each of Oates (1972), Davoodi 
and Zou (1998) and Bahl (1999) all observe a stark contrast in the decentralization of spending 
between more and less economically developed countries.  Whilst subnational governments 
account for roughly one third total government expenditure, subnational governments in 
developing countries account for roughly less than half (between 11% and 20%). 
 
Part of the reason for this push for more government decentralization, particularly in developing 
countries, is the expected benefits of fiscal decentralization.  The benefits of fiscal decentralization 
include improving government responsiveness to the diverse local demands of local citizens 
(Oates, 1972), which could ultimately improve public sector efficiency (Davoodi and Zou, 1998).  
Fiscal decentralization could also lead to competition between subnational governments and 
consequently, reduce excessive taxes (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) and provide sustained 
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economic development at the local and national level, which many believe centralized 
administration has failed to deliver (Oates, 1999). 
 Fiscal decentralization is not without its critics however.  Opponents of fiscal 
decentralization consider the potential dangers of subnational and local government autonomy 
(Prud’homme, 1995).  These dangers include a race to the bottom in taxes on capital (Hoyt, 1991), 
lower spending on social services and redistribution (Keen and Marchand, 1997), inter-regional 
differences in investment, productivity and public spending (Cai and Treisman, 2005), and lower 
spending on goods and services that exhibit positive externalities (Besley and Coate, 2003). 
 Furthermore, recent studies on the effects of fiscal decentralization have examined other 
aspects of decentralization that are often overlooked in favour of the more conventional measures 
of fiscal decentralization, namely subnational government share of revenue and expenditure 
(Stegarescu, 2005).  Treisman (2002) and Ivanyna and Shah (2014) have developed new datasets 
on subnational and local government autonomy and accountability, while Ebel and Yilmaz (2003); 
Thornton (2007a) and Altunbas and Thornton (2011) have incorporated a range of indicators of 
other aspects of fiscal decentralization in their empirical research.  Often, the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on public sector size, economic growth and corruption are sensitive to the chosen 
indicator of fiscal decentralization. 
 
In this thesis, I contribute to the area of fiscal decentralization by exploring empirically the effects 
of fiscal decentralization.  In chapter 1 I explore the fiscal decentralization literature.  I set out 
several theoretical arguments for and against further government decentralization, and I consider 
how various aspects of decentralization relate to those arguments.  In chapter 2 I explore the fiscal 
decentralization data.  I consider the limitations of the conventional measures of fiscal 
decentralization and I produce a decentralization dataset that contains a range of indicators for tax 
and spending decentralization, subnational government autonomy, local government 
accountability and other features of fiscal decentralization.  I use the theoretical arguments in 
chapter 1 and the decentralization dataset in chapter 2 to examine the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on several key areas of public policy.  Specifically, I investigate the effects of 
fiscal decentralization on poverty and income distribution (chapter 3); public healthcare and public 
education (chapter 4) and trust in government (chapter 5). The contributions of this research are 
several: 
1. One of the main contributions of this research is to shed light on the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on a particular group, namely the poor and poorest.  Most fiscal 
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decentralization research has examined the effects of fiscal decentralization on 
macroeconomic variables, such as economic growth (see Davoodi and Zou, 1998); public 
sector size (see Oates, 1985) and inflation (see Thornton, 2007b).  However, some of the 
aims of fiscal decentralization include strengthening ties between decision makers and 
citizens (Musgrave, 1983); improving local government accountability and making 
government more responsive to citizen demands for public services (Faguet, 2004).  As 
Dillinger (1994) comments, the effects of decentralization may not be positive, or negative, 
for everyone, and certain sections of society may lose out.  In this research, I focus on the 
effects of fiscal decentralization on poverty; income inequality; public healthcare and 
public education, and trust in government. 
2. The second contribution of my research is a look at how the effects of tax and spending 
decentralization depend on other aspects of decentralization that are often overlooked.  In 
the introductory chapters of my thesis I develop key concepts of decentralization (chapter 
1) and I represent those concepts in an extensive decentralization dataset (chapter 2).  My 
empirical research in chapters 3, 4 and 5 often demonstrate that the effects of tax and 
spending decentralization are mixed and statistically insignificant.  Instead, the effects of 
fiscal decentralization depend on many aspects of decentralization. 
3. In chapter 3 I use my decentralization dataset to examine the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on absolute poverty and income distribution (chapter 3). To my 
knowledge, this is the first examination of the effects of fiscal decentralization on poverty 
for a wide range of countries. I produce evidence that tax and spending decentralization can 
reduce income inequality in high income countries and increase absolute poverty in low 
and middle income countries.  Furthermore, the average size (area) of the local jurisdiction 
has a bearing on the effects of tax and spending share of subnational governments. 
Specifically, smaller localities help to reduce inequality and poverty when tax and spending 
is devolved to subnational governments, but the opposite is true when localities are larger. 
4. In chapter 4, I develop previous work on fiscal decentralization and public healthcare and 
public education by examining the effects of various aspects of decentralization on a range 
of public services indicators. My findings show that fiscal decentralization has different 
effects between different indicators of public services, and that fiscal decentralization can 
improve healthcare outputs (vaccination) when subnational governments have autonomy 
over spending and when total public spending is higher.  Spending decentralization also 
observes contrasting effects on public education, depending on whether the local executive 
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is elected locally, or appointed by the central government. 
5. In chapter 5, I examine the effects of fiscal decentralization on citizen trust in government.  
Only one piece of work has examined the effects of decentralization on trust in government 
across a selection of countries (see Ligthart and Oudheusen, 2015).  I build on their research 
by including measures for subnational government autonomy, local government 
accountability and local government population size to produce a greater range of results. 
I produce evidence that citizens are indifferent about the degree of tax and spending 
decision making of subnational governments. Instead, citizens trust government less when 
there are more tiers of government, and trust government more when local governments 
are responsible for fewer people. 
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1. An Introduction to Fiscal Decentralization 
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In the first chapter of this thesis I review the fiscal decentralization literature.  The aim of this 
review is to establish some of the key arguments, for and against, fiscal decentralization.  The 
arguments that I present in this review are particularly relevant to my own research on poverty, 
the provision of basic public services and citizen trust in government.  In addition to reviewing 
the effects of fiscal decentralization, I consider alternate forms of government decentralization 
that do not meet all the conditions of fiscal decentralization, defined in the opening sections of 
this chapter.  It is important to consider other forms of government decentralization, as some of 
the effects of fiscal decentralization may still arise without subnational government autonomy, 
local government accountability and so forth. 
This chapter is organised as follows.  In section 1.1 I define the concept of fiscal 
decentralization.  I briefly touch upon the case for fiscal decentralization, specifically in the 
allocation of government resources at the local level (Oates, 1972), before defining other forms 
of decentralization.  In sections 1.2 and 1.3 I present the case for fiscal decentralization (1.2) 
and highlight some of the dangers associated with subnational government autonomy (1.3).  In 
section 1.4 I consider how each form of decentralization discussed in section 1.1. relate to the 
different arguments for and against fiscal decentralization.  I include a discussion on an alternate 
form of decentralization, known as partial fiscal decentralization (see Brueckner, 2009), where 
subnational governments have autonomy over expenditure, but not taxation.  Finally, I conclude 
this literature review by leading into chapter 2: “measuring fiscal decentralization”  
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1.1. Concepts of Decentralization 
 
One of the main problems in the fiscal decentralization literature is how we define what fiscal 
decentralization means.  As Treisman (2002, 2007) explains, fiscal decentralization is often 
used to represent different things.  If it is unclear what fiscal decentralization means, then it will 
not be possible to understand the effects of fiscal decentralization.  In this section I provide a 
definition for fiscal decentralization based on several key contributions from Oates, Treisman 
and others, that encompasses the various aspects of fiscal decentralization.  I also define 
alternate forms of government decentralization that may be more common in practice.   
 
1.1.1. Fiscal Decentralization 
 
Fiscal decentralization is the distribution of tax and expenditure decision making between the 
different tiers of government, that together form a federal state (Oates, 1972).  Within a federal 
state, each tier of government is responsible for some tax and expenditure functions (Gordon, 
1983), but no tier is responsible for all functions.  The distribution of tax and expenditure 
functions between tiers of governments depends on the various advantages of fiscal federalism, 
which I will discuss later in this chapter.   
 Oates’ definition covers several aspects of government decentralization.  These aspects 
are: i) the share of government activity at the subnational government level (distribution of 
responsibility), ii) the discretion subnational governments have over certain tax and expenditure 
(autonomy), iii) the direct accountability of local governments to local constituents 
(accountability).  Each of these aspects of fiscal decentralization can be understood as alternate 
forms of government decentralization (see Treisman, 2007).  However, fiscal decentralization 
is defined as all of these aspects in one.  Fiscal decentralization depends on the distribution of 
government activity; discretion over government activity, and the extent to which local 
government is accountable directly to local constituents.   
As Treisman (2002) explains, it is not simply a matter of fiscal decentralization or fiscal 
centralization, but rather the organisation of powers to tax and spend between a multi-tiered 
government.  Therefore, fiscal decentralization concerns the degree to which subnational 
governments determine taxation and spending, relative to the central government.   
Fiscal decentralization is about more than the share of government activity for each tier 
of government.  A second important aspect of fiscal decentralization is that subnational 
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governments should have discretion over the functions that have been devolved to them.  The 
roles and responsibilities of subnational governments should be clearly defined, and free from 
any influence from the central government (Oates, 1972).  The autonomy of subnational 
government concerns certain constraints imposed by the central government.  We can think of 
constraints as either constitutional constraints, budget constraints or the appointment of local 
government officials by the central administration (Prud’homme, 1995).  In the absence of such 
constraints, we have fiscal decentralization.  Where such constraints exist, subnational 
governments do not have the necessary degree of autonomy to constitute fiscal decentralization, 
though some form of government decentralization may still take place.  As Tanzi (1996) 
explains, fiscal decentralization concerns the authority of subnational governments, determined 
by the constitution, to raise revenue and allocate expenditures.  Autonomy of subnational 
government decision making is a necessary condition of fiscal decentralization.   
Third, subnational governments should be held to account for the decisions that they 
make.  Each tier of government and unit of government within that tier has a duty to a particular 
group of people within the entire population of that country.  Fiscal decentralization requires 
that when a subnational tier of government provides a particular function, tax or expenditure, 
that affects a subset of the population, those citizens that are affected must be able to control 
directly the decisions made by that subnational government.  If this is not the case, then 
subnational government will be accountable to the central government, which will maintain a 
degree of control over the decisions that subnational governments make. 
 
Finally, we may understand fiscal decentralization as fiscal federalism, where a government 
consists of centralized and decentralized levels of decision making, where the choices that are 
made at each level of government are determined by the demands of the residents of their 
respective jurisdictions.  Subnational governments operate as individual units of governments, 
but are part of a sphere of a coordinated effort for certain policies.  Oates (1972) explains that 
fiscal federalism, the model of fiscal decentralization, requires the above strict conditions and 
that, in practice, fiscal decentralization (or fiscal federalism) is in fact rare, with only a dozen 
or so countries classified as federal states1.  Often central governments exert a greater degree 
of control over subnational government decision making.   
 
                                                 
1 Oates (1972) refers to the categorisation of fiscal federalism by Elazar, whose work is cited in Treisman (2008).  
Treisman notes that of 164 countries, only 19 countries are classified as having federal governments 
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1.1.2. Other Forms of Decentralization 
 
Recently, many academics have sought to distinguish between fiscal and other forms of 
decentralization.  There are three important reasons why we should consider other forms of 
decentralization, and how they differ from fiscal decentralization.   
 The first reason is the incorrect labelling of fiscal decentralization in practice.  Oates 
(1972), Boadway and Shah (2009) and Brueckner (2009) explain that fiscal decentralization is 
quite rare.  Subnational governments may account for a range of government activity, yet the 
degree to which subnational governments have discretion over devolved functions is often 
limited.  For example, subnational governments tend to have less control over taxation and 
depend upon transfers from the central government.  This enables the central government to 
mandate subnational government expenditure through transfers (Treisman, 2002; Boadway and 
Shah, 2009).  When subnational governments have some autonomy over expenditure, but not 
over revenue, we should recognise this as a different form of decentralization. 
 The second reason is the link between the decentralization theory and the different forms 
of decentralization.  Some of the key arguments in the fiscal decentralization literature do not 
necessarily require that subnational governments have autonomy.  Therefore, fiscal 
decentralization may not be necessary to achieve some of the supposed aims of fiscal 
decentralization.   
 The third reason is the limitation of data and the representation of fiscal decentralization.  
The empirical research in this area continues to encounter problems of representation, where 
fiscal decentralization is difficult to measure in a single indicator.  For example, the most 
common measure of decentralization used in empirical research captures the share of 
subnational government activity, but not extent of autonomy that the subnational government 
has.   
 For these reasons, it is important to distinguish between the different types of 
decentralization; to understand what effects each form of decentralization can have, and to 
examine those effects in practice through empirical research.  Before addressing the problems 
of measuring fiscal decentralization in chapter 2, I will address the other forms of 
decentralization that are touched on in the literature, and distinguish between them and fiscal 
decentralization in this introductory chapter.  
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Partial Fiscal Decentralization: 
Partial fiscal decentralization refers to a scenario where subnational governments depend on 
transfers from the central government to finance local expenditure (Brueckner, 2009).  
Subnational governments are provided with funds through intergovernmental transfers, from a 
central pot of funds controlled by the central government.  The subnational government is 
responsible for allocating expenditure according to the demands for certain goods and services 
at the local level.  In this scenario, the subnational government has autonomy over expenditure, 
but does not have the power to raise revenue and control the budget.  Critically, partial fiscal 
decentralization cannot constitute fiscal decentralization because the central government exerts 
influence over subnational government decision making (through intergovernmental transfers).  
Therefore, we must distinguish between these two forms of government decentralization.  
In practice, partial fiscal decentralization is more popular than fiscal decentralization.  
Compared to federal countries, most countries observe a “greater degree of central government 
control over the public sector” (Brueckner, 2009: 23).  Oates (1972) identifies only a small 
number of countries meeting his criteria for fiscal federalism, and Treisman’s (2008) updated 
decentralization dataset refers to only a small number of countries as federal states2.  
Subnational governments are often reliant upon transfers from the central government.  
Boadway and Shah (2009) observe this, where subnational governments in developed countries 
receive 1/3 of their total budgets from intergovernmental transfers, and in developing countries, 
the proportion is even higher, at 60%.   
A widely-held view in the literature is that the case for devolving expenditure is greater 
than the case for devolving revenue (see Prud’homme, 1995; Boadway and Shah, 2009).  The 
view in the literature is that fiscal decentralization may be welfare enhancing if it improves the 
allocation of resources according to heterogeneous demands across the population (Oates, 
1972).  However, the devolution of revenue could obstruct national objectives such as 
redistribution and stabilisation of the national economy.  I will go into this in greater detail 
during this literature review 
 
Electoral Decentralization: 
Another related concept of decentralization is known as electoral decentralization.  Even if 
subnational governments have autonomy over expenditures and/or taxes at the jurisdictional 
level, the decisions made by subnational governments will depend on who they are accountable 
                                                 
2 Only 19 countries out of a total 164 are classed as federal states in Treisman’s dataset. 
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to.  If the central government appoint subnational government executives then they may simply 
act as representatives of the central government at the subnational government level (Boadway 
and Shah, 2009).  In the absence of electoral decentralization, the incentives for subnational 
governments (to be re-appointed), will depend upon the agenda of the central government, and 
not the local constituencies.  If subnational governments are elected at the local level by those 
affected by the policies of the subnational government, then subnational governments have an 
incentive to respond to the demands of local citizens.   
Treisman (2007) explains that electoral decentralization can provide certain benefits, 
such as bringing governments closer to the people, and by improving the knowledge of 
governments of the demands (tastes and preferences of local citizens).  Even in the absence of 
much subnational government activity or autonomy, electoral decentralization may provide a 
means for the central government to extract information from local citizens, for example, 
through local elections.     
 
Local vs. Subnational Government: 
Treisman (2002) and Ivanyna and Shah (2014) explain that decentralization is not simply a 
matter of central government vs. non-central government (subnational government)3.  Also, 
subnational government will not have a consistent definition between countries, where some 
countries observe more complex government structures than others4.  Therefore, fiscal 
decentralization should not simply consider the range of responsibilities and decision making 
carried out by any subnational government, but the distribution of powers between the 
subnational governments.  If a given set of government functions are delivered by the regional 
government, this would constitute less decentralization than the exact same functions delivered 
by the most local government. 
 The reason why it is important to consider government structure and the distribution of 
powers between different tiers of subnational governments is because the decentralization of 
functions to local governments intensifies the effects of fiscal decentralization.  For example, 
the degree of mobility of citizens will be greater between local governments than regional5 
governments.  Mobility leads to competition between government units; hence decentralization 
                                                 
3 In the empirical literature decentralization is often represented through the proportion of government activity 
delivered by all tiers of government beneath the central government, known as the subnational government.   
4 Treisman’s (2008) decentralization dataset includes a measure for the number of government tiers (including 
central government).  The number of tiers of government can vary between 2 tiers and tiers.  In China, there are 5 
tiers of government: provinces, prefectures, countries, towns. 
5 Subnational governments have different names for different countries, regional or state is often used to portray a 
decentralized tier of government that is not the smallest (local).   
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to local governments will intensify that competition.  Similarly, if certain public goods and 
services exhibit economies of scale, then local governments will lose out more than regional 
governments.  Boadway and Shah (2009) explain that regions may be sufficiently large that 
there is little difference between centralized provision and regional provision.  Barankay and 
Lockwood (2007) explain that local governments would lose out the most.   
 In practice, different tiers of subnational government can occupy different 
responsibilities.  Wallis and Oates (1988) shows that state governments account for more 
government revenue and expenditure than local governments.  They also show that at the 
beginning of the 20th century local government dominate state government responsibility and 
that only over the course of 80 years toward the end of the 20th century that state governments 
accounted for more government activity.   
 
1.1.3. Considering Fiscal and Other Forms of Decentralization and the 
Literature 
 
As explained earlier, one of the reasons why it is important to distinguish between fiscal 
decentralization and other forms of decentralization is because not all of the decentralization 
theory relates specifically to the conditions of fiscal decentralization.  As Treisman (2002, 
2007) explains, fiscal decentralization is frequently used to represent alternate forms of 
government decentralization, and certain arguments are incorrectly associated with types of 
decentralization that do not fit the theory.  Boadway and Shah (2009) provide an in-depth 
discussion of the problems associated with fiscal centralization and how a balance between 
subnational government discretion and central government control could produce more 
favourable outcomes of government decentralization.  If the objective of decentralization is to 
induce a provision of public goods and services that is responsive to the heterogeneous needs 
of the population, perhaps other forms of decentralization can effectively achieve this objective, 
without the risks associated with subnational government autonomy (Prud’homme, 1995).  
Seabright (1996) also touches on this point, explaining that fiscal decentralization may not be 
a pre-requisite of a non-uniform set of public policies, merely that fiscal decentralization, 
specifically direct accountability of subnational government decision making, can induce that 
outcome.  However, Besley and Coate (2003) argue that there is neither theoretical, nor 
empirical evidence that suggests a central government cannot provide a non-uniform set of 
public policies across the country.  They also cite empirical evidence whereby infrastructure 
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investment from the US federal government differs (US highway).  However, this does not 
mean that a fully centralized government is in effect here, there may be other types of 
decentralization at play that enable a central government with control over fiscal revenues to 
establish a heterogeneous provision of public goods and services.   
 
1.2. The Case for Fiscal Decentralization 
 
The fiscal decentralization literature begins with the view that the most efficient public sector 
cannot be realised through a centralized government.  Therefore, the efficient allocation of 
public goods and services to all citizens within a country cannot be achieved when decisions 
are made solely by a single central administration.  Musgrave (1960), Oates (1972) and 
Boadway and Shah (2009) explain each government has three main functions.  The first is to 
ensure an equitable distribution of income and to redistribute income between citizens.  The 
second is to maintain a stable economy, with high employment, low inflation and sustainable 
growth, through fiscal and monetary policy.  The third is to allocate tax revenues to a wide 
range of public goods and services that are demanded by the citizens.  It is a widely-held view 
that of these three objectives (redistribution, stabilisation and allocation), two of them are best 
achieved through a strong central government, coordinating policy across the country.   
 
Redistribution: 
Many argue that fiscal decentralization could harm efforts to achieve equitable distribution of 
income across the country.  The main problem is that decentralization and redistribution will 
ultimately be self-defeating, as citizens are more mobile at the subnational government level 
than they are moving between countries.  As Prud’homme (1995) explains, subnational 
governments may be unwilling or unable to levy higher taxes on the wealthiest citizens, who 
will be able to exit a jurisdiction with higher taxes.  Subnational governments will either reduce 
taxes on the wealthiest to attract them, or they will drive them away by attempting to redistribute 
incomes to the poorest living in the jurisdiction.  Thus, the scope for redistributive programs is 
limited at the local government level due to the mobility of residents, which all other things 
equal, will be greater the smaller the jurisdiction (Oates, 1972: 8).   
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Stabilisation:  
Oates gives one example where decentralization could have devastating effects on the national 
economy.  His example, where local governments are able to print money, would result in local 
government using monetary policy, as oppose to fiscal policy, to raise sufficient revenue.  With 
all governments seeking to finance expenditures this way, the consequence would be high levels 
of inflation.   
 
Allocation: 
Whilst the case for fiscal decentralization with respect to redistribution and stabilisation is 
weak, the case for fiscal decentralization and allocation is strong.  Oates (1972) and others argue 
that a fully centralized government cannot achieve an efficient allocation of goods and services.  
Whilst there are certain goods that should be provided by the central government, such as 
national defence, which have large fixed costs and benefit everyone in the country equally, 
other goods and services exhibit spatial characteristics (Tanzi, 1996) and are best delivered to 
subsets of the population according to need (Oates, 1972).    
 
Following on from the work of Oates (1972) and Boadway and Shah (2009), I make the case 
for fiscal decentralization with regards to the benefits of allocation.  I refer to several key pieces 
of work in this section.  First, Oates (1972) presents the basic premise for the decentralization 
of public policy.  Second, Tiebout (1956) explains how differentiated public policy between 
regions can induce a more efficient allocation of resources.  Third, Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980) explain how mobile citizens can discipline against rent-maximising governments.  
Finally, Seabright (1996) and Besley and Case (1995) explain how the direct accountability of 
local government decision making to local citizens ensures local governments are responsive 
to local demands for public policy.   
At the end of this section I will demonstrate that in order to achieve an efficient 
allocation of public goods and services, set out in Oates’ decentralization theorem, subnational 
governments require discretion over spending, taxation, and local citizens should have direct 
control over the actions of subnational governments through local elections.   
I begin with Oates (1972) decentralization theorem.        
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1.2.1. ‘Decentralization Theorem’ (Oates, 1972) 
 
The reason why allocation is best devolved to local governments is outlined in Oates’ 
decentralization theorem.  The argument follows that where there are no cost-savings to be 
made from centralized provision, and where there are no external economies, fiscal 
decentralization can produce a more efficient allocation of goods and services among a 
population with heterogeneous preferences.  The argument assumes that central governments 
tend toward uniformity in the provision of public goods and services.  If this assumption holds, 
for those goods and services that have spatial characteristics (Tanzi, 1996), the case for 
decentralized allocation of expenditures is strengthened.   
In a simple model, Oates demonstrates that collective consumption for a good that could 
otherwise be consumed by individuals could lead to an inefficient outcome.  If individuals are 
able to consume a different quantity of goods, pareto efficiency may be realised.  I outline Oates 
(1972) model below. 
 
The Model: 
There are two individuals (𝐴, 𝐵) and there are two commodities (𝑋, 𝑌).  Commodity 𝑋 is defined 
as a pure private good, consumed by each individual separately.  Commodity 𝑌 is defined 
differently between two scenarios.  In scenario 1 the two individuals consume 𝑌 separately.  In 
scenario 2 commodity 𝑌 is consumed jointly.  However, when commodity 𝑌 is consumed 
jointly it is also consumed in equal amount by the two individuals, so that 𝑌𝐴 = 𝑌𝐵.  The 
following are the optimal solutions for each scenario: 
  
Scenario 1: An idea of decentralization (Y consumed separately) 
 
max 𝑈𝑖(𝑋𝑖, 𝑌𝑖)  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 ∑ 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑋 , ∑ 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑌 , 𝐹(𝑋, 𝑌)  
1.1 
 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐴 = 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐵 = 𝑀𝐶 1.2 
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Scenario 2: An idea of centralization (Y consumed collectively) 
 
max 𝑈𝑖(𝑋𝑖, 𝑌𝑖)  𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 ∑ 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑋 , ∑ 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑌 , 𝐹(𝑋, 𝑌), 𝑌𝐴 = 𝑌𝐵 
1.3 
 
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐴 + 𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐵 = 2𝑀𝐶 1.4 
 
If there are no cost-savings to be had from greater provision (consumption) of commodity 𝑌, 
scenario 1 will generally produce a more efficient outcome than scenario 2.  Only in a special 
case, where both individuals would consume the exact same quantity of commodity 𝑌, would 
scenario 2 be as efficient as scenario 1.  If 𝐴 and 𝐵 would choose to consume a different quantity 
of 𝑌 were they able to do so, then scenario 1 will produce Pareto-efficient welfare.  This is 
demonstrated below: 
 
Figure 1: Oates’ Decentralization Theorem Illustrated 
 
The horizontal line 𝑌 to 𝑌’ represents the constraint of scenario 2 (centralization), where both 
individuals consume 𝑌 equally.  In this scenario, we are at a sub-optimal position ‘C’, where 
utility curves 𝐵1 and 𝐴1 intersect.  However, we can see that the welfare of individual A can be 
improved without reducing the welfare of individual 𝐵, at point 𝐷 along the contract curve.  
Here, the MRS along 𝐵1 (same utility as centralization) is tangent to the MRS along 𝐴2 (greater 
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utility than centralization).  This is the pareto-optimal position that can only be obtained through 
decentralized consumption in this example.   
 In the general model, where there are many individuals and many public goods 
(Xi … Xn), and each good is consumed by a subset of the population, the responsibility of 
providing that public good should be devolved to the respective government.  In the case of 
pure public goods, they should be provided by the central government to all citizens, but for 
each good that benefits a subset of the population, there should be a subnational government to 
provide that good.   
 
1.2.2. Mobility of Citizens and Congregation of Preferences (Tiebout, 
1956) 
 
The Oates model demonstrates the inefficiency of equal consumption between individuals with 
different preferences.  However, Oates (1972) assumes that the central government will be 
unable to differentiate public policy between geographical subsets of the population, or at the 
very least, would be less efficient than the alternative: decentralized delivery.  Tiebout (1956) 
presents an important argument in favour of decentralization, which explains how 
decentralization can ensure that governments respond to different preferences between subsets 
of the population.  Tiebout argues that local provision can create a competitive environment 
between local governments, thereby improving the efficiency of government by minimising the 
costs of delivery public goods and services to a subset of the population.   
 
The Problem: 
In a defining piece, Tiebout addresses one of the concerns of public finance – the absence of a 
market based solution for the pricing and provision of public goods and services.  Musgrave 
(1939) and Samuelson (1954) explains this problem of the public sector.  Citizens voluntarily 
give up some of their income so that in return they receive a set of public goods and services to 
meet their preferences.  However, there is no mechanism by which the consumer (and taxpayer) 
can express their preferences for a range of public goods and services.  Tiebout explains that 
even if taxpayers could state their preferences, they would face an incentive to understate their 
demands so that they can avoid paying the correct price.    
The most efficient outcome would require that: i) the government is able to ascertain 
the preferences of each individual (information), ii) satisfies those preferences (allocation), and 
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charges each individual accordingly for their consumption (taxation).  Tiebout explains that 
whilst the problems raised by Musgrave and Samuelson are relevant to the central government, 
local governments may be able to induce a more efficient outcome   
 
The Model: 
To demonstrate how fiscal decentralization could solve the public sector problem explained 
above, Tiebout outlines a model containing several key assumptions.  Citizens are perfectly 
mobile and are knowledgeable of the range of public policies across many jurisdictions.  There 
are no cost-savings to be had and no externalities.  Local governments seek to optimise the size 
of the local population to whom they are accountable, so that the average cost of public goods 
and services in the local area is at the minimum.  It is also possible for jurisdictions to be over-
populated, which would reduce the utility of citizens living in that jurisdiction.   
 In this model, citizens can move to jurisdictions that matches their preferences closest.  
As citizens search for the set of public policies that matches their preferences, they register their 
demands for goods and services.  The decision to locate to a given region is recognised as the 
citizen’s willingness to pay.  Therefore, local governments providing different public goods and 
services to meet to the demands of their local jurisdictions can approximate a market solution, 
and improve the efficiency of public expenditure. 
 In practice, decentralization leading to heterogeneous public policy can only help to 
approach the Pareto-optimal solution due to the costs of migration (costs of mobility).  If 
citizens are not perfectly mobile, a cost (disutility) would be associated with movement.  The 
citizen faces a simple problem: In practice, the surplus welfare from moving from one 
jurisdiction to another jurisdiction that better matches the citizen’s preference would need to 
exceed the cost (disutility) migration.  Although the solution would not be Pareto-optimal, 
citizens would still register their demands when the marginal utility obtained by moving into 
the next jurisdiction would exceed the cost of doing so.   Though the information that local 
governments derive in the imperfect model would be weaker, we would still expect local 
governments to produce a more efficient set of public policies than a central government.   
Tiebout’s model is not without flaws and its critics.  Seabright (1996) points out that the 
restrictive assumptions of the Tiebout model means that it can “provide no basis for normative 
analysis of the actual world” (62).  Specifically, the absence of externalities and cost-savings 
will not hold for many public goods and services.  Also, as Tiebout recognises, in order for 
Pareto-optimal solution to be met there must be a sufficient number of jurisdictions to ensure 
that citizens can maximise welfare.  If the number of jurisdictions is fewer than the sufficient 
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number required to match every citizens’ demands, then some citizens would have to settle for 
second best, and move to a jurisdiction whose public policy is close to their preference, but not 
quite what they are looking for.   
 However, despite these limitations, Tiebout’s model still provides an understanding of 
how decentralized government decision making and heterogeneous public policy across a large 
number of smaller jurisdictions can improve public sector efficiency.  Another advantage of 
Tiebout’s model is that it provides an understanding of how a congregation of tastes and 
preferences for pubic goods and services may occur.  Over time citizens could congregate 
within geographically distinct regions, and geographical based heterogeneity of taste and 
preferences strengthens the case for differentiated delivery of public goods and services (Oates, 
1972; Wallis and Oates, 1988).     
 
1.2.3. Constraining the Leviathan (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) 
 
The next pivotal piece of work comes from Brennan and Buchanan (1980).  In depicting the 
central government as a revenue-maximising leviathan, Brennan and Buchanan suggest that 
competition between local governments for a mobile tax base can reduce tax rates and constrain 
the leviathan.   
 Brennan and Buchanan consider a monolithic government that seeks to exploit its 
citizens through higher tax rates.  This view runs counter to the Pigovian public finance view 
that governments are benevolent, and set tax rates and expenditures in the interests of all who 
are governed.  Instead, the central government functions in the same way a monopolist would 
function in the private sector.  If the central government faces no constraints, i.e. competition 
for taxable subjects, then it could seek to maximise tax revenues, operating at the peak of the 
Laffer curve (Cowley and Sobel, 2011).   
 If the assumption of the monolithic central government holds, the question then is how 
the central government can be constrained when it seeks to maximise revenue.  One view is 
that the decentralization of tax and expenditure decision making to local governments can 
reduce tax rates through tax competition.  As Tiebout (1956) demonstrates, when local 
governments are responsible for setting public policy, citizens are empowered to choose to 
locate where their welfare is maximised.  Treisman (2007) sums this point up, where subjects 
can be taxed anywhere by the central government, regardless of where the subjects (citizens, 
capital), reside.  On the other hand, subnational and local governments must consider the 
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potential outflow of taxable subjects (citizens and capital), as a consequence of local tax policy.  
Subnational and local governments must consider the elasticity of the tax base when deciding 
the optimal level of taxation.  The effect is stronger as functions are devolved to the most local 
government tier, as citizens can move more easily between local jurisdictions. 
 Essentially, the mobility of citizens acts to constrain the leviathan government, and 
leads to lower taxation overall.  This is demonstrated in a simple model below: 
 
The Leviathan Model: 
A government seeks to maximise tax revenue, where total revenue is a function of the tax rate 
‘𝜏’, and the tax base to which it is applied ‘𝐵’.  A government seeks to maximise revenue, 
which depends on the tax rates and the tax base.   
 
𝑅 = 𝜏𝐵(𝜏) 1.5 
 
The tax base ‘𝐵’ is a function of the tax rate – the Laffer curve.  There exists an optimal level 
of taxation ‘𝜏∗’ where tax revenue is maximised, ‘𝑅∗’.  When the tax rate is lower, tax revenue 
is also reduced.  However, as the tax rate increases, the tax base shrinks.  The change in tax 
revenue depends on two forces: the increase in the tax rate, the reduction in the tax base.  The 
tax base as a function of the tax rate, is modelled below: 
 
𝐵 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜏 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛼 > 0, 𝛽 < 0 
1.6 
 
There exists a tax base that is independent of the level of taxation ‘𝛼’. However, the rest of the 
tax base is dependent on the tax level, to the coefficient ‘𝛽’, which represents the elasticity of 
the tax base to the tax rate.  As β declines, the elasticity of the tax base to the tax raise increases.  
As ‘𝛽’ nears 0, the tax base is more inelastic.  Below is the optimal solution to this problem: 
 
𝑅 = 𝜏(𝛼 + 𝛽𝜏) 1.7 
𝑅 = 𝛼𝜏 + 𝛽𝜏2 1.8 
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝜏
= 𝛼 + 2𝛽𝜏 
1.9 
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝜏
= 0 
1.10 
17 | P a g e  
 
𝜏∗ = −
𝛼
2𝛽
 
1.11 
 
The more responsive the tax base is to changes in the tax rate, captured in 𝛽, the lower the 
optimal tax rate 𝜏∗ will be.  The sensitivity of the tax base to changes in the tax rate will depend 
on the degree of mobility of taxable subjects.  Therefore, fiscal decentralization would be 
associated with a higher value of 𝛽, and consequently, a lower value of 𝜏∗.  Hence, fiscal 
decentralization is associated with lower taxes, all other things equal. 
 
Brennan and Buchanan demonstrate that competition between subnational governments can 
ultimately lead to lower taxes.  Should Oates (1972) and Tiebout’s (1956) theories hold, then 
decentralized governments should produce a more efficient outcome for the public sector, 
which should also lead to lower taxes.  Brennan and Buchanan also provide an argument for 
subnational governments to have autonomy over tax, specifically, the tax rates in their 
jurisdiction (for one or any number of taxes). 
 
1.2.4. The Accountability of Local Governments 
 
Some of the more recent work in the decentralization literature has focused on alternate 
incentives for local governments.  In the absence of perfect mobility of citizens, or even if we 
assume that citizens are unable to move at all, other incentives may be created through fiscal 
decentralization that will produce a more efficient public sector.  In the next two sub-sections I 
consider the direct accountability of local governments to local citizens. 
By definition, fiscal decentralization would not only empower citizens to discipline 
governments through mobility, but in the absence of costless mobility, fiscal decentralization 
also empowers citizens to elect, or dismiss (reject), local governments.  As Seabright (1996) 
explains, Tiebout’s argument does not necessarily require fiscal decentralization.  However, 
fiscal decentralization does require that local governments are accountable to local citizens, and 
consequently, local governments face incentives to respond to the preferences of local citizens.  
Prud’homme (1995) points out that in order for local governments to have an incentive to satisfy 
local preference (of local citizens), they must first be accountable to them.  As Tanzi (1996) 
and Treisman (2007) point out, it is a condition of fiscal decentralization that local governments 
are directly accountable to the subset of the population for which they must govern   Finally, 
Faguet (2014) summarises this point: that electoral accountability changes the incentives that 
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public officials face at the local government level.  In the absence of direct accountability 
between local citizens (target of policy) and local government (deciders of policy), local 
governments would instead be accountable to central government, which would defeat the 
purpose of fiscal decentralization. 
On the other hand, the central government is not direct accountability to any local 
jurisdiction, and the centralization of government decision making could lead to “policies that 
are regionally more uniform than decentralized ones” (Seabright, 1996: 63).  Seabright provides 
a theoretical model to demonstrate this point, which I have outlined below: 
 
The Model: 
The economy contains ‘N’ jurisdictions, from 𝑖 =  1, … . , 𝑁.  The citizens living in each 
jurisdiction elect either a local government in each jurisdiction (decentralized government), or 
a single central government that covers all jurisdictions.  Once elected, governments implement 
a policy set: 𝑥 =  {𝑥1 … . 𝑥𝑛} for their respective jurisdictions.     
The welfare of the local citizen is defined below as a function of the policy set in the 
jurisdiction they occupy, and a shock specific to that local area, so that 𝑈𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦𝑖).  Citizens 
cannot control the set of policies in their jurisdiction directly, but will determine the decisions 
that governments made through the government objective function.   
 The government objective function depends on the cost (disutility) of effort and the 
reward of being elected.  Effort is a function of the policy set within the jurisdictions for which 
that government is responsible, local or central, and can be understood in literal terms (a harder 
working government means better quality public services) and could also refer to the foregoing 
of private interests (Seabright, 1996: 69).  The marginal disutility with respect to effort is 
constant across central and local governments (therefore there are no economies of scale).  The 
reward for being in (or retaining) office is denoted as 𝑊 for local governments, and 𝛼𝑊 for 
central governments, where 𝛼 >  1.  This means that the reward for occupying central office 
is greater than for local office.  The objective functions for the governments are:  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙: 𝑉𝑖(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑊 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑, 𝑉𝑖(𝑥𝑖) 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑡  1.12 
𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙: 𝑉(𝑥) + 𝛼𝑊 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑, 𝑉(𝑥) 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑡  1.13 
 
As Seabright points out, by making re-election contingent on the welfare of citizens, either at 
the local or national levels, politicians are motivated to serve their citizens.  However, welfare 
also depends on the shocks, which are assumed to be additive so that citizen welfare is: 
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𝑈𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦𝑖) = 𝑈𝑖(𝑥)+𝑦𝑖 1.14 
 
The range of 𝑦 = {𝑦1 … . , 𝑦𝑖 … . , 𝑦𝑛} and the range of shocks are assumed to be distributed with 
a joint density of 𝐷(𝑦).  Citizens do not observe the values of the policy set (𝑥𝑖).  Instead citizens 
have an expectation of welfare that must be met for them to re-elect the incumbent government 
(referred to ‘𝐶’).  We may think of ‘𝐶’ as the expected welfare from the alternative government 
in waiting.  The value of ‘𝐶’ could also be determined by the performance of local governments 
in neighbouring jurisdictions (yardstick competition).  I go into this later in sub section 1.2.5, 
and for this research the determination of ‘𝐶’ is unimportant.  As 𝐶 is increasing, the effort 
required from the incumbent to be re-elected will also need to increase, which means better 
welfare for citizens.   
 The election or dismissal of the incumbent depends on whether there is a local 
government in each jurisdiction or an all-encompassing central government.  If the welfare of 
local citizens falls short of the deterministic reservation level of 𝐶, then the incumbent can be 
replaced by the rival party through the local election.  However, if there is a central government, 
a sufficient number of the population also want to eject the central government.  In the case of 
a local government, the local citizens must be satisfied (𝑈𝑖(𝑥) + 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝐶).  In the event that the 
local citizens are satisfied, this is denoted 𝑠𝑖.   
 
𝑠𝑖 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑈𝑖(𝑥) + 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝐶 
𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝐶 − 𝑈𝑖(𝑥) 
1.15 
 
If there are no shocks, then for the local government to be re-elected, the utility of local citizens 
must be at least equal to the value of ‘𝐶’.   
The problem faced by the central government is different however.  For the central 
government to be re-elected, a sufficient number of the local jurisdictions must be satisfied with 
the central governments performance.  This is denoted by 𝑆𝐾, the equivalent of 𝑠𝑖 for local 
governments, when K of N jurisdictions are satisfied.     
 Therefore, the problems faced by the local government and central government in two 
scenarios are to choose the policy set (𝑥) maximise the following: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 ∶        𝐸[𝑉𝑖(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑊] = 𝑉𝑖(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑊. 𝑝𝑟[𝑠𝑖] 1.16 
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𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 ∶       𝐸[𝑉(𝑥) + 𝛼𝑊] = 𝑉(𝑥) + 𝛼𝑊. 𝑝𝑟[𝑆𝐾] 1.17 
 
Therefore, the local government chooses the policy set 𝑥𝑖, so that:  
 
−
𝑑𝑉𝑖
𝑑𝑥𝑖
= 𝑊
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑥𝑖
 . 𝐷(𝑦𝑖) 
1.18 
 
𝐷(𝑦𝑖) is the marginal density of 𝑦𝑖 evaluated at 𝐶 − 𝑈𝑖(𝑥).  Therefore, the local government 
chooses 𝑥𝑖 so that the marginal disutility from effort exerted as a result of a change in policy is 
equal to the reward of retaining or winning government in the local jurisdiction, times by the 
marginal increase in the probability of being re-elected.  The marginal increase in the 
probability of re-election depends on the marginal utility with respect to the local policy, and 
for each unit increase in the locality’s welfare, the increase in probability that, when shock 𝑦𝑖 
is realised, locality i’s welfare will exceed the deterministic value of ‘C’ – the benchmark 
welfare. 
 
The solution for the central government is as follows: 
 
−
𝑑𝑉𝑖
𝑑𝑥𝑖
= 𝛼𝑊
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑥𝑖
 . 𝐷(𝑦𝑖)Π𝑖 + 𝛼𝑊 ∑
𝑑𝑈𝑗
𝑑𝑥𝑖
.
𝑗
𝐷(𝑦𝑗)Π𝑗  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 
Π𝑖 = (𝑝𝑟[𝑆𝑖
𝐾−1|𝑠𝑖] − 𝑝𝑟[𝑠𝑖
𝐾|−𝑠𝑖]) 
Π𝑗 = (𝑝𝑟[𝑆𝑗
𝐾−1|𝑠𝑗] − 𝑝𝑟[𝑠𝑗
𝐾|−𝑠𝑗]) 
1.19 
 
Π𝑖 and Π𝑖 denote the importance of support from that jurisdiction in order for incumbent in 
central government to be re-elected.  The term (𝑝𝑟[𝑆𝑖
𝐾−1|𝑠𝑖] − 𝑝𝑟[𝑠𝑖
𝐾|−𝑠𝑖]) is the probability 
the central government will be re-elected when it obtains the support of the local jurisdiction 
‘i’ minus the probability it will be elected without the support of local jurisdiction ‘i’.  The 
second term represents the same calculation for all other jurisdictions ‘j’. 
 
The key difference between the two functions faced by a local government and the central 
government is the probability of being re-elected.  In the case of the local government, this 
depends on density of 𝑦𝑖, or simply the locality specific shock that is the gap between the utility 
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of citizens in the local jurisdiction and the minimum they would demand from the local 
government.  In the absence of shocks, the utility of the incumbent is directly related to the 
utility of citizens.  Hence local government is directly accountable to local citizens and their 
corresponding welfare.   
The problem for the central government is different.  Whilst the central government 
(incumbent) must also attain sufficient support to be re-elected, it does not require the support 
of every locality to do so, or rather, any particular locality to do so.  Instead the central 
government must weigh up the importance of a particular localities support against the 
remaining localities.  The central government sets public policy (𝑥𝑖) so that the disutility of 
effort is equal to the value of winning the election (𝛼𝑊) and the marginal increase in probability 
of being re-elected.  As explained above, the second item in function (1.19) contains the relative 
importance of each jurisdiction on the central government’s re-election chances.   
To conclude, the central government is not directly accountable to any single 
jurisdiction.  However, in the event that jurisdictions have different weights with respect to the 
central government’s re-election chances, then the central government has an incentive to 
improve the welfare of that jurisdiction more than any other jurisdiction.  If we consider an 
extreme example, whereby there is one jurisdiction of many who must deliver support for the 
incumbent to be re-elected, the central government will prioritise the welfare of that jurisdiction 
above all the other jurisdictions.       
 Seabright’s model demonstrates that local governments elected by local citizens have 
an incentive to improve the welfare of local citizens.  In order to improve the welfare of local 
citizens, local governments must consider the preferences of local citizens, and match those 
preferences with a set of local policies, 𝑥𝑖.  Hence, fiscal decentralization provides incentives 
for governments to know the preferences of local citizens more than the centralized 
government.   
 This particular finding is important for understanding how fiscal decentralization may 
induce a more efficient set of public policies for a range of demands across many jurisdictions.  
One area of the decentralization literature contends that local governments have an 
informational advantage over central government, where local governments possess greater 
knowledge of local demands.   
On the other hand, a central government does not face the same incentives that local 
governments do to differentiate public goods and services between regions.  Tabellini (2000) 
touches on this point as well.  The central government’s performance depends on public policy 
for the collective of localities.  Tabellini explains that “this weakens the incentives to perform 
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well, since there is a smaller link between effort and rewards” (page 6).  However, central office 
is more prestigious, more powerful and the incentives (rewards) for re-election are greater at 
the national level than the local level.   
  
1.2.5. Yardstick Competition 
 
The Seabright model demonstrates that when local governments must obtain the support of 
local citizens to be re-elected, incentives exist for local government to match local preferences.  
However, the effort required by the local politician to be re-elected depends not only on the 
effort that the local politician puts in (to provide public goods, services), but also on the 
expectations of local citizens.  It is important to consider how local citizens arrive at their 
expectations of local government performance.  One idea is that local citizens base their 
expectations on the performance of local governments of neighbouring jurisdictions.   
Besley and Case (1995) present the theory of yardstick competition6 in the context of 
the decentralized public sector, whereby citizens compare the performance of local 
governments that face identical cost curves.  Consequently, citizens create expectations of what 
their local government should provide, and at what cost. 
The basic model assumes that local governments are tasked with providing a particular 
public good or service to local citizens.  To provide this service they must raise their own 
revenue from taxes on the local citizens.  Besley and Case consider a problem of asymmetric 
information, where local governments are aware of the cost of provision, but the citizens are 
not.  There are two types of government: i) benevolent government that charges exactly what it 
costs to provide the public service to local citizens, and ii) rent seeking government that seeks 
to exploit local citizens by charging more than the cost of providing the service.  Citizens must 
decide whether to re-elect or not the current incumbent, and the incumbent desires to be re-
elected (same as the reward from the previous model).   
Yardstick competition provides a means for citizens to discipline inefficient 
governments, even when citizens are immobile.  In previous models, local governments would 
compete for mobile citizens through expenditure (Tiebout, 1956) and tax (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980).  However, if citizens are immobile (or not perfectly mobile) they can simply 
dismiss an inefficient local government.  Citizens can identify inefficient government by 
comparing the performance of different local governments. 
                                                 
6 See Shleifer (1985) for the idea of yardstick competition, specifically regarding franchise monopolies.   
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 Yardstick competition is likely to face some complications in practice.  Besley and Case 
(1995) present a robust model that considers different parameter values (i.e. the probability that 
the government is good or bad, or the probability of different cost shocks).  Also, the cost of 
provision may not be identical between different governments.  However, even if the cost of 
provision is not identical between local governments, either between two neighbouring 
jurisdictions or two neighbouring countries, the similarity in certain characteristics: size, 
population, location and so forth, will be much greater between local governments.  Essentially, 
yardstick competition provides another incentive for local governments to be more efficient, 
even when citizens are not mobile.  Local governments will be under pressure to deliver goods 
and services at minimum cost if citizens have higher expectations.  Those expectations will 
depend in part on the performance of other local governments.   
The accountability of local governments to local citizens may enhance welfare not 
simply by improving the responsiveness of government to local needs and preferences, but also 
by disciplining governments against corrupt behaviour.  As Seabright explains, ‘effort’ is not 
defined simply as the hard work of local politicians, but is also defined as the foregoing of rents 
that could be extracted from the local citizens.  Therefore, higher effort means less corruption.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) define corruption as the sale of government property by government 
officials for personal gain.  Boadway and Shah (2009) explain that the propensity for corruption 
depends on the benefits (rents to be extracted) and the costs of corruption (risk of being caught, 
losing the election).   
 Fiscal decentralization increases the ability of citizens to monitor government activity 
(Boadway and Shah, 2009) and Lin and Lou (2000) cite one advantage of fiscal 
decentralization, where local citizens are better able to monitor the actions of local 
governments, as opposed to central government.  Hence, fiscal decentralization increases the 
risk of exposure of corrupt activity (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  If government is more efficient 
when decentralized, and waste and inefficiency reduce the risk of exposure (spotting 
corruption), then there is less of an opportunity to hide corrupt activity (Fan et al. 2009).  To 
conclude, Besley and Case model demonstrates that bad governments will have an incentive to 
behave, charging citizens the cost of provision, rather than the cost plus additional rents that 
they would seek to extract. 
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1.2.6. A Summary of the Case for Fiscal Decentralization 
 
When citizen’s preferences for public goods and services are heterogeneous across the country, 
government should seek to allocate resources efficiently by matching provision of public goods 
and services to demands for them, at the local level.  In section 1.2 I proposed several arguments 
for why fiscal decentralization may be necessary to produce a more efficient public sector.  
These arguments are summarised below: 
i) When there are no economies of scale, and no externalities, the decentralization of 
provision of public goods and services to a population with heterogeneous demands 
will improve public sector efficiency (Oates, 1972) 
ii) When local governments provide public goods and services, citizens can choose the 
local jurisdiction that best matches their preferences (Tiebout, 1956) 
iii) When local governments are responsible for setting tax rates, citizens can move to 
the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rates.  Consequently, fiscal decentralization 
reduces excessive tax rates that would otherwise be set by a revenue-maximising 
central government (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) 
iv) When local governments are elected by local citizens, local governments have direct 
incentives to provide public policy specific to local needs (Seabright, 1996) 
v) When local government are elected by local citizens, citizens are empowered to 
compare the performance of local governments that could face similar costs for 
provision.  Consequently, citizens can dismiss inefficient local governments (Besley 
and Case, 1995) 
 
1.3. The Dangers of Fiscal Decentralization 
 
In section 1.2 I explained the key arguments in favour of fiscal decentralization.  Each of the 
arguments demonstrated how fiscal decentralization could be welfare enhancing, either by 
improving the allocation of public expenditures (Oates, 1972), enabling citizens to maximise 
their own welfare by moving to the region that best suits their preferences (Tiebout, 1956), by 
moving to an area that charges the lowest taxes (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), and by holding 
local governments to account through local elections (Seabright, 1996) and yardstick 
competition (Besley and Case, 1995).  Local governments could address the needs of local 
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citizens in a way that central government either could not, or would not, due to the lack of 
incentives to do so.  The result was a more efficient provision of public expenditures.   
 In this section I consider the dangers associated with fiscal decentralization.  
Specifically, I consider the adverse consequences of a shift from centralized government and 
national welfare to local government and local welfare.  A number of studies have developed 
on the basic ideas above, such as mobility and local governments addressing local welfare, and 
raised potential downsides of such behaviour.  Basically, if the aim of fiscal decentralization is 
to encourage local decision making, this may not always produce desirable results.  In this 
section I outline some of potential downsides of decentralization: 
i) Fiscal decentralization leading to sub-optimal taxation of capital and sub-optimal 
provision of public goods (Hoyt, 1991) 
ii) Fiscal decentralization leading to vertical tax externalities and overgrazing, where 
different tiers of government tax the same subjects (citizens, capital).  The 
consequence of this could include higher taxes overall (Keen and Kotsogiannis, 
2004; Treisman, 2007) 
iii) Fiscal decentralization changing the composition of government expenditure, with 
higher spending on productivity enhancing goods and services, and less on non-
productive public spending (Keen and Marchand, 1997) 
iv) Fiscal decentralization leading to inter-regional inequality, in tax, spending and 
productivity (Cai and Treisman, 2005)  
v) Fiscal decentralization and sub-optimal provision of public goods that exhibit 
positive externalities (Besley and Coate, 2003) 
 
1.3.1. Fiscal Decentralization and Sub-Optimal Taxation 
 
In the first paper, Hoyt 1991 considers the effects of fiscal decentralization on the taxation of 
capital used to finance government spending at the local level.  When local governments have 
autonomy over tax functions, and must finance their own expenditures in the local jurisdiction, 
fiscal decentralization can lead to fiscal competition between local governments for mobile 
factors (such as capital).  Local governments must maximise tax revenue (and consequently 
spending) according to the decisions made by other local governments.  Essentially, 
optimisation depends on the response of other local governments to the choices one local 
government makes (Treisman, 2007).  This is referred to as a horizontal tax externality, when 
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the actions of one local government have an effect on other local governments.  Though similar 
competition occurs between countries at the international level, fiscal decentralization and the 
competition between local governments will be more intense as the factors of production and 
the subjects of taxation are increasingly mobile.   
 The work of Hoyt (1991) demonstrate that fiscal decentralization, leading to fiscal 
competition for mobile capital, results in sub-optimal taxation on capital and an under-provision 
of public good(s).  Therefore, fiscal decentralization could have a negative effect on citizen 
welfare. 
 
The Model: 
An economy consists of a large number of identical jurisdictions.  Each jurisdiction has a single 
local government and a single representative citizen.  The government is assumed to be 
benevolent, seeking to maximise the welfare of the citizen.  Production is determined by a single 
input, capital, with a strictly increasing and concave production function.  Output in the 
jurisdiction depends on the capital located in that jurisdiction.  Investors choose to move capital 
to the jurisdiction that provides the highest post-tax return to capital.  As all jurisdictions are 
identical, the post-tax return to capital will be equal across all jurisdictions.  There is a fixed 
stock of capital in the economy, K, and the amount of capital located in each jurisdiction, k, is 
equal across all jurisdictions.  The share of capital located in one jurisdiction then is the total 
stock of capital divided by the number of jurisdictions, N. 
 
𝜌𝑖 = 𝐹
′(𝑘𝑖) − 𝜏𝑖 1.2 
𝑡𝑖 = 𝑡𝑗 ∴ 𝜌𝑖 = 𝜌𝑗 = 𝝆 ∴ 𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘𝑗 =
?̅?
𝑁
= 𝑚 
1.21 
∑ 𝑘𝑖 = 𝐾 
1.22 
 
The citizen’s utility function is assumed to be concave for two goods, a private good (x) and a 
public good (g).   
 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖, 𝑔𝑖) 1.23 
 
The utility function for the citizen in jurisdiction ‘i’ is function of the private good and public 
good produced in jurisdiction ‘i’, hence there are no externalities.  Each citizen receives an 
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income from two sources: i) income on local rents to the fixed factor in the jurisdiction (output 
minus the gross return to capital), ii) return to the share of capital located in the jurisdiction.  
The consumption of the public good is equal to its provision, where the public good is financed 
through taxes set by the local jurisdiction, on the stock of capital located in the jurisdiction.   
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑: 𝑥𝑖 = 𝐹(𝑘𝑖) − (𝜌𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖)𝑘𝑖 + 𝑚 ∗ (𝜌
?̅?
𝑁
) 
1.24 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑: 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖𝑘𝑖 1.25 
 
For the local government to increase the production (and consumption) of the public good (g), 
it must increase tax revenue.  The local government cannot attract further capital to the region 
as capital is distributed evenly between all the jurisdictions (function 1.21).  Therefore, the 
government must increase the tax rate on capital.  As a consequence of an increase in tax on 
capital, capital will flow out of the jurisdiction.  Below are the effects of an increase in tax on 
capital on the provision of the private good and the public good: 
 
𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑡𝑖
= −𝑘𝑖 1.26 
𝑑𝑔𝑖
𝑑𝑡𝑖
= 𝑘𝑖 [1 + (1 − 𝑚)𝑡𝑖
𝑘𝑖
′
𝑘𝑖
] 1.27 
𝑑𝑔𝑖
𝑑𝑡𝑖
𝑑𝑥𝑖
𝑑𝑡𝑖
= − [1 + (1 − 𝑚)𝑡𝑖
𝑘𝑖
′
𝑘𝑖
] < −1 1.28 
 
In function 1.26 an increase in taxation leads to a fall in private consumption to the value of the 
capital stock in the jurisdiction.  In function 1.27 an increase in taxation on capital leads to an 
increase in public consumption, but by a value less than ‘𝑘𝑖’
7.  Finally, the trade-off between 
private consumption and public consumption as a result of a change in tax (function 1.28) is 
less than unity.  This is because a tax increase leads to a shrink in the capital stock located in 
the jurisdiction, thereby reducing the tax base.  The increase in the tax rate on capital is offset 
by a capital outflow from the jurisdiction, which results in a rate of substitution between the 
                                                 
7 This is due the elasticity of capital demand effect, denoted in 
𝑘𝑖
′
𝑘𝑖
< 0 
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public good and the private good of less than -1.  Therefore, the tax rate on capital and the 
provision of the public good are sub-optimal: 
i) Tax rate and tax revenue is inefficiently low due to the competition effect 
ii) Due to lower tax revenues (than cooperative equilibrium), the provision of public 
good (g) is sub-optimal 
 To conclude, Hoyt’s model, though restricted by several assumptions, demonstrates that 
local governments face a problem that central governments do not: the mobility problem.  Local 
governments are constrained by the mobility of capital, and the loss of capital and production 
with higher tax rates.  The final solution shows that the marginal utility from extra consumption 
of public goods would be greater than the marginal utility from extra consumption of private 
goods, therefore the Pareto optimal set of private and public goods cannot be obtained in a 
decentralised setting.   
 
1.3.2. Fiscal Decentralization and Vertical Tax Competition 
 
In 1.3.1 I outlined the problem of the horizontal tax externality resulting from competition for 
mobile capital leading to a sub-optimal provision of public goods in each jurisdiction (and 
relative to the centralization scenario).  In 1.3.2 I outline the problem of the vertical tax 
externality, where local government and central government tax the same subjects, leading to a 
rivalry between subnational governments and the central government and the problems that 
arise from that.  In practice, fiscal decentralization does not simply lead to interactions between 
subnational governments, but also interactions between subnational governments and the 
central government (Treisman, 2007).   
 The problems that arise from vertical tax externalities are two-fold.  First, subnational 
governments and central government are now taxing the same subject (capital or citizens).  This 
can lead to a problem known as over-grazing, whereby the combined taxes of government on a 
single taxable source can exceed the tax that would be levied by a single central government.  
Therefore, vertical tax externalities could lead to over-taxation, rather than lower taxation 
observed in section 1.3.1.  This will be demonstrated below.  Second, the central government 
will now receive lower tax revenues than it would in a fully centralized scenario.  This effect is 
greater as the taxes levied by subnational governments increases (Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2004; 
Brulhart and Jametti, 2006).  The taxes levied by the subnational government can crowd out the 
federal government.     
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The Model: 
The basic model follows an economy with two identical jurisdictions: 𝑖 =  1, 2.  There is a total 
amount of capital in the economy: ?̅?, and the amount of capital invested in a particular 
jurisdiction is 𝑘𝑖.  Output (income) in each jurisdiction is a function of capital, and is strictly 
increasing and concave in capital, 𝑘𝑖. 
There are two scenarios: i) a centralized government, and ii) a decentralized government 
featuring one central government and two jurisdictional governments.  In the first scenario, the 
unitary government levies a common tax rate on taxable subjects of  𝑇 ∈  [0, 𝜏̅], where 𝜏̅ is the 
maximum tax rate.  In the second scenario, jurisdictional governments levy their own tax rate, 
𝑡𝑖 ∈  [0, 𝜏̅].  Unlike the Hoyt (1991) scenario, whereby there is no central government and 
jurisdictions compete horizontally, Treisman (2007)8 introduces a central government, which 
levies a tax alongside the jurisdictional tax of, 𝑇1 ∈  [0, 𝜏̅].  In the decentralized setting, there is 
an aggregated tax rate in each jurisdiction: 𝑇𝑖  +  𝑡𝑖  ≤  𝜏̅.  The objective of government is to 
maximise tax revenue, i.e. the Laffer curve, which depends on the output in a given jurisdiction.  
Output, as in previous models, depends on the capital located and the aggregate tax rate in the 
local jurisdiction: 
 
𝑓𝑖(𝑘𝑖, 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑇) = (1 − 𝑡𝑖 − 𝑇)𝛼𝑘𝑖 − 𝛽𝑘𝑖
2) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, 2 1.29 
 
Output is declining with taxation, where taxation is now made up of two taxes: one levied by 
the jurisdictional government (𝑡𝑖) and one levied by the central government (𝑇).  Tax revenue 
for either the local government or central government is the tax rate levied by that government, 
and the output function.  Output for the central government is the aggregate output across the 
two jurisdictions, or simply  𝑓(?̅?, 𝑡, 𝑇) 
 
𝑅𝑐 = 𝑇. 𝑓(?̅?, 𝑡, 𝑇) 1.30 
𝑅𝑖 =. 𝑡𝑖. 𝑓(𝑘𝑖, 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑇) 1.31 
 
Now let’s consider the two scenarios: a fully centralized government, and a decentralized 
government, and the optimal tax rates: 
 
Scenario 1: under centralization, the central government chooses 𝑇 to maximise 
                                                 
8 And similar work by Keen and Kotosgiannis (2004); Brulhart and Jametti, 2006 
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𝑇(1 − 𝑇)(𝛼𝑘1 − 𝛽𝑘1
2 + 𝛼𝑘2 − 𝛽𝑘2
2) 1.32 
 
As jurisdictions are identical, the capital located in each jurisdiction is exactly 𝑘1
∗ = 𝑘2
∗ =
1
2
, 
therefore the optimal tax rate, 𝑇∗, levied by the central government, must be 0.5. 
 
Scenario 2: under a decentralized government, where taxes are set simultaneously (Cournot-
Nash equilibrium), jurisdictional governments and the central government must set their own 
tax rates in response to the expected tax rates of the other parties.  First, the jurisdictional 
governments must set the jurisdictional tax rate to maximise 
 
𝑡𝑖(1 − 𝑡𝑖 − 𝑇)(𝛼𝑘𝑖 − 𝛽𝑘𝑖
2) 1.32 
 
Subject to the mobility of capital:  
 
(1 − 𝑡1 − 𝑇)𝑓𝑘(𝑘1
∗, 𝑡1 + 𝑇) = (1 − 𝑡2 − 𝑇)𝑓𝑘(𝑘2
∗, 𝑡2 + 𝑇) 1.33 
 
Given that both jurisdictions are identical to one another, which means that 𝑡1
∗ = 𝑡2
∗ = 𝑡∗ and 
𝑘1
∗ = 𝑘2
∗ =
1
2
, the first order condition for the local government is… 
 
𝑡∗ =
(1 − 𝑇)(2𝛼𝛽 − 𝛽2)
2𝛼2
 1.34 
 
Therefore, the optimal tax rate for the local government depends negatively on the central 
government tax rate, 𝑇.  Hence competition exists between the central and local governments.  
This competition, referred to as vertical tax competition, demonstrates that different tiers of 
government are competing to extract tax revenue from the same taxable subjects.  In this 
example, capital is taxed, but the same rule would apply to any mobile subject. 
Furthermore, vertical competition could have an effect on total taxation.  Following on 
from function (1.34), the central government must maximise revenue according to the following 
function: 
 
𝑇1𝑓1(𝑘1
∗, 𝑡1 + 𝑇1) + 𝑇2𝑓2(𝑘2
∗, 𝑡2 + 𝑇2) 1.35 
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As the central government would set taxes equal in each jurisdiction, so that 𝑇1 = 𝑇2, the first 
order condition for the central government is… 
 
𝑇∗ =
(1 − 𝑡∗)
2
 1.36 
Therefore, when 𝑡 > 0, the aggregate tax rate, 𝑇𝑖 + 𝑡𝑖 > 1/2.  What this means is that even 
though horizontal competition can reduce tax rates, as observed in Hoyt (1991), following on 
from the Leviathan hypothesis of Brennan and Buchanan (1980), vertical tax competition can 
lead to greater levels of taxation than a fully centralized government setting a single (uniform) 
tax rate on taxable subjects.  Hence, the over-grazing effect means that decentralization could 
in fact lead to greater taxation by an aggregate of subnational and central governments.  
Furthermore, function 1.36 demonstrates that the central government is responsive to taxes 
levied by the state, so 𝑡 > 0, the tax levied by the central government must be 𝑇 < 1/2, 
therefore less than the 0.5, the tax that would be levied by the central government in a fully 
centralized government.   
   
1.3.3. Fiscal Decentralization and the Composition of Expenditure 
 
Local governments may compete for capital through expenditure, as well as taxation.  Keen and 
Marchand (1997) investigate the effects of competition between local governments on the 
composition of expenditure at the local level.  In their model, Keen and Marchand distinguish 
between two types of public goods:  
i) Consumption items that enter the citizen utility function directly (denoted g), and 
includes items such as recreational facilities and social services.  ‘G’ may also refer 
to “redistributional payments” (34) 
ii) Productivity enhancing government expenditure (infrastructure etc.) (denoted p) 
Keen and Marchand consider how competition between local governments may lead to higher 
spending on infrastructure, and less on consumption items (e.g. parks and recreational facilities) 
and on redistribution.   
 I summarise their model below and the key finding on the composition of government 
spending at the local level.  For this model, I ignore subscripts. 
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The Model: 
The economy contains many identical jurisdictions, each containing a single government and 
single representative citizen.  The government is assumed to be benevolent, seeking to 
maximise the utility of the local citizen (1.37) according to a budget constraint (1.38) 
 
𝑈(𝑥 − 𝛼(𝐿), 𝐺) 1.37 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑥 = (𝑤 − 𝑡)𝐿 + (1 − 𝜃)𝑅 + 𝜌𝑘 1.38 
𝑉(𝑤 − 𝑡, 𝐺, 𝑀) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑀 = (1 − 𝜃)𝑅 + 𝜌𝑘) 
1.39 
 
Utility is increasing with the consumption of the private good (x), the public good (g), and the 
labour supplied (with 𝛼 capturing the disutility of Labour).  The budget constraint defines the 
consumption of the private good (𝑥) according to 3 income sources: i) disposable income, ii) 
post-tax income received from local rents (R), iii) return on capital endowment for citizen.   This 
gives the indirect utility function ‘𝑉’, which depends on the disposable income, the publicly 
provided public good) and additional income obtained from local rents (post tax) and return on 
the capital endowment of the citizen, denoted 𝑀 in function 1.39, which is the private income 
of the individual.   
 Output in the jurisdiction is produced through three inputs: capital, labour and 
productivity enhancing government spending (p).  Production is strictly increasing and concave 
for capital and labour and all factors are complimentary.  The employment of factors labour and 
capital are such that the marginal cost is equal to the marginal product.  Finally, the employment 
of Labour meets the market clearing condition: 
 
𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑃) 1.40 
𝑤 = 𝐹𝐿(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑃) = 𝑀𝑃𝐿 1.41 
𝜌 + 𝑡 = 𝐹𝑘(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑃) = 𝑀𝑃𝐾 1.42 
𝐿(𝑤 − 𝑡) = 𝐷(𝑟, 𝑤, 𝑃) 1.43 
 
The public sector’s revenue constraint is the total spending on public good (G) and productivity 
enhancing expenditure (P) must be equal to the three sources of government revenue: i) tax on 
labour (t), ii) tax on capital (𝜏), and iii) tax on rents (𝜃): 
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𝑃 + 𝐺 = 𝑡𝐿 + 𝑇𝑘 + 𝜏𝑅 1.44 
 
The objective of the government is to maximise welfare according to the five controllable 
variables: two forms of expenditure (P, G) and three tax instruments (t, T and τ).  The decisions 
taken by one government do not affect the decisions taken by other governments; however, 
capital is mobile so governments are competing for capital.  The economy wide rate of return 
is fixed at 𝜌.  However, governments do consider the effects of taxation on the equilibrium 
gross wage and the labour market.  The market clearing condition for Labour must hold. 
Using the indirect utility function (1.39), the revenue constraint (1.44), the market 
clearing condition for labour (1.43) and the taxation of rents, the Lagrangean function is below:  
 
max 𝑉(𝑤 − 𝑡, 𝐺, 𝑀)  
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 (𝑡, 𝑇, 𝜏, 𝑃, 𝐺),  
𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝐷𝐿 − 𝐿)  
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 (𝜏̅ − 𝜏) 
1.45 
 
Solving for the F.O.Cs, Keen and Marchand make a proposition that when jurisdictions are 
identical, in the non-cooperative equilibrium, the public good (g) is under provided.  The 
solution9 is outlined below: 
 
𝑉𝑔
𝑉𝑀
= (1 + [
𝑡𝐷𝑤 + 𝑇𝑘𝑤
(1 − 𝜏)𝐿′ − 𝐷𝑤
]
𝐿′
𝐿
)
−1
> 1 
1.46 
 
Function (1.46) shows the MRS between the public good (𝑔) and private income (𝑀) is greater 
than 1, below sub optimal.  The marginal utility with respect to government spending on non-
productive good (𝑔) and the marginal utility of income (𝑀) is greater than 1.  Income (𝑀) 
depends on income from rents and return to capital, which depends on the taxation of rents and 
capital (𝑇, 𝜏).  Hence, the interpretation of 1.46 is that the willingness to pay for further 
government spending (g) exceeds the cost.  Hence government spending on non-productive 
goods is sub-optimal (under-provided).   
                                                 
9 In appendix B, taking the FOC for (g) and for (t), we get the function: 
𝑉𝑔
𝛼
= (1 + (
𝜆
𝜇
)
𝐿′
𝐿
)
−1
.  In appendix A, the 
derived function for 
𝜆
𝜇
=
𝑡𝐷𝑤+𝑇𝐾𝑤
(1−𝜏)𝐿′−𝐷𝑤
.  Function (6.10) is derived.   
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 The conclusion of Keen and Marchand’s model is that the competition for capital is not 
restricted to the revenue side, but also has an effect on expenditure decision making.  The paper 
concludes that welfare could be improved by trading expenditure on productivity enhancing 
public goods for other public goods and services, but only if other subnational governments do 
likewise. 
 
1.3.4. Fiscal Decentralization and Inter-Regional Inequality 
 
In the third paper, Cai and Treisman (2005) removes one of the assumptions from the above 
models, that jurisdictions are identical.  They investigate the effect that interjurisdictional 
differences in endowments (infrastructure, human capital) on local government decision 
making.  I also consider the long-run implications of fiscal decentralization under this scenario. 
 
The Model: 
An economy contains many jurisdictions; however, the jurisdictions are not equal.  Jurisdictions 
are differentiated with respect to their endowments.  Endowments refer to the quality of 
infrastructure, natural resources and human capital.  Jurisdictions are divided into two groups: 
i) those that are well endowed (N) and ii) those that are poorly endowed (M).  Endowments 
enter the production function shown in function 1.47.  Well-endowed regions observe an 
advantage over poorly-endowed regions, where the production of the private good is positively 
associated with existing infrastructure, human capital, natural resources and so forth: 
 
𝐹 = 𝐴𝑁,𝑀𝑘
𝛼𝑝𝛽 1.47 
 
The production of the private good (x) is a function of the endowment, the capital stock in the 
jurisdiction, and government spending on infrastructure (productivity enhancing expenditure, 
like Keen and Marchand, 1997).  The endowment takes one of two values, 𝐴𝑁 𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑀 where 
𝐴𝑁 > 𝐴𝑀.  As the ratio of 
𝐴𝑁
𝐴𝑀
 increases, the productivity advantage of well-endowed units is 
greater.  As with previous papers, there is a finite amount of capital in the economy, such that: 
 
𝐾 = 𝑁𝑘𝑛 + 𝑁𝑘𝑚 1.48 
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Each jurisdiction contains a government seeking to maximise the following objective function, 
which depends on the consumption of two goods.   
 
𝑈 = (1 − 𝑡)𝐹 + 𝜆𝑔 1.49 
 
Utility is a function of private consumption (post-tax) and public consumption, with a 
preference for public consumption denoted by ‘𝜆’10.  As 𝜆 increases, the preference for 
consumption of the public good is greater.  Governments face a simple budget constraint, where 
total spending on investment ‘𝐼𝑖’ and non-productive spending ‘𝑐𝑖’ must equal initial fiscal 
revenues ‘𝑆’ and tax on production: 
 
𝐼 + 𝑐 = 𝑆 + 𝑡𝐹 1.50 
 
Governments seek to maximise the objective function 1.49 according to the budget constraint 
1.50.  Governments recognise that capital is a finite resource and must compete with other local 
governments through taxation and infrastructure investment (which increases the return to 
capital).  Jurisdictions that are well-endowed understand that further spending on infrastructure 
and further increases in capital increase production by more than poorly endowed units.  Cai 
and Treisman (2005) consider two scenarios in their analysis of the endowment effect: 
 
Scenario 1: Capital is immobile 
Previous papers have assumed capital is perfectly mobile; however, Cai and Treisman (2005) 
examine the effects of endowment when capital (𝑘) is fixed in the jurisdiction.  If capital is 
immobile then governments face a simple problem of maximising utility to a fixed level of 
capital.  Therefore, governments must determine the level of spending in both productive (𝑝) 
and non-productive goods (𝑥).  To derive the solution to this problem, the budget constraint 
(function 1.50) is entered into the utility function (function 1.49).  The solution is:  
 
                                                 
10 This model is slightly different to previous papers in that Cai and Treisman (2005) define ‘g’ as either a public 
good provided to increase the welfare of citizens, or as consumption of public funds by public officials seeking to 
improve their own welfare.  This does not change the results of this research however and I interpret g as the 
consumption of the public good (hence government is benevolent).   
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𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐼
= 𝜃 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜃 =
𝜆
[1 + (𝜆 − 1)𝑡]
  1.51 
 
Therefore, the optimal spending on investment depends on the preference factor ‘𝜆’.  As the 
preference for government spending on non-productive items increases, the marginal 
production from an increase in investment must also increase.  Hence function 1.51 
demonstrates the opportunity cost of infrastructure investment with respect to public spending.  
By substituting function 1.51 into the production function 1.47 we can see that the optimal level 
of investment depends on capital stock and the endowment factor of the jurisdiction: 
 
𝐼(?̅?, 𝐴) = (
1
𝜃
𝛽𝐴?̅?𝛼)
1
(1−𝛽)
 1.52 
 
So, the higher the preference (𝜆, captured in 𝜃), the lower the level of investment in the optimal 
solution.  Higher capital stock also increases the incentive to invest in infrastructure and boost 
production (due to the greater marginal productivity from an increase in investment).  This is a 
general finding for all jurisdictions.  However, the key finding is that the effect of the 
endowment.  A higher value of ‘𝐴’ (endowment) increases the value of infrastructure 
investments, and consequently increases total output in the jurisdiction.  The long-term effects 
of this finding will be discussed after scenario 2, when capital is perfectly mobile.   
 
Scenario 2: Capital is mobile 
If capital is mobile, then competition takes place between jurisdictions for the finite stock of 
capital in the economy.  An additional assumption is made in line with Hoyt (1991) that the 
actions of any single jurisdiction have no effect on the economy rate of return to capital.  The 
rate of return to capital is identical between jurisdictions: 
 
𝜌 = (1 − 𝑡)𝐹′(𝑘) 1.53 
 
By substituting the economy-wide return to capital (1.53) into the production function (1.47), 
the allocation of capital in the jurisdiction is determined by the level of infrastructure 
investment, the economy wide rate of return and the endowment: 
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𝑘(𝐼, 𝜌, 𝐴) =  (
1
𝜌
(1 − 𝑡)𝛼𝐴𝐼𝛽)
1
(1−𝛼)
 1.54 
 
Function (1.54) demonstrates that the capital in the jurisdiction is greater when the level of 
investment is higher; when taxation is lower and when the endowment is higher.  Given the rate 
of the economy wide return to capital, the government must choose the level of infrastructure 
investment that maximises the objective function.  The first order condition is shown below 
 
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝐼
+
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝐼
= 𝜃 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜃 =
𝜆
[1 + (𝜆 − 1)𝑡]
  1.55 
 
As with the previous condition when capital is immobile, the optimal investment in 
infrastructure depends on the preference factor in ‘𝜃’.  However, an additional term is included 
in the first order condition when capital is mobile: the positive effect of increasing investment 
on capital allocation in the jurisdiction.  Hence investment in infrastructure not only boosts 
productivity directly (
𝜕𝐹𝑖
𝜕𝐼𝑖
), but also indirectly (
𝜕𝐹𝑖
𝜕𝑘𝑖
𝜕𝑘𝑖
𝜕𝐼𝑖
).  The optimal level of infrastructure 
investment under the condition of mobile capital is highlighted below: 
 
𝐼(𝑘, 𝐴) = (1 − 𝛼)
−[
1
(1−𝛽)
]
(
1
𝜃
𝛽𝐴𝑘𝛼)
1
(1−𝛽)
 1.56 
 
As with the previous finding when capital is immobile (1.52), the investment in infrastructure 
is increasing with the level of capital in the jurisdiction and the endowment factor.  However, 
as a consequence of capital mobility, poorly endowed units will observe lower levels of 
investment than when capital is immobile, as the competitive advantage of the well-endowed 
units leads to unequal distribution of capital between the two groups of jurisdictions.  The 
allocation of capital between well-endowed and poorly endowed units is defined below:   
 
𝐼𝑁
𝐼𝑀
=
𝑘𝑁
𝑘𝑀
= (
𝐴𝑁
𝐴𝑀
)
1
(1−𝛼−𝛽)
 
1.57 
 
The difference in the level of investment between well-endowed jurisdictions and poorly 
endowed jurisdictions depends on the allocation of capital, which depends on the difference in 
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endowment.  The greater the ratio of 𝐴𝑁 to 𝐴𝑀, the greater the inequality in capital and in 
investment levels between the different jurisdictions.  Cai and Treisman (2005) refer to this as 
the polarization effect.  The competition effect, observed in Hoyt (1991) and Keen and 
Marchand (1997) would result in higher levels of investment (or lower taxes in previous papers) 
across all jurisdictions.  However, when jurisdictions are not identical, the inequality in 
endowments has a different effect, leading to higher levels of investment in some jurisdictions 
(those that are well endowed), and lower levels of investment in the remaining jurisdictions 
(those that are poorly endowed).   
 Cai and Treisman (2005) also allude to another consequence of inter-regional 
inequalities in investment and capital stock.  In the long term, infrastructure investment will 
become future endowments.  Therefore, endowments are not fixed through time, but are built 
up over time through further increases in investment.  This means that even a small difference 
in endowments can ultimately lead to much greater differences in investment, productivity and 
production between governments over time (see Boadway and Shah, 2009).   
 
1.3.5. Fiscal Decentralization and Externalities 
 
The existence of externalities may also result in sub-optimal provision of essential public goods 
and services.  Besley and Coate (2003) explain that the problem with devolving the 
responsibility to provide particular goods and services that exhibit externalities is that local 
governments care only for the welfare of local citizens.  Indeed, this is one of the main 
arguments in favour of fiscal decentralization, addressed in sub-section 1.2.  Local governments 
are motivated to address the welfare of local citizens, and do not consider the effects of 
provision on citizens living outside the jurisdiction.  Consequently, a decentralized government 
will provide less than the optimal quantity of the good or service (Gordon, 1983). 
 Besley and Coate (2003) demonstrate this problem below.   
  
The Model: 
An economy contains two geographically distinct regions, containing a representative citizen.  
There are three goods: a private good (𝑥), a public good provided by the domestic government 
(𝑔𝑖) and a public good provided by the foreign government (𝑔−𝑖).  Citizen utility is defined 
below  
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𝑈𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜆[(1 − 𝛿)𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛿𝑙𝑛𝑔−𝑖] 
𝑁𝑜 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∶  𝛿 = 0 
𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠 ∶  𝛿 = 0.5 
1.58 
 
The utility of the representative citizen is a function of the private good and public goods 
provided by the domestic and foreign governments.  The degree of externalities are reflected in 
‘𝛿’, which can take a value of either 0, when there are no externalities, or 0.5.  Therefore, where 
externalities exist, the citizen’s utility depends equally on the public goods provided by either 
the domestic government or the foreign government 
 
𝐼𝑓 𝛿 = 0,   𝑈𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜆𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖 1.59 
𝐼𝑓 𝛿 = 0.5,   𝑈𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜆 [
𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝑙𝑛𝑔−𝑖
2
] 
1.60 
 
In a decentralized setting, the amount of public goods provided in each jurisdiction depends on 
the preference for public good consumption ‘𝜆’.  For this example, I denote the preference for 
public good consumption in each jurisdiction as (𝑚1, 𝑚2).  In order to finance this consumption 
of public goods the government applies a head tax on the representative citizen ‘𝑡’.  The optimal 
solution for a two government (decentralization) scenario is as follows: 
 
𝑔𝑖
𝑑 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑔𝑖{𝑚𝑖[(1 − 𝛿)𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛿𝑙𝑛𝑔−𝑖] − 𝑡𝑔𝑖} 1.61 
𝐹𝑂𝐶 ∶ (𝑔1
𝑑, 𝑔2
𝑑) = (
𝑚1(1 − 𝛿)
𝑡
,
𝑚2(1 − 𝛿)
𝑡
) 
1.62 
 
The optimal solution for a single government (centralization) scenario is as follows: 
 
𝑔𝑐 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑔{[𝑚1 + 𝑚2]𝑙𝑛𝑔 − 2𝑡𝑔} 1.63 
𝐹𝑂𝐶: 𝑔𝑐 =
𝑚1 + 𝑚2
2𝑡
 
1.64 
 
The first order conditions show that if there are no spillovers, if (𝑚1 = 𝑚2), both scenarios 
(decentralization and centralization) will produce the same quantity of goods.   However, if  
𝛿 = 0.5, then it is clear that the provision of public goods in each local jurisdiction will be 
suboptimal.  However, if there are no externalities, and preference for public goods between 
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the two regions is not equal (𝑚1 ≠ 𝑚2), then decentralization may be more efficient – as 
demonstrated in Oates (1972) model.   
 
1.3.6. A Summary of the Dangers of Fiscal Decentralization 
 
In section 1.3 I have outlined some of the dangers of fiscal decentralization.  Specifically, I 
have considered how fiscal decentralization can lead to harmful competition between local 
governments, which could ultimately reduce citizen welfare.  Some of the negative 
consequences of fiscal decentralization revolve around the mobility of capital and citizens, and 
how in the non-cooperative equilibrium local governments compete for capital through lower 
taxes and higher investment.  This competition is detrimental to non-productive spending on 
redistribution, social services, and recreational facilities. 
When capital is mobile, local governments recognise that increasing tax on capital in 
order to increase provision of public goods, would lead to an outflow of capital from the region 
(Hoyt, 1991).  Hence local governments face a problem that central governments do not (or to 
a lesser extent), which leads to a sub-optimal provision of public services.  Furthermore, local 
governments may also compete through expenditure on productivity enhancing goods and 
services.  In order to attract more capital to the jurisdiction, local governments could spend 
more on productivity enhancing goods (airports, infrastructure), than on parks and recreational 
facilities, and on redistribution (Keen and Marchand, 1997; Treisman, 2007).  Finally, inter-
regional inequalities in capital, investment and productivity may also arise when some 
jurisdictions possess certain advantages, namely better quality infrastructure, more natural 
resources, current human capital or simply as a result of location (i.e. landlocked).  Cai and 
Treisman (2005) showed that poorly endowed jurisdictions would not be able to attract the 
same level of capital, even with lower taxes and higher infrastructure investment.  Inter-regional 
inequalities will also grow over time, regardless of whether capital is mobile or not. 
 Other problems may arise even if capital is immobile.  One such problem is vertical tax 
competition.  Subnational and central government may also compete with one another to 
optimise tax revenue when they both levy taxes on the same subject.  Consequently, when two 
tiers of government tax the same subject, total taxation may be higher than the leviathan tax 
rate (Treisman, 2007).  Also, when the tax levied by the subnational government increase, the 
tax levied by the federal government falls.  Therefore, the federal government is weakened 
through vertical tax externalities (Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2004).  Finally, subnational 
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governments may under-provide public goods and services that exhibit positive externalities 
(Besley and Coate, 2003). 
 
1.4. Comparing the Different Types of Decentralization 
 
In this final section of my introduction to fiscal decentralization I compare the different types 
of decentralization outlined in section 1.1, according to the arguments for and against fiscal 
decentralization addressed in sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
 
Fiscal Decentralization: 
Fiscal decentralization is a necessary condition for all of the effects, desirable or otherwise, 
outlined in sections 1.2 and 1.3.  When subnational governments have autonomy over taxation 
and expenditure responsibilities they can better address the needs of local citizens (Oates, 
1972), compete on expenditure and taxation and provide choice to citizens with different 
preferences (Tiebout, 1956) and ensure that the central government cannot set inefficiently high 
taxes (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980).  Furthermore, autonomous subnational governments can 
also be held to account by local citizens when subnational government executives are directly 
elected.  This results in electoral incentives for local governments to address local needs 
(Seabright, 1996), and also leads to yardstick competition (Besley and Case, 1995).   
On the other hand, fiscal decentralization produces all of the negative effects outlined 
in section 1.3 Taxation autonomy leads to a race to the bottom in taxation (Hoyt, 1991), and 
expenditure autonomy leads to an under-provision of public goods and services that do not 
enhance productivity (Keen and Marchand, 1997).  Taxation autonomy also leads to over-
grazing, reducing the tax power of the federal government (Treisman, 2007) and potentially 
increasing taxes overall.  Fiscal decentralization also leads to and exacerbates inter-regional 
inequalities in investment, capital and productivity (Cai and Treisman, 2005).  Finally, 
expenditure autonomy leads to an under-provision of public goods and services that exhibit 
externalities (Besley and Coate, 2003).   
 Though it is clear how fiscal decentralization can produce all of these effects, what is 
unclear is the effect of other forms of decentralization that are often observed in practice.  The 
aim is to consider alternate forms of decentralization that may induce some of the beneficial 
effects of fiscal decentralization, but without the dangers associated with fiscal autonomy of 
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local governments.  The first alternate form of decentralization I consider is partial fiscal 
decentralization (Brueckner, 2009). 
 
Partial Fiscal Decentralization: 
In the absence of taxation autonomy, partial fiscal decentralization could produce a healthier 
trade-off between the benefits of decentralized delivery of public goods and services, and 
limitations on taxation. 
 Brueckner (2009) explains that partial decentralization may still produce efficiency 
benefits underlined by the Oates’ decentralization theorem.  Subnational governments will still 
be more responsive to heterogeneous needs than central governments due to the information 
advantage they possess (Tanzi, 1996).  However, as Brueckner explains, partial fiscal 
decentralization involves a constraint that fiscal decentralization does not, namely that 
subnational governments do not control their budgets, and may lack sufficient resources to 
address local needs. 
 Perhaps the strongest change is the degree of subnational government accountability.  A 
consequence of partial fiscal decentralization is a loss of accountability of subnational 
government decision making.  Even if subnational governments are directly elected, they are 
not entirely accountable for the decisions they make with respect to local expenditures.  Local 
government executives can simply blame central government for inadequate resources to fulfil 
necessary expenditure at the subnational government level.  The central government can also 
shift blame onto the subnational governments for not allocating resources efficiently.  On the 
other hand, central government control can protect against inequalities arising from competition 
and from unequal endowments (Boadway and Shah, 2009).  Under partial fiscal 
decentralization, central governments can harmonise the delivery of public goods and services 
across regions, and reduce inter-regional inequality. 
 The attraction of partial fiscal decentralization is that central government control over 
subnational government may prevent some of the ill effects of local government autonomy.  Of 
the dangers of decentralization outlined in section 1.3, only two apply to partial fiscal 
decentralization: competition through expenditure and the effect of externalities.  In the case of 
the latter, subnational governments with restricted budgets will face an incentive to spend more 
on goods that do not exhibit positive externalities, and will have an incentive to free-ride on the 
provision of such goods by neighbouring jurisdictions (Besley and Coate, 2003).  The strength 
of partial fiscal decentralization is that central government control over taxes can prevent inter-
regional inequalities from growing, as central governments can harmonize tax and spending 
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between regions (Boadway and Shah, 2009).  Central governments can also provide incentives 
for subnational governments to provide certain goods and services through conditional 
transfers, which would reduce the cost of externalities.  However, further central control over 
subnational government expenditure decision making would have a negative effect on the 
benefits of decentralization (Boadway and Shah, 2009).   
 
Electoral decentralization: 
Whether the local government is elected by local citizens, or appointed by central government 
will have a bearing on the decisions made at the local level.  If the local government is 
appointed, then it will seek to appease central government.  On the other hand, if the local 
government is elected, then it will have to satisfy the demands of local citizens to be re-elected, 
as Seabright’s model demonstrated.   
 Electoral decentralization can have different effects depending on the degree of 
subnational government activity and autonomy.  If subnational governments are autonomous 
and are responsible for a wide range of government activities, then electoral decentralization 
ensures that subnational governments will use its tax and spending powers to improve the 
welfare of local citizens.  Electoral decentralization may also negate some of the dangers of 
fiscal decentralization.  For example, citizens may mandate local government to spend less on 
infrastructure and set higher taxes on capital.  Local government elections also provide a means 
for local citizens to communicate their demands for public goods and services.  Though 
subnational governments will still be wary of the consequences of higher taxes on capital, 
electoral decentralization can ensure that citizens control the trade-off between private and 
public good consumption. 
 Electoral decentralization can also serve a purpose even if subnational governments do 
not have discretion over revenue or spending.  If subnational governments act as agents of the 
central government, referred to as deconcentration (see Treisman, 2002; Meloche et al, 2004), 
then local government elections mean that local citizens must still be satisfied with the policies 
in the local area.  Therefore, local governments will need to communicate the demands of local 
citizens to the central government.  This may enable a centralized government to provide a non-
uniform set of public goods and services.  This is one way that a centralized government may 
be able to ascertain the different needs of citizens.  Besley and Coate (2003) explain that there 
is no theoretical argument for why central government cannot deliver different public goods 
and services, and electoral decentralization may provide the central government will the 
information it needs to achieve this. 
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Local vs. Subnational Governments: 
Finally, the devolution of tax and spending powers to local governments would produce 
stronger effects than were those powers devolved to regional governments.  This is because 
there are more local governments than regional governments.  As a result, each local 
government is responsible for a smaller number of people, and the size (area) of local 
governments will also be smaller than regional governments, therefore increasing the mobility 
of citizens.  This means that local governments will provide greater choice to citizens in the 
Tiebout model, stronger preference matching in Oates’ model, greater mobility and lower taxes 
in the Brennan and Buchanan model, and more responsive governments in the Seabright model.  
Yardstick competition will also be stronger as the similarities between governments will 
become greater the smaller the government unit is. 
 The downside is that competition will be more intense between local governments than 
regional governments due to the increased mobility of capital and citizens.  In Hoyt’s model, 
we see that as the market share of capital in each jurisdiction falls, the value of capital to each 
jurisdiction increases and competition intensifies.  A higher number of jurisdictions at the local 
government level will enhance the effects observed in Hoyt’s model, and the provision of public 
goods will be further below the optimal level (see 1.28, and the value of ‘m’).  Devolution of 
tax and spending decision making to local governments may also increase administrative costs 
and, for goods and services that exhibit economies of scale with greater provision, the costs of 
decentralized delivery will be even greater (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007; Boadway and 
Shah, 2009).  Boadway and Shah suggest that decentralization to regional governments may 
provide a balance between too much centralized decision making and too much local 
government autonomy.  This forms part of Alesina and Spolaore’s (2003) discussion on the 
optimal size of the jurisdiction – one that can take advantage of economies of scale, whilst 
addressing local needs that are heterogeneous between states. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have summarised the fiscal decentralization literature.  I began with a 
discussion on fiscal decentralization, what fiscal decentralization actually means, and what the 
alternate forms of government decentralization there are.  I then explained several key 
arguments in favour of fiscal decentralization, and counter arguments that caution against local 
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government tax and spending autonomy.  In the final section of this chapter I considered how 
different types of decentralization relate to those key arguments.  Together, this chapter forms 
the basis of my empirical research into the effects of fiscal decentralization, as an important 
part of studying fiscal decentralization, is understanding what fiscal decentralization entails, 
and what the effects of greater subnational government autonomy are.  The last section of this 
introduction is particularly relevant to the more recent contributions to the area of fiscal 
decentralization.  For example, contributions from Treisman (2002, 2007) and Brueckner 
(2009) challenge the view that fiscal decentralization is a pre-requisite for some of the benefits 
of government decentralization to be realised.   
 Throughout this research, I consider how various aspects of decentralization relate to 
the studies I undertake in this research.  Consequently, by examining how the different aspects 
of decentralization affect poverty and income distribution (chapter 3), public healthcare and 
public education (chapter 4) and trust in government (chapter 5), I am able to produce more 
insightful conclusions on the effects of government decentralization.  However, in order to test 
the relevance of the different types of decentralization, I must construct a dataset fit for that 
purpose.  In chapter 2 I provide brief overview of cross-country data that is available, and I 
construct a dataset for use in the rest of my thesis. 
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2. Measuring Fiscal Decentralization 
  
47 | P a g e  
 
One of the main problems in the fiscal decentralization literature is how to measure the role of 
subnational government.  Accurately capturing fiscal decentralization and the different aspects 
of decentralization is essential for studying the effects of decentralization, which in turn has 
implications for decentralization policy.  Following on from the work of Oates (1972), Brennan 
and Buchanan (1980), Seabright (1996), Keen and Marchand (1997) and others in chapter 1, 
scholars have investigated the practical implications of fiscal decentralization on economic 
development (Davoodi and Zou, 1998), on public sector size (Oates, 1985) and on the quality 
of government (Treisman, 2000).  However, the effects of fiscal and other forms of 
decentralization will likely differ, as each type of decentralization produces only some of the 
effects described in the literature. 
 Until fairly recently, basic measures of subnational government activity (tax and 
expenditure) from the Government Finance Statistics were used to investigate relationships 
between fiscal decentralization and various macroeconomic variables and government quality.  
However, as Stegarescu (2005) explains, these measures misrepresent the degree of subnational 
government autonomy over tax and expenditure activity.  Recent literature has criticised the 
use of these indicators to measure subnational government autonomy (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; 
Meloche et al., 2004; Stegarescu, 2005).  It is also important to capture other aspects of 
decentralization.  Treisman (2008) and Ivanyna and Shah (2014) have sought to measure 
different concepts of decentralization, and have produced extensive datasets to measure 
political and electoral decentralization, government structure and local government 
characteristics. 
In this chapter I consider the different measures of decentralization that are available for 
use in my empirical research, and I consider the strengths and weaknesses of those indicators.  
My approach here is not to scrutinise the measures of decentralization.  Rather, I accept that 
there is no indicator that captures every single aspect of decentralization (Treisman, 2002, 
2007).  Instead I produce an extensive dataset that contains information on various types of 
decentralization, and put this dataset to use in my own research on fiscal decentralization and 
poverty, public healthcare and public education, and citizen trust in government. 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows.  I begin by outlining the conventional 
measures of subnational government share of revenue and expenditure, in section 2.1.  In 
section 2.2 I consider the importance of subnational government autonomy over expenditure 
functions (2.2.1), and I also look at data on taxation autonomy (2.2.2).  In section 2.3 I consider 
measures of other aspects of decentralization that are related to the arguments I addressed in 
chapter 1, and will prove useful for examining the effects of fiscal decentralization in my own 
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empirical research.  In section 2.4 I outline the complete dataset for all countries covered in this 
research, and provide descriptive statistics for the dataset.   
 
2.1. Subnational Government Share of Revenue and Expenditure 
 
The first aspect of fiscal decentralization concerns the degree of tax and expenditure activity 
carried out by subnational government.  These are considered to be the conventional measures 
of decentralization (Stegarescu, 2005) and have been used in many of the earlier pieces of 
empirical work in the decentralization literature.  The share of activity located at the subnational 
government level is not broken down according to types of expenditure or the degree of tax 
autonomy.  Instead these measures simply give an idea of the role of subnational government 
relative to all government activity (the general government).  The general government consists 
of central government (one) and subnational government, which consists of all state and local11 
government.  The original data from the Government Finance Statistics (IMF) provides data for 
government activity.  The World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicators12 uses the 
Government Finance Statistics dataset to produce the following measures of subnational 
government share of revenue (function 2.1) and expenditure (function 2.2).   
  
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
 𝑥100 2.1 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
 𝑥100 2.2 
 
These two measures of subnational government share of tax and spending activity have been 
used to represent fiscal decentralization in various empirical research, including Oates (1985); 
Davoodi and Zou (1998); Zhang and Zou, (1998); Akai and Sakata (2002).  For the rest of this 
thesis I refer to these indicators as ‘SCG Revenue’ (short for sub-central government share of 
revenue) and ‘SCG Expenditure’ (short for sub-central government share of expenditure).  In 
addition to SCG Expenditure, which breaks down all public expenditure between subnational 
                                                 
11 Subnational government is defined as state and local.  Subnational government is essentially any government 
that is not central.  Government Finance Statistics Manual (2001: 13), based on SNA (1993) Framework 
12 The data is available here: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm and 
the publication file for descriptions of the dataset is available here: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/285741-
1326399585993/8366509-
1332861347588/DatabaseofFiscalandPoliticaDecentralizationVariablesDefinition_040712.pdf 
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government and central government, other indicators may be created to examine the distribution 
of certain types of expenditure between subnational and central government.  For example, we 
could examine the distribution of public healthcare and public education expenditure between 
subnational and central governments, which may be useful for contrasting the degree of 
decentralization of certain types of expenditure.  Such measures can be used to compare the 
degree of subnational government share of activity for certain expenditures, and may also 
provide different results in empirical research.  In chapter 4 I included measures for ‘SCG 
Healthcare Expenditure’ and ‘SCG Education Expenditure’ to complement my research on 
“Public Healthcare, Public Education and Fiscal Decentralization” (covered in Chapter 4) . 
 All of the above indicators are available in the World Bank Fiscal Decentralization 
Indicators dataset.  The data covers a maximum of 93 countries, between 1990 and 2009.  The 
panel dataset is unbalanced, and few countries have complete data for SCG Revenue (from 
1990 to 2009). 
 Unfortunately, whilst there is a fairly large amount of data available for a wide range of 
countries, these indicators provide only an idea of the role of subnational government.  
Nevertheless, these indicators have proven useful for measuring certain effects in the literature.  
For example, Davoodi and Zou (1998) examine the effect of subnational government share on 
economic growth.  They focus specifically on the optimal distribution of government activity 
between central, state and local government.  Their research provides some evidence of a link 
between subnational government share and economic growth13.  However, for studying the 
effects of fiscal autonomy it is important to distinguish between SCG Revenue and SCG 
Expenditure, and measures that include information on subnational government autonomy.   
 
2.2. Subnational Government Autonomy 
 
The limitation of the conventional measures of tax and expenditure decentralization has led to 
new indicators of fiscal autonomy and fiscal decentralization.  As Stegarescu (2005) explains, 
the above indicators misrepresent the degree of fiscal decentralization as they contain no 
information on subnational government autonomy.  The subnational government may be reliant 
upon the central government in one of two ways: i) either subnational governments depend 
upon transfers from the central government, which could limit expenditure autonomy, and ii) 
                                                 
13 They observe a negative relationship between subnational government share of expenditure for a selection of 
countries. 
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subnational governments do not control the taxes in their local jurisdiction, either in terms of 
tax rate, tax base or both, which would limit tax autonomy.  In this section I review a range of 
new indicators of subnational government spending and taxation autonomy.  
 
2.2.1. Subnational Government Expenditure Autonomy 
 
Central governments may influence subnational government expenditure decision making.  
Treisman (2002) explains that expenditure decentralization could be controlled through 
conditional transfers from the central government.  As Boadway and Shah (2009) explain, 
conditional transfers can be used to control subnational government’s allocation of resources, 
as subnational governments are mandated to spend on particular goods and services.  Brueckner 
(2009) comments that even unconditional transfers (block grants) restrict subnational 
government decision making, as they are still reliant upon grants to finance their expenditures.  
Therefore, in order to measure subnational government autonomy over expenditure, we must 
deduct all transfers received from the central government.  This measure can be constructed 
using the Government Finance Statistics, or the World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicators.  
Transfers are deducted from subnational government revenue to create the indicator ‘own-
source revenue’14 
 
𝑆𝐶𝐺 𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠: 𝑆𝐶𝐺 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝑆𝐶𝐺 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠(𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡) 2.3 
 
Second, the degree of subnational government autonomy over expenditures is calculated as the 
share of subnational government expenditure financed by own-source revenues: 
   
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
  
2.4 
 
The above indicator represents subnational government autonomy over their expenditures.  By 
combining SCG Expenditure (2.1) and SCG Autonomy (2.4) I construct a new measure of 
subnational government autonomous expenditure share of total government spending. 
                                                 
14 Stegarescu (2005) and others define own-source revenue more strictly, according to subnational government 
autonomy over the base and rate of taxes in the local area.  Essentially own-source revenue here represents all 
revenue the subnational government collect from the local jurisdiction, regardless of whether they can change the 
tax rate or targets of tax.   
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[
𝑆𝐶𝐺 𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑆𝐶𝐺 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
𝑥 𝑆𝐶𝐺 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒] 𝑥 100  
2.5 
 
The indicator, which I refer to as ‘SCG Autonomous Expenditure’ (short for sub-central 
government share of autonomous expenditure), represents the proportion of total government 
spending carried out by subnational governments, on the condition that the subnational 
government has discretion over how they allocate that expenditure.  This measure constitutes 
the opposite of partial fiscal decentralization, which Brueckner (2009) defines as SCG 
expenditures financed by transfers.  The data for this indicator is fairly large, covering most of 
the countries for which SCG Revenue and SCG Expenditure are available.  A breakdown of 
total government expenditure for 59 countries15 is available in chart 1.  The bar furthest to the 
right is the average of the entire sample of countries, and shows that just over 20% of 
government expenditure is delivered by subnational government.  Roughly two thirds of SCG 
Expenditure is financed by own-source revenues, whilst one third is financed through 
intergovernmental transfers from the centre. 
 Only two countries observe greater than 50% subnational government expenditure 
share, Canada and Switzerland, with United States observing just under 50%.  Of these three 
countries, there is limited central government influence through transfers.  Some countries 
observe heavy central government influence, such as Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and 
Spain.  Denmark would appear considerably more decentralized under SCG Expenditure, but 
once transfers are deducted, SCG Autonomous Expenditure is less than a half of SCG 
Expenditure. 
 
                                                 
15 For this breakdown I could only use those countries that have data for each of SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure 
and SCG Autonomous Expenditure.  For the entire list of countries that have data for at least the SCG Revenue 
indicator, see table 5 of this chapter 
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Chart 1: CG Expenditure vs. SCG Expenditure vs. SCG Autonomous Expenditure 
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2.2.2. Subnational Government Taxation Autonomy 
 
The exclusion of transfers allows us to examine the degree of subnational government 
autonomy over expenditures.  However, capturing taxation autonomy presents another 
problem.  As Treisman (2002) explains, measuring revenue decentralization is subject to 
a myriad of nuances (page 12), such as the degree of autonomy over tax rates, tax base 
and tax sharing.  The weakness of the above indicators is that they do not give an idea of 
the degree of control subnational governments have over their budgets.  Ideally we should 
distinguish between own-source revenues (controlled by the subnational government) and 
those that are not own source (Rodden, 2002). 
Unfortunately, the only data available to provide some idea of the degree of 
taxation autonomy is limited in both scope and scale.  The OECD Fiscal Decentralization 
Indicators16 break down subnational government tax share, excluding transfers, according 
to the degree of autonomy over the setting of tax rates and tax base.  There are five 
categories of tax autonomy, ranging from total autonomy (SCG sets tax rate and base), to 
no autonomy (centralized decision making). 
 
Table 1: SCG Revenue (excluding transfers) Tax Autonomy Categories 
Category a) SCG determines tax rate and tax base 
Category b) SCG determines tax rate 
Category c)  SCG determines tax base 
Category d)  Tax sharing arrangements with the centre 
Category e) Central government sets tax rate and tax base 
 
Data is available for 4 years between 1990 and 2009: 1995, 2002, 2005 and 2008 and 
covers up to 34 mostly high income European countries (in year 2008 dataset).  These 
indicators have often been used to demonstrate the difference between SCG Revenue and 
tax autonomy of subnational governments (see Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Meloche et al., 
2004 and Stegarescu, 2005).   
 In this research I use this data merely to demonstrate the degree of autonomy for 
some of the countries used in my dataset.  Most of my research is focused on low and 
                                                 
16 For the dataset, see here: http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=TAXAUTO&lang=en, and for 
further information on the dataset, see here: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/measuring-fiscal-
decentralisation/measuring-decentralisation_9789264174849-3-en  
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middle income countries which are not covered by the OECD dataset.  Depending on the 
research that I conducted, data would be available for only a dozen or so countries in the 
complete dataset; hence this data has no use within my own empirical research.  Instead 
I want to have an idea of how much of own-source revenue (function 2.3) is actually 
controlled by subnational governments.  Specifically, I wanted to identify the proportion 
of own-source revenue for which subnational governments control tax rate and base (a), 
tax rates only (b) and tax base only (c).  The arguments presented in chapter 1 on tax 
competition require that subnational governments have control over taxes.  Therefore, it 
is important to have an idea of how much tax autonomy subnational governments actually 
have, and how relevant the arguments on tax competition in chapter 1 are in my indicators.   
 In table 2 we see the degree of taxation autonomy of subnational governments I 
in the OECD dataset.  Across the entire sample, subnational government has control over 
70% of their budgets.  Almost half of tax revenue accruing to subnational governments 
falls into category b: control over tax rates.  It is less common that subnational 
governments have the power to change the tax base.  If we include taxes that are shared 
between subnational government and central government (category d), almost 90% of tax 
revenues exhibit some form of subnational government control.  Interestingly, category 
d, for shared taxes, accounts for almost 20% of SCG Revenue (excluding transfers).  This 
is important when considering vertical tax externalities, where central and subnational 
tiers of government tax the same subject (see Treisman, 2007 and Keen and Kotsogiannis, 
2004). 
If we apply this information to the SCG Autonomous Expenditure indicator, it is 
clear to see that most revenues accruing to the subnational government are controlled by 
the subnational government (for high income countries at least).  It is not possible to know 
what the degree of tax autonomy is for low and middle income countries, due to the 
absence of similar data for those countries. 
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Table 2: Cross-Sectional Data (OECD Fiscal Decentralization: Tax Autonomy) 
Country Continent Income Span TA Years# 
Autonomous 
Taxation (a, b and 
c
17
) 
SCG Tax Breakdown 
a b c d e f 
Australia OC High 1999-2009 02, 05, 08 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Austria EU High 1995-2009 95, 02, 05, 08 31.78 20.51 11.27 0.00 8.85 44.61 14.75 
Canada N.A. High 1990-2007 05, 08 92.35 74.93 17.42 0.00 0.86 0.31 6.49 
Chile S.A. Middle 2000-2009 08 24.97 0.00 24.97 0.00 75.03 0.00 0.00 
Denmark EU High 1995-2009 95, 02, 05, 08 93.46 0.00 93.46 0.00 2.92 3.61 0.01 
Estonia EU Middle 1995-2009 02, 05, 08 8.32 0.96 7.36 0.00 91.68 0.00 0.00 
Finland EU High 1995-2008 95, 02, 05, 08 90.76 0.00 90.76 0.00 9.09 0.11 0.04 
France EU High 1995-2009 02, 05, 08 80.93 67.78 6.58 6.57 6.45 9.34 3.29 
Germany EU High 1995-2009 95, 02, 05, 08 14.94 0.05 14.89 0.00 79.04 3.87 2.15 
Greece EU High 1995-2009 02, 05, 08 45.88 0.00 45.88 0.00 18.07 35.41 0.63 
Hungary EU Middle 1995-2009 95, 02, 05, 08 80.36 0.00 80.36 0.00 19.29 0.00 0.35 
Iceland EU High 1998-2009 02, 05, 08 94.06 0.00 94.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.94 
Ireland EU High 1995-2009 95, 02, 05, 08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Israel AS High 2000-2009 02, 05, 08 100.00 5.14 94.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Italy EU High 1995-2009 02, 05, 08 62.11 7.89 54.22 0.00 31.93 5.96 0.00 
Luxembourg EU High 1999-2009 02, 05, 08 97.09 5.02 92.07 0.00 0.00 1.06 1.85 
Mexico N.A. Middle 1990-2000 95 65.35 65.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.65 0.00 
Netherlands EU High 1995-2009 95, 02, 05, 08 99.41 0.00 99.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 
New Zealand OC High 2001-2007 02, 05 98.99 98.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.01 0.00 
Norway EU High 2000-2009 02, 05, 08 97.91 1.12 67.43 29.36 0.00 2.10 0.00 
Poland EU Middle 2001-2009 02, 05, 08 42.60 0.00 42.60 0.00 52.80 0.25 4.35 
Portugal EU High 1995-2009 95, 02, 05, 08 64.42 7.65 56.77 0.00 18.09 17.26 0.23 
Slovakia EU Middle 2003-2009 05, 08 100.00 5.69 94.02 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Slovenia EU Middle 1992-2009 02, 05, 08 14.80 14.80 0.00 0.00 71.27 10.32 3.61 
Spain EU High 1995-2009 95, 02, 05, 08 64.54 43.37 21.17 0.00 34.16 1.21 0.09 
Sweden EU High 1995-2009 95, 02, 05, 08 99.41 0.07 99.34 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.00 
Switzerland EU High 1990-2008 95, 02, 05, 08 98.14 59.58 38.56 0.00 1.75 0.00 0.10 
United Kingdom EU High 1995-2009 95, 02, 05, 08 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AVERAGE 70.09 20.68 48.12 1.29 18.62 6.13 5.16 
                                                 
17 It’s very rare that subnational governments determine the targets of a particular tax instrument, but do not control the rate of tax.  Nevertheless, category c is deemed 
to be part of the tax autonomy indicator and accounts for under 2% of subnational government taxes across the sample 
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2.3. Capturing Other Aspects of Decentralization 
 
Altunbas and Thornton (2011) explain that other forms of decentralization may be used 
to address the shortcomings of indicators for tax and expenditure decentralization.  In 
their empirical research they combine the various tax and spending decentralization 
indicators with institutional variables for election decentralization, federal constitution 
and political decentralization (i.e. legislative powers of subnational governments).  
Treisman (2008)18 and Ivanyna and Shah (2014)19 provide datasets for measuring the 
different aspects of decentralization.  Ivanyna and Shah (2014) provide data for local 
government specifically, whilst Treisman (2008) covers different types of 
decentralization for subnational governments.  In this section I consider some of their 
indicators and how they may be relevant to my research and the arguments addressed in 
chapter 1 
 
2.3.1. Local Government Elections 
 
The first aspect of decentralization concerns the direct accountability of local government 
decision making.  Direct accountability requires that subnational governments 
(representatives) are elected, which is a necessary condition of certain arguments in the 
literature.  For example, Seabright (1996) considers the responsiveness of local 
governments to local demands when local governments are elected by the local 
constituent.  Elections provide a useful disciplining tool against wasteful or corrupt 
governments through yardstick competition (Besley and Case, 1995).  On the other hand, 
if central governments appoint the executive of the local government then there is an 
incentive for the local government to do what the central government wants, and not to 
deliver for local demands.  Therefore, we might expect further decentralization to have a 
different effect depending on whether the local government is elected or appointed. 
 Treisman (2008) presents two indicators of electoral decentralization, one for the 
bottom (local) tier of government and one for the second tier.  In the original Treisman 
(2008) dataset, the variables take 3 discrete values: 0 (when SCG official is appointed), 1 
                                                 
18 Treisman (2008), Decentralization Dataset, available for download here: 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/ 
19 Ivanyna and Shah (2014), Worldwide Indicators on Localization and Decentralization, available here: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2014-3  
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(when SCG official is elected), and 0.5 for any system in between (i.e. where a local 
council is elected, who then appoint the town Mayor, see Bolivia).  I modify this data so 
as to define this indicator as either strictly direct elections (1) or not (0), so in the case of 
Bolivia, this would be 0, rather than 0.5. 
To measure electoral decentralization, I select the indicator for the bottom tier of 
government (local government elections or appointment).  The reason I have chosen this 
indicator is because, as Seabright (1996) explains, when a government is accountable to 
more than one locality, as a central and regional20 government would be, they are not 
accountable to one particular local region.  Hence the direct accountability effect is 
strongest at the local government level.  This is also true for Besley and Case (1995) 
yardstick competition argument.  Local governments are more likely to face a similar cost 
curve than say regional governments.  Also there is a moderate positive correlation (0.43) 
between the two indicators, which means that in countries where the local government is 
elected, often the next tier up is also elected by the constituents.  For the remainder of this 
research I refer to this indicator as “Electoral Decentralization” (see table 3) 
 
2.3.2. Political Decentralization 
 
The second aspect of decentralization concerns other decisions made by government that 
are not tax or spending related.  Treisman (2002) refers to decision making 
decentralization, whereby subnational governments have the power to legislate.  As 
Treisman puts it, in a country where all decisions are made by the central government, 
this would represent full political centralization.  Though measuring decision making 
decentralization presents a wide range of problems, Treisman provides three indicators 
outlined below:  
i) Residual authority, where the subnational legislature has the right to 
legislate (according to constitution) over issues that may be assigned to 
other levels of government (“aut”) 
ii) Autonomy, where the subnational legislature has the right to legislate on 
a particular issue, but the constitution reserves power to decide on (“res”) 
iii) Weak autonomy is either residual authority (i) or autonomy (ii) (“autres”) 
                                                 
20 Or state, provincial etc. 
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To measure political decentralization, I use option iii) above.  I refer to this indicator for 
the remainder of the research as “Legislative Decentralization” (see table 3) 
 
2.3.3. Federal Constitution 
 
I also include a measure for federal constitution.  This indicator is fairly straightforward.  
In Treisman’s (2008) dataset countries are described as having either a federal 
government or unitary government.  Oates (1972) explains that the definition of fiscal 
federalism has few practical observations.  Treisman’s dataset supports this view, with 
only 19 of 164 countries described as having a federal government.  The remainder are 
classified as unitary, with substantial central government control.  Altunbas and Thornton 
(2011) explain that countries which have a federal constitution are assumed to observe 
more subnational government responsibilities.  In the final dataset in section 1.4 of this 
chapter those countries in the federal government group appear to be more decentralized 
according to other indicators than most other countries.  For example, federal 
governments in Canada and in the USA are some of the most decentralized countries, 
according to all indicators.  Both countries observe some of the highest levels of 
subnational government share of activity, and autonomous expenditure and autonomous 
taxation (OECD dataset).  For the remainder of this research I refer to this indicator as 
“Federal Constitution” 
 
2.3.4. Vertical Decentralization (Tiers of Government) 
 
Another aspect of decentralization is vertical decentralization, or the number of tiers of 
government.  I use this indicator exclusively for my work on fiscal decentralization and 
trust (chapter 5).  Vertical decentralization refers to the number of tiers of government.  
In a dataset containing over 150 countries, Treisman (2008) observes a range of 
government structures.  Some governments contain only a central and a local government.  
In Slovenia there is a central government and local (municipal) governments.  In contrast, 
the governments of China and India feature as many as five tiers of government in certain 
parts of the country.  For the remainder of this research I refer to this indicator as “Tiers” 
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2.3.5. Local Government Size and Population 
 
The final aspects of decentralization refer to two local government features: i) the average 
size (area) of local jurisdictions, ii) the average population count in local jurisdictions.  
These two indicators provide extra information on important theories in the 
decentralization literature.  First, area size may determine the degree of mobility of 
citizens (and capital), and by proxy, the degree of subnational government competition.  
Let’s imagine a country with a fixed land area, if we increase the number of local 
governments (jurisdictions), then the average size of the local government will fall.  All 
other things equal, citizens will be more mobile the smaller the size of the local 
jurisdiction.  If the number of local jurisdictions increases, the size of each jurisdiction 
falls, and this represents a greater degree of fiscal decentralization, all other things equal.  
Hoyt (1991) and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2004) demonstrate that when refer to the 
number of jurisdictions in their models on tax competition.  For example, in Hoyt (1991) 
‘m’, the share of capital in the local jurisdiction is decreasing with a larger number of 
local government units.  As ‘m’ falls, the value of capital rises, and the competition for 
mobile capital increases.  The effects are intensified when the size of local government is 
smaller.  For the remainder of this research I refer to this indicator as “LG area size”.   
 Second, population size may determine the degree of local government 
responsiveness and accountability to a subset of the population.  I use this indicator 
exclusively in the trust chapter to see whether citizens are more trusting of decentralized 
governments if their local government is responsible for fewer citizens.  Seabright’s 
model (1996) compares central government responsible for lots of localities and local 
governments responsible for a single locality each.  The idea is that local governments 
are more responsive to local citizens than central government would be.  The same 
argument should also apply to the number of people the local government is accountable 
to.  As the population size of the local jurisdiction falls, local governments are expected 
to be more responsive, which could have an effect on trust in government (see chapter 5).  
For the remainder of this research I refer to this indicator as “LG population size”. 
 The full list of the alternate measures of decentralization is in table 3. 
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Table 3: Treisman (2008) and Ivanyna and Shah (2014) Decentralization Indicators 
Aspect of 
Decentralization 
(title) 
Short Description Sources 
Electoral 
Decentralization 
Dummy variable: if executive at bottom tier directly elected (1); 
appointed by directly elected assembly (0) 
Treisman (2008) 
Legislative 
Decentralization 
Dummy variable: if constitution allows for limited autonomy 
for subnational government (1); otherwise (0) 
Treisman (2008) 
Federal 
Constitution 
Dummy variable: if country has federal government (1); if 
country has unitary government (0) 
Treisman (2008) 
Tiers Dummy variable: if country has 4 or more tiers of government 
(1); if countries has fewer than 4 tiers of government (0) 
Treisman (2008) 
LG Area Size The logarithm of the average number of citizens living in the 
smallest jurisdiction (local government), in 1,000s 
Ivanyna and Shah 
(2014) 
LG Population Size The logarithm of the average number of citizens living in the 
smallest jurisdiction (local government), in 1,000s 
Ivanyna and Shah 
(2014)  
 
2.4.  A Comprehensive Fiscal Decentralization Dataset  
 
The final dataset that I use in this research contains each of the indicators of aspects of 
decentralization outlined above.  In all, there are 12 indicators of decentralization.  Some 
indicators measure subnational government share of fiscal activity; other measures 
capture other forms of decentralization, such as political decentralization and local 
government legislative autonomy.  I also include measures for government structure and 
local government size, area and population. 
 The final dataset covers 69 low, middle and high income countries, over a period 
of 20 years, between 1990 and 2009.  The summary statistics in table 4 indicate that 
governments are still fairly centralized, with subnational government accounting for just 
under a quarter of total government revenue and expenditure.  When taking into account 
intergovernmental transfers, subnational government has autonomy over just 14% of all 
government expenditure.  However, subnational governments account for a larger 
proportion of public healthcare and public education spending.  In public education 
spending, subnational governments account for the majority of total government spending 
on public education.   
 Local jurisdiction population and area size is quite varied across the entire dataset.  
On average, local governments are responsible for 47.5 thousand people, and the average 
size of the local jurisdiction across the entire sample is 79.7 square kilometres. 
 Finally, the breakdown of the sample according to electoral and legislative 
decentralization, federal constitution and tiers presents an interesting overview of the 
degree of other aspects of decentralization.  First, electoral decentralization is fairly 
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common, despite how limited the share of subnational government activity is.  For more 
than 80% of the sample the local government executive is elected.  Second, subnational 
governments often don’t have legislative powers.  In only 18 countries (of 65) subnational 
governments have some legislative autonomy.  Third, as expected, there are many more 
unitary governments than federal governments.  Fourth, there is a more even split in the 
sample regarding government tiers.  In 28 countries governments contain 3 or 4 or more 
tiers of government, while 35 governments contain no more than 3 tiers. 
  
I provide a complete list of the countries covered in this research in tables 5 and 6.  In 
table 5 I provide cross-sectional averages for the primary tax and spending indicators used 
in the empirical research: SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure.  Data is not available for all 20 years for each country, so I have provided 
details on the ‘span’ of data available in table 5.  In table 6 I provide data for the remaining 
decentralization indicators from Treisman (2008) and Ivanyna and Shah (2014).  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Quantitative Indicators of Decentralization 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SCG Revenue 69 24.67 14.26 1.66 66.05 
SCG Expenditure 67 21.71 13.09 1.23 57.38 
SCG Healthcare Expenditure 46 41.36 31.10 0.49 96.44 
SCG Education Expenditure 48 55.10 26.24 2.55 96.54 
SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure 61 13.99 10.46 0.26 45.98 
Tax Autonomy 28 70.09 33.62 0.00 100.00 
LG Population Size 67 47.51 80.77 1.60 427.40 
LG Area Size 67 79.655 71.982 7.917 394.158 
 
Panel B: Qualitative Indicators of Decentralization 
 Obs. Yes No 
Electoral Decentralization 58 47 11 
Legislative Decentralization 65 18 47 
Federal Constitution 68 14 54 
Tiers 63 28 35 
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Table 5: Cross-Sectional Data (World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicators) 
Country Continent Income Span 
SCG 
Revenue 
SCG 
Expenditure 
SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure 
Albania EU Low 1995-1998 23.576 18.668 0.883 
Argentina S.A. Middle 1990-2001 42.355 41.585 31.047 
Armenia EU Middle 2003-2009 6.547 6.151 3.646 
Australia OC High 1999-2009 40.142 38.762 24.680 
Austria EU High 1995-2009 32.401 30.465 21.609 
Azerbaijan EU Low 1994-2008 32.699 25.791 12.963 
Belarus EU Middle 1992-2009 32.243 29.196 25.450 
Belgium EU High 1995-2009 14.44 35.87  
Bolivia S.A. Low 1990-2007 29.526 21.348  
Brazil SA Middle 1990-1998 42.260 36.467 21.156 
Bulgaria EU Middle 1990-2009 18.904 15.599 5.457 
Canada N.A. High 1990-2007 59.751 57.379 45.980 
Chile S.A. Middle 2000-2009 12.371 11.325 7.907 
China AS Middle 1995-2008 66.054   
Colombia S.A. Middle 2001-2009 31.019 25.602 16.354 
Costa Rica N.A. Middle 1990-2009 3.486 2.925  
Croatia EU Middle 1994-2009 10.634 9.715  
Cyprus EU High 1993-2009 21.537 16.996 13.055 
Czech 
Republic 
EU High 2000-2009 16.49 21.48  
Denmark EU High 1995-2009 47.161 45.332 20.907 
El Salvador N.A. Middle 2002-2009 7.771 4.621 3.668 
Estonia EU Middle 1995-2009 22.713 24.770 10.609 
Finland EU High 1995-2008 33.762 32.634 23.354 
France EU High 1995-2009 22.397 19.195 8.886 
Georgia EU Low 1995-2009 19.617 13.684 5.376 
Germany EU High 1995-2009 40.018 37.542 26.851 
Greece EU High 1995-2009 6.530 4.547 1.879 
Honduras N.A. Middle 2003-2009 11.405 8.191 4.498 
Hungary EU Middle 1995-2009 22.908 22.793 7.339 
Iceland EU High 1998-2009 27.868 24.915 22.373 
India AS Low 1990-2007 46.604 42.120 26.831 
Indonesia AS Low 1990-1998 11.059 10.726 4.263 
Iran AS Middle 1999-2009 6.390 3.333  
Ireland EU High 1995-2009 23.223 17.471 2.611 
Israel AS High 2000-2009 13.459 12.270 7.970 
Italy EU High 1995-2009 26.840 23.657 10.576 
Jordan AS Middle 2008-2009 7.730 5.029  
Kazakhstan AS Middle 1997-2009 39.832 30.733 22.145 
Latvia EU Middle 1994-2009 25.667 21.715 16.188 
Lithuania EU Middle 2001-2009 22.777 20.969 12.972 
Luxembourg EU High 1999-2009 12.334 10.955 7.486 
Macedonia EU Middle 2006-2008 9.383 7.564 4.644 
Malaysia AS Middle 1990-2001 11.417 13.864 10.710 
Malta EU High 2003-2009 1.663 1.231 0.261 
Mexico N.A. Middle 1990-2000 28.676 23.234 19.942 
Moldova EU Low 1994-2009 23.009 18.671 9.447 
Mongolia AS Low 1992-2002 36.980 35.897 27.637 
Morocco AF Middle 2002-2009 10.265 6.747 5.445 
Netherlands EU High 1995-2009 32.411 28.910 8.164 
New 
Zealand 
OC High 
2001-2007 8.444 8.482 8.078 
Norway EU High 2000-2009 23.723 30.294 18.245 
Paraguay  S.A. Middle 1990-2009 8.842 7.451 5.058 
Peru S.A. Middle 1990-2009 22.147 13.470 3.886 
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Poland EU Middle 2001-2009 31.077 26.726 15.453 
Portugal EU High 1995-2009 14.281 11.692 4.697 
Romania EU Middle 1990-2001 17.090 15.651 14.767 
Russia AS Middle 1994-2009 43.715 40.657 31.754 
Serbia EU Middle 2007-2009 16.064 14.158 11.523 
Slovakia EU Middle 2003-2009 17.650 15.752 8.113 
Slovenia EU Middle 1992-2009 15.204 12.877 9.809 
South Africa AF Middle 1990-2002 22.083 18.004 10.395 
Spain EU High 1995-2009 40.682 35.110 15.370 
Sweden EU High 1995-2009 38.665   
Switzerland EU High 1990-2008 53.512 54.585 42.396 
Tajikistan AS Low 1999-2004 27.285 29.641 23.165 
Thailand AS Middle 1990-2009 6.515 5.379  
Ukraine EU Middle 1999-2009 31.306 28.010 20.431 
United 
Kingdom 
EU High 1995-2009 26.207 22.450 6.498 
United 
States 
N.A. High 
1990-2001 49.477 45.640 35.581 
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Table 6: Cross-Sectional Data (Treisman, 2008; Ivanyna and Shah, 2014 Decentralization 
Indicators) 
Country Continent Income Legislate Federal Tiers Election 
LG 
Population 
LG 
Area 
Albania EU Low 0 0 3 1 24.6 0.033 
Argentina S.A. Middle 1 1 3 1 17.4 0.133 
Armenia EU Middle 0 0 3  6.4 0.021 
Australia OC High 0 1 3 1 29.0 0.394 
Austria EU High 1 1 4 1 3.5 0.022 
Azerbaijan EU Low 1 0 3  5.9 0.021 
Belarus EU Middle 0 0 4 0 16.2 0.040 
Belgium EU High 1 1 4 0   
Bolivia S.A. Low 0 0 4 0 54.7 0.216 
Brazil SA Middle 1 1 4 0 33.6 0.147 
Bulgaria EU Middle 0 0 4 1 29.3 0.077 
Canada N.A. High 1 1 4 1 16.4 0.190 
Chile S.A. Middle 0 0 4 1 90.5 0.173 
China AS Middle 0 0 5  117.8 0.056 
Colombia S.A. Middle 0 0 3 1 75.9 0.120 
Costa Rica N.A. Middle 0 0 4 1 23.6 0.036 
Croatia EU Middle 0 0 3 1 15.6 0.037 
Cyprus EU High 1 0 3 0 1.6 0.016 
Czech 
Republic 
EU High 
0 0 
3 1 
  
Denmark EU High 0 0 3 1 105.2 0.077 
El Salvador N.A. Middle  0 3 1 48.3 0.033 
Estonia EU Middle 0 0 3 1 11.1 0.052 
Finland EU High 0 0 3 1 12.6 0.107 
France EU High 0 0 4 1 5.0 0.015 
Georgia EU Low 0 0 4 0 8.6 0.031 
Germany EU High 1 1 4 1 12.8 0.020 
Greece EU High 0 0 4.5 1 20.4 0.042 
Honduras N.A. Middle  0 3 1 43.3 0.071 
Hungary EU Middle 0 0 3 1 6.3 0.020 
Iceland EU High 0 0 2 1 3.8 0.136 
India AS Low 1 1 5  4.4 0.014 
Indonesia AS Low 0 0 5 0 427.4 0.230 
Iran AS Middle 0 0 4  59.2 0.071 
Ireland EU High 0 0 3 1 36.5 0.094 
Israel AS High 0 0 3 1 26.7 0.034 
Italy EU High 1 0 4 1 21.4 0.023 
Jordan AS Middle 0 0 3  97.5 0.109 
Kazakhstan AS Middle 0 0 4 0 17.9 0.123 
Latvia EU Middle 0 0 3 1 8.3 0.041 
Lithuania EU Middle 0 0 3 1 56.9 0.124 
Luxembourg EU High 1 0 3 0 3.9 0.018 
Macedonia EU Middle 0 0   23.9 0.065 
Malaysia AS Middle 1 1 3 0 178.1 0.180 
Malta EU High 0 0 3 1 5.9 0.008 
Mexico N.A. Middle 1 1 3 1 42.3 0.107 
Moldova EU Low 0 0 3  10.8 0.026 
Mongolia AS Low 0 0   3.8 0.105 
Morocco AF Middle 0 0 3 1 38.6 0.064 
Netherlands EU High 0 0 3 0 71.7 0.036 
New Zeal OC High 0 0 3 1 91.9 0.206 
Norway EU High 0 0 3 1 20.5 0.101 
Paraguay  S.A. Middle 0 0 3 1 47.6 0.153 
Peru S.A. Middle 0 0 4 1 40.0 0.094 
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Poland EU Middle 0 0 3 1 41.7 0.040 
Portugal EU High 0 0 4 1 6.9 0.017 
Romania EU Middle 0 0 3 1 13.5 0.032 
Russia AS Middle 1 1 4 1 11.8 0.100 
Serbia EU Middle     90.2 0.089 
Slovakia EU Middle 0 0 4 1 3.7 0.015 
Slovenia EU Middle 0 0 2 1 9.5 0.037 
South Africa AF Middle 1 0 3 1 337.4 0.250 
Spain EU High 1 1 4 1 10.6 0.030 
Sweden EU High 0 0 3 1 58.2 0.144 
Switzerland EU High 1 1 3 1 2.7 0.015 
Tajikistan AS Low 0 0 4  6.2 0.025 
Thailand AS Middle 0 0 5 1 15.8 0.030 
Ukraine EU Middle  0 4 1 11.7 0.027 
United 
Kingdom 
EU High 0 0 4 1 382.0 0.086 
United States N.A. High 1 1 4 1 6.8 0.040 
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3. Poverty, Income Distribution and Fiscal 
Decentralization 
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The Human Development Report (2005) provides a summary of the significant variations 
in income based poverty between developed and developing countries and the trend of 
growing inequality in some of the largest countries in the world.  Efforts to tackle poverty 
have often focused on sustained economic development, government expenditure on 
social programs and primary public services and the importance of good governance.  In 
this empirical research I contribute to this area of study by investigating whether fiscal 
decentralization has an impact on poverty and income distribution. 
The aim of this empirical research is to identify whether fiscal decentralization is 
associated with poverty and income distribution, and if so, whether fiscal decentralization 
helps to reduce poverty and income inequality, or fiscal decentralization instead hinders 
efforts by the national government to reduce poverty.  Using a selection of low, middle 
and high income countries, 57 in all, over a period of 20 years between 1990 and 2009, I 
carry out this empirical investigation.  I provide results for the general effects of tax, 
expenditure decentralization and fiscal autonomy on measures of poverty and income 
inequality.  I also investigate whether fiscal decentralization has different impacts on 
poverty and income inequality when local executives are elected by and accountable to 
local citizens.  I contrast the effects of fiscal decentralization between federal and unitary 
governments and I examine whether the size of local jurisdictions have a bearing on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty and income distribution.  Finally, 
I examine whether fiscal decentralization has different effects during periods of higher 
economic growth, when total government expenditure is higher, and when the quality of 
government is better.   
My final results provide evidence that fiscal decentralization is associated with 
poverty and income distribution.  However, the nature of that association is sensitive to a 
number of conditions.  My main findings are: 
i) Fiscal decentralization can help to reduce income inequality in high 
income countries and lead to higher levels of absolute poverty in low and 
middle income countries.  
ii) Decentralization observes different effects depending on the size of the 
local jurisdiction.  Often, decentralization increases inequality and 
absolute poverty when the size of the local jurisdiction is larger.   
iii) Fiscal decentralization can also help to reduce poverty when total 
government expenditure is lower and quality of government is lower.  
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This chapter is organised into seven sections.  In section 3.1 I discuss the relevant 
literature and establish links between income distribution, poverty and fiscal 
decentralization.  In section 3.2 I outline the data used in this empirical research, and 
include explanations for why I have chosen certain indicators for absolute poverty, 
income distribution and fiscal decentralization.  In section 3.3 I provide an overview of 
the data used in this research, including descriptive statistics and correlations.  In section 
3.4 I explain the different econometric methods used to produce credible estimates of the 
key relationships and the various problems encountered in this empirical research.  In 
section 3.5 I provide estimates for the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
income distribution and poverty, and include additional estimations based on various 
interactions between the share of government activity, autonomous expenditure share and 
the other aspects of fiscal decentralization.  In section 3.6 I provide further interactions 
between decentralization and economic growth, total government spending and quality 
of government overall.  I end this chapter with my conclusions and closing remarks, in 
section 3.7.   
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3.1. Related Literature 
 
In this literature review I identify the different ways that fiscal decentralization may be 
associated with poverty and income distribution.  I use some of the key arguments in the 
decentralization literature to explain how fiscal decentralization may enhance local 
economic development and reduce poverty through local growth; how fiscal 
decentralization could improve the outcomes of government spending on the poorest; and 
how fiscal decentralization may improve the quality of government, reduce corruption 
and ensure that governments tackle the issue of poverty.  I also provide counter arguments 
for each of these points.  I consider how fiscal decentralization may lead to inter-regional 
inequality in spending; how different regions of the country may grow at faster rates if 
local governments are responsible for raising own revenues; and how fiscal 
decentralization could have a negative impact on the central government’s aims of 
reducing poverty and redistributing income at the national level.   
 The literature review is broken down for each of the different areas (economic 
growth, government spending and quality of government).  The final section of my 
literature review considers mitigating factors on the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and income distribution and poverty.   
 
3.1.1. Economic Growth, Poverty and Fiscal Decentralization 
 
Efforts to tackle poverty have often focused on the importance of sustained economic 
development; increasing opportunities for long-term employment and a secure income 
for the poorest.  Dollar and Kraay (2002) explains that policies associated with economic 
development, such as liberal economic policies, open markets and trade, help to create 
jobs and provide long term incomes for the poorest.  The empirical evidence supports this 
theory, as poverty often falls during periods of economic growth (Ravallion and Guarev, 
2002; Besley and Burgess, 2003; Ravallion and Chen, 2007).  Similarly, the absence of 
sustained economic development in some of the poorest countries is a cause of persistent 
poverty (Collier, 2008). 
Though there is a consensus in the literature that economic growth is good for the 
poor, recent empirical research has investigated the heterogeneity of the growth-poverty 
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relationship (Loayza and Raddatz, 2010).  In this research, I consider how the degree of 
fiscal decentralization may explain variations in the effects of growth on poverty. 
Fiscal decentralization could improve the outcomes of growth for the poorest by 
shifting the focus from national economic development to local economic development.  
Innocents (2011) argues that local governments with responsibility to raise revenue and 
allocate expenditure will invest in local infrastructure; local productivity and boost the 
local economy.  The decentralization of revenue and expenditure functions to local 
governments would also lead to fiscal competition, where local governments reduce taxes 
on capital and increase spending on infrastructure in order to attract capital and wealth to 
the local area (Hoyt, 1991; Keen and Marchand, 1997). 
On the other hand, fiscal decentralization may harm efforts to reduce poverty and 
inequality through national growth.  Some areas of the country may observe faster rates 
of growth than others.  For example, regions with higher levels of human capital and 
better infrastructure may observe a productivity advantage (Cai and Treisman, 2005).  
Consequently, more capital will be invested in the area, and over time inter-regional 
inequalities will grow.  We may also observe inter-regional inequalities through unequal 
tax capacities where some regions observe a higher tax intake and are able to invest more 
in infrastructure and boost local growth.  
Essentially, poverty may fall faster in some areas of the country than others 
(Prud’homme, 1995).  This presents a new problem of inter-regional inequality in growth 
and poverty.  Whilst local economic development can help alleviate poverty and 
inequality at the local level, it is the central government that will need to address national 
inequality (Elbers et al., 2007).  Boadway and Shah (2009) also support the need for a 
strong central government to harmonize efforts to reduce poverty between regions.   This 
can be achieved by equalising expenditure between regional and local governments 
through transfers and block grants.  Ultimately the central government will be required to 
harmonise regional efforts to tackle local poverty.  Too much decentralization will 
weaken the central government and increase likelihood of inter-regional inequalities 
arising through tax and expenditure competition.       
 The empirical evidence, though limited, appears to support both points of view.  
Pappa (2005) provides empirical evidence that in the US, spending at the state level is 
more productive, increasing employment opportunities and wages more than equal 
spending by the federal government.  Thießon (2003) also identifies a positive 
relationship between productivity and fiscal decentralization.  However, Thießon (2003) 
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identifies a non-linear relationship between decentralization and productivity.  
Specifically, the relationship is hump-shaped, where too little or too much 
decentralization can have a negative effect on productivity. 
Most of the empirical evidence in the decentralization literature focuses on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and national growth.  The empirical evidence 
in this area is inconclusive.  Davoodi and Zou (1998) provide evidence that fiscal 
decentralization is negatively associated with economic growth in less developed 
countries and Akai and Sakata (2002) observe a positive relationship between 
decentralization and growth in the USA.  However, Thornton (2007) uses new data on 
subnational government autonomy21 and finds no significant relationship between 
decentralization and growth.  Gemmell et al. (2013) compare the effects of revenue and 
expenditure decentralization on economic growth.  They find that expenditure 
decentralization is associated with lower economic growth, but in contrast, revenue 
decentralization is associated with higher growth.   
Overall, the empirical evidence does not provide a clear picture on the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and growth, at the local or national level.  Even if fiscal 
decentralization is associated with higher growth at the national level, this is not evidence 
that fiscal decentralization improves the outcomes of growth for the poorest.  For 
example, if fiscal decentralization enhances growth only in the wealthier areas of the 
country, then income inequality could rise and poverty may remain unchanged.  It is 
essential that poorer areas grow as well (see Ravallion and Chen, 2007). 
 
3.1.2. Tax, Expenditure and Poverty  
 
Economic growth alone may not be sufficient to reduce absolute poverty and inequality.  
When the benefits of growth do not accrue to the poorest (Boadway and Shah, 2009) then 
the government can tackle poverty and inequality directly through taxation and 
expenditure.  They can do this through progressive taxation and through spending on 
poverty alleviation programs; employment programs and social services. 
Gupta et al. (2002), reflects on the importance of a progressive tax system in 
addressing inequality.  Progressive taxation ensures that governments can raise sufficient 
                                                 
21 Thornton uses decentralization on subnational government autonomy (i.e. whether subnational 
government sets tax rate and tax base of tax revenue) from the OECD Fiscal Decentralization Database 
73 | P a g e  
 
revenue without taxing the poorest, and use that revenue for expenditure on services vital 
for the poor (education, healthcare, social services).  On the expenditure side, Fan et al. 
(2000) distinguish between the direct and indirect effects of government spending on the 
poorest.  Governments can address poverty directly by providing employment 
opportunities for the poorest or by boosting incomes through cash transfers (Boadway 
and Shah, 2009).  However, allocating expenditure to infrastructure, research and 
development and education are more effective in reducing poverty (Fan et al., 2000).   
The empirical evidence suggests that increasing government expenditure can 
reduce poverty by increasing employment opportunities and boosting real wages.  Pappa 
(2005) and Owyang and Zubairy (2013) provide empirical evidence of a positive 
association between government spending and employment and real wages, in the public 
and private sector.  However, Ravallion and Chen (2007) argue that increasing 
government spending may not be the most effective way for governments to reduce 
poverty.  Instead, governments should try to cut taxes that hurt the poor. Ravallion and 
Chen provide empirical evidence that tax cuts, specifically in agriculture, helped reduce 
poverty in rural areas in China.  The cuts in taxes are more effective in reducing poverty 
than equivalent increases in government spending.   
 
3.1.2.1. Tax and Expenditure Decentralization and Poverty 
 
Supporters argue that decentralized spending can improve the allocation of public 
expenditure and thereby reduce the cost incurred by citizens for the set of public policies 
(Oates, 1972).  This includes the provision of essential public goods, public services and 
programs aimed at alleviating poverty.  Tanzi (1996) explains that local governments are 
more informed of the local needs and preferences and are better placed to address them 
through local public expenditure.  Elbers et al. (2007) addresses this point specifically, 
where local governments in regions with higher levels of poverty are able to focus on 
helping the local poor through the provision of services and employment programs than 
may otherwise be provided by a distant central government.   Fiscal 
decentralization could also empower the poorest citizens to move to a local area where 
the set of public policies best meet their demands (Tiebout, 1956).  However, the poorest 
citizens may be the least mobile, due to the costs associated with moving from one 
jurisdiction to the other.  Nevertheless, as tax and spending functions are devolved to the 
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smallest government units (i.e. the local governments), the poorest households will be 
more able to move to a particular area (jurisdiction) that provides essential public goods 
and services that will help them to climb out of poverty. 
 Fiscal decentralization could help address some of the administrative issues 
associated with direct spending on the poorest.  Boadway and Shah (2009) argue that 
spending on the poorest doesn’t always reach the intended targets.  Should targets fail to 
receive aid, and those who are not targets consume some of the goods and services 
provided for the poorest, then ultimately this will harm efforts by government to reduce 
poverty.  In less developed countries where resources are scarce, expenditure will need 
to be allocated strictly based on who is most in need of aid (Elbers et al., 2007; Coady 
and Morley, 2003).  The inefficient allocation of already scarce resources will hurt the 
poorest more, particularly in less developed countries where the incidence of absolute 
poverty is higher.   
A consequence of a more efficient allocation of public expenditure may be that 
taxes will fall, as the cost of providing public goods and services tends toward the 
minimum point through decentralized expenditures (Oates, 1972 and Tiebout, 1956).  
Fiscal decentralization may also constrain the rent-maximising central government 
(Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), which would reduce taxes for citizens and in turn remove 
barriers to prosperity (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).   
Opponents of fiscal decentralization often consider the problems of redistribution 
at the subnational government level (Oates, 1972) and inter-regional inequalities arising 
from unequal endowments (i.e. infrastructure, human capital) between regions (Boadway 
and Shah, 2009).  Such problems arise where local government face incentives to reduce 
taxes on the wealthiest citizens (Prud’homme, 1995) and divert expenditures from welfare 
spending to productivity enhancing expenditures, i.e. infrastructure (Keen and Marchand, 
1997). 
First, expenditure decentralization may lead to a different composition of public 
expenditures that is harmful for the poorest.  Local governments may seek to attract 
capital investment in their local area by spending on productivity enhancing goods and 
services: infrastructure and airports, for example (Keen and Marchand, 1997).  As a 
consequence, less resources will be allocated to social services and on redistribution. 
Second, tax decentralization may lead to a race to the bottom in taxes on capital, 
again with a motivation to attract capital to the region.  As Hoyt (1991) demonstrates, in 
a decentralized setting, the competition for capital between local governments will lead 
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to sub-optimal taxation of capital, and consequently a sub-optimal provision of public 
goods and services (Hoyt, 1991).  Though both tax and spending competition could 
improve economic development (Chu and Yang, 2012), if the poorest citizens are not 
receiving the benefits of growth, then governments will still need to provide essential 
public services and redistribute wealth.  Prud’homme (1995) also argues that tax on 
wealthier citizens will fall because those citizens can move more freely, away from 
regions with higher taxes on wealth, and to other regions with lower taxes.  If there is 
asymmetric mobility, local governments will resort to taxing the less mobile, and reduce 
taxes on those who are more mobile (Boadway and Shah 2009; Treisman, 2007).  Oates 
(1972) points out that if decentralization does reduce inequality, it will only do so within 
the local area by separating the population according to wealth. 
Third, fiscal decentralization may lead to inter-regional inequalities, in growth, in 
local government tax and spending capacity, and in poverty.  Cai and Treisman (2005) 
explain that the return to capital may be different between regions, due to the current 
infrastructure, human capital, natural resources, location (i.e. landlocked), and therefore 
those regions observe a competitive advantage.  All other things equal (capital tax rate, 
infrastructure spending), better endowed regions will observe greater capital investments, 
higher growth, and higher tax revenues and spending.  Boadway and Shah (2009) explain 
that in the event of inter-regional inequality, the central government will be required to 
harmonise tax and spending between regions, through transfers.  However, another 
problem may develop through fiscal decentralization that would weaken the central 
government’s capacity to tackle inter-regional inequality. 
Fiscal decentralization could limit the tax resources accruing to the central 
government, thereby reducing the central government’s capacity to reduce inter-regional 
inequalities.  Vertical tax competition, where subnational government and central 
government compete to tax the same subject, could reduce the taxes set by the central 
government (Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2004; Treisman, 2007) reduce the capacity of 
central government to tackle poverty and inequality between regions.  This argument is 
also true for differences in taxation and spending between regions.  In areas where there 
is a higher concentration of poverty, local governments may be unable to raise sufficient 
tax revenues to tackle absolute poverty.  Central governments can equalize efforts to 
reduce poverty through expenditure by providing additional resources to poorer areas 
through intergovernmental transfers (Boadway and Shah, 2009).  Salmon (1987) and 
Tanzi (1996) argue that the central government will be required to provide grants to 
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poorer regions in order to reduce the inter-regional inequality between wealthy and less 
well-off regions  
There is only limited research on the effects of decentralization on tax and 
spending, specifically the relationship between decentralization and government size.  
Oates (1985) concludes that decentralization does not reduce the size of government 
(measured by tax revenue) for a selection of low, middle and high income countries.  
Ehdaie (1994) however observes a negative relationship between decentralization and 
government size, whilst Jin and Zou (2002) observe that the relationship is positive for 
the decentralization of expenditure, but negative for the decentralization of revenue.   
Overall it is unclear whether fiscal decentralization will improve the outcomes of 
government spending on the poorest, or instead lead to lower taxes on capital and lower 
spending on welfare.  In practice, different types of decentralization may produce 
different outcomes.  Expenditure decentralization could boost efficiency and 
effectiveness of government spending overall, where local governments are best placed 
to address local needs.  However, revenue decentralization and local government 
autonomy could lead to fiscal competition between local governments and hinder efforts 
by the central government to tackle poverty and inequality nationally.     
 
3.1.3. Governance and Poverty 
 
Finally, the quality of government will also determine the ability of governments to 
address poverty through taxation and spending.  Collier (2008) argues that the prevalence 
of corruption is strongly associated with persistent poverty in some of the poorest 
countries.  Poor governance is associated with the misuse of funds, specifically funds 
intended for the poorest (Collier, 2008).  The negative consequence of poor governance 
will be greater in less developed countries, where absolute poverty is higher and fiscal 
capacity is more limited (Rodden and Rose-Ackerman, 1997).   
There are a few reasons why corruption has a greater negative effect on the 
poorest.  First, corruption can limit revenues and increase the cost of government.  Gupta 
et al. (2002) argue that corruption threatens the “progressivity of tax systems” (pp. 25) 
and increases the operating costs of government.  Consequently, corruption will further 
limit the resources available for tackling poverty and for increasing the provision of vital 
public services.  Second, weaker governments are less accountable to the electorate, 
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particularly the poorest, and corrupt governments spend less on the poorest (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999).  Third, corruption may change the composition of spending, 
specifically from education, healthcare and social services, to military and technology 
programs (see Mauro, 1998).    
Mauro (1998) and Gupta et al. (2002) provide some evidence of a link between 
corruption and increased poverty and income inequality.  Mauro (1998) examines the 
effects of corruption on the composition of government spending, and conclude that 
higher levels of corruption result in less spending on social programs, intended for the 
poorest.  Gupta et al. (2002) examine the direct link between corruption and income based 
poverty and inequality.  They provide robust evidence of an association between higher 
levels of corruption and higher levels of absolute poverty and income inequality.  Their 
empirical research covers a selection of low, middle and high income countries, and 
covers a period of 18 years, between 1970 and 1987. 
 
3.1.3.1. Governance, Poverty and Fiscal Decentralization 
 
The decentralization literature offers conflicting views on how fiscal decentralization may 
affect the quality of government. 
 On the one hand, fiscal decentralization can empower citizens to hold local 
governments to account (Salmon, 1987).  First, local elections mean that local 
government decision making is driven by local welfare.  As Seabright (1996) 
demonstrates, in order for local governments to be elected they must improve the welfare 
of local citizens through a set of local policies.  This is in contrast to a central government 
that needs to satisfy only a sufficient number of localities, but not all of them.  Second, 
local citizens can contrast the performance of their home government with governments 
of neighbouring jurisdictions.  As Besley and Case (1995) explain, yardstick competition 
provides disincentives for rent-seeking governments, which will be found out should they 
seek to over-charge local citizens for public goods and services.  As a consequence of 
local elections and yardstick competition, local governments must cut waste, inefficiency 
and corruption in order to be re-elected.  Finally, Fan et al. (2009) explain that if fiscal 
decentralization helps to reduce waste and inefficiency, by any means, then politicians 
will face greater risks from rent-seeking, as citizens will be better able to distinguish 
between inefficient government and corrupt government. 
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However, Prud’homme (1995) and Tanzi (1996) argue that decentralization 
provides greater incentives for corruption at the local government level.  Tanzi explains 
that corruption is stimulated by the proximity of government to elite groups.  Therefore, 
by bringing governments closer to those affected by government policy, there is a greater 
risk of elite capture – local politicians responding to the demands of local elites 
(Prud’homme, 1995).  The design of decentralization policy could also increase 
corruption.  If responsibilities are not clearly assigned to governments, or are shared, then 
local citizens may be unable to discipline governments effectively (Fukasaku and de 
Mello, 1999).  Local government accountability depends on whether local governments 
are in fact directly elected, or instead, appointed centrally.  Tanzi (1996) argues that the 
nature of the relationship between decentralization and governance depends on the 
incentives for local government executives.  If the local government and executives are 
democratically elected, then they will be more responsive to the local citizens.  However, 
if the central government appoints local government executives, then the incentive to 
provide for local citizens would not exist. 
 Empirical studies in this area have often supported the view that decentralization 
is improves the quality of government; however, the results are sensitive to the choice of 
indicator for fiscal decentralization and the selection of control variables.  Fisman and 
Gatti (2002) observe a positive relationship between expenditure decentralization and the 
quality of government in a cross-country analysis.  Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) 
show that fiscal decentralization can improve the quality of government, however this 
relationship is conditional on the existence of strong national parties.  Treisman (2000) 
argues that the nature of the relationship between decentralization and governance is 
sensitive to the type of decentralization.  Altunbas and Thornton (2011) find that fiscal 
decentralization helps reduce corruption, but this relationship is mitigated when including 
information on vertical administration and local government autonomy. 
 
3.1.4. Summary of Related Literature 
 
Overall, the literature provides contrasting views on the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and poverty.  On the one hand, decentralization can help improve 
efficiency of public spending (Oates, 1972), help reduce tax rates (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980) and ensure that local governments are directly accountable to local 
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citizens (Seabright, 1996).  On the other hand, fiscal decentralization may lead to 
competition between local governments through tax (Hoyt, 1991) and spending (Keen 
and Marchand, 1997), and consequently reduce spending on social services and 
redistribution.  Fiscal decentralization may also lead to inter-regional inequality in 
growth, taxation and spending (Cai and Treisman, 2005).   
However, there may be certain aspects of decentralization that are good for the 
poor, and other aspects that could be quite harmful.  In my empirical research I consider 
aspects of decentralization that are relevant to the arguments above.  For example, 
electoral decentralization is essential for local government accountability.  On the other 
hand, appointment of local government executives can ensure that local governments 
deliver according to central government suggestion.  Another potentially important factor 
is the degree of mobility of citizens.  The size of local governments may have a bearing 
on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty.  As the size of the local 
jurisdictions falls, citizens become more mobile and have a greater range of local 
jurisdictions that they can move to.  Therefore, the average size of the local jurisdiction 
is inversely related to Tiebout (1956) and Hoyt’s (1991) arguments on fiscal competition.  
Federal governments may exhibit different effects to Unitary governments.  One reason 
may be that Federal governments are typically more devolved (Altunbas and Thornton, 
2011), and the benefits of greater decentralization may depend on the degree of 
decentralization at the time (Thießon, 2003).  Federal governments are also likely to 
observe greater subnational government decision making in other areas (i.e. the 
construction of poverty alleviation programs).  The merits of fiscal decentralization may 
also depend on other mitigating factors.   
The relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty may be sensitive to 
how economically developed a country is.  There are a number of reasons why fiscal 
decentralization may perform differently in low income countries than in high income 
countries.  Boadway and Shah (2009) argue that the incidence of poverty is greater in less 
developed countries where tax resources are more limited.  Rodden and Rose-Ackerman 
(1997) suggest that for decentralization to prosper there needs to be sufficient tax 
resources to distribute between the different tiers of government.  Similarly, Boadway 
and Shah (2009) explain that the definition of ‘resources’ is not limited to tax and 
spending, but also personnel.  For decentralized government to prosper there needs to be 
skilled managers at every tier of government.  The absence of a large pool of skilled 
managers may strengthen the case for centralized administration.  On the other hand, 
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decentralization may improve democracy and the quality of government in less developed 
countries, and therefore have a greater positive effect on the poor relative to more 
economically developed countries.  In this empirical research I class countries into two 
income groups: i) high income countries, ii) low and middle income countries, and 
provide further estimations on the effects of fiscal decentralization according to these 
samples.   
 Finally, fiscal decentralization may perform differently during periods of stronger 
growth, higher levels of government expenditure and better quality government.  For 
example, Loayza and Raddatz (2010) provide evidence that the degree to which economic 
growth reduces poverty depends on the strength of growth.  The final aim of my research 
is to see whether fiscal decentralization has a stronger effect on poverty and income 
distribution under certain conditions, or whether fiscal decentralization mitigates against 
the negative or positive direct effects of the control variables for growth, spending and 
governance.   
 
3.2. Data Definitions  
 
In this section I outline the data that I will use in this empirical research.  I explain the 
choice of data that I will use to represent the poverty, income distribution and fiscal 
decentralization, and include references to previous work that is comparable to this study.  
I also provide a list of control variables to represent the other determinants of poverty. 
 
3.2.1. Poverty and Income Distribution Indicators 
 
I use two variables to examine changes in poverty and income distribution.  The first 
variable captures changes in absolute poverty – the percentage of the population earning 
below $1.25 a day (World Bank).  The headcount measure is often used to capture 
changes in absolute poverty (see Beck et al., 2007); however, I opt for a slightly higher 
threshold of $1.2522.  Data for absolute poverty is available for low and middle income 
countries.  The second variable captures changes in income distribution – the Gini 
coefficient.  The Gini coefficient provides a numerical value for the difference between 
equal distribution of income across the entire population and the Lorenz curve.  The Gini 
                                                 
22 Ravallion et al. (2008) advocate a $1.25/day threshold for absolute poverty.   
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coefficient ranges between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality).  An increase in 
the Gini coefficient reflects an increase in income inequality.  The Gini coefficient is often 
used in empirical research on income distribution (see Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Beck et 
al., 2007; Ravallion and Chen, 2007).  My Gini coefficient data is comprised of three 
sources: World Bank, OECD and unu-Wider, and covers low, middle and high income 
countries.  The definition of the Gini coefficient is consistent between the three sources 
and there is little overlap between the individual datasets23.  By combining them I have 
increased the scope of the research substantially.   
The final panel dataset covers 57 countries over a period of 20 years, between 
1990 and 2009.  The dataset is unbalanced and the data available for each country is often 
less than the maximum 20 observations between 1990 and 2009.  Gini coefficient is 
available for low, middle and high income countries24, with 592 observations in total25.  
The poverty data is available for low and middle income countries only.  All poverty and 
income distribution data is transformed to their logarithms.  The logarithm of the data 
means I can examine changes in the dependent variables, particularly where observations 
are close to 0 (i.e. the levels of absolute poverty).   
For examining cross-sectional variations in the indicators I convert the panel data 
into averages for the time period.  Due to gaps in the panel data, the length of time that a 
single observation represents is often less than the maximum 20 years.  The average 
length of time between first and last observations for each of the countries is 11 years.  
Gini coefficient data is available for all 57 countries and absolute poverty data is available 
for 28 low and middle income countries.   
 
3.2.2. Decentralization Indicators 
 
To capture the different aspects of decentralization I use a wide range of indicators.  I 
capture the share of government activity, SCG Revenue and SCG Expenditure.  I capture 
                                                 
23 When data is available (for a given year, given country) in more than one source, there Gini coefficient 
is not identical.  This could mean that data was taken at a different time of the year between the two sources, 
or that there is measurement error.  The fact that the data is not identical between the two sources is a cause 
for concern, even if the difference is relatively small.  Therefore, in such instances where there is 
overlapping data between the sources, I have chosen only one source, covering the longest period of time. 
24 Income classification is based on World Bank definition: available here 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications.  Some countries change income groups during the 
time period.  The classification in this table is based on an average across the time period 
25 592 observations for 57 countries is roughly 10.4 observations per country.   
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subnational government autonomy using SCG Autonomous Expenditure.  Alongside 
these indicators I capture other aspects of decentralization with a wide range of qualitative 
indicators from Treisman (2008) and Ivanyna and Shah (2014).  These indicators are: 
local government area size (Ivanyna and Shah), federal constitution and electoral 
decentralization (Treisman, 2008).  I omit an additional interaction between the panel 
decentralization indicators and legislative decentralization, though I did initially estimate 
this relationship.  The main reason for omitted this interaction is due to similar results 
between legislative decentralization and federal constitution in their interactions with the 
tax and spending indicators.  Though some unitary countries observed legislative 
decentralization, for example, the results themselves were similar in magnitude, and the 
sign of the coefficients were the same. 
 The decentralization dataset for this chapter covers 57 countries over the 20-year 
period.  SCG Revenue data covers all 57 countries, with 592 observations.  There are only 
a few gaps in the SCG Expenditure data (587 observations). Finally, SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure covers 55 countries, but contains more gaps, with 447 observations.  Data is 
complete for local government size, and of the 57 countries covered in this research, 45 
of them observe electoral decentralization, whilst 12 observe appointments by central 
government.  13 have a federal constitution, whilst 40 do not (data is missing for four 
countries).     
    
3.2.3. Control Variables 
 
I also include a selection of control variables to represent other determinants of poverty 
and income distribution.  I include four controls for economic indicators based on a 
similar piece of research (see Beck et al., 2007).  I control for income level (logarithm of 
real GDP per capita), economic growth (annual growth of GDP per capita in nominal 
terms), inflation (consumer price index) and foreign trade (logarithm of total trade as a 
share of GDP).  I also include controls for government spending, the quality of 
government and short selection of indicators for public services.  My additional controls 
include government expenditure (logarithm of general government consumption 
expenditure, in current US dollars), governance (Corruption Perception Index)26, primary 
                                                 
26 The corruption perception index ranges between 0 (high perceived corruption) to 10 (low perceived 
corruption).  Therefore, a higher value indicates better quality of government/better governance.  Gupta et 
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enrolment (the logarithm of primary school enrolment), immunization (the logarithm of 
immunization) and sanitation (the logarithm of access to improved sanitation facilities).  
All of the data is available in the World Bank World Development Indicators dataset, 
with the exception of the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International).  
I list each of the control variables above in table 7.  I include an expectation of the 
coefficient sign, i.e. the expected association between the control variable and 
poverty/income inequality. 
 
The final dataset covers a maximum of 5727 low, middle and high income countries, over 
a period of 20 years, from 1990 to 2009.  The panel dataset is unbalanced: there are gaps 
in the absolute poverty data, and for some of the control variables.  However, I have 
ensured that data is complete for the Gini coefficient and SCG Revenue Decentralization.   
  
                                                 
al., (2002) included this data in their empirical research on corruption and poverty.  Treisman (2002) also 
used the same corruption perception index in his research on decentralization and governance.   
27 For a full list of countries featured in Chapter 3, see Appendix B 
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Table 7: List of Control Variables 
Determinant of Poverty Expected Coefficient Sign (to 
poverty) 
Income (logarithm of real GDP per capita) Negative 
Economic Growth (annual growth in nominal GDP 
per capita) 
Negative 
Inflation (consumer price index) Positive28  
Trade (logarithm of total trade as a share of GDP) Unknown29 
Government Expenditure (logarithm of general 
government consumption expenditure, in US $) 
Negative 
Governance (corruption perception index) Negative 
Healthcare (logarithm of immunization coverage) Negative 
Education (logarithm of primary school enrolment) Negative 
Infrastructure (logarithm of improved sanitation 
facilities) 
Negative 
  
                                                 
28 Most of the literature considers the negative consequences of high inflation on the poor, where a large 
increase in prices affects the poorest more (see Cudjoe et al., 2010; Alem and Sodermon, 2012; Fujii, 2013) 
29 Liberalization seen as positive for the poor (Donaldson, 2008) and trade associated with job creation 
(Bene et al., 2010).  However, in practice trade and liberalization has had mixed effects (see O’Rourke, 
2000; Clemens and Williamson, 2001) 
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3.3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  
In this section I provide a description of the data used in this research.  I provide 
descriptive statistics for the cross-sectional dataset, including the average levels of the 
poverty and income distribution indicators between 1990 and 2009 for this set of 
countries.  I also include additional statistics for the growth of the dependent variables for 
the time period.  These statistics can provide some evidence of the changes in the 
dependent variables between 1990 and 2009.  All statistics are provided for the entire 
sample, and for each of three income groups (low, middle and high income).  The last 
statistics I provide are the pairwise correlation coefficients for the panel dataset for all of 
the variables used in this research.   
 
3.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics are for the cross-sectional dataset.  The statistics reflect the 
average levels of all dependent and independent variables for the cross-sectional 
indicators (table 8).  I also include statistics for the growth in the Gini coefficient and 
growth in poverty over the time period.  I provide further statistics according to income 
group: low, middle and high income 
 
3.3.1.1. Poverty and Income Distribution  
 
In table 8, panel A, there is evidence of large variations in income distribution and 
absolute poverty.  Across the sample of 57 countries, the deviation, minimum and 
maximum statistics demonstrate the range of observations in this dataset.  More equal 
countries appear to be in the European continent, with the lowest degree of income 
inequality in Denmark (0.2273) and Finland (0.2346).  At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, countries in South America exhibit larger degrees of income inequality: in 
Colombia (0.5783) and Bolivia (0.5618).  Across all observations for the Gini coefficient 
there is a positive skew.  Most countries exhibit lower than the mean level of income 
inequality, with a few countries exhibiting much higher degrees of income inequality.   
 In the sample of 28 low and middle countries, 5.8% of the population earn below 
$1.25 a day.  There is a large variation within the dataset.  The distribution of countries 
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is characterized by a sharp positive skew.  Of the 28 countries, in 11 of them under 1% 
of the population earns below the poverty income threshold, and in 18 of them under 5%.  
However, there is only one statistical outlier – Tajikistan.  In Tajikistan, 33% of the 
population earn below the $1.25 income threshold.  Removing this outlier brings the mean 
absolute poverty down below 5% (4.79%). 
In terms of the growth coefficients, there appears to be an increase in income 
inequality, but a decline in absolute poverty.  The Gini coefficient has increased gradually 
over the time period.  Across the 57 countries, there is an even distribution of positive 
and negative changes in income inequality.  28 of 57 countries observe a decline in 
inequality (a fall in the Gini coefficient). 
 The largest negative change is in Kazakhstan where over 8 years there has been a 
-4.34% annual change in the Gini coefficient.  Croatia (-2.27% over 10 years) and 
Romania (-2.64% over 14 years) also observe large changes in income distribution.  
Those countries observing positive changes in income inequality are more clustered, near 
a 1% annual change in the Gini coefficient.   
Absolute poverty has declined over the last 20 years in most of the low and middle 
income countries, with an overall decline across the sample.  There has been sharp falls 
in absolute poverty in a few countries in the sample.  Kazakhstan observes the largest 
decline in poverty – a staggering -60% annual change in headcount over 8 years.  
Argentina is at the opposite end of the scale, with an 18.7% increase in headcount (over 
13 years).   
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics (cross-sectional dataset)   
Panel A: Poverty and Income Distribution 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Gini Coefficient 57 0.3524 0.0966 0.2273 0.5839 
Absolute Poverty 28 5.8017 7.9249 0.0746 33.1267 
Growth in Gini 57 0.0935 1.162701 -4.3447 2.9437 
Growth in Poverty 26 -12.40 19.7795 -60.24 18.7446 
 
Panel B: Decentralization 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
SCG Revenue 57 24.53 13.03 1.52 59.7 
SCG Expenditure 57 23.59 13.3 1.28 58.65 
SCG Autonomous Expenditure  55 15.19 11.03 0.01 44.16 
Local Government Size 57 75.23 71.59 7.92 394.16 
 
Panel C: Selection of Covariates 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Real GDP/capita 56 22530 16101 1426 83565 
Economic Growth 55 3.179 2.133 0.28 11.93 
Inflation 55 11.25 24.92 0.8 129 
Trade 57 0.8829 0.4295 0.24 2.793 
Immunization Coverage 57 0.9226 0.0482 0.736 0.99 
Primary Enrolment 45 0.9436 0.0429 0.821 0.998 
Improved Sanitation 56 0.9088 0.1393 0.3709 0.100 
Government Expenditure 57 8.451 22.925 0.016 160 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 56 5.34 2.38 1.9 9.59 
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3.3.1.2. Decentralization and Controls 
 
In panel B it is clear that tax and expenditure in most countries is heavily centralized.  
SCG Revenue and SCG Expenditure are very similar: in average, deviation and the 
ranking of countries within the sample is similar between both variables.  Canada (59.7%) 
and Switzerland (51.0%) are the only two countries where sub-central government 
accounts for more than half of general government revenue.  United States (49.7%) is not 
far behind.  The least decentralized countries are Costa Rica, Armenia and Greece, all 
hovering around 5% revenue decentralization.  Less than 20 per cent of the sample 
observes below 10% revenue decentralization.   
 When accounting for fiscal autonomy it is clear that SCG Revenue and SCG 
Expenditure overestimate the degree of fiscal decentralization.  SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure is 15% for the entire sample.  However, there are large variations in the data.  
Canada is the most decentralized (44.16%), yet this is large decline from the 
administrative decentralization data of close to 60%.  For some countries fiscal 
decentralization is considerably lower than administrative decentralization: United 
Kingdom shows a decline from 23% administrative decentralization to 7% fiscal 
decentralization.  In the Czech Republic sub-central governments account for over 21% 
of total government expenditure, but the degree of fiscal decentralization is less than 1%.  
This evidence appears to support the view that administrative decentralization data 
overestimates the degree of decentralization (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002).  Of the total 
number of countries included in the sample (55), 23 observe less than 10% of fiscal 
decentralization.    Finally, there is a wide range of local government sizes (area).  The 
largest LG size is Australia, 394 square kilometres, whilst the smallest tend to be 
European countries: France, Portugal and Germany all below the average level.   
 In panel C we see that on average there has been economic growth over the time 
period.  Economic growth was positive between 1990 and 2009, across the entire sample 
the average growth per annum is 3.18%.  None of the countries observed negative average 
growth over the time period.  Also, the large deviations in the control variables illustrate 
that this dataset contains a wide variety of countries.  Income per capita, government 
expenditure and the provision of healthcare, education and access to sanitation facilities 
all exhibit large variations in the cross-sectional dataset. 
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3.3.1.3. Income Groups Comparison 
 
In table 9 there are noticeable differences in the control variables between income groups 
(low, middle and high income).  The first differences are in the Gini coefficient (in levels 
and in growth).  First, high income countries, particularly in Europe, have much lower 
levels of income inequality.  In the low and middle income samples, the Gini coefficient 
is roughly the same, near a 0.40 coefficient.  In high income countries the average is 10 
points lower, near 0.30.  Within the samples, high income countries are more clustered 
around the mean of the Gini coefficient for the sample, whilst low and middle income 
countries observe a wide range of observations.   
Second, in low and high income countries income inequality has risen, but in 
middle income countries income inequality has fallen.  Within the middle income group, 
there is a larger variation in the Gini coefficient.  Again, higher income countries are more 
clustered, often observing increases in income inequality.  Even with the exclusion of the 
outlier (Kazakhstan), middle income countries are more spread around the mean negative 
change in the Gini coefficient.   
The third difference is in the fiscal decentralization indicators.  High income 
countries observe higher degrees of decentralization for each of the indicators.  This 
finding is consistent with previous analysis of fiscal decentralization between less and 
more economically developed counties (see Oates, 1972; Bahl, 1999; Davoodi and Zou, 
1998).  There is not much different in local government size between the income groups.  
The two countries with the largest local government size are high income countries 
(Australia and Canada), but the average of the income group samples are similar. 
 Fourth, there are large differences between groups for the selection of control 
variables.  There is evidence that the poorest countries observe faster economic growth, 
though the sample is small.  Middle income countries have also grown faster than higher 
income countries.  High income countries are more clustered.  Trade accounts for a higher 
proportion of GDP in lower and middle income countries.  Inflation is highest in the 
middle income sample, and is steady in the high income sample.  The provision of public 
services also varies between income groups.  For example, access to improved sanitation 
facilities is 70.4% in low income countries, 86.7% in middle income countries, and almost 
100% in high income countries.  Government expenditure is lower and perceived 
corruption higher in low and middle income countries  
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics, Income Group Comparison 
Panel A: Low Income 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Gini Coefficient 5 0.3942 0.1005 0.3168 0.5618 
Growth in Gini 5 0.7887 1.5698 -0.6772 2.9437 
SCG Revenue 5 28.34 3.46 25.45 32.48 
SCG Expenditure 5 26.58 6.30 22.09 36.05 
SCG Autonomous Expenditure 5 19.88 3.02 16.21 23.29 
Local Government Size 5 80.57 82.70 25.24 215.54 
Real GDP/capita 5 3353.39 1192.46 1426.28 4343.19 
Economic Growth 5 4.602 2.517 1.47 7.24 
Inflation 5 8.338 3.727 3.44 12.29 
Trade 5 0.9872 0.3472 0.549 1.3289 
Immunization Coverage 5 0.8614 0.0841 0.736 0.9492 
Primary Enrolment 4 0.9124 0.0465 0.8575 0.9692 
Improved Sanitation 5 0.7044 0.2613 0.3709 0.9495 
Government Expenditure 5 0.0638 0.0500 0.016 0.13 
Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) 
4 2.4625 0.4034 1.9 2.76 
 
Panel B: Middle Income 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Gini Coefficient 27 0.3963 0.1088 0.2414 0.5839 
Growth in Gini 27 -0.0623 1.4521 -4.3447 2.6380 
SCG Revenue 27 20.20 11.31 4.87 43.63 
SCG Expenditure 27 18.09 10.96 3.48 40.51 
SCG Autonomous Expenditure 25 13.18 9.46 2.64 33.87 
Local Government Size 27 72.16 48.97 15.47 180.37 
Real GDP/capita 26 11967.75 4820.87 4060.02 24186.3 
Economic Growth 27 3.9133 2.4092 0.28 11.93 
Inflation 25 20.42 35.03 3.63 129.1 
Trade 27 0.8733 0.3434 0.24 1.7613 
Immunization Coverage 27 0.9404 0.0284 0.873 0.99 
Primary Enrolment 20 .09167 0.0389 0.821 0.9652 
Improved Sanitation 27 0.8673 0.1156 0.6513 1.00 
Government Expenditure 27 1.601 2.969 0.066 15 
Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) 
27 3.781 1.180 2.32 7.07 
 
Panel C: High Income 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Gini Coefficient 25 0.2966     0.0389 0.2273 0.3673 
Growth in Gini 25 0.1571 0.5605 -0.9196 1.4085 
SCG Revenue 25 28.44 14.67 1.52 59.70 
SCG Expenditure 25 28.92 14.50 1.28 58.65 
SCG Autonomous Expenditure 25 16.27 13.16 0.01 44.16 
Local Government Size 25 77.47 90.55 7.92 394.16 
Real GDP/capita 25 37836.98 11978.33 24718.8 83564.8 
Economic Growth 23 2.009 0.7935 0.720 3.96 
Inflation 25 2.670 1.380 0.800 7.26 
Trade 25 0.8818 0.5384 0.2437 2.793 
Immunization Coverage 25 0.9143 0.0472 0.805 0.9775 
Primary Enrolment 21 0.9752 0.0181 0.9367 0.998 
Improved Sanitation 24 0.9987 0.0038 0.9847 1.000 
Government Expenditure 25 18.12 33.17 0.120 160 
Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) 
25 7.535 1.617 4.44 9.59 
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3.3.2. Correlations 
 
In table 10 I provide the pairwise correlation coefficients for the entire dataset.   There 
are some interesting correlations to note.  First, the Gini coefficient for all countries is 
correlated with all of the decentralization indicators.  The negative correlation indicates 
that when fiscal decentralization is higher (for all indicators), income inequality is lower 
and income distribution more equal.  The correlation coefficients are significant at the 
1% level.  Second, only SCG Expenditure is correlated with absolute poverty.  The 
coefficient is negative, which indicates that at higher levels of decentralization, absolute 
poverty is lower.   
 Third, the correlations between the Gini coefficient and absolute poverty and the 
control variables present some interesting results.  Income is negatively correlated with 
poverty (and also with income distribution), which is expected.  However, at higher levels 
of growth the Gini coefficient is higher, indicating higher levels of income inequality.  
Trade is negatively correlated with income inequality and absolute poverty, which could 
indicate that openness to trade benefits the poorest.  Better quality of government is 
correlated with lower inequality and poverty.  Finally, the public service indicators are 
mostly negatively correlated with inequality and poverty, with the exception of primary 
enrolment.  Primary enrolment is positively associated with absolute poverty.   
 The correlation coefficients are not evidence of causation, though they show 
which variables move with higher inequality and poverty, and which variables do not.   
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Table 10: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients (Decentralization and Poverty, Income Distribution, Panel Data)  
 Distribut-
ion 
Poverty SCG 
Revenue 
SCG 
Expend. 
SCG Aut. 
Exp. 
Income Growth Inflation Trade Govern. 
Exp. 
Corrupti-
on 
Immuniz-
ation 
Sanitation Primary 
Enrolment 
Distribution 1.000              
Poverty 0.7019*** 1.000             
SCG Revenue -0.1408*** -0.0485 1.000            
SCG 
Expenditure 
-0.2247*** -0.1317* 0.9364*** 1.000           
SCG 
Autonomous 
Expenditure 
-0.1208** -0.1004 0.8901*** 0.8800*** 1.000          
Income -0.5185*** -0.7209*** 0.2848*** 0.3604*** 0.1888*** 1.000         
Growth 0.0847** -0.0532 -0.1049** -0.0780* 0.0066 -0.2191*** 1.000        
Inflation -0.0490 -0.0950 -0.0578 -0.0648 -0.0425 -0.1821*** -0.1429*** 1.000       
Trade -0.3131*** -0.2491*** -0.3836*** -0.2859*** -0.3259*** -0.0317 0.1470*** 0.0244 1.000      
Government 
Expenditure 
-0.2436*** -0.4616*** 0.4672*** 0.5066*** 0.3289*** 0.7451*** -0.2653*** -0.1630*** -0.4352*** 1.000     
Corruption -0.5107*** -0.2614*** 0.3428*** 0.4059*** 0.2625*** 0.8174*** -0.2108*** -0.2390*** 0.0391 0.5406*** 1.000    
Immunization -0.1637*** -0.3615*** -0.0872** -0.0656 -0.0061 0.0663 0.0188 0.0516 0.1931*** 0.0125 -0.0698 1.000   
Sanitation -0.5879*** -0.4572*** 0.0999** 0.1799*** 0.1277*** 0.6023*** -0.0215 -0.0374 0.1589*** 0.4215*** 0.5414*** 0.2930** 1.000  
Primary 
Enrolment 
-0.1842*** 0.1524* 0.2597*** 0.3107*** 0.1631*** 0.5736*** -0.2103*** -0.1552*** -0.1438*** 0.5396*** 0.5448*** 0.0206 0.3370*** 1.000 
Statistical significance of the pairwise correlation coefficients: 0.10 (*), 0.05 (**), 0.01 (***) 
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3.4. Methodology 
 
In this section I outline the methods used to produce estimates of the relationship between 
poverty and income distribution, and fiscal decentralization.  I outline the initial estimates 
of the relationship using a cross-sectional dataset, before discussing the potential 
endogeneity problems in the initial estimations.  I consider the possibility that fiscal 
decentralization is endogenous (correlated with the error terms), which would bias the 
estimates of the true relationship between decentralization and poverty.  To correct 
against this potential bias, I produce further estimates using a cross-sectional instrument 
variable model, and a panel model with random effects. 
 
3.4.1. Cross-sectional Estimates 
 
The first set of estimations I produce using ordinary least squares, for the cross-sectional 
dataset.  In function 3.1 I examine the relationship between the average level of income 
distribution and poverty (𝑃𝑖) and the average level of tax and spending decentralization 
and control variables over the time period30.  The independent variables include the 
average level of each of the three decentralization indicators (𝐷𝑖), and interactions 
between decentralization and LG area size, electoral decentralization and federal 
constitution (𝐷𝑖. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖).  Finally, I include the average level for each of the control 
variables (represented in vector of 𝑋𝑖).   
 
𝑃𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 3.1 
 
3.4.2. Endogeneity 
 
One of the problems with estimating the true relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and various dependent variables, including poverty and income distribution in this 
research, is that fiscal decentralization could be endogenous in function 3.1.  If this is the 
                                                 
30For most countries data is not available for every single year between 1990 and 2009.  Data often covers 
a shorter time period, with an average of 10 years’ data per country, across the entire dataset.  Therefore, 
the cross-sectional observations do not necessarily cover the entire time period for each country. 
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case, then one of the Gauss Markov conditions would be invalidated, as the covariance 
between decentralization (𝐷𝑖) and the residuals (𝜀𝑖) would not be equal to 0. 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐷𝑖, 𝜀𝑖) ≠ 0 
 
The consequence of endogeneity is that the estimates of the relationship between 
decentralization and the dependent variables, 𝛽1, would be biased and inconsistent.  
Essentially, the estimate of 𝛽1 in the true model may be over/understated in the initial 
OLS estimates in 3.1.  Consequently, this would invalidate tests of significance of the 
estimated parameter and the conclusions of this research. 
 There are several reasons decentralization could be endogenous in 3.1.  First, the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and poverty may work both ways.  In the 
literature survey (section 3.1) I established how fiscal decentralization could impact on 
poverty and income distribution – forward causality.  However, it is possible that the level 
of poverty and inequality could affect central government decision making, with respect 
to decentralization policy.  Poverty, often seen as a bellwether of government 
performance, may lead to further centralization of powers (control) or devolution of 
blame. 
 Second, the absence of explanatory variables in function 3.1 will be contained 
within the residuals as the unexplained variation in the dependent variable.  If fiscal 
decentralization is correlated with those omitted variables, this could bias the estimate of 
𝛽1, the relationship between decentralization and poverty. 
 To correct against the above problems of reverse causality and omitted variable 
bias, I produce further estimates using a cross-sectional instrument variable model, and a 
random effects panel estimator. 
 
3.4.3. Cross-sectional Instrument Variable Estimates 
 
One possible way to eliminate the problem of endogeneity in 3.1 is to instrument the 
endogenous variable, 𝐷𝑖.  Essentially, instruments are used to capture the variation in the 
dependent variable, that is caused by variations in the endogenous variable.  Hence the 
trust effect of decentralization, 𝛽1, can be estimated using a two stage least squares model.  
To produce estimates for a cross-sectional IV model, I require valid instruments for 
95 | P a g e  
 
decentralization.  Valid instruments must meet two conditions.  The first condition is that 
instruments must be associated with the endogenous variable, in this case, 
decentralization ‘𝐷𝑖’.  This is known as the first stage, where the instrument(s) are used 
to explain variations in the decentralization variable. 
 
𝐷𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛿1𝑍1,𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑍2,𝑖 … + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 3.2 
 
The stronger the instrument(s), the more precise the instruments are in capturing 
variations in decentralization.  Therefore, the first stage can be used to identify links 
between the instruments variables and the decentralization variable, through 𝛿1, 𝛿2 and so 
forth.  Collective strength of the instrument variables can also be collective using an f-
test.  Essentially, the covariance between the instrument variable(s) and the endogenous 
variable, must be different from 0. 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ: 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑖, 𝐷𝑖) ≠ 0 
 
However, there is a second condition that must also be met.  That condition is known as 
the exclusion restriction, where the instrument variable(s) should affect the dependent 
variable only through their association with the endogenous variable.  Hence, the 
instruments must be exogenous, uncorrelated with the error term, thereby eliminating the 
problem of endogeneity in the OLS estimations in 3.1: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐸𝑥𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦): 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍𝑖, 𝜀𝑖) = 0 
 
If the instrument variables affect the dependent variable, 𝑃𝑖, either directly or indirectly, 
through 𝜀𝑖, then the problem of endogeneity will remain in the new estimates for the 
cross-sectional instrument variable model.  Therefore, instruments must be strong 
(condition 1) and valid (condition 2) 
Identifying good instruments presents a challenge.  As this is the first empirical 
research into the effects of decentralization on poverty, no previous research could be 
used to identify potential instruments.  Though other studies on the effects of 
decentralization on governance (Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Altunbas and Thornton, 2011); 
trust (de Mello, 2004 and Dincer, 2010), political ideology and various dependent 
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variables (Enikolopov and Zhurakskaya, 2007) have encountered problems of 
endogeneity, there is no certainty that their instruments will satisfy the two conditions for 
my research. 
Instead, I use two instruments for decentralization that I expect to be exogenous, 
and associated with variations in decentralization.  The first instrument I have chosen is 
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation.  De Mello (2004) explains that “in ethnically diverse or 
polarized societies, fiscal decentralization has been an important measure to satisfy the 
minorities’ demands for self-governance” (page 20).  Furthermore, Oates (1972) and 
Tiebout (1956) explain the merits of decentralization with respect to heterogenous 
demands and communities.  There is also empirical evidence that the degree of tax and 
spending decentralization depends on fractionalisation.  Wallis and Oates (1988) and 
Panizza (1999) investigate the effects of a selection of variables on the degree of 
decentralization, in the US and across a broad selection of countries.  One of those 
variables, fractionalisation, is found to be positively associated with fiscal 
decentralization. 
Another reason why fractionalisation may be a suitable instrument for 
decentralization, is that it should explain variations in poverty and income distribution 
through variations in decentralization.  De Mello (2004) explains how decentralization is 
used to cater to heterogenous demands, partly driven by ethnic diversity.  Furthermore, 
any indirect link ethnic fractionalisation could share with poverty, for example, through 
liberal economic policy, will be captured by covariates already included in the model (i.e. 
trade openness). 
In addition to ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, I include a second instrument 
which is expected to be strongly correlated with decentralization.  Recently, new datasets 
from Treisman (2008) and Ivanyna and Shah (2014) contain various indicators of 
government decentralization that may be correlated with the tax and spending measures, 
𝐷𝑖.  I have opted for one of Ivanyna and Shah (2014) indicators for local democracy.  The 
qualitative indicator for local democracy captures legislative provisions for local public 
approval and local democracy (such as local referenda on spending and taxing decisions 
at the local level).  I include this instrument as I believe it meets the two conditions for 
valid instruments.  First, countries that observe higher tax and spending decentralization, 
typically observe other forms of decentralization, such as local government accountability 
and legislative powers of subnational governments (Treisman, 2008; Ivanyna and Shah, 
2014).  Therefore, I expect a positive correlation to exist between further legislative 
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provisions for local government accountability and local democracy, and tax and 
spending decentralization.  Second, local democracy is expected to affect income based 
poverty and distribution through tax and spending decentralization only.  As local 
democracy is worth only what local governments are able to do with respect to local tax 
and expenditure decision making, local democracy should not affect poverty directly.  
Furthermore, indirect links between democracy (locally and nationally), would be 
captured in other covariates, for example, real income and government spending.  As 
more developed countries may exhibit greater local democracy, as they do national 
democracy. 
 
Therefore, the first stage estimations are outlined below in function 3.2: 
 
𝐷𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛿1𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖 + 𝛿2𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 3.2 
 
Function 3.2 outlines the first stage estimations.  The instrument variables are ethnic 
fractionalisation (𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖) and local democracy (𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖).  The first stage regression also 
contains all the exogenous variables31 in function 3.1.  In the results sections in this 
chapter, sections 3.5 and 3.6, I provide the estimates for the first stage.  I expect that local 
democracy will be positively associated with tax and spending decentralization (𝐷𝑖), 
therefore 𝛿1 > 0.  Treisman (2008) and Ivanyna and Shah (2014) examine various aspects 
of decentralization and find that countries with higher levels of tax and spending 
decentralization, exhibit other forms of decentralization, including local democracy and 
local government accountability.  I also expect that ethnic fractionalisation will be 
positively associated with the degree of fiscal decentralization, so that 𝛿2 > 0, based on 
work by Wallis and Oates (1988) and Panizza (1998)  
Along with the first stage estimates I provide the p-value for the f-test of collective 
significance of the instrument variables.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, then this 
indicates collective statistical significance of the instrument variables.  It is also important 
that the instrument variables are exogenous.  In second stage estimations, I provide the J-
                                                 
31 I based my first stage estimations on the work of Altunbas and Thornton (2011).  I instrument 
decentralization, 𝐷𝑖 , but treat the interaction terms, 𝐷𝑖 . 𝐼𝑁𝑇 in 3.1 as exogenous.  Therefore, they are 
contained within the vector of 𝑋𝑖 in the first stage estimations in function 3.2.  I performed additional IV 
estimations, where I instrument the interaction terms as well (two endogenous variables), and included 
additional instruments – interactions between the instruments in 3.2 and the interactions (LG size, federal 
constitution, electoral decentralization).  The coefficient estimates were similar, though the standard 
errors were different and, consequently, changes in statistical significance. 
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Hansen statistic of instrument exogeneity.  If the null hypothesis is not rejected in the J-
Hansen statistic, then the instruments are valid (exogenous).  Finally, I include the p-
value for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test as evidence that decentralization may, or may not 
be endogenous.  If the null-hypothesis is rejected, then the cross-sectional IV estimation 
is the preferred estimator for examining links between decentralization and poverty, 
between countries. 
 
3.4.4. Random Effects Panel Estimator 
 
To counter the problem of omitted variable bias, I consider including fixed or random 
effects in a panel estimation.  The preference would be to use random effects, for two 
reasons.  One, to exploit cross-section variability in the decentralization panel dataset (see 
Kyriacou and Roca-Sagales, 2011).  Two, the large number of countries and shorter time 
dimension.  The consequence of using fixed effects for this dataset would be a loss of32. 
However, though the random effects estimator is preferred, it would not be 
suitable if decentralization is correlated with the unobserved country effects.  If such a 
correlation exists, then the estimates in the random effects panel estimator would be 
inconsistent.  One way to determine whether to use fixed effects or random effects is to 
use Hausman’s test (1978).  The test compares the estimations from the fixed effects and 
random effects estimator.  If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then the random effects 
estimator is more efficient and is the preferred estimator.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, 
then the random effects estimator is inconsistent – there is correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the country specific errors, and the fixed effects estimator is 
preferred.   
After comparing the fixed effects and random effects estimator using the 
Hausman specification test, the results of that test support the use of the random effects 
panel estimator33.  The estimation is outlined in function 3.3 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑡 . 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖 + + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + (𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡)  3.3 
                                                 
32 The dataset contains up to 57 countries.  Using fixed effects would generate a further 56 explanatory 
variables in the form of intercept dummies for each country. 
33 The results of the Hausman test are not consistent across all tax and spending decentralization 
indicators.  When comparing fixed effects and random effects estimations for SCG Revenue and SCG 
Expenditure, the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 10% level.  Yet for SCG Autonomous Expenditure, 
the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level.   
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3.5. Main Results 
 
In this section I present estimates of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
poverty and income distribution.  I utilise the cross-sectional and panel dataset, and 
produce results using cross-sectional OLS estimations, cross-sectional IV estimations, 
and random effects panel estimations.  The results are organised according to two 
dependent variables: i) income distribution in 3.5.1, and ii) absolute poverty in 3.5.2.  
When using panel data to examine variations in decentralization and poverty over-time, I 
split the dataset between high income countries, and low and middle income countries.  
Due to data limitations, it is not possible to provide the same analysis for the cross-
sectional dataset.  All estimates are produced using a single specification containing all 
control variables outlined in section 3.2.334 
 
3.5.1. Income Distribution 
 
In the first set of estimates for cross-sectional OLS, fiscal decentralization appears to have 
some effect on income distribution (table 11).  SCG Revenue and SCG Expenditure are 
negatively associated with income distribution (1 and 5).  The negative coefficient 
indicates that greater decentralization between countries reduces income inequality.  A 
one percentage point difference between countries explains a 0.4% variation in the Gini 
coefficient.   
Interactions between tax and spending decentralization and other aspects of 
decentralization produce some significant results.  Though local jurisdiction size appears 
to have little effect on the relationship between decentralization and the Gini coefficient, 
federal constitution produces contrasting results.  In unitary countries, fiscal 
decentralization reduces income inequality, and in federal countries fiscal 
decentralization has the opposite effect (3, 7 and 11).  Finally, SCG Revenue and SCG 
Expenditure also reduce inequality when the local government executive is appointed (4 
and 8).
                                                 
34 Primary enrolment data is excluded from cross-sectional estimates due to lack of data. 
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Table 11: Cross Sectional OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Income Distribution (Entire Sample)  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 3.748 3.982* 3.574 4.159* 3.640 4.001* 3.306 3.949* 3.288 3.709 2.963 3.748 
(2.415) (2.207) (2.316) (2.236) (2.460) (2.249) (2.346) (2.343) (2.380) (2.349) (2.131) (2.415) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.403* -0.350 -0.709** -0.581*         
 (0.227) (0.210) (0.322) (0.298)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.413** -0.383* -0.703** -0.562**     
     (0.200) (0.194) (0.289) (0.251)     
 SCG 
Autonomous 
Expenditure 
        -0.374 -0.261 -0.941** -0.606 
         (0.229) (0.217) (0.391) (0.382) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x LG Area 
 0.099    0.112    0.108   
  (0.066)    (0.069)    (0.105)   
 Decentralization 
x Federal 
  0.400*    0.397*    0.760**  
   (0.216)    (0.208)    (0.342)  
 Decentralization 
x Election 
   0.261    0.214    0.316 
    (0.245)    (0.215)    (0.399) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.069 -0.055 -0.098 -0.075 -0.061 -0.045 -0.088 -0.067 -0.064 -0.056 -0.112* -0.070 
 (0.057) (0.059) (0.061) (0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.059) (0.062) (0.056) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.005 -0.018 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.018 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.013 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.016) 
 Inflation -0.002* -0.002** -0.001 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Trade -0.080 -0.061 -0.078 -0.050 -0.068 -0.045 -0.062 -0.043 -0.073 -0.054 -0.072 -0.051 
 (0.072) (0.069) (0.073) (0.080) (0.069) (0.066) (0.070) (0.079) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.080) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Governance -0.011 -0.032 -0.002 -0.012 -0.014 -0.034 -0.006 -0.015 -0.017 -0.031 -0.004 -0.018 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) 
 Immunization -0.136 -0.409 -0.028 -0.222 -0.170 -0.479 -0.056 -0.242 -0.070 -0.316 0.090 -0.161 
 (0.526) (0.485) (0.549) (0.504) (0.528) (0.478) (0.540) (0.515) (0.516) (0.504) (0.509) (0.510) 
 Sanitation -0.667*** -0.453* -0.678*** -0.695*** -0.636** -0.418* -0.624*** -0.647*** -0.654** -0.510* -0.648*** -0.659** 
 (0.243) (0.247) (0.225) (0.233) (0.242) (0.244) (0.220) (0.236) (0.248) (0.256) (0.216) (0.244) 
Observations 51 48 51 51 51 48 51 51 49 47 49 49 
R-squared 0.607 0.654 0.639 0.614 0.613 0.669 0.645 0.618 0.602 0.628 0.649 0.606 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
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Most of the control variables are statistically insignificant, apart from inflation (in 
some specifications) and sanitation.  Surprisingly, the relationship between inflation and 
the Gini coefficient is negative.  Sanitation is also negatively associated with the annual 
growth in the Gini coefficient in every relationship.  A one percent increase in access to 
sanitation facilities results in a decline in income inequality, between 0.418 and 0.695, 
across the specifications.   
The second set of estimates are produced using a cross-sectional IV model.  The 
estimates for the first stage of the two-stage model are presented in table 12, and the 
second stage estimates are presented in table 13.  The first stage estimates provide 
evidence that local democracy and ethnolinguistic fractionalisation explain variations in 
decentralization between countries.  The local democracy dummy is a stronger 
instrument, statistically significant in all but a few specifications.  Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation is often statistically insignificant at the 10% level – though this is 
marginal in some specifications.  The collective significance of the instrument variables 
is indicated in the f-tests in table 12.  The instruments together are found to explain 
variations in decentralization in most specifications.  Of the variables assumed to be 
exogenous in the IV estimations, governance shares some correlation with fiscal 
decentralization, which suggests that a link between governance (corruption) and 
decentralization could exist (see Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Altunbas and Thornton, 2011).  
Other aspects of decentralization in the interactions are also found be to associated with 
decentralization. 
The second stage estimates in table 13 are largely insignificant.  The only 
statistically significant result is in interactions between tax and spending decentralization, 
and local jurisdiction size.  In specifications 2, 6 and 10, greater tax and spending 
decentralization is positively associated with income inequality, as the size of the local 
jurisdiction increases.  In the ordinary least squares estimations, this interaction was 
statistically insignificant.  The change in the coefficients between OLS and IV estimations 
may indicate weak instrument variables or that decentralization was endogenous in OLS 
estimations, and instrumentation has resolved the endogeneity bias.  However, the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test suggests that decentralization may be exogenous and the 
ordinary least squares estimator may be suitable for estimating the relationship between 
tax and spending decentralization and income distribution.  Therefore, the contrast in 
results between ordinary least squares and instrument variable estimation may be down 
to weak instruments in the first stage.
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Table 12: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (1st Stage), Dependent Variable: Decentralization (Entire Sample) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 0.625 1.288 -0.522 0.072 -1.378 -0.098 -2.441 -1.351 -0.100 -0.409 -1.371 -0.552 
(2.567) (3.072) (2.487) (1.942) (2.496) (2.763) (2.599) (1.870) (2.559) (2.675) (2.076) (1.543) 
Instrument Variables 
 Local 
Democracy 
0.116** 0.110* -0.173** 0.047 0.168*** 0.164*** -0.180 0.093** 0.122** 0.114* -0.109*** 0.018 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.066) (0.039) (0.046) (0.050) (0.125) (0.043) (0.057) (0.057) (0.035) (0.031) 
 Ethnic 
Fractionalisation 
0.161 0.200* 0.106 0.145 0.073 0.160 0.013 0.094 0.152* 0.142 0.105 0.104 
 (0.097) (0.110) (0.089) (0.089) (0.115) (0.101) (0.115) (0.085) (0.089) (0.109) (0.080) (0.073) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.053 -0.056 -0.032 -0.032 -0.039 -0.056 -0.025 -0.028 -0.052 -0.049 -0.041 -0.026 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.041) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.045) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.033) (0.032) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.005 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
 Inflation 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Trade -0.074 -0.093* -0.051 0.012 -0.020 -0.048 -0.020 0.050 -0.044 -0.055 -0.030 0.033 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.040) (0.037) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.046) (0.032) (0.029) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Governance 0.042** 0.047** 0.028 0.025* 0.027 0.040** 0.016 0.014 0.035** 0.035* 0.023 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.013) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.011) 
 Immunization 0.067 0.140 -0.040 -0.059 -0.130 0.054 -0.166 -0.195 0.335 0.388 0.191 -0.042 
 (0.308) (0.341) (0.257) (0.261) (0.314) (0.265) (0.292) (0.276) (0.326) (0.331) (0.277) (0.226) 
 Sanitation -0.016 -0.020 -0.029 -0.088 0.067 0.049 0.045 0.001 -0.037 -0.070 -0.008 -0.051 
 (0.119) (0.148) (0.113) (0.101) (0.122) (0.142) (0.111) (0.095) (0.125) (0.140) (0.102) (0.083) 
 Decentralization 
(Interaction) 
 -0.025 0.774*** 0.499***  -0.016 0.876*** 0.504***  -0.057 0.908*** 0.760*** 
  (0.026) (0.149) (0.139)  (0.026) (0.307) (0.140)  (0.040) (0.127) (0.112) 
F-test (p-value) for 
instruments 0.008 0.004 0.042 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.215 0.018 0.005 0.174 0.016 0.093 
Observations 42 39 42 42 42 39 42 42 41 39 41 41 
R-squared 0.561 0.570 0.648 0.698 0.566 0.646 0.614 0.724 0.521 0.524 0.686 0.754 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Table 13: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Income Distribution (Entire Sample) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 1.730 1.868 1.647 1.708 2.119 2.136 2.266 2.202 3.030 2.606 3.274 3.503 
(3.936) (3.806) (4.042) (3.902) (3.800) (3.845) (4.774) (3.877) (4.082) (3.890) (4.641) (4.514) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 0.196 0.213 0.427 0.214         
 (0.253) (0.292) (0.643) (0.534)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    0.152 0.192 0.222 0.238     
     (0.247) (0.246) (0.993) (0.431)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        0.175 0.269 0.422 0.810 
         (0.252) (0.323) (0.844) (1.160) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x LG Area 
 0.082*    0.093**    0.123*   
  (0.043)    (0.047)    (0.069)   
 Decentralization 
x Federal 
  -0.096    -0.042    -0.179  
   (0.351)    (0.518)    (0.655)  
 Decentralization 
x Election 
   -0.001    -0.096    -0.769 
    (0.418)    (0.337)    (1.066) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.007 0.006 0.004 -0.007 -0.012 0.007 -0.009 -0.011 -0.002 0.006 0.011 0.009 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.067) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) (0.062) (0.050) (0.049) (0.053) (0.076) (0.068) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.013 -0.024* -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.025* -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.025* -0.018 -0.025 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019) 
 Inflation -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 Trade -0.040 -0.022 -0.029 -0.038 -0.049 -0.022 -0.049 -0.061 -0.053 -0.027 -0.050 -0.112 
 (0.061) (0.059) (0.062) (0.086) (0.064) (0.059) (0.064) (0.082) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.113) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Governance -0.046** -0.065*** -0.053* -0.047** -0.043** -0.066*** -0.044 -0.042** -0.047** -0.064*** -0.053* -0.044** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.031) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.031) (0.022) 
 Immunization 0.000 -0.238 0.020 0.004 0.016 -0.295 0.025 0.049 -0.108 -0.344 -0.149 0.080 
 (0.591) (0.528) (0.596) (0.578) (0.615) (0.531) (0.593) (0.632) (0.582) (0.561) (0.694) (0.662) 
 Sanitation -0.637*** -0.435* -0.628*** -0.636** -0.652*** -0.431* -0.656*** -0.644*** -0.587** -0.432* -0.579** -0.542** 
  (0.229) (0.228) (0.243) (0.248) (0.227) (0.229) (0.232) (0.231) (0.239) (0.237) (0.259) (0.276) 
DWH test (p-value) 0.189 0.213 0.142 0.141 0.123 0.019 0.539 0.051 0.132 0.197 0.094 0.118 
Hansen J-statistic 
(p-value) 
0.880 0.595 0.867 0.861 0.772 0.569 0.767 0.819 0.795 0.588 0.933 0.834 
Observations 42 39 42 42 42 39 42 42 41 39 41 41 
R-squared 0.643 0.687 0.603 0.640 0.646 0.690 0.634 0.633 0.649 0.678 0.607 0.564 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG 
Autonomous Expenditure are instrumented using a local democracy dummy variable and ethnic fractionalisation, from the first stage.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen 
J-statistic are provided. 
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The instruments are valid however, as indicated by the Hansen J-statistic.  The test of 
instrument exogeneity does not reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level in any 
specification. 
The control variables are largely consistent with the OLS estimations.  Inflation, 
governance and access to improved sanitation facilities are negatively associated with 
income inequality.  These results are broadly expected based on the theory.  However, 
inflation is negatively associated with the Gini coefficient – an unexpected result35 
The final set of estimates for income distribution are produced using the random 
effects panel estimator.  I produce three set of estimates for the panel dataset: i) entire 
sample (table 14), high income sample (table 15) and low and middle income sample 
(table 16). 
 When estimating the effects of decentralization on income distribution for the 
entire sample, there is only one statistically significant effect.  Spending decentralization 
is statistically associated with income inequality through interactions with local 
jurisdiction size.  This result, which is consistent with the cross-sectional IV estimates, 
suggests that higher spending decentralization leads to greater inequality, as the size of 
the local jurisdiction increases (in specifications 6 and 10). 
 When estimating the same relationship for high income countries, there is more 
evidence that fiscal decentralization is associated with income distribution.  Tax, 
spending and autonomous spending decentralization are statistically associated with 
income distribution (specifications 1, 5 and 9).  The effect is always negative.  This result 
suggests that, when controlling for random effects, greater tax, spending and autonomous 
spending decentralization reduces income inequality over time.  The size of the effect 
varies between indicator, and is strongest for tax decentralization (1).  A 1% increase in 
tax decentralization, reduces income inequality according to the GINI coefficient, by 
0.44%.  
 There is also evidence that other types of decentralization have a bearing on the 
relationship between tax and spending decentralization and income inequality.  Tax and 
spending decentralization reduces income inequality when the local government size is 
smaller, and increases inequality when the local government size is sufficiently large (2, 
6 and 10).  This supports the findings in previous estimations for the cross-sectional 
dataset. 
                                                 
35 This result has also been observed in Cudjoe et al., 2010; Alem and Sodermon, 2012; Fujii, 2013 
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Table 14: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Income Distribution (Entire Sample) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 2.874** 2.669** 2.886** 2.928** 2.876** 2.530** 2.891** 2.875** 3.109*** 2.755** 3.222*** 3.067*** 
(1.200) (1.209) (1.204) (1.180) (1.204) (1.205) (1.210) (1.208) (1.122) (1.163) (1.175) (1.152) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.119 -0.090 -0.128 -0.204         
 (0.132) (0.148) (0.172) (0.301)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    0.034 0.143 0.102 0.003     
     (0.140) (0.169) (0.162) (0.381)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        0.015 0.403 0.098 0.368 
         (0.222) (0.279) (0.382) (0.477) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x LG Area 
 0.026    0.074*    0.191**   
  (0.038)    (0.042)    (0.081)   
 Decentralization 
x Federal 
  0.018    -0.175    -0.167  
   (0.155)    (0.137)    (0.367)  
 Decentralization 
x Election 
   0.105    0.035    -0.491 
    (0.282)    (0.345)    (0.481) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.119** -0.122** -0.117** -0.121** -0.119* -0.124* -0.118* -0.120* -0.152** -0.154** -0.147** -0.140** 
 (0.059) (0.061) (0.058) (0.058) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.062) (0.074) (0.075) (0.070) (0.071) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Inflation -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Trade 0.036 0.032 0.035 0.039 0.032 0.030 0.024 0.033 0.028 0.037 0.023 0.012 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.038** 0.037** 0.037** 0.037** 0.036** 0.036* 0.039** 0.036** 0.040** 0.037* 0.043** 0.045** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
 Governance -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 Immunization -0.043 -0.037 -0.045 -0.040 -0.016 0.005 -0.009 -0.015 -0.003 0.039 -0.010 -0.000 
 (0.078) (0.082) (0.078) (0.079) (0.077) (0.079) (0.074) (0.076) (0.080) (0.071) (0.086) (0.078) 
 Sanitation -0.781*** -0.736*** -0.784*** -0.787*** -0.779*** -0.730*** -0.789*** -0.779*** -0.751*** -0.712*** -0.772*** -0.756*** 
 (0.158) (0.157) (0.157) (0.154) (0.165) (0.162) (0.168) (0.164) (0.166) (0.171) (0.167) (0.174) 
 Primary 
Enrolment 
-0.015 0.000 -0.013 -0.018 -0.039 -0.012 -0.050 -0.038 -0.085 -0.079 -0.105 -0.108 
 (0.224) (0.231) (0.220) (0.223) (0.222) (0.232) (0.215) (0.223) (0.194) (0.198) (0.202) (0.204) 
Observations 339 329 339 339 334 324 334 334 286 282 286 286 
Groups 45 42 45 45 45 42 45 45 43 41 43 43 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Table 15: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Income Distribution (High Income Countries)  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 12.189* 10.695 12.073* 9.565 13.356* 11.880* 13.355* 11.068 18.144** 17.167** 18.266*** 14.246** 
(6.598) (6.571) (6.588) (6.951) (7.445) (7.081) (7.572) (7.817) (7.046) (7.028) (6.551) (7.040) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.436*** -0.440*** -0.538** -1.345**         
 (0.142) (0.159) (0.234) (0.684)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.199** -0.168* -0.147** -0.914***     
     (0.085) (0.087) (0.071) (0.191)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        -0.250*** -0.017 -0.381** -2.281** 
         (0.088) (0.110) (0.182) (0.983) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x LG Area 
 0.005    0.053**    0.099**   
  (0.029)    (0.026)    (0.044)   
 Decentralization 
x Federal 
  0.178    -0.103    0.154  
   (0.169)    (0.093)    (0.223)  
 Decentralization 
x Election 
   0.904    0.721***    2.020** 
    (0.652)    (0.177)    (0.971) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
0.029 0.032 0.022 0.031 0.036 0.047 0.039 0.045 0.022 0.021 0.031 0.060 
 (0.096) (0.102) (0.089) (0.094) (0.117) (0.128) (0.118) (0.117) (0.127) (0.137) (0.115) (0.133) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Inflation -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Trade 0.026 0.033 0.036 0.041 0.033 0.039 0.028 0.053 0.013 0.029 -0.003 0.017 
 (0.044) (0.046) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.038) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.046) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.030* 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.026 0.021 0.032 0.030 0.029* 0.019 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.016) (0.022) 
 Governance -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
 Immunization -0.397* -0.403* -0.400* -0.379* -0.346 -0.344 -0.339 -0.339 -0.254 -0.251 -0.225 -0.250 
 (0.213) (0.228) (0.214) (0.205) (0.225) (0.241) (0.221) (0.219) (0.269) (0.262) (0.296) (0.257) 
 Sanitation -2.290 -1.956 -2.248 -1.697 -2.600 -2.279 -2.617 -2.087 -3.835** -3.574** -3.875** -2.923* 
 (1.593) (1.612) (1.586) (1.678) (1.810) (1.756) (1.836) (1.889) (1.735) (1.717) (1.599) (1.742) 
 Primary 
Enrolment 
-0.457 -0.464 -0.449 -0.501* -0.450 -0.480 -0.449 -0.492* -0.359 -0.415 -0.358 -0.448 
 (0.287) (0.296) (0.291) (0.283) (0.303) (0.307) (0.305) (0.291) (0.369) (0.339) (0.362) (0.361) 
Observations 188 184 188 188 184 180 184 184 158 157 158 158 
Groups 24 22 24 24 24 22 24 24 23 22 23 23 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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 Unitary and federal governments also observe contrasting effects of greater tax and 
spending decentralization.  In unitary countries, greater decentralization reduces inequality.  
However, there is no effect in federal countries (3, 7 and 11).  Finally, decentralization has 
different effects depending on whether the local government executive is appointed or elected.  
When the executive is appointed, higher tax and spending decentralization reduces inequality 
(specifications 4, 8 and 12).  When the executive is elected, higher spending decentralization 
has the opposite effect – increasing inequality in specifications 8 and 12.  The magnitude of the 
effect is stronger than all other results in table 15.  In specification 12, a 1% increase in 
autonomous spending will reduce inequality by 2.28% if the executive is appointed, but 
increase inequality by 2.02% if the executive is elected.  This suggests that central government 
control, at least with respect to local government accountability, is essential for reducing 
poverty through tax and spending decentralization. 
 In the corresponding estimations for the low and middle income sample in table 16, 
there is limited evidence that tax and spending decentralization can reduce.  Only through 
interactions with local government area size is tax and spending decentralization statistically 
significant (specifications 2, 6 and 10).  The relationship is positive regardless of the size of the 
local government.  This would indicate that the size of the local jurisdiction is important with 
respect to the effects of tax and spending decentralization on the poorest.  However, as the effect 
is positive whatever the size of the local jurisdiction, this would suggest that a smaller local 
government merely mitigates against the undesirable effects of tax and spending 
decentralization for the poorest. 
 Of the control variables, there are different effects between the two income groups.  The 
only variables that explain variations in income distribution in the high-income group are 
vaccination coverage and sanitation – both share a negative association with income inequality.  
They are statistically significant only in a selection of specifications.  Nevertheless, it is 
interesting that none of the economic variables: income, growth and trade have any effect over 
time.  However, in the low and middle income group, income, growth and inflation are 
associated with income distribution.  Higher income reduces income inequality, as does higher 
inflation – an unexpected result.  Economic growth actually increases income inequality over 
time, which contradicts the findings of Dollar and Kraay (2002).  Government spending appears 
to help the better off disproportionately.  Though sanitation remains statistically, negatively 
associated with inequality. 
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Table 16: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Income Distribution (Low and Middle Income Countries)  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 2.133 1.287 2.118 2.325 2.304 1.237 2.319 2.225 2.951* 1.479 2.993* 2.587* 
(1.666) (1.663) (1.658) (1.587) (1.672) (1.659) (1.654) (1.565) (1.520) (1.627) (1.538) (1.401) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 0.161 0.361** 0.148 0.058         
 (0.202) (0.177) (0.214) (0.306)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    0.261 0.554** 0.271 0.354     
     (0.263) (0.252) (0.283) (0.401)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        0.242 0.575*** 0.269 0.461 
         (0.356) (0.213) (0.400) (0.431) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x LG Area 
 0.192**    0.256***    0.311***   
  (0.082)    (0.097)    (0.100)   
 Decentralization 
x Federal 
  0.126    -0.051    -0.173  
   (0.251)    (0.321)    (0.390)  
 Decentralization 
x Election 
   0.177    -0.139    -0.518 
    (0.333)    (0.438)    (0.501) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.202*** -0.183** -0.201*** -0.211*** -0.195*** -0.161** -0.197*** -0.191*** -0.229*** -0.175** -0.231*** -0.232*** 
 (0.077) (0.076) (0.078) (0.075) (0.074) (0.070) (0.076) (0.074) (0.086) (0.086) (0.088) (0.083) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Inflation -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Trade -0.015 -0.019 -0.014 -0.011 -0.021 -0.026 -0.021 -0.024 -0.032 -0.027 -0.034 -0.042 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.058*** 0.047** 0.056** 0.057** 0.056** 0.039* 0.057** 0.058*** 0.063** 0.036 0.066** 0.072*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027) 
 Governance 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.017 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) 
 Immunization -0.013 -0.004 -0.017 -0.010 -0.012 0.014 -0.011 -0.011 -0.097 -0.002 -0.094 -0.076 
 (0.109) (0.112) (0.111) (0.112) (0.106) (0.102) (0.105) (0.103) (0.124) (0.104) (0.124) (0.112) 
 Sanitation -0.663*** -0.593*** -0.656*** -0.666*** -0.674*** -0.606*** -0.677*** -0.679*** -0.626*** -0.604*** -0.637*** -0.622*** 
 (0.150) (0.157) (0.151) (0.149) (0.148) (0.150) (0.152) (0.152) (0.142) (0.154) (0.141) (0.143) 
 Primary 
Enrolment 
0.102 0.237 0.105 0.074 0.071 0.242 0.068 0.079 0.003 0.241 -0.007 0.033 
 (0.273) (0.291) (0.272) (0.272) (0.274) (0.297) (0.268) (0.267) (0.252) (0.287) (0.254) (0.236) 
Observations 151 145 151 151 150 144 150 150 128 125 128 128 
Groups 27 25 27 27 27 25 27 27 25 24 25 25 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Overall, the evidence suggests that fiscal decentralization is associated with income 
distribution, but the nature of the relationship is sensitive to other forms of 
decentralization and how economically developed the country is.   
The cross-sectional estimates are significant, and suggest that tax and spending 
decentralization are negatively associated with the GINI coefficient, thereby reducing 
poverty.  However, this result is not robust to econometric technique.  The cross-sectional 
IV estimations eliminate almost all evidence of a statistical link between decentralization 
and inequality.  The only effect observed in the IV estimations are for local jurisdiction 
size, which has a negative effect on the relationship between decentralization and 
inequality. 
Finally, the random effects provide some evidence that fiscal decentralization can 
affect income distribution over time.  The strongest results are in the high-income country 
sample, where fiscal decentralization reduces inequality.  Only when the size of the local 
jurisdiction is sufficiently large, does tax and spending decentralization increase 
inequality. 
  
3.5.2. Absolute Poverty 
 
The cross-sectional estimates in table 17 provide only limited evidence of an association 
between fiscal decentralization and absolute poverty.  The evidence is restricted to 
specifications including interactions with other aspects of decentralization.  Fiscal 
decentralization increases absolute poverty when the average size of local government is 
larger (2, 6 and 10), a result that is consistent with the income distribution results.  Federal 
countries also observe a positive relationship between decentralization and absolute 
poverty (3, 7 and 11).  In Federal countries, a 1% change in decentralization would result 
in between 11.5% (SCG Revenue, 2) and 21% (SCG Autonomous Expenditure, 11) 
increase in absolute poverty.  Finally, greater SCG Autonomous Expenditure reduces 
absolute poverty when the local executive is elected (12). 
 Of the controls, real income has a strong negative effect on absolute poverty, 
which is expected.  A one percent increase in real income reduces absolute poverty by 
more than two percent.  Economic growth is also negatively associated with absolute 
poverty, but the effect is small and restricted to a single specification.  Trade and 
government spending is negatively associated with absolute poverty between countries.  
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Finally, public services do not appear to explain variations in absolute poverty between 
countries. 
 The next set of estimates are produced using the cross-sectional IV model.  The 
first stage results are presented in table 18.  The same instrument variables that were found 
to explain variations in decentralization for the entire sample (in table 12), are weak 
instruments for low and middle income countries in table 18.  Neither local democracy or 
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation explain variations in decentralization in most 
specification.  This is evident in the high p-values for the f-test of collective significance.  
When either of the instruments are statistically associated with tax and spending 
decentralization, the effects are as we would expect – positive for either local democracy 
or fractionalization.  As a consequence of the weak effects of the instrument variables in 
the first stage, the second stage results may not provide credible estimates of the effect of 
decentralization on absolute poverty. 
 Despite this, the results in the second stage in table 19 do support the 
corresponding results in the OLS estimation, in table 17.  Greater tax and spending 
decentralization increase absolute poverty when the local jurisdiction size is larger, and 
in federal countries.  Once again, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test suggests that 
decentralization may not be endogenous, and that the OLS estimations may be valid.  The 
instruments are also found to be exogenous, as expected.  The p-value for the Hansen J-
statistic is greater than 0.10 in every specification.  Hence, the null hypothesis of 
instrument exogeneity cannot be rejected at the 10% level. 
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Table 17: Cross Sectional OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Absolute Poverty (Low and Middle Income Countries) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 34.840 30.755 31.092 23.379 34.048 28.285* 29.888 21.952 33.263 24.565 29.957 26.427 
(26.198) (17.905) (23.325) (28.177) (25.111) (15.727) (21.669) (27.116) (26.857) (21.287) (21.356) (26.074) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -2.399 -1.399 -1.874 -1.380         
 (3.606) (1.915) (3.603) (3.340)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -2.832 -1.123 -2.240 -1.193     
     (3.775) (1.795) (3.807) (3.452)     
 SCG 
Autonomous 
Expenditure 
        -1.772 1.713 -2.202 -1.645 
         (4.606) (2.564) (4.515) (3.433) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x LG Area 
 2.346***    2.846***    3.991***   
  (0.746)    (0.728)    (1.289)   
 Decentralization 
x Federal 
  11.541***    13.506***    20.992***  
   (2.681)    (2.890)    (3.934)  
 Decentralization 
x Election 
   -4.732    -5.743    -10.177* 
    (3.854)    (3.907)    (5.351) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-2.363*** -2.441*** -2.389*** -2.451*** -2.407*** -2.567*** -2.429*** -2.438*** -2.133*** -2.694*** -2.127*** -1.933*** 
 (0.730) (0.558) (0.719) (0.695) (0.769) (0.489) (0.756) (0.698) (0.593) (0.596) (0.564) (0.591) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.006 -0.154*** -0.056 -0.081 0.005 -0.134*** -0.058 -0.064 -0.027 -0.136*** -0.108 -0.130 
 (0.123) (0.038) (0.127) (0.123) (0.121) (0.030) (0.126) (0.116) (0.109) (0.042) (0.124) (0.098) 
 Inflation -0.004 0.001 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 0.002 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
 Trade -1.272 -1.305** -1.681** -1.852* -1.214 -1.256** -1.783*** -1.727* -1.230 -1.347** -2.113*** -1.573 
 (0.787) (0.477) (0.593) (0.878) (0.788) (0.460) (0.593) (0.845) (0.847) (0.558) (0.628) (0.890) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
-0.028 -0.053 -0.369** 0.044 -0.008 -0.040 -0.427** 0.080 -0.055 -0.084* -0.579*** 0.129 
 (0.126) (0.054) (0.151) (0.098) (0.144) (0.050) (0.176) (0.099) (0.134) (0.042) (0.166) (0.114) 
 Governance 0.233 0.112 0.113 0.396 0.238 0.147 0.110 0.410 0.153 0.194 -0.059 0.153 
 (0.439) (0.246) (0.401) (0.388) (0.447) (0.218) (0.410) (0.377) (0.417) (0.259) (0.323) (0.355) 
 Immunization -0.919 -2.477 -0.513 2.014 -0.799 -1.830 -0.311 2.258 -1.545 -0.454 -1.424 -0.620 
 (6.443) (5.123) (5.953) (7.139) (6.201) (4.554) (5.634) (6.927) (7.131) (6.350) (6.042) (6.953) 
 Sanitation -1.790 1.328 -0.741 -1.405 -1.717 1.369 -0.478 -1.529 -1.255 1.019 0.546 -0.495 
 (2.026) (1.254) (2.022) (2.119) (2.011) (1.134) (2.035) (2.040) (2.248) (1.583) (2.199) (1.994) 
Observations 26 24 26 26 26 24 26 26 24 23 24 24 
R-squared 0.721 0.879 0.789 0.744 0.723 0.896 0.794 0.754 0.718 0.873 0.830 0.765 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
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Table 18: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (1st Stage), Dependent Variable: Decentralization (Low and Middle Income Countries) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -2.349 -3.058 -0.610 -2.486 -2.775 -3.614 -1.592 -2.871 -0.701 -1.286 -0.306 0.565 
(3.789) (3.506) (3.102) (4.281) (3.105) (2.817) (2.870) (3.492) (3.211) (3.207) (3.152) (2.620) 
Instrument Variables 
 Local 
Democracy 
-0.152 -0.119 2.338** -0.154 -0.120 -0.100 0.679 -0.121 -0.051 -0.036 0.269 -0.014 
 (0.108) (0.064) (0.798) (0.118) (0.077) (0.050) (0.377) (0.083) (0.067) (0.063) (0.246) (0.069) 
 Ethnic 
Fractionalisation 
0.310* 0.248 0.376** 0.310* 0.259* 0.217 0.304** 0.259* 0.169 0.134 0.201 0.134 
 (0.141) (0.135) (0.118) (0.144) (0.112) (0.119) (0.109) (0.116) (0.120) (0.131) (0.121) (0.100) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
0.010 0.067 -0.001 0.009 -0.000 0.044 -0.008 -0.000 0.021 0.051 0.014 0.035 
 (0.066) (0.062) (0.056) (0.066) (0.055) (0.050) (0.050) (0.056) (0.056) (0.061) (0.054) (0.047) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.008 0.005 0.013 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.015 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.009 -0.005 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
 Inflation 0.002** 0.001 0.002** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.002** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Trade -0.014 -0.034 0.082 -0.023 0.012 -0.003 0.078 0.009 0.038 0.026 0.077 0.026 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.064) (0.066) (0.047) (0.049) (0.059) (0.051) (0.044) (0.045) (0.060) (0.042) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.027** 0.019** 0.083*** 0.029* 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.067** 0.031** 0.022*** 0.018** 0.045* 0.036*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.021) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.020) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.009) 
 Governance -0.020 -0.046 -0.011 -0.017 -0.020 -0.040 -0.013 -0.017 -0.038 -0.050 -0.034 -0.029 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.038) (0.034) (0.024) 
 Immunization -0.163 -0.593 0.020 -0.158 -0.223 -0.525 -0.099 -0.223 -0.441 -0.619 -0.322 -0.726 
 (0.581) (0.592) (0.405) (0.596) (0.436) (0.446) (0.362) (0.444) (0.537) (0.571) (0.462) (0.437) 
 Sanitation 0.014 0.131 -0.160 0.030 0.071 0.161 -0.048 0.080 0.096 0.134 0.010 0.242 
 (0.157) (0.152) (0.130) (0.184) (0.123) (0.104) (0.130) (0.135) (0.128) (0.126) (0.114) (0.125) 
 Decentralization 
(Interaction) 
 -0.080 -8.729** -0.084  -0.063 -3.326* -0.069  -0.074 -1.930 -0.755 
  (0.070) (2.818) (0.354)  (0.064) (1.573) (0.309)  (0.114) (1.495) (0.539) 
F-test (p-value) for 
instruments 0.103 0.217 0.026 0.125 0.097 0.202 0.066 0.120 0.412 0.589 0.297 0.422 
Observations 20 18 20 20 20 18 20 20 19 18 19 19 
R-squared 0.759 0.861 0.862 0.761 0.828 0.909 0.878 0.830 0.831 0.863 0.853 0.881 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Table 19: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Absolute Poverty (Low and Middle Income Countries) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -20.778 12.591 -8.778 -21.707 -25.035 14.919 -13.400 -26.782 3.048 25.505 16.796 14.063 
(52.769) (31.216) (49.003) (55.793) (53.837) (35.959) (49.092) (56.350) (52.210) (26.839) (50.398) (46.185) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -4.566 0.266 -2.915 -4.596         
 (4.620) (5.071) (3.418) (4.571)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -5.253 0.483 -3.288 -5.247     
     (5.605) (5.697) (4.274) (5.494)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        -7.622 7.525 -8.357 -5.621 
         (8.723) (7.575) (7.043) (12.081) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x LG Area 
 2.698***    3.028***    5.385***   
  (0.880)    (0.889)    (1.236)   
 Decentralization 
x Federal 
  8.952***    10.773***    17.795***  
   (2.451)    (2.990)    (3.471)  
 Decentralization 
x Election 
   -0.585    -1.352    -9.203 
    (4.402)    (4.423)    (15.215) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-2.047*** -2.693*** -2.195*** -2.055*** -2.100*** -2.719*** -2.226*** -2.102*** -1.812*** -3.398*** -1.825** -1.765** 
 (0.701) (0.741) (0.688) (0.665) (0.697) (0.650) (0.680) (0.677) (0.659) (0.724) (0.727) (0.810) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.074 -0.123** 0.026 0.065 0.096 -0.116* 0.034 0.081 0.030 -0.158*** -0.046 -0.096 
 (0.148) (0.051) (0.146) (0.142) (0.151) (0.063) (0.146) (0.145) (0.152) (0.053) (0.157) (0.191) 
 Inflation 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.016) 
 Trade -1.956** -1.258** -1.998** -2.016** -1.825** -1.242** -2.026** -1.893** -1.564** -1.361*** -1.863*** -1.766** 
 (0.876) (0.591) (0.830) (0.972) (0.880) (0.499) (0.841) (0.933) (0.743) (0.353) (0.695) (0.771) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
-0.101 -0.089* -0.354*** -0.088 -0.068 -0.080 -0.401*** -0.034 -0.029 -0.147* -0.427** 0.143 
 (0.127) (0.053) (0.119) (0.134) (0.155) (0.076) (0.149) (0.165) (0.197) (0.087) (0.175) (0.520) 
 Governance -0.292 0.209 -0.178 -0.269 -0.300 0.216 -0.187 -0.248 -0.463 0.613 -0.437 -0.259 
 (0.425) (0.423) (0.405) (0.390) (0.430) (0.414) (0.404) (0.389) (0.435) (0.527) (0.427) (0.462) 
 Immunization 3.916 5.946 4.596 3.915 3.645 5.062 4.436 3.627 -0.587 11.903 -3.076 -0.977 
 (6.503) (7.261) (6.155) (6.531) (6.642) (6.919) (6.380) (6.612) (8.627) (7.412) (8.577) (13.557) 
 Sanitation -2.841 -0.819 -2.317 -2.725 -2.569 -0.513 -1.967 -2.387 -1.408 -1.753 0.306 -0.288 
 (2.325) (1.500) (2.327) (2.342) (2.354) (1.649) (2.354) (2.383) (2.724) (1.491) (2.867) (4.734) 
DWH test (p-value) 0.428 0.541 0.254 0.453 0.371 0.438 0.268 0.407 0.483 0.990 0.209 0.783 
Hansen J-statistic 
(p-value) 
0.190 0.146 0.738 0.195 0.193 0.150 0.840 0.202 0.162 0.165 0.806 0.128 
Observations 20 18 20 20 20 18 20 20 19 18 19 19 
R-squared 0.748 0.913 0.801 0.747 0.744 0.914 0.802 0.746 0.708 0.933 0.765 0.747 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG 
Autonomous Expenditure are instrumented using a local democracy dummy variable and ethnic fractionalisation, from the first stage.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen 
J-statistic are provided 
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The third and final estimates are produced using a random effects panel estimator.  The 
random effects estimator can provide evidence of a relationship between decentralization 
and poverty over time.  These results are presented in table 20. 
 Spending and autonomous spending are found to be statistically associated with 
absolute poverty in specifications 5 and 9.  An increase of 1% in spending decentralization 
would lead to an increase in absolute poverty of just under 5% increase (5) in absolute 
poverty for general spending decentralization, and close to 7% increase for autonomous 
spending (9).  Tax and spending decentralization is also positively associated with 
poverty in interactions with local government size, a result that is consistent with the 
income distribution results.  There is only one result that suggests tax and spending 
decentralization could actually reduce absolute poverty.  In specification 12, greater 
autonomous spending decentralization reduces absolute poverty when the local executive 
is elected.  In contrast, when the local government executive is appointed, greater tax and 
spending decentralization increases absolute poverty.  This result suggests that local 
government accountability can reverse the generally positive association between 
decentralization and absolute poverty. 
 Across all estimations, the control variables exhibit expected effects on absolute 
poverty.  Real income reduces absolute poverty, both in cross-sectional estimates and the 
random effects estimations.  Economic growth explains cross-sectional variations in 
absolute poverty, but has no effect in random effect estimations.  Government spending 
can help reduce absolute poverty over-time in the random effects estimations, but does 
not explain cross-sectional variations in absolute poverty.  Of the remaining control 
variables, most are found to be statistically insignificant or not robust between cross-
sectional OLS and cross-sectional IV estimations 
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Table 20: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Absolute Poverty (Low and Middle Income Countries)  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 14.447 6.722 14.957 16.105 20.022 9.558 20.127 19.100 22.251 10.054 22.373 16.531 
(21.879) (20.799) (21.671) (21.867) (21.912) (20.469) (21.957) (21.523) (20.940) (22.582) (20.756) (20.124) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 2.512 4.132** 2.075 2.105         
 (1.705) (1.673) (1.660) (1.769)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    4.946* 5.694** 4.879 6.016**     
     (2.973) (2.817) (3.046) (3.043)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        6.975** 7.683** 8.030*** 9.636*** 
         (3.033) (3.082) (2.797) (2.756) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x LG Area 
 1.898***    2.070**    1.723   
  (0.718)    (0.893)    (1.081)   
 Decentralization 
x Federal 
  2.968    0.727    -4.254  
   (4.566)    (5.087)    (7.326)  
 Decentralization 
x Election 
   1.057    -1.703    -7.203* 
    (2.075)    (2.737)    (4.201) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-1.851** -1.935** -1.806** -1.892** -1.640** -1.779** -1.628** -1.541* -1.216 -1.439* -1.174 -1.049 
 (0.825) (0.802) (0.837) (0.842) (0.814) (0.771) (0.828) (0.867) (0.906) (0.859) (0.940) (0.984) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.031 0.038 0.029 0.029 0.022 0.031 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.026 0.020 0.020 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
 Inflation -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.018 -0.014 -0.018 -0.024 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) 
 Trade -0.423 -0.438 -0.329 -0.323 -0.519 -0.561 -0.472 -0.473 -0.340 -0.371 -0.347 -0.308 
 (0.569) (0.543) (0.560) (0.553) (0.601) (0.585) (0.588) (0.562) (0.685) (0.742) (0.631) (0.620) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
-0.575* -0.593** -0.642* -0.605* -0.640** -0.626** -0.661** -0.646** -0.638** -0.613** -0.576* -0.537* 
 (0.319) (0.278) (0.345) (0.325) (0.322) (0.273) (0.336) (0.321) (0.320) (0.303) (0.338) (0.321) 
 Governance 0.006 0.091 0.022 0.001 -0.011 0.085 -0.007 -0.008 0.010 0.016 -0.024 0.053 
 (0.191) (0.235) (0.194) (0.193) (0.170) (0.220) (0.173) (0.176) (0.226) (0.244) (0.220) (0.221) 
 Immunization 1.281 0.885 1.140 1.409 1.388 0.963 1.374 1.437 0.461 0.948 0.629 0.781 
 (2.094) (2.161) (2.148) (2.154) (1.880) (1.892) (1.949) (1.917) (2.013) (1.965) (2.026) (1.912) 
 Sanitation -2.270 -1.327 -2.103 -2.272 -2.416* -1.538 -2.361* -2.441* -2.728* -2.356 -3.015* -2.918* 
 (1.420) (1.484) (1.414) (1.449) (1.380) (1.476) (1.406) (1.469) (1.568) (1.602) (1.704) (1.768) 
 Primary 
Enrolment 
3.588 5.066 3.593 3.216 2.301 4.493 2.266 2.268 2.015 4.273 1.730 2.324 
 (3.541) (3.654) (3.548) (3.611) (3.476) (3.587) (3.531) (3.418) (3.652) (4.220) (3.610) (3.400) 
Observations 121 114 121 121 120 113 120 120 99 96 99 99 
Groups 25 23 25 25 25 23 25 25 23 22 23 23 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Overall, there is some evidence that fiscal decentralization has an effect on poverty.  The 
evidence suggests that decentralization is not good for those in absolute poverty.  In both 
sets of cross-sectional estimates, tax and spending decentralization leads to higher 
absolute poverty when the size of local government is larger, and in federal countries.  
Furthermore, the random effects panel estimations provide evidence that spending 
decentralization increases absolute poverty.  The only contrasting result in the absolute 
poverty regressions is in interactions between autonomous spending and local 
government accountability.  In cross-sectional OLS and random effects panel estimations 
(tables 17 and 20), greater spending decentralization when the local government 
executive is elected, leads to lower poverty. 
 
3.5.3. Main Results Summary 
 
Across all results there are several key findings: 
- Fiscal decentralization appears to reduce income distribution between countries 
in the cross-sectional estimates.  Unitary countries, and countries with smaller 
local jurisdiction size, benefit from greater decentralization.  However, this result 
is not robust to IV estimation.  The instruments for decentralization were weak in 
some specifications however.  IV estimations do confirm that local jurisdiction 
size has an effect on the relationship between tax and spending decentralization 
and income inequality. 
- Fiscal decentralization reduces inequality over time in the high-income country 
group, with little effects observed in the low and middle income group.  Tax and 
spending decentralization are negatively associated with inequality over time, for 
high income countries.  Larger local government size mitigates against this 
positive effect, as does local government elections.  The only effect in low and 
middle income countries is in interactions between tax and spending 
decentralization and local jurisdiction size.  Decentralization harms the poor 
regardless of local jurisdiction size, though the magnitude of the effect is greater 
as local jurisdiction size is larger. 
- Despite lack of evidence in income distribution estimations, tax and spending 
decentralization shares some association with absolute poverty.  The majority of 
evidence suggests that greater decentralization leads to more absolute poverty.  
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This effect is strongest in federal countries, and when the local jurisdiction size is 
larger.  The only contrasting result is in interactions between spending 
decentralization and local government accountability.  This result suggests that 
higher autonomous spending, combined with local government accountability, 
can lead to lower poverty 
One of the more interesting results comes in interactions between decentralization and 
local jurisdiction size, particularly for low and middle income countries.  Often, tax and 
spending decentralization to larger local government size (area) leads to higher inequality 
and absolute poverty.  The decentralization literature covered in chapter 1 may have 
suggested a different result regarding LG size.  Prud’homme (1995) argues that 
decentralization could be harmful for the poorest due to wealthier citizens being more 
mobile.  Another theory is that when government size is smaller (i.e. the size of the local 
government), this leads to greater competition between governments, which could 
exacerbate certain effects, such as lower taxes on capital or mobile citizens, and less 
spending on the poorest (Hoyt, 1991; Keen and Marchand, 1997; Boadway and Shah, 
2009).  However, in the results we see that when the local government size is larger, fiscal 
decentralization is bad for the poor.  This may mean that wealthier citizens and capital is 
already freely mobile, regardless of local government size, and that by reducing local 
government size this doesn’t have any negative on the poorest with respect to the 
arguments above on mobility and competition.  However, when local government size is 
smaller, poorer citizens may be more mobile, and consequently, will also be able to 
discipline governments through mobility.  Also, smaller local governments will be more 
responsive to local citizens, which could empower the poorest further, improving poverty 
alleviation programs and policy at the local level.  These ideas are difficult to test; 
however, the main finding here is that lower government area size is not detrimental for 
the poor, the opposite true in fact. 
 
3.6. Additional Interactions 
 
In the final set of results, I provide estimates for the effects of fiscal decentralization on 
income distribution and poverty through three interactions: economic growth, 
government expenditure and governance.  The aim of these interactions is to determine 
whether fiscal decentralization has a different effect during periods of higher or lower 
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growth; when government spending is higher and when corruption is lower (better quality 
government).  I restrict my estimations in this section to the cross-sectional IV model and 
the random effects panel estimator. 
 
3.6.1. Income Distribution 
 
The first stage results for the cross-sectional IV estimator are presented in table 21.  Once 
again, local democracy and ethnolinguistic fractionalisation observe some individual 
significance.  The nature of the relationship is as expected (positive for both).  The f-test 
of collective significance often rejects the null hypothesis at the 1 or 5% level.  The only 
exception is when interactions between tax and spending decentralization, and electoral 
decentralization are included in the second stage, and are exogenous variables in the first 
stage. 
 The corresponding results for the second stage are presented in table 22.  Tax and 
spending decentralization are found to be statistically significant in only two 
specifications.  First, greater tax decentralization helps to reduce income inequality during 
periods of higher growth (2).  A similar result is observed in interactions between 
autonomous spending decentralization and growth in specification 10.  The diagnostic 
statistics in table 22 suggest that the instruments are exogenous (Hansen J-statistic) and 
that decentralization may also be exogenous in the OLS estimations, as indicated by the 
high p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test – above 0.10 in every specification. 
 The final set of estimates are for the random effects panel estimator.  I produce 
estimates for the entire sample in table 23, high income countries in table 24, and low and 
middle income countries in table 25.  The results are mostly insignificant, and sensitive 
to the selection of countries chosen in the estimations. 
There is limited evidence that fiscal decentralization has an effect on income 
distribution for the entire sample, in table 23.  This was the case in the initial interactions 
in table 14.  Greater tax decentralization helps to reduce income inequality, when the 
quality of government is higher, as measured by the corruption perception index 
(specification 4).  This effect is not consistent between the different indicators of tax and 
spending decentralization, as there is no statistical relationship in specifications 8 and 12.  
The only other statistical relationship is in specification 10 
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Table 21: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (1st Stage) Dependent Variable: Decentralization, with Additional Interactions (Entire Sample) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 0.625 4.760** 0.223 -1.859 -1.378 3.351* -1.786 -2.647** -0.100 3.555** -0.569 -1.432 
(2.567) (1.778) (2.531) (1.310) (2.496) (1.823) (2.458) (1.283) (2.559) (1.534) (2.454) (1.305) 
Instrument Variables 
 Local 
Democracy 
0.116** 0.071** 0.108* -0.011 0.168*** 0.100*** 0.148*** 0.003 0.122** 0.059* 0.112* 0.010 
 (0.055) (0.034) (0.057) (0.023) (0.046) (0.029) (0.050) (0.024) (0.057) (0.032) (0.057) (0.023) 
 Ethnic 
Fractionalisation 
0.161 0.082 0.123 0.048 0.073 0.034 0.029 0.012 0.152* 0.095* 0.107 0.009 
 (0.097) (0.062) (0.102) (0.047) (0.115) (0.079) (0.120) (0.049) (0.089) (0.047) (0.095) (0.048) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.053 -0.061*** -0.044 0.041* -0.039 -0.043* -0.029 0.037* -0.052 -0.045*** -0.043 0.025 
 (0.040) (0.017) (0.041) (0.022) (0.043) (0.024) (0.045) (0.021) (0.037) (0.013) (0.036) (0.023) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.005 -0.036*** 0.004 0.006 0.006 -0.035*** 0.005 0.008 0.008 -0.022*** 0.007 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) 
 Inflation 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 Trade -0.074 -0.077*** -0.077 0.009 -0.020 -0.041 -0.030 0.021 -0.044 -0.054** -0.048 0.018 
 (0.046) (0.028) (0.046) (0.025) (0.044) (0.027) (0.042) (0.025) (0.042) (0.023) (0.041) (0.023) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.000 -0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.006* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
 Governance 0.042** 0.042*** 0.037** -0.050*** 0.027 0.031** 0.021 -0.051*** 0.035** 0.034*** 0.029** -0.032*** 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.020) (0.014) (0.021) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) 
 Immunization 0.067 -0.140 -0.048 -0.063 -0.130 -0.211 -0.273 -0.057 0.335 0.041 0.180 -0.061 
 (0.308) (0.207) (0.308) (0.147) (0.314) (0.238) (0.351) (0.157) (0.326) (0.183) (0.339) (0.151) 
 Sanitation -0.016 0.047 0.007 -0.057 0.067 0.090 0.099 -0.024 -0.037 0.016 -0.001 -0.036 
 (0.119) (0.067) (0.126) (0.064) (0.122) (0.066) (0.132) (0.070) (0.125) (0.055) (0.127) (0.067) 
 Decentralization 
(Interaction) 
 0.182*** 0.008 0.146***  0.184*** 0.013* 0.146***  0.189*** 0.010* 0.141*** 
  (0.023) (0.005) (0.014)  (0.028) (0.007) (0.012)  (0.020) (0.005) (0.014) 
F-test (p-value) for 
instruments 0.008 0.050 0.049 0.602 0.001 0.006 0.017 0.910 0.005 0.030 0.032 0.760 
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 41 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.561 0.867 0.576 0.908 0.566 0.842 0.602 0.915 0.521 0.877 0.552 0.904 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Table 22: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Income Distribution, with Additional Interactions (Entire Sample) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 1.730 -3.014 1.541 4.506 2.119 -2.465 2.002 26.278 3.030 -2.666 3.014 14.396 
(3.936) (5.675) (3.864) (7.807) (3.800) (5.507) (3.657) (64.435) (4.082) (5.279) (4.037) (17.072) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 0.196 0.658 0.122 1.208         
 (0.253) (0.510) (0.339) (3.166)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    0.152 0.611 0.117 9.140     
     (0.247) (0.528) (0.350) (23.313)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        0.175 0.907* 0.159 7.515 
         (0.252) (0.528) (0.350) (10.105) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Growth 
 -0.197*    -0.204    -0.297**   
  (0.120)    (0.133)    (0.129)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure  
  0.004    0.002    0.000  
   (0.010)    (0.012)    (0.012)  
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
   -0.199    -1.379    -1.123 
    (0.471)    (3.434)    (1.463) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.007 0.026 -0.006 -0.070 -0.012 0.011 -0.011 -0.368 -0.002 0.027 -0.002 -0.238 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.127) (0.048) (0.043) (0.047) (0.907) (0.049) (0.042) (0.048) (0.345) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.013 0.029 -0.013 -0.019 -0.013 0.030 -0.013 -0.085 -0.016 0.025 -0.016 -0.071 
 (0.013) (0.030) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) (0.032) (0.013) (0.185) (0.014) (0.024) (0.013) (0.077) 
 Inflation -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.004 -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
 Trade -0.040 -0.001 -0.048 -0.088 -0.049 -0.015 -0.052 -0.271 -0.053 -0.009 -0.054 -0.221 
 (0.061) (0.070) (0.067) (0.101) (0.064) (0.076) (0.070) (0.585) (0.060) (0.068) (0.065) (0.251) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) 
 Governance -0.046** -0.066** -0.046** 0.036 -0.043** -0.060** -0.042** 0.450 -0.047** -0.071*** -0.047** 0.227 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.021) (0.170) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (1.224) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.364) 
 Immunization 0.000 0.186 -0.051 0.073 0.016 0.158 -0.009 0.534 -0.108 0.121 -0.111 0.567 
 (0.591) (0.637) (0.618) (0.586) (0.615) (0.650) (0.665) (1.799) (0.582) (0.576) (0.604) (1.618) 
 Sanitation 0.119 0.928 0.209 -0.536 0.050 0.891 0.097 -5.634 -0.097 0.881 -0.090 -3.166 
 (0.612) (0.818) (0.634) (1.836) (0.598) (0.798) (0.627) (15.017) (0.689) (0.825) (0.710) (4.474) 
DWH test (p-value) 0.189 0.242 0.308 0.514 0.123 0.146 0.203 0.263 0.132 0.187 0.205 0.197 
Hansen J-statistic 
(p-value) 
0.880 0.814 0.932 0.216 0.772 0.724 0.781 0.826 0.795 0.925 0.793 0.879 
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 41 41 41 41 
R-squared 0.643 0.649 0.654 0.584 0.646 0.646 0.651   0.649 0.662 0.651   
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG 
Autonomous Expenditure are instrumented using a local democracy dummy variable and ethnic fractionalisation, from the first stage.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen 
J-statistic are provided 
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Greater autonomous spending increases inequality when there is economic growth.  This result 
is in contrast to the cross-sectional IV results, and is only significant at the 10% level. 
 Despite the lack of evidence of a relationship for the entire sample in table 23, high 
income countries once again observe stronger effects of decentralization on inequality.  First, 
tax, spending and autonomous spending all help to reduce income inequality when growth is 0 
(specifications 2, 6 and 10).  There is no effect when there is growth (or negative growth).  This 
suggests that during periods of lower growth, greater decentralization can help reduce income 
inequality.   
Second, revenue decentralization, interacting with government spending produces a 
significant effect.  The negative coefficient in specification 3 indicates that higher tax 
decentralization, combined with lower government spending, can help reduce income 
inequality.   
Third, greater autonomous spending decentralization can reduce income inequality 
when the quality of government is lower, and increase income inequality when it is higher.  This 
result is rather interesting.  This result suggests that instead of fiscal decentralization having 
(more) positive effects when the quality of government is greater, fiscal decentralization 
appears to mitigate against the potential negative consequences of corruption on inequality, as 
observed in Gupta et al. (2002). 
The final estimations are for low and middle income countries in table 25.  There is 
almost no evidence that fiscal decentralization has an effect on income distribution in low and 
middle income countries.  There is only one significant result.  When the quality of government 
is lower – as indicated with a lower score on the corruption perception index – greater spending 
decentralization increases income inequality (specification 8).  This result is statistically 
significant at the 10% level only, and does not appear in interactions between governance and 
tax or autonomous spending decentralization.  Nevertheless, this suggests that greater spending 
decentralization can be harmful for the poor, if the quality of government is lower and 
corruption is higher, as measured by the CPI. 
 Overall the results in the additional interactions do not provide a greater insight into the 
effects of fiscal decentralization.  Once again, high income countries exhibit the strongest 
effects in table 21 for the random effects panel estimator.  The results indicate that tax and 
spending decentralization can continue to reduce income inequality during periods of low 
growth, low spending and when the quality of government is lower. 
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Table 23: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Income Distribution, with Additional Interactions (Entire Sample)  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 2.874** 2.946** 2.829** 2.842** 2.876** 2.945** 2.958** 3.103*** 3.109*** 3.361*** 3.367*** 3.028*** 
(1.200) (1.214) (1.247) (1.179) (1.204) (1.216) (1.229) (1.167) (1.122) (1.110) (1.207) (1.116) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.119 -0.139 1.215 0.498         
 (0.132) (0.120) (1.746) (0.361)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    0.034 0.002 2.075 0.568     
     (0.140) (0.117) (1.777) (0.438)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        0.015 -0.165 2.479 0.431 
         (0.222) (0.130) (2.116) (0.511) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Growth 
 0.012    0.015    0.032*   
  (0.016)    (0.014)    (0.017)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure  
  -0.056    -0.085    -0.102  
   (0.070)    (0.071)    (0.082)  
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
   -0.107**    -0.088    -0.074 
    (0.053)    (0.062)    (0.067) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.119** -0.115** -0.118** -0.120** -0.119* -0.117* -0.115* -0.108* -0.152** -0.143* -0.144** -0.132** 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.074) (0.074) (0.071) (0.067) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.003*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Inflation -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Trade 0.036 0.039 0.033 0.031 0.032 0.037 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.020 0.015 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041) (0.038) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.038** 0.038** 0.053** 0.037** 0.036** 0.038** 0.058** 0.033* 0.040** 0.041** 0.058** 0.038** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.017) 
 Governance -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 0.025 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 0.016 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) 
 Immunization -0.043 -0.053 -0.040 -0.038 -0.016 -0.026 -0.009 -0.019 -0.003 -0.041 -0.018 0.002 
 (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.073) (0.074) (0.080) (0.080) (0.082) (0.081) 
 Sanitation -0.781*** -0.804*** -0.795*** -0.757*** -0.779*** -0.802*** -0.819*** -0.792*** -0.751*** -0.780*** -0.791*** -0.747*** 
 (0.158) (0.158) (0.167) (0.160) (0.165) (0.167) (0.174) (0.161) (0.166) (0.158) (0.177) (0.164) 
 Primary 
Enrolment 
-0.015 -0.008 -0.073 -0.059 -0.039 -0.034 -0.141 -0.104 -0.085 -0.094 -0.194 -0.107 
 (0.224) (0.225) (0.214) (0.207) (0.222) (0.223) (0.214) (0.206) (0.194) (0.192) (0.224) (0.196) 
Observations 339 339 339 339 334 334 334 334 286 286 286 286 
Groups 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 43 43 43 43 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Table 24: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Income Distribution, with Additional Interactions (High Income Countries)  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 12.189* 12.940** 8.402 11.758* 13.356* 13.412* 13.311* 12.487* 18.144** 17.674*** 17.344** 19.049*** 
(6.598) (6.392) (7.932) (6.676) (7.445) (7.033) (7.557) (6.924) (7.046) (6.333) (7.443) (6.149) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.436*** -0.433*** -4.206* -1.048         
 (0.142) (0.142) (2.386) (0.751)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.199** -0.198** 0.024 -0.852     
     (0.085) (0.083) (1.525) (0.673)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        -0.250*** -0.258*** -1.346 -2.000*** 
         (0.088) (0.076) (2.071) (0.731) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Growth 
 -0.008    0.005    0.004   
  (0.011)    (0.009)    (0.014)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure  
  0.150    -0.009    0.042  
   (0.093)    (0.062)    (0.081)  
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
   0.079    0.088    0.233** 
    (0.094)    (0.088)    (0.098) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
0.029 0.027 0.007 0.029 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.029 0.022 0.022 0.026 -0.005 
 (0.096) (0.093) (0.090) (0.096) (0.117) (0.115) (0.120) (0.114) (0.127) (0.129) (0.127) (0.109) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Inflation -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Trade 0.026 0.023 0.037 0.031 0.033 0.031 0.035 0.040 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.051 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.039) (0.045) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.038) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.030* 0.030* -0.015 0.032* 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.032 0.032 0.024 0.046*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.040) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.017) 
 Governance -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.020 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.029 0.006 0.006 0.007 -0.018 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.028) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
 Immunization -0.397* -0.390* -0.373* -0.413** -0.346 -0.349 -0.346 -0.366* -0.254 -0.263 -0.235 -0.365 
 (0.213) (0.215) (0.215) (0.210) (0.225) (0.222) (0.224) (0.222) (0.269) (0.276) (0.295) (0.238) 
 Sanitation -2.290 -2.478 -1.378 -2.127 -2.600 -2.603 -2.593 -2.342 -3.835** -3.707** -3.670** -3.771*** 
 (1.593) (1.538) (1.882) (1.616) (1.810) (1.696) (1.827) (1.659) (1.735) (1.528) (1.818) (1.463) 
 Primary 
Enrolment 
-0.457 -0.433 -0.289 -0.495* -0.450 -0.459 -0.462 -0.460 -0.359 -0.377 -0.334 -0.526* 
 (0.287) (0.286) (0.294) (0.284) (0.303) (0.285) (0.319) (0.289) (0.369) (0.329) (0.361) (0.298) 
Observations 188 188 188 188 184 184 184 184 158 158 158 158 
Groups 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 23 23 23 23 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Table 25: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Income Distribution, with Additional Interactions (Low and Middle Income 
Countries)  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 2.133 1.990 1.461 2.045 2.304 2.067 1.882 2.325 2.951* 2.402* 2.766* 2.927* 
(1.666) (1.602) (1.705) (1.687) (1.672) (1.561) (1.643) (1.684) (1.520) (1.392) (1.475) (1.521) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 0.161 0.077 3.892 0.589         
 (0.202) (0.185) (2.924) (0.415)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    0.261 0.132 3.561 0.754*     
     (0.263) (0.216) (2.676) (0.454)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        0.242 -0.129 3.417 0.782 
         (0.356) (0.341) (2.320) (0.535) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Growth 
 0.025    0.022    0.036   
  (0.018)    (0.017)    (0.024)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure  
  -0.168    -0.150    -0.145  
   (0.128)    (0.116)    (0.100)  
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
   -0.125    -0.140    -0.183 
    (0.093)    (0.085)    (0.181) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.202*** -0.184*** -0.200*** -0.212*** -0.195*** -0.187*** -0.199*** -0.196*** -0.229*** -0.205*** -0.243*** -0.233*** 
 (0.077) (0.065) (0.075) (0.079) (0.074) (0.068) (0.076) (0.073) (0.086) (0.077) (0.086) (0.088) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.006*** -0.001 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.000 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Inflation -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Trade -0.015 -0.001 -0.012 -0.014 -0.021 -0.005 -0.024 -0.021 -0.032 -0.009 -0.039 -0.033 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.058*** 0.056*** 0.101** 0.059*** 0.056** 0.057*** 0.095** 0.056** 0.063** 0.059** 0.093*** 0.065** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.041) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.039) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.035) (0.027) 
 Governance 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.035 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.033 0.017 0.010 0.017 0.038 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.032) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.028) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.029) 
 Immunization -0.013 -0.021 -0.003 -0.025 -0.012 -0.018 -0.003 -0.025 -0.097 -0.067 -0.085 -0.113 
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.104) (0.104) (0.106) (0.105) (0.102) (0.097) (0.124) (0.097) (0.120) (0.117) 
 Sanitation -0.663*** -0.733*** -0.693*** -0.643*** -0.674*** -0.721*** -0.715*** -0.669*** -0.626*** -0.692*** -0.664*** -0.615*** 
 (0.150) (0.149) (0.160) (0.148) (0.148) (0.151) (0.155) (0.141) (0.142) (0.137) (0.151) (0.137) 
 Primary 
Enrolment 
0.102 0.172 0.052 0.099 0.071 0.145 0.020 0.050 0.003 0.123 -0.042 -0.005 
 (0.273) (0.264) (0.258) (0.274) (0.274) (0.260) (0.264) (0.278) (0.252) (0.236) (0.246) (0.253) 
Observations 151 151 151 151 150 150 150 150 128 128 128 128 
Groups 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 25 25 25 25 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
125 | P a g e  
 
3.6.2. Absolute Poverty 
 
The final set of estimates I present in this research are for interactions between tax and 
spending decentralization and growth, spending and governance, and absolute poverty 
and low and middle income countries.  In the previous estimations in section 3.5.2, I 
found some evidence that fiscal decentralization, specifically spending decentralization 
was positively associated with absolute poverty. 
 The cross-sectional IV estimations produce little evidence that tax and spending 
decentralization explain cross-sectional variations in poverty.  The first stage estimates in 
table 26 are similar to those in table 17, where ethnolinguistic fractionalisation and local 
democracy are not as effective in capturing variations in tax and spending decentralization 
for low and middle income countries.  Occasionally ethnolinguistic fractionalisation 
captures variations in decentralization, and occasionally the f-test of collective 
significance of the instruments is rejected at the 10% level.  However, the instrumentation 
of decentralization for low and middle income countries remains an issue. 
 With this in mind, the second stage estimates provide only limited evidence of an 
association between tax and spending decentralization and absolute poverty through the 
additional interactions of growth, total public spending and governance.  Tax 
decentralization in specification 3, and spending decentralization in specification 7, 
reduce absolute poverty when government spending is lower.  This suggests that 
decentralization is potentially helpful to the poor when tax resources are scarce.  The 
effect is stronger for tax decentralization – a 1% increase in tax decentralization, when 
government spending is close to 0, can reduce absolute poverty by over 10%.  However, 
there is no similar effect for autonomous spending in specification 11. 
 The only other statistically significant effect is in specification 12.  When the 
quality of government is lower, reflected by a low score on the corruption perception 
index, greater autonomous spending decentralization can reduce income inequality 
substantially.  If the CPI score is 0, then a 1% increase in autonomous spending 
decentralization, reduces absolute poverty by 50% between countries.  However, when 
the quality of government is sufficiency higher (approximately 3/10 on the CPI score), 
further autonomous spending decentralization increases absolute poverty.  This result has 
been observed in previous estimations, namely table 24, random effects panel estimates 
for income distribution in high income countries. 
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Table 26: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (1st Stage), Dependent Variable: Decentralization, with Additional Interactions (Low and Middle 
Income Countries) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -2.349 3.648 -1.656 0.131 -2.775 1.790 -1.923 -0.236 -0.701 2.900 -0.358 -0.705 
(3.789) (2.720) (4.684) (0.787) (3.105) (2.081) (3.549) (0.873) (3.211) (1.578) (3.565) (0.707) 
Instrument Variables 
 Local 
Democracy 
-0.152 -0.032 -0.189 -0.027 -0.120 -0.024 -0.185** -0.032 -0.051 0.021 -0.075 -0.036 
 (0.108) (0.082) (0.100) (0.017) (0.077) (0.069) (0.058) (0.017) (0.067) (0.048) (0.069) (0.019) 
 Ethnic 
Fractionalisation 
0.310* 0.108 0.344** 0.070 0.259* 0.109 0.304** 0.067 0.169 0.049 0.190 0.053 
 (0.141) (0.110) (0.130) (0.047) (0.112) (0.088) (0.119) (0.044) (0.120) (0.081) (0.132) (0.036) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
0.010 -0.041 0.004 0.008 -0.000 -0.032 -0.006 -0.003 0.021 -0.008 0.019 -0.003 
 (0.066) (0.037) (0.078) (0.016) (0.055) (0.030) (0.059) (0.017) (0.056) (0.028) (0.059) (0.013) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.008 -0.023* 0.010 0.002 0.011 -0.016* 0.015 0.002 0.006 -0.014** 0.008 0.004* 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.002) 
 Inflation 0.002** 0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000* 0.002** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Trade -0.014 -0.087* 0.007 0.012 0.012 -0.058 0.060 0.000 0.038 -0.020 0.061 0.008 
 (0.057) (0.040) (0.084) (0.014) (0.047) (0.032) (0.072) (0.014) (0.044) (0.024) (0.070) (0.011) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.027** 0.011 0.081 0.005 0.029*** 0.012 0.091 0.007 0.022*** 0.007 0.044 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.106) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.053) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.040) (0.003) 
 Governance -0.020 0.011 -0.018 -0.070*** -0.020 0.004 -0.017 -0.066*** -0.038 0.000 -0.037 -0.041*** 
 (0.037) (0.019) (0.045) (0.015) (0.033) (0.015) (0.037) (0.016) (0.033) (0.013) (0.036) (0.009) 
 Immunization -0.163 -0.346 -0.127 0.034 -0.223 -0.189 -0.128 0.026 -0.441 -0.399 -0.393 0.094 
 (0.581) (0.431) (0.603) (0.167) (0.436) (0.327) (0.415) (0.178) (0.537) (0.316) (0.521) (0.164) 
 Sanitation 0.014 0.081 -0.028 -0.027 0.071 0.076 -0.018 0.011 0.096 0.095 0.053 -0.038 
 (0.157) (0.115) (0.191) (0.045) (0.123) (0.083) (0.150) (0.053) (0.128) (0.061) (0.129) (0.044) 
 Primary 
Enrolment 
0.678 -0.353 0.511 -0.021 0.768 -0.145 0.521 0.062 0.450 -0.282 0.343 0.116 
 (0.682) (0.503) (0.827) (0.120) (0.560) (0.426) (0.676) (0.158) (0.501) (0.321) (0.583) (0.164) 
 Decentralization 
(Interaction) 
 0.137*** -0.134 0.302***  0.122*** -0.140 0.287***  0.127*** -0.058 0.321*** 
  (0.027) (0.256) (0.026)  (0.026) (0.112) (0.036)  (0.020) (0.099) (0.044) 
F-test (p-value) for 
instruments 0.103 0.628 0.060 0.338 0.097 0.498 0.045 0.243 0.412 0.734 0.408 0.179 
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 19 19 19 
R-squared 0.759 0.926 0.766 0.982 0.828 0.951 0.849 0.978 0.831 0.968 0.837 0.984 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Table 27: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Absolute Poverty, with Additional Interactions (Low and Middle 
Income Countries) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -20.778 50.917 -67.330 -0.300 -25.035 24.528 -38.148 -3.336 3.048 -34.330 -5.802 -16.417 
(52.769) (91.258) (53.965) (39.627) (53.837) (66.267) (56.672) (40.758) (52.210) (109.967) (58.982) (54.614) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -4.566 -13.431 -10.723*** -27.980         
 (4.620) (14.713) (4.155) (29.530)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -5.253 -11.816 -8.226* -38.837     
     (5.605) (13.674) (4.640) (26.126)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        -7.622 15.411 -11.941 -49.527** 
         (8.723) (37.094) (8.664) (21.727) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Growth 
 2.197    1.942    -1.567   
  (2.318)    (1.961)    (4.851)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure  
  5.760    0.886    0.994  
   (3.876)    (2.261)    (2.242)  
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
   9.437    12.936    17.701** 
    (9.989)    (8.475)    (7.912) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-2.047*** -2.821*** -1.624* -1.902*** -2.100*** -2.655*** -2.003** -2.220*** -1.812*** -2.231*** -1.634* -2.177*** 
 (0.701) (0.787) (0.907) (0.665) (0.697) (0.624) (0.836) (0.674) (0.659) (0.605) (0.854) (0.664) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.074 -0.340 0.061 0.085 0.096 -0.240 0.106 0.072 0.030 0.168 0.028 0.163 
 (0.148) (0.459) (0.154) (0.118) (0.151) (0.334) (0.166) (0.116) (0.152) (0.542) (0.168) (0.166) 
 Inflation 0.000 -0.003 0.007 -0.014 0.001 -0.004 0.005 -0.015 0.004 -0.018 0.010 -0.029 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) 
 Trade -1.956** -3.240* -2.990*** -1.464** -1.825** -2.843** -2.108* -1.965*** -1.564** -1.660 -1.814 -1.619** 
 (0.876) (1.711) (1.110) (0.664) (0.880) (1.297) (1.178) (0.623) (0.743) (1.188) (1.129) (0.690) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
-0.101 -0.074 -2.232 -0.146 -0.068 -0.092 -0.379 -0.106 -0.029 -0.307 -0.300 -0.141 
 (0.127) (0.136) (1.530) (0.103) (0.155) (0.137) (0.978) (0.147) (0.197) (0.282) (0.824) (0.150) 
 Governance -0.292 0.040 -0.558 -2.317 -0.300 -0.026 -0.409 -3.042 -0.463 0.072 -0.665 -2.247*** 
 (0.425) (0.399) (0.522) (2.257) (0.430) (0.357) (0.506) (1.868) (0.435) (0.419) (0.523) (0.809) 
 Immunization 3.916 0.862 0.475 6.956 3.645 4.551 1.257 7.311 -0.587 15.265 -4.154 8.139 
 (6.503) (10.575) (8.357) (5.603) (6.642) (7.720) (7.395) (6.425) (8.627) (19.034) (10.264) (9.145) 
 Sanitation 8.897 -1.880 21.570** 2.823 9.803 -0.085 14.487 3.724 6.048 1.659 10.533 5.941 
 (9.049) (11.361) (9.960) (6.593) (9.832) (9.890) (9.854) (7.873) (10.086) (10.359) (11.244) (9.113) 
DWH Test (p-
value) 
0.428 0.708 0.085 0.678 0.371 0.772 0.170 0.415 0.483 0.565 0.189 0.122 
Hansen J-statistic 
(p-value) 
0.190 0.196 0.132 0.163 0.193 0.175 0.148 0.203 0.162 0.015 0.136 0.376 
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 19 19 19 
R-squared 0.748 0.739 0.692 0.766 0.744 0.765 0.711 0.720 0.708 0.706 0.659 0.638 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Revenue, Expenditure and Autonomous 
Expenditure are instrumented using a local democracy dummy variable and ethnic fractionalisation, from the first stage.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen J-statistic are 
provided 
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The final estimates are produced using a random effects panel estimator in table 28.  These 
results suggest that tax and spending decentralization can affect absolute poverty over time, 
through various interactions.  The first effect is in interactions between decentralization and 
economic growth.  Whilst decentralization has no effect on poverty when growth is close to 0, 
greater tax and spending decentralization can lead to higher absolute poverty when growth is 
higher.  This effect is consistent between the different decentralization indicators in 
specifications 2, 6 and 10.  Economic growth is found to be negatively associated with poverty 
in specifications 2 and 6, which suggests that growth is good for the poor.  However, greater 
tax and spending decentralization mitigates against this positive effect, and ultimately increases 
poverty during periods of higher growth. 
 The second consistent result is in interactions with government spending.  When 
government spending is near to 0, higher tax and spending decentralization have strong positive 
effects on the level of absolute poverty.  Increasing absolute poverty, year on year, by as much 
as 80.5% (specification 12).  As government spending increases, higher levels of tax and 
spending decentralization can begin to reduce absolute poverty – as indicated by the negative 
coefficient for the interaction between decentralization and expenditure.   
 The third result, which applies to tax and spending decentralization, is in interactions 
with government quality (specifications 4 and 8).  Once more, greater tax and spending 
decentralization increases absolute poverty when the quality of government is higher.  In slight 
contrast to the cross-sectional instrument variable estimates in table 27, there is no effect when 
the quality of government is very low (close to 0 on CPI score). 
 Overall, new interactions in the absolute poverty dataset confirm previous estimations 
of the relationship between decentralization and absolute poverty – further tax and spending 
decentralization appears to increase absolute poverty in most conditions.  The random effects 
estimations provide evidence that decentralization increases absolute poverty during periods of 
higher growth, when spending is lower, and when there is less corruption.  Perhaps the most 
interesting result is in interactions between decentralization and the governance indicator.  The 
result, where decentralization increases absolute poverty when the government is perceived to 
be of better quality, suggests that decentralization may mitigate against the positive effects of a 
better government quality (see Gupta et al. 2002). 
 
129 | P a g e  
 
Table 28: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Absolute Poverty, with Additional Interactions (Low and Middle Income 
Countries)  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 14.447 12.917 3.932 16.375 20.022 16.377 12.151 20.929 22.251 13.971 18.987 20.730 
(21.879) (18.429) (19.880) (21.297) (21.912) (17.237) (19.435) (21.571) (20.940) (18.366) (18.227) (21.269) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 2.512 0.040 68.039** -4.961         
 (1.705) (1.387) (33.837) (4.169)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    4.946* 0.956 75.246*** -3.336     
     (2.973) (2.129) (27.428) (5.744)     
 SCG Autonom 
Expenditure 
        6.975** 0.437 80.485*** -2.678 
         (3.033) (2.689) (21.505) (8.013) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Growth 
 0.557***    0.591***    0.649***   
  (0.183)    (0.182)    (0.180)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure  
  -2.972**    -3.206***    -3.354***  
   (1.499)    (1.182)    (0.930)  
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
   2.343**    2.619**    3.538 
    (1.040)    (1.269)    (2.244) 
Controls 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-1.851** -1.528* -1.838** -1.629* -1.640** -1.390* -1.599* -1.504* -1.216 -0.742 -1.129 -1.193 
 (0.825) (0.792) (0.847) (0.842) (0.814) (0.804) (0.834) (0.781) (0.906) (0.883) (0.888) (0.895) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.031 -0.110** 0.028 0.032 0.022 -0.102** 0.024 0.024 0.021 -0.060 0.024 0.017 
 (0.028) (0.046) (0.024) (0.028) (0.023) (0.040) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.037) (0.023) (0.022) 
 Inflation -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.018 -0.016 -0.023* -0.018 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
 Trade -0.423 0.002 -0.293 -0.436 -0.519 0.058 -0.556 -0.519 -0.340 0.100 -0.497 -0.343 
 (0.569) (0.520) (0.523) (0.570) (0.601) (0.556) (0.551) (0.593) (0.685) (0.692) (0.587) (0.647) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
-0.575* -0.624** 0.208 -0.622* -0.640** -0.632** 0.162 -0.666** -0.638** -0.690** -0.025 -0.674** 
 (0.319) (0.308) (0.451) (0.321) (0.322) (0.311) (0.394) (0.323) (0.320) (0.332) (0.386) (0.316) 
 Governance 0.006 0.025 -0.058 -0.604 -0.011 0.046 -0.072 -0.618 0.010 -0.090 0.001 -0.444 
 (0.191) (0.170) (0.158) (0.395) (0.170) (0.164) (0.152) (0.393) (0.226) (0.180) (0.183) (0.379) 
 Immunization 1.281 0.491 1.392 1.334 1.388 0.502 1.694 1.447 0.461 0.447 0.914 0.861 
 (2.094) (1.696) (1.879) (2.085) (1.880) (1.654) (1.767) (1.822) (2.013) (1.670) (1.917) (2.135) 
 Sanitation -2.270 -3.310** -2.530 -2.576 -2.416* -3.430** -3.039** -2.582* -2.728* -3.682** -3.563* -2.799* 
 (1.420) (1.429) (1.571) (1.601) (1.380) (1.407) (1.532) (1.496) (1.568) (1.605) (1.864) (1.630) 
 Primary 
Enrolment 
3.588 5.029 2.189 3.644 2.301 4.000 0.499 2.493 2.015 3.908 0.153 2.445 
 (3.541) (3.095) (3.486) (3.538) (3.476) (2.856) (3.262) (3.475) (3.652) (3.434) (2.952) (3.758) 
Observations 121 121 121 121 120 120 120 120 99 99 99 99 
Groups 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 23 23 23 23 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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3.6.3. Additional Interactions Summary 
 
Once again, interactions between decentralization and various conditions: growth, 
government spending and governance, produce different results for high income countries 
and low and middle income countries: 
i) Higher income countries continue to observe negative effects of 
decentralization on inequality.  During periods of low growth, when 
government spending is lower, and (perceived) corruption is higher, 
decentralization helps to reduce income inequality over time (random effects 
estimations).  There is no effect in the low and middle income sample 
ii) Fiscal decentralization continues to increase absolute poverty in low and 
middle income countries, particularly over time.  During periods of higher 
growth, when government spending is lower, and when the quality of 
government is higher, greater tax and spending decentralization result in 
higher levels of absolute poverty.  Only when there is sufficient levels of 
government spending, does tax and spending decentralization benefit the 
absolute poor 
 
3.7. Conclusions and Closing Remarks 
 
In this chapter I investigated whether the degree of fiscal decentralization and aspects of 
government decentralization had an effect on the level of income inequality and the extent 
of absolute poverty.  The aim of this chapter was to determine whether fiscal 
decentralization had any effect on poverty and income distribution, and if so, whether 
further decentralization helped to reduce poverty, or exacerbate poverty, at the national 
level.  Any evidence could then be used to support the various arguments addressed in 
the related literature (3.1).  To achieve this aim I used the fiscal decentralization dataset 
(chapter 2), and data on income distribution and absolute poverty for low and middle 
income countries.  I used various econometric methods to produce two sets of cross-
sectional estimates, one with ordinary least squares, and another with instrument 
variables, and a set of random effects panel estimates.  The conclusions of the empirical 
research are summarised below: 
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1. Across the estimations, there is evidence that fiscal decentralization could reduce 
income inequality in higher income countries and increase absolute poverty in low 
and middle income countries.  In income distribution estimations, when the 
sample is split into a high-income group and a low and middle income group, 
there is contrasting fortunes with respect to decentralization.  High income 
countries observe consistent, negative effects of decentralization on income 
inequality.  Low and middle income groups observe either no effect, or positive 
effects in the corresponding estimates.   
2. These results are also supported by additional interactions.  Further tax and 
spending decentralization reduces income inequality during periods of lower 
growth, when government spending is lower and when the quality of government 
is lower, in the high-income group.  There is no effect for low and middle income 
countries. 
3. Tax and spending decentralization leads to higher levels of absolute poverty under 
most conditions.  When the size of the local jurisdiction is larger and in federal 
countries, tax and spending decentralization is positively associated with absolute 
poverty.  Furthermore, during periods of higher growth and when government 
spending is lower, decentralization increases absolute poverty. 
4. Fiscal decentralization appears to have contrasting effects depending on the size 
of the local jurisdiction.  Where there is statistical significance, tax and spending 
decentralization often helps reduce income inequality when the average size of 
the local jurisdiction is smaller.  On the other hand, if the size of local government 
is larger, then fiscal decentralization can be harmful for the poor and poorest.  This 
result runs counter to certain arguments in the literature.  Oates (1972) and 
Boadway and Shah (2009) caution against fiscal decentralization with respect to 
redistribution, due to the disincentives for local governments to raise taxes on the 
wealthiest who can simply move to another region (Prud’homme, 1995).  
Furthermore, models that explain the effects of fiscal competition also 
demonstrate that when governments are smaller and there are more of them, 
competition on tax and expenditure is more intense (see section 1.3.1).  Yet, the 
results here suggest that fiscal decentralization can actually help the poor when 
local government size is smaller.  One explanation for this result may be that in a 
world where capital and the wealthy are already very mobile, by reducing the size 
of local government the poorest can also migrate to areas of the country that best 
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suit their needs.  Smaller government size could also improve local government 
accountability and enhance ‘yardstick competition’ (see 1.2.5, page 26). 
5. Fiscal decentralization can help the poorest when the local government executive 
is elected locally, and accountable to local citizens.  This result is the only 
evidence that tax and spending decentralization can result in lower absolute 
poverty. 
Overall, the results suggest that fiscal decentralization can help reduce income inequality, 
particularly in high income countries, and increase absolute poverty in low and middle 
income countries.  The effects of decentralization also depend on other factors such as 
local jurisdiction size, federal constitution and local government accountability.  
 
This research, the first in this area, provides a useful foundation for further work.  I would 
make two recommendations for further work in this area.  First, better instruments are 
required to examine cross-sectional variations in poverty and the effects of 
decentralization.  The instruments I used in this research, though valid and good 
predictors of variations in decentralization in income distribution estimations, were very 
weak for the low and middle income sample.  Specifically, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation did not explain variations in decentralization as much as expected. 
 Second, future research should examine the long-term effects of fiscal 
decentralization.  Due to data limitations, my research focused on the instantaneous 
effects of fiscal decentralization on income based poverty (absolute and relative).  In the 
next chapter I will examine a related area – the impact of fiscal decentralization on the 
provision of public services.  As part of my thesis on fiscal decentralization and the poor, 
this chapter raised important questions about the effect that fiscal decentralization can 
have on incomes of the poor.  However, poverty is a multi-dimensional concept, and by 
improving access to basic public services, such as vaccinations and primary education, 
the issue of absolute poverty may be tackled in the long run.  
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4. Public Healthcare, Public Education and Fiscal 
Decentralization 
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In this chapter I investigate whether there is an association between fiscal decentralization 
and public healthcare and public education.  By public healthcare and public education, I 
refer to the availability of essential public healthcare services, such as vaccinations, and 
general healthcare, and of primary education and the quality of the education provided.   
The aim of this research is to establish whether fiscal decentralization improves the 
delivery of and consumption of these public services.    
 Though the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public services has 
received attention recently (see Treisman, 2000; Khaleghian, 2004; Falch and Fischer, 
2012), my empirical research focuses on the different concepts of decentralization and 
under what conditions fiscal decentralization can improve access to and delivery of public 
healthcare and public education services, if at all.  My research contributes to this area of 
research in a number of ways: 
i) I use the extensive dataset outlined in chapter 2 to establish whether 
expenditure share (SCG Expenditure) and autonomous subnational 
government spending (SCG Autonomous Expenditure) observe different 
effects on public healthcare and public education.  I also incorporate measures 
of other aspects of decentralization, such as electoral decentralization, 
legislative decentralization and federal constitution to identify whether local 
government autonomy and accountability have a bearing on the relationship 
between spending decentralization and public healthcare and public 
education. 
ii) I examine whether fiscal decentralization has different effects on public 
healthcare and public education depending on the degree of heterogeneity in 
demands for public goods and services36, which is often assumed to strengthen 
the case for greater decentralization (Oates, 1972) 
iii) Finally, I examine whether fiscal decentralization has different effects 
according to the level of total government spending.  The interaction between 
decentralization of spending and the level of total government spending could 
indicate whether low or high income countries should pursue decentralization 
policy in order to improve public healthcare and public education 
                                                 
36 The measure used to represent heterogeneity contains information on income inequality, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, urbanization and so on that could explain variations in the demand for public goods and 
services.  Index is from Ivanyna and Shah (2014), available here: http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-
ejournal.ja.2014-3     
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Using a dataset containing 40 low, middle and high income countries over a period of 20 
years, between 1990 and 2009, I produce several estimations for the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and public healthcare and education.  My final results suggest that 
fiscal decentralization is neither universally good nor bad for the provision and 
consumption of public services.  My results show that the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and public healthcare and public education is sensitive to the degree of 
fiscal autonomy; to other aspects of decentralization; the degree of heterogeneity of need 
and the level of total expenditure on healthcare and education.   
The structure of this chapter is as follows.  In section 3.1 I bring together the public 
healthcare and education literature and fiscal decentralization literature, and establish 
how fiscal decentralization may be associated with public services.  In section 3.2 I 
outline the data used in this empirical research.  In section 3.3 I provide descriptive 
statistics for the dataset used in this empirical research.  In section 3.4 I outline the 
methodology and decisions that I have made to improve the credibility of my conclusions.  
In section 3.5 I provide a selection of estimates for the cross-sectional and panel data, and 
provide an analysis of the results.  Finally, in section 3.6 I provide a conclusion for this 
research and my closing remarks.   
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4.1. Related Literature 
 
In this literature survey I establish links between fiscal decentralization and public 
healthcare and public education.  I provide a brief introduction on public provision, 
including a summary of arguments in favour of publicly funded healthcare and education.  
I consider the various demand and supply side factors.  I consider whether increasing 
expenditure on public services is the best policy for improving outcomes, and consider 
what constraints exist that reduce access, particularly for the poorest.  I then explain how 
fiscal decentralization could improve the delivery of public services and remove barriers 
to access.  I also consider how fiscal decentralization could harm nationwide delivery of 
public services and lead to inter-regional inequality in the availability and quality of 
public healthcare and education.   
 
4.1.1. Public Healthcare and Public Education   
 
According to recent statistics, the large majority of healthcare and education services 
available are publicly funded.  In 2011 public sector expenditure on healthcare accounted 
for 59% of total expenditure, up from 56% in 200037.  In OECD member countries, public 
sector expenditure accounted for 84% of total expenditure on education in 201038.  
Supporters of public healthcare and education cite the need for equitable service and how 
best to provide services that are available to everyone (Demery, 2000).  Banerjee and 
Duflo (2011) argue that universal healthcare and education are essential for tackling 
chronic poverty.  Sen (1985) argues that barriers to primary education, and poor 
healthcare, are significant causes of poverty.  Consequently, global initiatives aimed at 
tackling chronic absolute poverty focus on the need for greater access to basic healthcare, 
particularly for the poorest, and access to primary education39  
 The recent literature has focused on the various determinants of provision and 
access to public services.  Specifically, there has been a debate about the relative benefits 
of increasing expenditure to increase provision of public services, both in scale and scope, 
                                                 
37 The figures for average public expenditure on healthcare are calculated using data from the World Bank 
(World Development Indicators), for a sample of 186 countries 
38 Average from 34 OECD members in 2010.  Education at a Glance, 2013 report, page 205, available here: 
http://www.oecd.org/edu/eag2013%20(eng)--FINAL%2020%20June%202013.pdf 
39 The Millennium Development Goals included targets for universal primary education, reducing infant 
mortality rates and reducing absolute poverty 
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and whether governments should focus instead on removing barriers to access and 
ensuring that people are able to access the services that are already available.   
Makinen et al. (2000) argue that even in the poorest countries, basic healthcare 
services are provided, but few use them.  Ensor and Cooper (2004) explain that the poor 
are not aware of the services that are intended for them and at what cost.  In their research 
they rank the different reasons why people did use available healthcare services in 
Bangladesh, and found that 40% of respondents were not aware of the services available 
to them.  Where there is limited knowledge of services and barriers to access, demand 
(uptake) is lower (Gauri and Khaleghian, 2004), and it is the poor that lose out the most 
(Ensor and Cooper, 2004).   
If demand side barriers exist, then increasing expenditure to increase provision 
may not necessarily benefit those who are missing out on public services.  Where there is 
evidence that increasing expenditure does not benefit the poorest (see Makinen et al., 
2000), Castro-Leal et al. (1999) argue that problems of targeting; the quality of the 
services available and the barriers to access, are the reasons why.  McGuire (2006) and 
Pal (2010) argue that increases in expenditure should be focused on improving access, by 
improving infrastructure for example, rather than simply increasing the outputs of 
healthcare and education.   
 
The empirical evidence supports the view that expenditure is positively associated with 
the consumption of the services of public healthcare and public education.  However, the 
strength of the relationship between expenditure and access to public services is sensitive 
to a range of socioeconomic factors.  There is also disagreement on the distributional 
effects of increasing expenditure, and whether increases in expenditure disproportionately 
benefit the poorest. 
 Bidani and Ravallion (1997), Gupta et al. (2003) and Wagstaff (2003) provide 
evidence that increases in public expenditure on healthcare is positively associated with 
health outcomes (infant mortality and life expectancy) for the poorest.  They identify a 
link between poverty and lower life expectancy and higher infant mortality and contrast 
the effects of higher expenditure on healthcare on the poor and non-poor.  They provide 
evidence that higher levels of expenditure increase life expectancy and reduce infant 
mortality rates, and this effect is stronger for the poorest. 
 There is also evidence that public expenditure on education improves outcomes.  
Blatchford et al., (2003) and Blatchford et al., (2011) provide evidence that higher 
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expenditure leads to small class sizes (pupil to teacher ratio), and consequently higher 
literacy rates.  This effect is stronger in early years (primary school) and for lower 
attainment.  Deke (2003) and Yang et al. (2014) provide evidence of a link between public 
expenditure on education (i.e. free, compulsory education) and access to further 
education.  Deke (2003) also identifies a correlation between further education and higher 
earnings, and they conclude that further expenditure is positively linked to future 
earnings. 
 However, there is some evidence that contradicts the narrative that higher 
expenditure on public services improves availability of public services, particularly for 
the poorest.  Filmer and Pratchett (1999) argue that when socioeconomic variables 
(income, income inequality and ethnic fragmentation) are accounted for, healthcare 
expenditure explains only 1% of the variation in healthcare outcomes.  McGuire (2006) 
also finds evidence that increasing expenditure is ineffective in improving healthcare 
(infant mortality).  He cites various reasons: misallocation of funds, corruption and weak 
administrative capacity.  He concludes that instead of focusing on increasing expenditure, 
a better approach would be to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of current 
expenditure.    
 
4.1.2. Decentralization and Public Healthcare and Education: Basic 
Arguments 
 
In practice the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public healthcare and 
education could go either way.  Oates (1972) and Tiebout (1956) provide two critical 
arguments in favour of decentralization of provision, namely that local governments are 
better able to address local needs (Oates) and that citizens are able to pick and choose a 
set of local policies that best matches their preferences (Tiebout).  On the other hand, 
local governments may be unable to raise sufficient revenues to tend to those needs, due 
to fiscal competition leading to lower tax rates and expenditure (Hoyt, 1991), or they may 
free-ride on the provision of public services in a neighbouring jurisdiction when those 
services exhibit positive spillovers (Besley and Coate, 2003).  I provide the case for and 
against decentralization below. 
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4.1.2.1. The Case for Decentralization 
 
On the supply side, supporters of decentralization often focus on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government spending at the local level.  One such argument is that local 
governments will tailor expenditure to local demand (Khaleghian, 2004), and 
consequently, decentralization will improve allocative efficiency (Oates, 1972).  The 
provision of public services from a central government may be inefficient, where the 
central government provides public services that are more regionally uniform (Oates, 
1972).  For this reason, when there is a greater range of preferences between subsets of 
the population, the case for decentralization is stronger.  Oates also argues that if there 
are no cost-savings to be had from centralized provision, and there are no external 
economies, then the case for decentralization trumps the case for centralization whenever 
demand for public services is not homogeneous.   
Decentralized provision of public services may also lead to policy differentiation 
between jurisdictions.  As Tiebout (1956) explains, decentralization can bring about 
diversity in the provision of public goods and services between local areas and citizens 
can simply move to the area that best matches their preferences.  Local governments 
effectively compete for citizens, and aim to provide the optimal set of public goods and 
services at minimum cost to their constituents.  Fiscal decentralization essentially 
empowers citizens to hold local governments to account for local decision making, and if 
they are not satisfied, voters could choose to move to areas where the provision of public 
services best matches their needs (Tiebout 1956; Epple et al., 2012). 
Fiscal decentralization can also empower citizens to hold local governments to 
account through local elections.  As Seabright (1996) demonstrates, local governments 
have an incentive to provide a set of public policies, including the provision of essential 
public services, to satisfy the preference of the local population.  Central government on 
the other hand may simply supply a uniform set of public goods and services that satisfies 
the median voter (Seabright).  Therefore, central governments may indeed provide goods 
according to a one-size-fits-all dictum (Oates, 1972), as that may be sufficient for the 
central government to be re-elected.  Ultimately, central government may not address 
local issues regarding supply of and access to public services. 
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4.1.2.2. The Case for Centralization  
 
Whilst fiscal decentralization may improve the allocation of public expenditure, there are 
a number of risks involved in further fiscal decentralization. 
 First, subnational governments may be unable to raise sufficient revenues to 
finance expenditure to match local demands (Khaleghian, 2004).  If the responsibility to 
raise taxes is devolved to local governments then this could lead to lower taxes on capital 
and mobile citizens, and reduce expenditure on public goods and services (Hoyt, 1991).  
Prud’homme (1995) cautions against decentralization for this reason, as local 
governments may not be able to extract the necessary resources to finance local 
expenditure on public healthcare and education. 
 Second, if local governments are responsible for raising their own revenues, then 
inter-regional inequalities may arise.  Boadway and Shah (2009) argue that some areas of 
the country will be wealthier than others, and if local governments are tasked with raising 
tax revenue and setting own budgets, then there will be inequality in taxation and 
expenditure between local governments.  Cai and Treisman (2005) demonstrate how 
inter-regional inequality in endowments (productive capacity through natural resources, 
human capital etc.) could lead to greater welfare of local citizens and higher spending on 
public goods (and services).  Inequalities may arise in investment in infrastructure and 
other productivity enhancing goods and services, in capital located in each jurisdiction, 
in productivity and growth, and consequently in tax revenue, expenditure and the 
provision of public services.   
 Pal (2010) and Yang et al. (2014) provide evidence of inter-regional inequality in 
public education.  Pal (2010) observe large inequalities in the distribution of resources in 
India resulting from concentrations of poor and wealthy households in certain areas.  
Yang et al. (2014) observe a similar gap in education attainment between rural and urban 
areas.  The gap has narrowed following a policy on providing free and compulsory 
primary education, supported through local government expenditure.  In the event of 
inter-regional externalities, central governments will need to harmonise expenditures and 
maintain minimum standards of the public services provided (Garcia-Valinas, 2005). 
  
Third, the central government could retain control over tax revenues, and devolve 
expenditure functions to subnational governments, but doing so would restrict the 
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autonomy of subnational government.  Subnational governments would be reliant on 
transfers from the central government, and they would not be able to control the size of 
their budgets (Brueckner, 2009).  Furthermore, transfers from the central government may 
strings attached (Boadway and Shah, 2009), which would mandate local governments to 
spend on certain public goods and services (Treisman, 2007).  Consequently, local 
governments may not be able to respond to local demands as they are mandated to spend 
elsewhere. 
 Fourth, even if local governments cannot compete through taxation (Hoyt, 1991), 
they may still compete through expenditure (Keen and Marchand, 1997).  This could lead 
to lower spending on public healthcare and public education.  Local governments may 
allocate too much expenditure to infrastructure and airports, and less on public services 
in an attempt to attract capital to their jurisdiction (Keen and Marchand, 1997). 
 Fifth, local governments may spend less on goods that exhibit positive 
externalities.  Besley and Coate (2003) raise the problem of free-riding, whereby the 
provision of public services in a neighbouring jurisdiction may improve the welfare of 
local citizens.  An example of a service that would exhibit spillovers would be 
immunization, whereby the health of citizens living in one jurisdiction will also affect the 
health of jurisdictions in the neighbouring jurisdiction.  Without control to increase 
budgets, local governments may prioritise expenditure on goods and services that do not 
exhibit positive spillovers.  If every local government ignores essential public services 
for this reason, then those public services will be underprovided nationally. 
Oates (1972) and Khaleghian (2004) argue that local governments should only be 
responsible for providing public goods and services when local governments can fully 
internalize the costs and benefits of those services.  Otherwise, local governments may 
simply under-provide such services to their local area, which will mean lower provision 
of public services that exhibit externalities nationally.  Essentially, for services that 
exhibit larger externalities, the case for fiscal decentralization is weaker (Chu and Yang, 
2012) 
 
4.1.2.3. Empirical Evidence 
 
The theory suggests that fiscal decentralization could help or hinder national delivery of 
public healthcare and public education, and the empirical evidence that is available is by 
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no means conclusive.  Mostly, the empirical evidence suggests that fiscal decentralization 
can improve the provision of public services, however the results are sensitive to the 
choice of controls and how decentralization is measured.   
Treisman (2000) investigates the relationship between several forms of 
decentralization and the provision of public healthcare (vaccinations and infant mortality) 
and education (primary enrolment and literacy rates).  The cross-sectional evidence 
suggests that the nature of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and provision 
is dependent on how decentralization is captured.  Specifically, how decisions are 
arranged between different tiers of government and local government autonomy are 
negatively associated with provision. 
Khaleghian (2004) examines the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
vaccination coverage (DPT and measles).  Further decentralization is positively 
associated with coverage in low-income countries, but the opposite is observed in middle-
income countries.  Jimenez-Rubio (2011) examines the relationship between revenue 
decentralization, fiscal decentralization and infant mortality.  They conclude that fiscal 
decentralization is negatively associated with infant mortality, and hence positively 
associated with healthcare.  An increase in total expenditure is also positively associated 
with healthcare, and the effect is stronger than that of decentralization.   
Falch and Fischer (2012) investigate the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and public education (attainment).  They find a positive association 
between test scores and expenditure decentralization.  Accounting for higher levels of 
total expenditure (general consumption spending) appears to mitigate the effects of 
expenditure decentralization.  Falch and Fischer propose further work on transmission 
effects on public services. 
 
4.1.3. Summary of Related Literature 
 
Fiscal decentralization could improve the provision of public healthcare and public 
education, but there are also risks associated with greater fiscal autonomy of local 
governments.  The case for decentralization argues that decentralized government can 
more effectively provide healthcare and education to local needs, which are often 
different between one locality and the next (Oates, 1972).  Fiscal decentralization also 
empowers citizens to move to the jurisdiction that best matches their preference for 
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healthcare and education services (Tiebout 1956).  Finally, fiscal decentralization can 
empower citizens to elect local governments that will deliver the public goods and 
services that the local citizens want (and need).   
 On the other hand, by allowing local governments to set own tax rates and decide 
own expenditure, essential public healthcare and public education services may be under-
provided.  Local governments may be pressured to reduce taxes on capital and on the 
wealthy, and reduce government spending on public services (Hoyt, 1991).  Local 
governments may also allocate a higher proportion of public spending to infrastructure, 
and less to public services (Keen and Marchand, 1997).  Fiscal decentralization may also 
result in unequal access to and quality of public services across the country, which could 
hurt national outcomes.   
 It is no surprise then that the results in the related empirical research suggest that 
the effects of fiscal decentralization are mixed.  Some of the studies provide evidence that 
decentralization improves provision and consumption of public services (Khaleghian, 
2004; Falch and Fischer, 2012; Jimenez-Rubio, 2012).  However, these studies have used 
indicators for tax and spending share (SCG Revenue and SCG Expenditure), and their 
results may not capture the effects of fiscal autonomy and fiscal decentralization on public 
healthcare and public education.  When other forms of decentralization are examined, 
different results may be realised.  Treisman (2000) identifies slightly different effects for 
local government autonomy (legislative).  Furthermore, work should be done to establish 
transmission effects, i.e. decentralization interacting with other factors, such as 
expenditure (Falch and Fischer, 2012).   
 In this research, I build on the suggestions above and my own ideas established in 
the earlier chapters on different aspects of decentralization. 
 First, I consider whether fiscal decentralization performs differently when local 
governments are directly elected or appointed by the central government.  On the one 
hand, local governments that are elected have an incentive to respond to local demands, 
which may improve the communication of citizen needs to local governments 
(Khaleghian, 2004).  Khaleghian refers to the knowledge issue, whereby either local 
governments are not knowledgeable about the needs of local citizens, or the citizens are 
not knowledgeable about the local goods and services available to them.  The latter may 
refer to demand side barriers that exist that reduce consumption of public services that 
are readily available (Ensor and Cooper, 2004).  On the other hand, local governments 
may under-provide certain goods due to either externalities or competition.  Central 
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governments may seek to control local government decision making through 
appointments.   
 Second, autonomy could have an effect on the relationship between tax and 
spending decentralization and public healthcare and public education.  The question is 
whether simply by increasing the share of subnational government activity will improve 
provision, as Treisman (2007) and others have argued.  Or, whether fiscal autonomy and 
accountability of local governments provides added incentives that ensure decentralized 
governments provide public services more efficiently.       
Third, Khaleghian (2004) and Besley and Coate (2003) raise the point that fiscal 
decentralization performs better when there is a greater heterogeneity of need.  If there 
are no cost-savings, fiscal decentralization may be more rewarding if the degree of 
heterogeneity is higher.  In this research I test this theory by interacting an indicator for 
heterogeneity with fiscal decentralization.  The indicator for heterogeneity from Ivanyna 
and Shah (2014) contains information on income inequality, ethnic fractionalization and 
geographical differences within the country, which could explain variations in demand 
for public goods and services.  The greater the heterogeneity of demands, the more 
decentralization is expected to improve allocation of public services. 
Fourth, if cost-savings do exist, perhaps due to the administrative costs of 
providing public goods and services (Boadway and Shah, 2009), fiscal decentralization 
may perform better when there is greater fiscal capacity (i.e. greater total government 
spending).  If fiscal capacity is higher, then decentralization may be more rewarding as 
there is more money to spend on providing public services, and the administration costs 
of decentralized provision will take up a smaller percentage of total expenditures.  For 
this reason, I examine whether fiscal decentralization is more or less rewarding (better 
for provision) when total expenditures are higher.   
If there is a relationship between decentralization and the provision of public 
services, it is unlikely that the relationship will be strictly positive or negative, and there 
are other mitigating factors to consider.  The nature of the relationship between 
decentralization and provision could be sensitive to the degree of subnational government 
autonomy; the accountability of local policymakers, the current degree of 
decentralization.  Fiscal decentralization may also perform differently depending on the 
degree of heterogeneity and the level of total spending on healthcare and education.  
Therefore, it is important that we account for these factors when conducting 
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investigations of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the provision of 
public services.  In this empirical research, I examine these effects.   
 
4.2. Data Definitions 
 
In this section I outline the indicators used to capture provision of healthcare and 
education.  I provide a brief recap of the decentralization indicators that are available and 
the reasons why I have selected the decentralization indicators for this research.  I outline 
the control variables used in my models and explain why I have chosen them.     
 
4.2.1. Public Healthcare and Public Education Indicators 
 
I use a total of four indicators to capture the provision of public healthcare and public 
education.  I adopt measures that have been in previous research in this area and where 
there is a reasonable quantity of data available for a wide range of countries.   
To capture the provision of public healthcare I use vaccination coverage: the 
percentage of children (12-23 months) who received vaccinations for Measles and 
Diphtheria.  Treisman (2000) and Khaleghian (2004) previously used vaccinations as a 
representation of public healthcare provision.  Khaleghian argues that vaccination 
coverage is an effective proxy for public healthcare provision because the availability of 
vaccines for measles and DPT are a core part of public health programs and the 
availability of and access to vaccinations and captures many of the important aspects of 
public provision (access, knowledge and supply).  The second variable is infant mortality 
rates: the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1000 births.  
Treisman (2002) uses this indicator alongside vaccinations to represent changes in 
healthcare outcomes40.  Jimenez et al., (2011) also used infant mortality to examine the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and healthcare outcomes.  By using these two 
measures I can examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the provision 
of an essential healthcare service and the quality of basic healthcare. 
                                                 
40 Treisman (2002) distinguishes between outputs and outcomes of provision in his empirical research.  
Outputs examine a specific aim of provision, such as access to vaccinations and primary education.  
Outcomes measure the general aim of provision – to improve standards of healthcare and education.   
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To capture the provision of public education I use two indicators: one for access 
to public education and one for the quality of public education.  For access to public 
education, I use the primary school enrolment rate.  I have chosen to focus on access to 
primary school enrolment for several reasons.  First, this measure has been used in 
previous research in this area (see Treisman, 2000).  One of the aims of this research is 
to build on previous work by examining the effects of many forms of decentralization.  
Therefore, I can compare my results with similar studies.  Second, the data available for 
primary school enrolment is greater in scope and scale than other measures for secondary 
school, further education, or pre-primary school (UNESCO).  Third, the chosen measure 
of public education in this research should reflect availability and accessibility, according 
to the supply and demand side factors addressed in the literature review in section 4.1.  
The focus of this empirical research is to see whether decentralization explains variations 
in access to primary education.  An alternative measure, for example, average years of 
schooling, would not capture access and availability, but would provide information on 
the availability of education to those who access it, and perhaps the quality of that 
education.  Fourth, universal access to primary education is one of the one of the 
Millennium Development Goals41. 
Finding a second measure for public education presented a single issue: the 
availability of data.  Falch and Fischer (2012) use test scores to measure attainment; 
however, the data they used is unavailable for this research.  Treisman (2000) uses youth 
literacy to capture the quality of public education.  However, data on youth literacy is 
very scarce.  Instead I opt for classroom size: the ratio of pupils to teacher at primary 
school level.  I use this measure as a proxy for quality of education and for educational 
attainment42. 
The panel dataset for the public healthcare and education indicators contains a 
maximum of 360 observations covering 40 countries over 20 years, between 1990 and 
2009.  There is complete data for the public healthcare indicators; however, the public 
education literature is available for only half the dataset.  The total number of observations 
for classroom size and primary enrolment is 240 and 256, covering 37 and 36 countries 
respectively.  All data is transformed into logarithms.   
                                                 
41 The Millennium Development Goals for year 2015, included universal primary education as one of 
several targets for governments to achieve  
42 Blatchford et al., (2003) and Blatchford et al., (2011) identify a link between classroom size and 
attainment (youth literacy) 
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 I examine cross-sectional variations in the same way as the previous chapter.  I 
take the averages of each of the indicators for public healthcare and public education; 
fiscal decentralization (panel) and the selection of control variables (2.3).   
 
A summary of the measures used to represent public services is available in table 29. 
 
Table 29: Indicators for Public Services  
Public Service Indicators (Source) 
Healthcare 1. Vaccinations (World Bank, World Development 
Indicators) 
2. Infant Mortality (UNICEF, World Health Organisation and 
World Bank, World Development Indicators) 
Education 1. Classroom Size (World Bank, World Development 
Indicators) 
2. Primary School Enrolment (UNESCO Education Statistics) 
 
4.2.2. Indicators for High Income Countries 
 
One of the potential problems with using these indicators in empirical research, is the 
limited variability in the indicators for high income countries.  The dataset that I use in 
this research contains a range of low, middle and high income countries.  However, 
whereas measures of basic education and healthcare are expected to vary between 
developing countries, and in those countries over time, high income countries are 
expected to be clustered, and observe limited variability over time.  There are several 
important points to consider.   
The variability in these indicators for high income countries is not as limited as 
one might expect.  Though low and middle income observe greater variability, high 
income countries observe deviation in vaccination coverage, enrolment and classroom 
size.  Even in infant mortality, where cross-sectional variation is limited for high income 
countries43, the variability over time is close between the two income groups.  Annual 
change in infant mortality is -3.5% for high income, and -4.5% for low and middle income 
countries.  Therefore, panel estimations will still provide an opportunity to examine links 
between decentralization and public healthcare. 
                                                 
43 Standard deviation in cross-sectional observations for high income countries is 1.25, in contrast to 23.5 
for deviation in low and middle income countries. 
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There are also intuitive reasons for why these indicators are suitable for high 
income countries.  The arguments addressed in the literature focus on availability of, and 
access to, essential public services.  The gap between universal coverage (vaccinations, 
enrolment) and actual coverage, will reflect accessibility issues for the poorest.  For 
example, if primary enrolment is 95%, then the 5% who do not access enrolment will 
likely come from the poorest backgrounds.  Therefore, any changes in provision resulting 
from government decentralization should be investigated.  Finally, these indicators have 
been used in previous research in this area, and one of the aims of my research is to 
contrast my own results with previous results in the conclusions.  Particularly as I build 
on previous work to develop new arguments and new results through interactions between 
decentralization and other aspects of decentralization, heterogeneity and expenditure (see 
section 4.4) 
 
4.2.3. Decentralization Indicators 
 
I use a selection of the decentralization indicators outlined in chapter 2.  First, I use two 
panel indicators in this empirical research.  I use SCG Expenditure to capture share of 
government activity, and SCG Autonomous Expenditure to capture SCG autonomy over 
expenditures.  I initially tested SCG Revenue; however, the results were very similar to 
those for SCG Expenditure and consequently I dropped SCG Revenue and focused on the 
results for SCG Expenditure and Autonomous Expenditure.  In addition to the 
expenditure indicators, I also examined the effect of SCG Healthcare Expenditure and 
SCG Education Expenditure on public healthcare and public education.  These indicators 
were primarily used for robustness checks for the results of SCG Expenditure.  In the end 
the results were very similar to SCG Expenditure and did not provide further insight into 
the effects of spending decentralization on public healthcare and public education.  
Therefore, I focus on SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous Expenditure in the results 
in section 4.5. 
In addition to the panel indicators for fiscal decentralization, I include three 
indicators for electoral decentralization, legislative decentralization and federal 
constitution.  As in chapter 3, I interact these three variables to establish whether fiscal 
decentralization performs differently for subnational governments that have legislative 
powers, are more decentralized (federal) or when the subnational government executive 
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is directly elected.  I also tested the effects of local government area size after observing 
strong significance in the previous chapter; however, the results were largely insignificant 
in this study.   
 The decentralization data used in this chapter covers 40 countries over 20 years, 
from 1990 to 2009.  There is a total of 360 observations in the panel dataset.  360 
observations are available for each of the panel indicators of decentralization44SCG 
Expenditure and SCG Autonomous Expenditure.  Of the 40 countries covered, 27 of them 
observe electoral decentralization, whilst 13 observe appointments by the central 
government.  Legislative decentralization applies to 10 countries, but in 29 countries 
subnational governments do not have the power to legislate.  9 countries have a Federal 
constitution, whilst 31 are classed as unitary  
 
4.2.4. Control Variables 
 
In previous studies of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and provision the 
selection of control variables is broadly the same.  Treisman (2002) includes baseline 
controls for income, population size, land area, and ethnic fragmentation in his research 
on public services.  Khaleghian (2004) investigates the relationship between 
decentralization and vaccination coverage, and includes controls for income, population 
size, population density, literacy rate and foreign aid.  Falch and Fischer (2012) 
investigate the relationship between decentralization and education attainment includes 
controls for income, population size and public sector size.   
 In my research I adopt a similar set of control variables.  I include baseline 
controls in all of the regressions, they are: income (logarithm of real GDP per capita), 
population size (logarithm of total population), heterogeneity index (Ivanyna and Shah, 
2014), public healthcare expenditure (logarithm of real healthcare expenditure per capita) 
in regressions featuring healthcare indicators and public education expenditure (logarithm 
of public education expenditure per primary school student) in regressions featuring 
education indicators.  In regressions for infant mortality I provide an extra set of control 
variables in certain specifications.  Treisman (2000) argues that outcomes and outputs of 
                                                 
44 Though only results for SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous Expenditure are present in this chapter, 
when creating the dataset for this research I ensured that the data used was consistent for each of the 
decentralization indicators.  Some countries and years were lost due to this process, but this enabled a 
consistent comparison between the effects of different decentralization indicators. 
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healthcare are not the same thing, and that healthcare outcomes (infant mortality) should 
include other variables to capture the wide range of factors that determine general health 
standards.  The additional variables are improved sanitation (logarithm of the proportion 
of the population with access to improved sanitation facilities), personnel (the number of 
physicians per 1,000 people) and beds (the number of beds per 1,000 people).  In infant 
mortality regressions I also include immunization, the same data as the dependent 
variable, to capture availability of/access to vaccinations, which are expected to be 
strongly associated with infant mortality.   
 All but one of the baseline controls has been used in previous research.  The only 
exception is the variable I have chosen to represent heterogeneity.  Ethnic 
fractionalization is often used to represent heterogeneity (see Treisman, 2000; 
Khaleghian, 2004).  However, the two indicators for ethnic fractionalization: language 
and religion, are not complete for this dataset, and do not cover all types of heterogeneity.  
Recently, Ivanyna and Shah (2014) have constructed their own indicator for 
heterogeneity.  The heterogeneity index they provide covers ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, demographics and income distribution45.  Like the ethnolinguistic 
indicators, the data for heterogeneity is cross-sectional, and covers a period between 2000 
and 2005 (see Ivanyna and Shah, 2014).   
In table 30 I provide the complete list of the control variables and I include 
expected coefficient sign for each variable.  My expectations are based on the related 
literature covered in section 4.1.  I expect income to be positively associated with 
provision of healthcare and education.  McGuire (2006) argues that higher incomes 
generate more money for individuals and households to spend on food, healthcare and 
basic needs.  Population size is expected to be negatively associated with provision, where 
smaller populations are associated with effective government and civic virtue (Treisman, 
2000).  Heterogeneity is expected to be negatively associated with provision.  Treisman 
(2000) argues that heterogeneity increases the rationale for electoral decentralization.  
Ivanyna and Shah (2014) explain that heterogeneity increase disutility, where there is a 
larger difference between an individual’s preference and the policy of government. All 
expenditure is expected to be positively associated with provision.  Infant mortality 
                                                 
45 In recent empirical research on public healthcare, the Gini coefficient has been included in models (see 
Macinko et al., 2004).  Unfortunately, the data I used in the previous chapter is not complete for this dataset, 
and including the panel Gini coefficient would further reduce the scope of this research.   Hence I have 
opted to include income distribution through the heterogeneity index instead.   
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controls are all expected to be negatively associated with infant mortality rates.  Lin 
(2005) and Farahani (2009) include health infrastructure in their empirical research on 
infant mortality and healthcare provision.   
The final dataset covers a maximum of 40 low, middle and high income countries 
(full list in the appendix), over a period of 20 years, from 1990 to 2009.    
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Table 30: List of Control Variables 
Control Variable Expected Coefficient Sign 
Baseline Controls 
Income (logarithm of real GDP per capita) Positive 
Population (logarithm of total population) Negative 
Heterogeneity (heterogeneity index containing information on 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization, income distribution, age 
dependency and geographical characteristics) 
Negative 
Public Healthcare Expenditure (logarithm of public healthcare 
expenditure per capita) 
Positive 
Public Education Expenditure (logarithm of public education 
expenditure per primary school student) 
Positive 
Additional Controls (Infant Mortality) 
Quality of Sanitation (logarithm of the proportion of the 
population with access to improved sanitation facilities) 
Negative 
Healthcare Personnel (the number of physicians per 1,000 
people) 
Negative 
Healthcare Resources (the number of beds per 1,000 people) Negative 
Healthcare Provision (logarithm of the proportion of infants 
receiving vaccinations for measles and DPT) 
Negative 
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4.3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
In this section I provide descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the dataset 
used in this research.  The descriptive statistics cover the average, variation and range of 
observations in the cross-sectional dataset, whilst the correlation coefficients cover the 
entire panel dataset.   
 
4.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics in table 31 are based on the cross-sectional dataset.  As part of 
the descriptive statistics I include the average level of the indicators for public healthcare 
and public education, and the growth in those indicators to see whether this is any 
interesting changes in the indicators over the 20-year period. 
 
4.3.1.1. Public Healthcare and Public Education 
 
The descriptive demonstrate variation between public healthcare and public education 
indicators.   
First, average vaccination coverage is just in 90 (in 100).  Most countries in the 
sample observe higher levels of vaccination coverage than the average level (28 of 40).  
Of those countries that observed lower than the average level of vaccination coverage, 
India had the lowest coverage of 61.45.  Other countries that observed below the average 
level of vaccinations include South Africa (67.86) and Bolivia (69.25).  The data for infant 
mortality observes a similar distribution.  The mean infant mortality rate, 19.55, is higher 
than the median, due to some countries observing much higher rates of infant mortality.  
28 countries have lower IMR than the mean.  However, despite the negative skew in the 
distribution, there is only one statistical outlier: Tajikistan, with 74.54.  Other countries 
with high levels of infant mortality include, again Bolivia (61.32) and Indonesia (52.96), 
South Africa observes (50.68). 
Over the period, growth in vaccination coverage and a fall in infant mortality rates 
indicate an improvement in public healthcare provision.  On average, vaccination 
coverage has increased by 0.6% per year, and infant mortality rates have fallen by 4.1% 
per year.  Most countries in the sample have seen improvements in healthcare, however 
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there are exceptions.  In South Africa vaccination coverage has fallen by just under 1% 
per year, whilst infant mortality has increased by over 1% per year (between 1995 and 
2005).  Vaccination coverage has declined for one third of the sample, however infant 
mortality rates have risen in only two countries (South Africa and Belarus).    
 With respect to the indicators for public education, the distribution of countries in 
the dataset is more even.  Across the 30 countries for which there is data, the average 
classroom size (pupils to teacher) is 17.62.  The smallest classroom sizes are in more 
economically developed countries in Europe – Italy with the lowest size of just under 11 
pupils per teacher. 18 of the 30 countries observe smaller classroom size than the mean.  
South Africa is the only outlier, with the largest classroom size of 33 pupils per teacher.  
Primary enrolment data is much the same.  17 of 30 countries observe higher primary 
enrolment than the mean of 94.64.  There are no outliers in the sample of 30 countries, 
with a fairly tight range of observations included in this research.  European countries 
observe the highest primary enrolment rates, with near to full enrolment (Spain, Norway 
and Netherland above 99).  The lowest rate is in Mongolia (86.37) 
 Countries have observed mixed fortunes with respect to improvements in 
education provision over the time period.  Overall, access to primary enrolment and 
classroom sizes have declined.  There is a greater spread of change in classroom size 
across the sample.  There is one outlier (El Salvador, -12.3% per year).  Removing the 
outlier does not change the overall result, the mean change falls from -1.73% per year, to 
-1.27% per year.  
 Enrolment in primary school has also increased, however the result is marginal.  
When I removed a statistical outlier (Azerbaijan, 2.5% increase per year) the overall 
change is 0.07%.  Contrasting education provision with healthcare provision, the evidence 
that education provision has improved between 1990 and 2009 is weaker than for 
healthcare provision.  There is evidence that classroom sizes and enrolment has increased, 
though in the case of primary school enrolment the change is very close to 0 
 Across all the indicators, public healthcare and public education has improved.    
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Table 31: Descriptive Statistics (cross-sectional dataset) 
Panel A: Provision Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Immunization 40 89.168 10.153 61.452 98.995 
Infant Mortality 40 19.551 21.887 2.375 74.543 
Classroom Size 30 17.622 5.038 10.782 33.286 
Primary Education Enrolment 30 94.643 3.673 86.371 99.777 
Growth in Immunization 40 0.735 1.247 -0.919 5.298 
Growth in Infant Mortality 40 -4.125 1.894 -8.214 1.154 
Growth in Classroom Size 23 -1.267 1.857 -4.940 2.928 
Growth in Primary Education Enrolment 21 0.194 0.654 -0.586 2.484 
 
Panel B: Decentralization Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
SCG Expenditure 40 28.176 11.698 9.59 58.19 
SCG Autonomous Expenditure 40 18.518 9.911 0.95 42.75 
 
Panel C: Baseline Controls (excl. Heterogeneity) Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Income 40 17049.53 13749.72 880.7731 54973.14 
Population Size 40 53.823 164.627 0.3007 1011.814 
Public Health Expenditure (per capita) 39 1499.121 1370.701 38.535 4515.269 
Public Education Expenditure (per 
student) 
23 5662.716 3431.564 239.140 12143.39 
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4.3.1.2. Decentralization 
 
Decentralization across the sample exhibits similar characteristics to the larger sample of 
countries covered in the previous chapter.  Subnational government expenditure 
decentralization estimates a higher level of fiscal decentralization than the alternate 
measure, subnational government autonomous expenditure decentralization.  Canada is 
the most decentralized country in both measures, with 58% of total expenditure accruing 
to subnational governments, and 43% of total expenditure financed by own tax revenue.  
The median for the sample is lower than the mean in both of the decentralization 
indicators.  There is a positive skew in the distribution of the data, where the majority of 
countries observe lower levels of decentralization than the mean values in panel B (i.e. a 
positive skew in the distribution). 
 
4.3.1.3. Controls 
 
The important information in panel C is the range of the observations for each of the 
control variables. The dataset contains a wide range of countries with different economic 
backgrounds (in Income), different population size, and different levels of spending on 
healthcare and education.  The variations in the decentralization and baseline control 
variables could explain the different changes in the dependent variables over the time 
period in this dataset.     
 
4.3.2. Correlations 
 
In table 32 I provide the pairwise correlations for all public healthcare and education 
indicators, fiscal decentralization indicators and baseline controls.  Most of the variables 
share some correlation with one another and there are some interesting findings.  First, 
there is a positive correlation between the indicators of public healthcare and education 
provision.  Higher vaccination coverage is correlated with lower infant mortality rates, 
smaller classroom sizes and higher primary school enrolment.  This could mean that these 
variables are interconnected – good healthcare leads to good education, and visa-versa.  
It could also mean that the same variables that explain the provision of one public service, 
also explain the provision of other public services.   
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 Second, there is limited correlation between the indicators for decentralization and 
the provision of public services.  Only subnational government expenditure 
decentralization (SCG Expenditure) is found to be significantly correlated with 
vaccination coverage.  The negative coefficient shows that higher vaccination coverage 
is correlated with lower degrees of decentralization.   
 Third, many of the controls exhibit the expected correlation with provision.  
Income and expenditure are positively correlated with provision, whilst population and 
heterogeneity are negatively associated with provision.  Fourth, higher healthcare and 
education expenditure is positively associated with decentralization.  This may suggest 
that in countries where there is larger total expenditure, there is a stronger case for 
distributing that expenditure to lower tiers of government.   
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Table 32: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients (Public Services, Fiscal Decentralization and Baseline Controls)  
 Vaccine Mortality Class Size Primary 
Enrolment 
SCG 
Expenditure 
SCG 
Autonomous 
Expenditure 
Income Population Heterogen-
eity 
Healthcare 
Expenditure 
Education 
Expenditure 
Vaccine 1.0000           
Mortality -0.5996*** 1.0000          
Class Size -0.5067*** 0.7644*** 1.0000         
Primary 
Enrolment 
0.4397*** -0.6568*** -0.6467*** 1.0000        
SCG  
Expenditure 
-0.1481*** -0.0286 0.1177 -0.0526 1.0000       
SCG 
Autonomous 
Expenditure 
0.0244 -0.0314 -0.0347 -0.0226 0.8182*** 1.0000      
Income 0.5197*** -0.9473*** -0.6905*** 0.6136*** 0.1230** 0.0865 1.0000     
Population -0.4502*** 0.3229*** 0.1572** -0.0944 0.3887*** 0.2418*** -0.2281*** 1.0000    
Heterogeneity -0.4096*** 0.5260*** 0.4996*** -0.2987*** 0.4445*** 0.4489*** -0.3799*** 0.6307*** 1.0000   
Healthcare 
Expenditure 
0.4141*** -0.9371*** -0.6808*** 0.7080*** 0.1674*** 0.1127** 0.9855*** -0.1662*** -0.3789*** 1.0000  
Education 
Expenditure 
0.4883*** -0.9257*** -0.8171*** 0.7610*** 0.1387* 0.3281*** 0.9613*** -0.2672*** -0.5042*** 0.9496*** 1.0000 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively 
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4.4. Methodology 
 
The methods I use to estimate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public 
healthcare and public education are similar to those used in chapter 3.  The first estimates 
are produced using a cross-sectional OLS estimator and the second estimates are 
produced using a cross-sectional instrument variable model.  The IV estimator is expected 
to mitigate against potential endogeneity bias in the ordinary least squares estimations.  
Finally, I produce estimates for the effects of decentralization on public healthcare and 
public education over time, using a random effects panel estimator. 
 
4.4.1. Cross-sectional Estimates 
 
In the first set of regressions I examine the relationship between the average levels for the 
dependent and independent variables in the cross-sectional dataset (function 4.1).  The 
dependent variable (𝑌𝑖) is the average level for each of the indicators for public healthcare 
and education.  The independent variables include the averages for the two spending 
decentralization indicators over the time period (𝐷𝑖) and the vector of control variables 
(𝑋𝑖).  In additional specifications, I estimate the coefficients for up to five interactions 
between the average level of spending decentralization: SCG Expenditure and SCG 
Autonomous Expenditure, captured in 4.1. as 𝐷𝑖 . 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖.  These interactions are: i) 
legislative decentralization; ii) electoral decentralization, and iii) federal constitution, iv) 
heterogeneity and iv) total public healthcare or education spending.  The cross-sectional 
estimation is outlined in function 4.1: 
 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 4.1 
 
4.4.2. Endogeneity Bias: Brief Summary of Previous Research 
 
In the second set of estimations I instrument the decentralization variable in the cross-
sectional specification in 4.1.  As in the previous chapter I consider the possibility that 
decentralization (𝐷𝑖𝑡) is endogenous in function 4.1.  In previous studies of the effects of 
decentralization on public services, reverse causality and omitted variable bias have been 
cited as potential causes of endogeneity in the OLS estimations.   
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Khaleghian (2004) raises the potential problem of omitted variable bias, where 
unobserved factors of vaccination coverage: various public health reforms, unspecific 
social or political variables, may be correlated with a country’s decision to centralize or 
decentralize fiscal functions.  Jimenez-Rubio (2011) examines the relationship between 
decentralization and infant mortality and also raises the possibility of omitted variable 
bias in the estimations.  Endogeneity may also be caused by reverse causality, where the 
dependent variable explains variations in decentralization.  Khaleghian (2004) also 
considers this with respect to vaccination coverage, where important public healthcare 
outputs may influence decentralization policy. 
Treisman (2000) argues that reverse causality may not be an issue for the selection 
of public healthcare and public education indicators (vaccination coverage, infant 
mortality, primary enrolment).  However, omitted variable bias could affect estimations 
of the relationship between decentralization and those indicators.  The problem of omitted 
variable bias, whereby some underlying variables causes changes in both decentralization 
and the dependent variable, can be mitigated against using covariates, and using random 
or fixed effects.  Falch and Fischer (2012) also suggest that fixed or random effects can 
mitigate against potential endogeneity bias resulting from omitted variable bias. 
To counter potential endogeneity bias resulting from either reverse causality, or 
omitted variable bias, I produce further estimates using a cross-sectional IV estimator 
(4.4.3), and a random effects panel estimator (4.4.4) 
 
4.4.3. Cross-sectional Instrument Variable Estimates 
 
The second set of estimates are produced using a cross-sectional instrument variable 
model.  The instruments used in this model must satisfy the two criteria explained in the 
previous chapter.  The instruments must explain variations in the endogenous variable, 
decentralization.  The instruments must also be exogenous – uncorrelated with the error 
term.  Therefore, the chosen instruments should explain variations in the dependent 
variable(s), only indirectly, through the endogenous variables, decentralization. 
 In this research, I have selected the legal origin dummies (La Porta et al., 2008) 
as instruments of decentralization.  There are two reasons why I have chosen these 
instruments.  First, legal origins are expected to explain variations in fiscal 
decentralization.  Fisman and Gatti (2002) explain that civil legal systems are associated 
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with greater government centralization, due to the constraints of statutes laid down by 
federal legislators (page 337).  Therefore, countries with civil legal codes (French legal 
origins) are expected to be more centralized, than countries with common legal code (UK 
legal origins).  The empirical evidence confirms this expectation.  Furthermore, where 
legal origins have been used to instrument decentralization previously, the evidence 
suggests that legal origins explain variations in decentralization in the first stage (see 
Altunbas and Thornton, 2011). 
 Secondly, legal origins are not expected to be directly linked to the selection of 
dependent variables in this research.  Instead, legal origins are expected to share an 
association with public healthcare and public education indicators indirectly, through the 
degree of government decentralization, based on the rationale above.  There is also no 
prospect of reverse causality between the public healthcare and public education 
indicators, and a country’s legal origin. 
 
The first stage estimation is outlined in function 4.2: 
 
𝐷𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛿1𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿 𝑂𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 4.2 
 
The first stage estimations are presented alongside the second stage results in section 4.5.  
I provide an analysis of the individual significance of each of the legal origins dummy 
variables.  I also discuss the effect that each legal origin has on decentralization.  As 
Fisman and Gatti (2002) explain, countries with certain legal origins tend to be more 
decentralized than others46.  I confirm in my results whether the sign and coefficient for 
the legal origins dummy variables are as expected.  Furthermore, I include p-values for 
the f-test of collective significance of the legal origins dummy variables.  If the null 
hypothesis is rejected (p-value less than 0.05), then the legal origins dummy variables are 
suitable instrument variables for predicting cross-sectional variations in decentralization. 
I also provide two diagnostic tests in the corresponding second stage estimations.  
I provide the p-value for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistic, that can be used to 
identify potential endogeneity of the decentralization variable in the original ordinary 
least squares.  Finally, I provide the p-value for Hansen j-statistic of instrument 
                                                 
46 Fisman and Gatti (2002) find that countries with French Legal Origins are more decentralized than 
countries with UK Legal Origins, where local government expenditure accounts for a smaller percentage 
of total government spending (0.12 to 0.21 respectively) 
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exogeneity.  If the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% significance level, then there 
is evidence that the instruments are exogenous, and suitable for the cross-sectional 
instrument variable regressions.  The evidence suggests that legal origins is suitable for 
instrumenting decentralization, both in terms of validity (exogeneity) and explanatory 
power in the first stage estimations. 
 
4.4.4. Random Effects Panel Estimator 
 
To exploit the richer panel dataset available for this research and to investigate the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and public healthcare and public education 
over time, I opt for a random effects panel estimator for several reasons.  As explained in 
the poverty chapter (see 3.4.3), the choice between a fixed effects estimator and a random 
effects estimator depends on several considerations.  Ideally, the random effects estimator 
would be used due to the large number of countries, relative to the short time period for 
this panel dataset.  Furthermore, by using random effects, time-invariant explanatory 
variables can be included in the model.  Therefore, the heterogeneity index, which forms 
an important part of this empirical analysis, can still be used if random effects are used.  
If the fixed effects estimator is used, then heterogeneity cannot be included in the model, 
due to correlation with the country intercept terms in the fixed effects estimator.   
However, despite the advantages of using a random effects estimator, it is 
essential that decentralization is not associated with the unobserved country effects.  
Therefore, I perform the Hausman specification test to compare the fixed effects and 
random effects estimator, and to determine which estimator is either more efficient 
(random effects) or more consistent (fixed effects).  I produced several tests for each of 
the different dependent variables, and for the two decentralization indicators, and 
produced fairly conclusive evidence that the random effects estimator was more suitable 
for this research.  The null hypothesis was not rejected in all but one comparison47 
 Therefore, I produce final estimations using the random effects panel estimator, 
outlined in function 4.3. 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑡 . 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖 +  𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  (𝑣𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡) 4.3 
                                                 
47 The null hypothesis was rejected at the 10% level when comparing fixed effects and random effects 
estimator for Primary School Enrolment, and with SCG Expenditure as the decentralization indicator. 
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4.5. Results 
 
In this section I provide an analysis of the results for each of the indicators for public 
healthcare and public education.  For each indicator, there is one set of cross-sectional 
estimates, one set of cross-sectional IV estimates, including the first stage estimations, 
and one set of random effects panel estimations.  Within each set of results, I provide 
specifications for the relationship between provision and i) fiscal decentralization, ii) 
fiscal decentralization interacting with each of the aspects of decentralization (electoral, 
legislative and federal constitution), and iii) fiscal decentralization interacting with 
heterogeneity indicator and total spending on healthcare and education.  All specifications 
contain the baseline controls outlined in section 4.2, with the exception of classroom size, 
where education expenditure data is not included in the cross-sectional dataset. 
 
4.5.1. Public Healthcare 
 
I estimate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public healthcare in 8 tables 
(33-40).  Estimates for vaccination coverage are in tables 33-36 and estimates for infant 
mortality rates are in tables 37-40.  
 
4.5.1.1. Vaccination Coverage 
 
The first set of estimates is for the OLS cross-sectional regressions, in table 33.  There is 
very limited evidence of an association between fiscal decentralization is associated with 
vaccination coverage.  First, greater SCG Autonomous Expenditure is positively 
associated with vaccination coverage (7).  The coefficient indicates that a one percentage 
point increase in subnational government autonomous expenditure results in a 0.38% 
increase in vaccination coverage.  Second, legislative decentralization reverses the 
positive effect of SCG Autonomous Expenditure.  In specification 8, further SCG 
Autonomous Expenditure continues to improve vaccination coverage when the 
subnational government does not have the autonomy to legislate.  However, when 
subnational governments do have autonomy to legislate, the relationship is reversed.  
SCG Expenditure also has a negative effective on immunization coverage when 
subnational governments have some legislative autonomy (2).  No other results are 
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significant, neither the type of government (unitary or federal) or electoral 
decentralization have any effect on vaccination coverage. 
 Finally, fiscal decentralization observes contrasting effects depending on the 
degree of heterogeneity and the degree of total healthcare expenditure.  SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure is positively associated with vaccination coverage as the degree of 
heterogeneity rises (11), though there is no effect for SCG Expenditure.  This is an 
expected result, which shows that countries which feature higher degrees of 
heterogeneity, observe improvements in vaccination coverage through greater 
decentralization, in this case, SCG Autonomous Expenditure.  Finally, SCG Expenditure 
has a positive effect on vaccination coverage when total government expenditure is 
sufficiently high (5). 
The next set of estimates are produced using the cross-sectional instrument 
variable model.  The first stage estimations in table 34 indicate that legal origins explain 
variations in tax and spending decentralization.  The sample of countries is split into four 
groups: Scandinavia, UK, Germany and French legal origins, hence there are three legal 
origins dummies in the first stage estimates.  Countries in the omitted group, Scandinavia 
legal origins, observe the highest level of tax and spending decentralization.  This is 
reflected in the negative coefficients for each of the legal origins groups in the first stage 
estimates.  Countries in the French legal origins group are the most centralized in terms 
of spending (panel A), whilst countries in the UK legal origins group are the most 
centralized in terms of autonomous spending (panel B).  In most specifications, all of the 
legal origins dummies are statistically significant.  This is evident in the low p-values for 
the f-test of collective significance.  There is a notable exception however.  When 
interacting decentralization with total healthcare spending, in specification 6 and 12, the 
instruments are no longer collectively significant.  Of the control variables assumed to be 
exogenous in the second stage, heterogeneity is consistently positively associated with 
decentralization, which supports previous research in this area (Wallis and Oates, 1988; 
Panizza, 1998). 
The second stage results are presented in table 35.  Fiscal decentralization is often 
statistically insignificant in the cross-sectional IV estimates.  However, SCG expenditure 
is associated with vaccination coverage when subnational government has legislative 
autonomy.  The negative coefficient indicates that greater decentralization reduces 
vaccination coverage. 
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Table 33: Cross Sectional OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Vaccinations, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Vaccinations and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Vaccinations and Subnational Government Autonomous 
Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Decentralization -0.047 0.075 -0.079 -0.215 -0.418 -1.948* 0.376* 0.504** 0.432 0.107 -0.652 -0.281 
(0.142) (0.156) (0.140) (0.236) (0.477) (0.999) (0.205) (0.244) (0.275) (0.296) (0.622) (0.832) 
Income 0.151 0.135 0.153 0.148 0.150 0.189* 0.199* 0.193* 0.198* 0.197* 0.169* 0.208** 
(0.110) (0.111) (0.112) (0.118) (0.113) (0.103) (0.102) (0.104) (0.103) (0.111) (0.095) (0.100) 
Population -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Heterogeneity -0.203 -0.033 -0.229 -0.197 -0.683 -0.194 -0.439* -0.306 -0.406 -0.424 -1.098** -0.457* 
(0.300) (0.317) (0.366) (0.324) (0.928) (0.288) (0.244) (0.270) (0.298) (0.267) (0.402) (0.247) 
Healthcare 
Expenditure 
-0.096 -0.071 -0.100 -0.109 -0.100 -0.208** -0.141* -0.124 -0.137 -0.158* -0.123 -0.169** 
(0.089) (0.090) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.089) (0.081) (0.084) (0.084) (0.087) (0.074) (0.081) 
Decentralization 
x Legislative 
 -0.250**      -0.302*     
 (0.121)      (0.172)     
Decentralization 
x Federal Const. 
  0.051      -0.093    
  (0.210)      (0.267)    
Decentralization 
x Elected 
Bottom Tier 
   0.225      0.368   
   (0.205)      (0.267)   
Decentralization 
x Heterogeneity 
    1.161      2.782*  
    (1.735)      (1.425)  
Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
     0.267*      0.095 
     (0.133)      (0.122) 
Constant 3.820*** 3.720*** 3.845*** 3.936*** 4.003*** 4.231*** 3.679*** 3.557*** 3.640*** 3.813*** 4.064*** 3.788*** 
(0.469) (0.462) (0.493) (0.515) (0.552) (0.531) (0.446) (0.454) (0.477) (0.505) (0.473) (0.505) 
Observations 39 38 39 39 39 39 39 38 39 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.261 0.363 0.263 0.298 0.271 0.339 0.321 0.396 0.324 0.363 0.374 0.329 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis   
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Table 34: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (1st Stage), Dependent Decentralization, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Vaccinations and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Vaccinations and Subnational Government Autonomous 
Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Instrument Variables 
UK Legal 
Origins 
-0.163** -0.182** -0.178*** -0.119** -0.063** -0.009 -0.176*** -0.195*** -0.190*** -0.098** -0.069*** -0.002 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.062) (0.050) (0.024) (0.008) (0.047) (0.033) (0.032) (0.043) (0.021) (0.004) 
Germany Legal 
Origins 
-0.134** -0.151** -0.160*** -0.104** -0.031 -0.012 -0.097** -0.124*** -0.132*** -0.059* -0.039*** -0.010** 
(0.061) (0.058) (0.057) (0.046) (0.021) (0.009) (0.041) (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.014) (0.004) 
French Legal 
Origins 
-0.169*** -0.187*** -0.178*** -0.125** -0.042* -0.017 -0.132*** -0.161*** -0.147*** -0.074** -0.055*** -0.003 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.057) (0.046) (0.022) (0.012) (0.038) (0.030) (0.028) (0.034) (0.015) (0.005) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
Income -0.054 -0.020 -0.028 -0.052 -0.006 0.018 -0.072 -0.033 -0.034 -0.056 -0.026 -0.005 
(0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.054) (0.022) (0.020) (0.053) (0.045) (0.044) (0.052) (0.016) (0.011) 
Population 0.021*** 0.012 0.008 0.013* 0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 0.002 0.002 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) 
Heterogeneity 0.727*** 0.529*** 0.435** 0.571*** -0.893*** 0.042 0.767*** 0.526** 0.378** 0.501** -0.349*** 0.004 
(0.206) (0.188) (0.177) (0.177) (0.163) (0.040) (0.203) (0.199) (0.177) (0.208) (0.102) (0.029) 
Healthcare 
Expenditure 
0.057 0.015 0.014 0.034 -0.001 -0.054*** 0.069 0.020 0.010 0.029 0.017 -0.015 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.051) (0.020) (0.018) (0.046) (0.038) (0.040) (0.045) (0.015) (0.009) 
Decentralization 
x Interaction 
 0.259*** 0.347*** 0.279** 2.602*** 0.131***  0.445*** 0.567*** 0.464*** 2.227*** 0.113*** 
 (0.093) (0.076) (0.113) (0.297) (0.005)  (0.122) (0.119) (0.135) (0.203) (0.003) 
Constant 0.252 0.281 0.399* 0.362* 0.416*** 0.223*** 0.232 0.296 0.412** 0.347 0.324*** 0.166*** 
(0.198) (0.205) (0.205) (0.202) (0.094) (0.068) (0.209) (0.211) (0.198) (0.217) (0.055) (0.050) 
F-test (p-value) 
for instruments 0.056 0.032 0.034 0.081 0.038 0.558 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.140 0.006 0.894 
Observations 39 38 39 39 39 39 39 38 39 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.619 0.692 0.739 0.690 0.951 0.979 0.544 0.712 0.763 0.679 0.957 0.997 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Table 35: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Vaccinations, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Vaccinations and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Vaccinations and Subnational Government Autonomous Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Decentralization -0.098 -0.176 -0.089 -0.406 1.244 -5.796* 0.300 0.133 0.212 -0.318 -0.219 -0.281 
(0.277) (0.238) (0.259) (0.442) (1.286) (3.079) (0.327) (0.284) (0.290) (0.726) (0.891) (0.832) 
Income 0.146 0.117 0.152 0.134 0.175* 0.247** 0.190* 0.162 0.182* 0.169 0.185* 0.208** 
(0.104) (0.100) (0.105) (0.114) (0.105) (0.120) (0.101) (0.105) (0.098) (0.129) (0.095) (0.100) 
Population -0.004 0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.013 -0.006 -0.005 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
Heterogeneity -0.173 0.071 -0.226 -0.113 1.081 -0.079 -0.397* -0.177 -0.364 -0.279 -0.876 -0.457* 
(0.268) (0.284) (0.350) (0.265) (1.655) (0.290) (0.235) (0.282) (0.292) (0.257) (0.548) (0.247) 
Healthcare 
Expenditure 
-0.091 -0.052 -0.099 -0.099 -0.108 -0.407** -0.133 -0.098 -0.126 -0.144 -0.135* -0.169** 
(0.087) (0.082) (0.089) (0.089) (0.087) (0.182) (0.083) (0.086) (0.080) (0.095) (0.074) (0.081) 
Decentralization 
x Legislative 
 -0.200*      -0.161     
 (0.118)      (0.182)     
Decentralization 
x Federal Const. 
  0.054      0.023    
  (0.174)      (0.250)    
Decentralization 
x Elected Bottom 
Tier 
   0.295      0.614   
 
  (0.257)   
 
  (0.511)   
Decentralization 
x Heterogeneity 
    -3.400      1.736  
    (3.931)      (2.154)  
Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
     0.784*      0.095 
     (0.412)      (0.122) 
Constant 3.834*** 3.796*** 3.848*** 4.012*** 3.225*** 5.076*** 3.705*** 3.697*** 3.739*** 3.985*** 3.903*** 3.788*** 
(0.442) (0.424) (0.449) (0.523) (0.741) (0.872) (0.433) (0.450) (0.441) (0.640) (0.538) (0.505) 
DWH Test (p-
value) 0.860 0.357 0.975 0.660 0.131 0.154 0.785 0.114 0.380 0.493 0.468 0.295 
Hansen J-
statistic (p-
value) 0.232 0.175 0.253 0.235 0.199 0.340 0.215 0.155 0.251 0.197 0.221 0.513 
Observations 39 38 39 39 39 39 39 38 39 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.260 0.335 0.263 0.285 0.106 0.033 0.318 0.348 0.309 0.318 0.366 0.329 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure are instrumented using legal origin dummies, from the first stage.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen J-statistic are provided.   
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Spending decentralization is also negatively associated with vaccination coverage when 
spending is lower, and positively associated with vaccination coverage when spending is 
higher.  This suggests that decentralization is a policy better undertaken when there is 
sufficient spending resources to distribute to subnational and local governments.  Hence, 
centralization is a better policy for low and middle income countries.  These results 
support the ordinary least squares results in table 33.  In panel B, autonomous spending 
has no effect on vaccination coverage in any of the specifications.   
` There is some change in significance between the OLS estimates in table 33 and 
the IV estimates in table 35.  In particular, autonomous spending has no effect on 
vaccination coverage in the IV estimates, though it did have an effect in the OLS 
estimates.  This may indicate that decentralization was endogenous in the ordinary least 
squares results, and the instrumentation has fixed the potential bias in the OLS 
estimations.  However, fiscal decentralization could be treated as exogenous, based on 
the p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, which are all comfortably above 0.10 
significance level.  There is also a noticeably difference in the magnitude of the effect in 
specification 6 between IV and OLS estimations.  In the first stage, the legal origins 
instruments were not associated with decentralization in that specification.  Therefore, 
the difference between the estimates may indicate weak instruments, at least with respect 
to specifications featuring interactions between decentralization and public healthcare 
spending. 
 The final set of estimations are produced using a random effects panel estimator.  
In these results, subnational government expenditure decentralization, in panel A, 
observes no significance in all but one interaction.  Greater spending decentralization, 
combined with greater public healthcare spending, can increase vaccination coverage.  
This result is consistent with previous estimates.   
Autonomous spending decentralization is often statistically associated with 
vaccination coverage.  All of the statistically significant results are positive.  Greater 
spending decentralization increases vaccination coverage over time generally 
(specification 7), a result that is consistent with the OLS cross-sectional estimates in table 
33.  Furthermore, greater tax and spending decentralization improves vaccination 
coverage when subnational governments do not have autonomy to legislate; in unitary 
countries and when the local government executive is appointed.  The reverse in these 
interactions observes no statistical significance, though the coefficients are negative.   
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Table 36: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Vaccinations, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Vaccinations and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Vaccinations and Subnational Government Autonomous Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Decentralization 0.068 0.109 0.108 -0.001 0.643 -0.513 0.297*** 0.310*** 0.360** 0.307*** 0.424 0.191 
(0.139) (0.127) (0.193) (0.191) (0.425) (0.325) (0.088) (0.104) (0.164) (0.067) (0.404) (0.312) 
Income 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.021 0.025 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.027 0.025 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.077) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.072) 
Population -0.010 -0.011 -0.007 -0.011 -0.013 -0.012 -0.010 -0.013 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Heterogeneity -0.214 -0.141 -0.168 -0.195 0.396 -0.224 -0.319 -0.289 -0.282 -0.321 -0.250 -0.328 
(0.234) (0.234) (0.308) (0.246) (0.423) (0.232) (0.221) (0.226) (0.258) (0.222) (0.343) (0.224) 
Healthcare 
Expenditure 
0.022 0.023 0.023 0.019 0.023 -0.001 0.021 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.019 
(0.065) (0.064) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) 
Decentralization 
x Legislative 
 -0.098      -0.029     
 (0.108)      (0.126)     
Decentralization 
x Federal Const. 
  -0.094      -0.113    
  (0.188)      (0.197)    
Decentralization 
x Elected Bottom 
Tier 
   0.094      -0.019   
 
  (0.140)   
 
  (0.097)   
Decentralization 
x Heterogeneity 
    -1.620      -0.320  
    (1.044)      (0.909)  
Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
     0.085*      0.018 
     (0.045)      (0.055) 
Constant 4.198*** 4.144*** 4.160*** 4.213*** 3.985*** 4.392*** 4.198*** 4.167*** 4.151*** 4.198*** 4.165*** 4.222*** 
(0.306) (0.304) (0.321) (0.311) (0.333) (0.346) (0.278) (0.283) (0.289) (0.278) (0.292) (0.305) 
Observations 321 318 321 321 321 321 321 318 321 321 321 321 
Groups 40 39 40 40 40 40 40 39 40 40 40 40 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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This indicates that greater spending decentralization can improve vaccination coverage, 
and is unlikely to harm it, under certain circumstances.  The results in the random effects 
panel estimator are some of the strongest, though despite the lack of statistical evidence 
in the cross-sectional estimates, the results are consistent. 
Overall, there is some evidence of an association between fiscal decentralization 
and vaccination coverage.  However, the results differ between spending and autonomous 
spending indicators, and are not robust to estimation technique.  Spending 
decentralization is found to be negatively associated with vaccination coverage when 
subnational government has legislative autonomy.  This result is exclusive to cross-
sectional variations.  Spending decentralization is negatively associated with vaccination 
coverage when public spending on healthcare is lower, and positively associated with 
vaccination coverage when public spending is higher.  This result may be evidence that 
centralization is a better policy with respect to vaccination coverage in low and middle 
income countries, where tax resources are limited.  Finally, autonomous spending 
explains variations in vaccination coverage over time, as shown by the random effects 
panel estimations 
 
4.5.1.2. Infant Mortality 
 
The cross-sectional estimates in table 37 are statistically insignificant in all but two 
estimations.  SCG Autonomous Expenditure is negatively associated with infant mortality 
(8).  The coefficient indicates that a one percentage point increase in fiscal 
decentralization would reduce infant mortality rates between countries by 1.4%.  Fiscal 
decentralization also reduces infant mortality in federal countries, however this result is 
restricted to the first indicator for decentralization (4), and there is no effect in unitary 
countries.  SCG Expenditure reduces infant mortality when the degree of heterogeneity 
is greater (6). 
 The next set of estimates are for the cross-sectional IV model.  The first stage 
estimates are presented in table 38, and the corresponding second stage estimates in table 
39. 
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Table 37: Cross Sectional OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Infant Mortality and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Infant Mortality and Subnational Government Autonomous Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Decentralization -0.372 -0.612 -0.382 0.011 -0.438 1.927 -4.172 -1.389* -0.715 -0.756 -0.482 -0.731 0.806 -3.092 
(0.691) (0.690) (0.636) (0.571) (0.738) (1.315) (2.521) (0.736) (0.723) (0.654) (0.637) (0.704) (1.579) (2.130) 
Income -0.161 0.139 0.056 0.065 0.095 0.091 0.200 -0.281 0.086 -0.009 0.015 0.012 0.040 0.058 
(0.277) (0.313) (0.258) (0.254) (0.267) (0.264) (0.245) (0.285) (0.330) (0.282) (0.273) (0.284) (0.295) (0.276) 
Population 0.003 0.043 0.011 0.014 -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 0.036 0.000 0.000 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.036) (0.035) (0.030) (0.032) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036) 
Heterogeneity 2.961** 2.128** 2.697*** 3.000*** 2.617*** 5.698*** 2.594*** 3.512*** 2.226** 2.823*** 3.036*** 2.859*** 3.988*** 2.772*** 
(1.150) (0.846) (0.880) (0.664) (0.889) (1.738) (0.850) (1.069) (0.851) (0.890) (0.785) (0.889) (1.250) (0.883) 
Healthcare 
Expenditure 
-0.494** -0.655** -0.627*** -0.600** -0.655*** -0.628** -0.894*** -0.384 -0.618** -0.585** -0.574** -0.586** -0.608** -0.700*** 
(0.224) (0.278) (0.224) (0.222) (0.232) (0.231) (0.227) (0.233) (0.290) (0.238) (0.238) (0.249) (0.251) (0.248) 
Vaccinations  -1.879*** -1.604*** -1.652*** -1.689*** -1.612*** -1.899***  -1.709*** -1.365** -1.525*** -1.476*** -1.371*** -1.542*** 
 (0.349) (0.514) (0.431) (0.515) (0.458) (0.430)  (0.381) (0.513) (0.472) (0.496) (0.494) (0.470) 
Sanitation  -0.010**       -0.010*      
 (0.005)       (0.005)      
Beds  -0.017       -0.009      
 (0.017)       (0.020)      
Physicians  -0.016       -0.009      
 (0.047)       (0.046)      
Decentralization 
x Legislative 
  -0.214       -0.089     
  (0.375)       (0.538)     
Decentralization 
x Federal Const. 
   -0.736*       -0.551    
   (0.392)       (0.605)    
Decentralization 
x Elected Bottom 
Tier 
    -0.017       -0.141   
    (0.496)       (0.627)   
Decentralization 
x Heterogeneity 
     -7.423**       -4.545  
     (3.569)       (4.349)  
Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
      0.521       0.330 
      (0.345)       (0.313) 
Constant 6.212*** 14.310**
* 
12.399**
* 
12.165**
* 
12.655**
* 
11.196**
* 
14.270**
* 
6.578*** 13.627**
* 
11.643**
* 
11.958**
* 
11.958**
* 
10.992**
* 
12.630**
* 
(1.192) (1.614) (2.242) (1.913) (2.349) (2.217) (2.168) (1.217) (1.655) (2.205) (2.113) (2.253) (2.467) (2.188) 
Observations 39 33 38 39 39 39 39 39 33 38 39 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.917 0.957 0.950 0.952 0.946 0.951 0.950 0.928 0.957 0.951 0.950 0.948 0.950 0.950 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
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Table 38: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (1st Stage), Dependent Variable: Decentralization, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Infant Mortality and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Infant Mortality and Subnational Government Autonomous Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Instrument Variables 
UK Legal 
Origins 
-0.163** -0.173* -0.177** -0.180*** -0.122** -0.067*** -0.011 -0.176*** -0.171*** -0.183*** -0.180*** -0.099** -0.069*** -0.005 
(0.067) (0.087) (0.070) (0.062) (0.049) (0.023) (0.008) (0.047) (0.047) (0.032) (0.032) (0.043) (0.021) (0.008) 
Germany Legal 
Origins 
-0.134** -0.177** -0.158** -0.159*** -0.100** -0.028 -0.010 -0.097** -0.160*** -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.064* -0.036** -0.001 
(0.061) (0.065) (0.059) (0.057) (0.044) (0.020) (0.008) (0.041) (0.043) (0.029) (0.027) (0.032) (0.014) (0.007) 
French Legal 
Origins 
-0.169*** -0.157** -0.193*** -0.177*** -0.119** -0.039* -0.015 -0.132*** -0.140*** -0.173*** -0.153*** -0.080** -0.052*** -0.000 
(0.060) (0.068) (0.061) (0.058) (0.046) (0.021) (0.011) (0.038) (0.044) (0.027) (0.027) (0.036) (0.015) (0.008) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
Income -0.054 -0.026 -0.034 -0.024 -0.040 0.004 0.025 -0.072 -0.096** -0.071* -0.058 -0.066 -0.018 0.010 
(0.052) (0.068) (0.055) (0.056) (0.055) (0.024) (0.019) (0.053) (0.042) (0.037) (0.044) (0.049) (0.018) (0.015) 
Population 0.021*** 0.032** 0.012 0.008 0.012 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.017** -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 0.002 -0.000 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
Heterogeneity 0.727*** 0.618** 0.512** 0.433** 0.558*** -0.907*** 0.037 0.767*** 0.700*** 0.514*** 0.398** 0.521** -0.379*** 0.004 
(0.206) (0.260) (0.186) (0.181) (0.180) (0.150) (0.040) (0.203) (0.177) (0.165) (0.153) (0.191) (0.106) (0.038) 
Healthcare 
Expenditure 
0.057 0.032 0.021 0.012 0.026 -0.008 -0.059*** 0.069 0.080* 0.038 0.025 0.037 0.012 -0.037*** 
(0.047) (0.062) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.021) (0.017) (0.046) (0.040) (0.030) (0.037) (0.042) (0.015) (0.012) 
Decentralization 
x Interaction 
  0.286*** 0.348*** 0.293** 2.619*** 0.132***   0.484*** 0.551*** 0.435*** 2.282*** 0.138*** 
  (0.098) (0.077) (0.123) (0.274) (0.005)   (0.109) (0.109) (0.145) (0.201) (0.006) 
Vaccinations  -0.238 0.112 -0.028 -0.082 -0.065 -0.050  0.008 0.256** 0.153* 0.063 -0.046 -0.011 
 (0.161) (0.104) (0.093) (0.118) (0.040) (0.034)  (0.144) (0.104) (0.076) (0.116) (0.032) (0.030) 
Sanitation  0.002       0.002      
 (0.002)       (0.002)      
Beds  0.007       0.018***      
 (0.008)       (0.006)      
Physicians  -0.004       0.003      
 (0.021)       (0.016)      
Constant 0.252 1.020 -0.122 0.500 0.668 0.657*** 0.408** 0.232 0.012 -0.626 -0.155 0.108 0.496*** 0.213* 
(0.198) (0.643) (0.431) (0.422) (0.524) (0.192) (0.150) (0.209) (0.638) (0.400) (0.304) (0.498) (0.126) (0.119) 
F-test (p-value) 
for instruments 0.056 0.081 0.031 0.038 0.086 0.024 0.491 0.004 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.132 0.009 0.868 
Observations 39 33 38 39 39 39 39 39 33 38 39 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.619 0.686 0.699 0.740 0.695 0.954 0.981 0.544 0.759 0.769 0.785 0.682 0.959 0.973 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure are instrumented using federal constitution dummy and ethnic fractionalisation, from the first stage.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen J-statistic are provided 
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Table 39: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Infant Mortality and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Infant Mortality and Subnational Government Autonomous Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Decentralization -0.342 -0.188 -0.638 -0.530 -0.342 2.073 -8.255 -0.502 -0.095 -0.478 -0.298 0.879 1.737 -0.502 
(1.004) (0.719) (0.854) (0.868) (1.257) (1.866) (9.360) (0.940) (0.768) (0.792) (0.842) (1.678) (2.180) (0.940) 
Income -0.158 0.164 0.035 0.030 0.100 0.092 0.297 -0.181 0.163 0.025 0.034 0.133 0.067 -0.447 
(0.267) (0.274) (0.237) (0.232) (0.254) (0.242) (0.316) (0.284) (0.301) (0.265) (0.267) (0.282) (0.285) (0.816) 
Population 0.002 0.034 0.013 0.016 -0.005 -0.008 0.002 -0.003 0.030 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.009 -0.005 
(0.032) (0.029) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.032) (0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.032) (0.079) 
Heterogeneity 2.943*** 1.913*** 2.804*** 3.165*** 2.578*** 5.853*** 2.659*** 3.021*** 1.873** 2.718*** 2.990*** 2.281** 4.500*** 3.079* 
(1.128) (0.720) (0.879) (0.732) (0.972) (1.933) (0.775) (1.132) (0.757) (0.843) (0.739) (1.032) (1.281) (1.580) 
Healthcare 
Expenditure 
-0.497** -0.686*** -0.607*** -0.570*** -0.659*** -0.628*** -1.130** -0.479** -0.689** -0.610*** -0.587** -0.652*** -0.627*** 1.107 
(0.220) (0.248) (0.207) (0.204) (0.218) (0.207) (0.565) (0.236) (0.268) (0.223) (0.228) (0.237) (0.239) (2.120) 
Vaccinations  -1.817*** -1.591*** -1.675*** -1.679*** -1.607*** -2.122***  -1.779*** -1.435*** -1.557*** -1.543*** -1.328*** -1.176 
 (0.308) (0.459) (0.380) (0.444) (0.397) (0.562)  (0.333) (0.525) (0.461) (0.523) (0.432) (1.262) 
Sanitation  -0.010***       -0.011***      
 (0.004)       (0.004)      
Beds  -0.018       -0.017      
 (0.013)       (0.015)      
Physicians  -0.018       -0.018      
 (0.038)       (0.039)      
Decentralization 
x Legislative 
  -0.159       -0.202     
  (0.343)       (0.517)     
Decentralization 
x Federal Const. 
   -0.568       -0.643    
   (0.384)       (0.586)    
Decentralization 
x Elected Bottom 
Tier 
    -0.054       -1.041   
  
  (0.589)   
  
  (1.077)   
Decentralization 
x Heterogeneity 
     -7.824       -6.849  
     (4.930)       (5.376)  
Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
      1.071       -6.363 
      (1.255)       (8.020) 
Constant 6.204*** 14.03*** 12.43*** 12.46*** 12.58*** 11.11*** 16.01*** 6.277*** 13.87*** 11.80*** 12.00*** 11.56*** 10.49*** 15..91*** 
(1.130) (1.478) (1.939) (1.715) (2.050) (2.026) (4.002) (1.150) (1.409) (2.100) (1.897) (1.960) (2.287) (4.348) 
DWH Test (p-
value) 0.9710 0.418 0.651 0.372 0.924 0.934 0.655 0.281 0.287 0.593 0.742 0.288 0.540 0.045 
Hansen J-statistic 
(p-value) 0.537 0.213 0.163 0.270 0.248 0.452 0.314 0.816 0.199 0.147 0.225 0.320 0.292 0.9971 
Observations 39 33 38 39 39 39 39 39 33 38 39 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.917 0.956 0.949 0.950 0.946 0.951 0.945 0.923 0.955 0.951 0.950 0.940 0.950 0.937 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
. 
 
174 | P a g e  
 
The first stage estimates are similar to those observed in the vaccination coverage 
regressions.  Scandinavia legal origin group observes the highest level of decentralization, 
so each of the coefficients for the other groups in table 38 are negative.  Each dummy 
variable is statistically significant individually, in most specifications.  The f-test also 
confirms the collective significance of the dummy variables in all but a few of the 
specifications.  As was the case in the vaccination coverage first stage estimates, in table 
34, legal origins are not as effective in capturing variations in decentralization, in the final 
specifications for decentralization and total healthcare spending. 
The second stage estimates in table 39 provide no evidence in any specification 
of a relationship between fiscal decentralization and infant mortality.  The control 
variables observe some interesting effects on infant mortality.  As expected, public 
healthcare is negatively associated with infant mortality.  Vaccination coverage is also 
negatively associated with infant mortality, which is also expected.  However, 
heterogeneity is positively associated with infant mortality, which suggests that when 
voters have heterogenous demands, healthcare outcomes are affected negatively.  All of 
these results are robust to IV estimation. 
 The final set of estimates for the random effects panel model provides almost no 
evidence of any effect of decentralization on infant mortality over time.  The only result 
that is statistically significant is in specification 12.  When the local government executive 
is appointed, greater autonomous spending decentralization increases infant mortality.  
However, when the local executive is elected, the effect is now negative.  This suggests 
that when local governments are accountable to local citizens, they may use spending 
resources to tackle health issues at the local issue, which in turn would reduce infant 
mortality rates.  Essentially, in this result at least, local governments are more responsive 
when dealing with local health issues, than the central government. 
Most of the control variables share a relationship with infant mortality rates that 
is consistent with the theory.  Income is negatively associated with infant mortality rates 
in each of the four tables, and frequently statistically significant.  Healthcare expenditure 
and vaccination coverage are negatively associated with infant mortality.  Heterogeneity 
is positively associated with infant mortality, which is consistent with the cross-sectional 
estimations. 
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Table 40: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Infant Mortality, with Additional Interactions  
 PANEL A: Infant Mortality and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Infant Mortality and Subnational Government Autonomous Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Decentralization 0.141 0.294 0.199 0.293 0.456 0.169 -1.508 -0.058 -0.298 -0.148 -0.130 0.293*** -0.400 0.003 
(0.276) (0.268) (0.303) (0.340) (0.302) (1.337) (1.511) (0.166) (0.204) (0.267) (0.277) (0.100) (0.720) (0.705) 
Income -0.425*** -0.458*** -0.420*** -0.415*** -0.417*** -0.416*** -0.427*** -0.428*** -0.485*** -0.425*** -0.427*** -0.426*** -0.423*** -0.421*** 
(0.155) (0.125) (0.141) (0.140) (0.142) (0.140) (0.133) (0.156) (0.126) (0.136) (0.136) (0.139) (0.140) (0.143) 
Population -0.012 -0.036 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.016 -0.027 -0.009 -0.028 -0.016 -0.022 -0.007 -0.013 -0.014 
(0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.035) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) 
Heterogeneity 2.783*** 1.625* 2.674*** 2.860*** 2.582*** 2.686** 2.706*** 2.872*** 1.987** 2.618*** 2.641*** 2.683*** 2.488*** 2.742*** 
(0.988) (0.941) (0.931) (0.881) (0.930) (1.327) (0.962) (0.958) (0.851) (0.954) (0.986) (0.878) (0.958) (0.939) 
Healthcare 
Expenditure 
-0.220* -0.133 -0.207* -0.207* -0.201* -0.209* -0.273* -0.216* -0.113 -0.209* -0.204* -0.195 -0.203* -0.204 
(0.125) (0.090) (0.122) (0.121) (0.120) (0.119) (0.148) (0.128) (0.093) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.121) (0.125) 
Vaccinations  -0.105 -0.420** -0.437** -0.423** -0.429** -0.450**  -0.025 -0.438** -0.436** -0.444** -0.435** -0.443** 
 (0.192) (0.203) (0.206) (0.208) (0.203) (0.206)  (0.184) (0.201) (0.192) (0.196) (0.194) (0.198) 
Sanitation  -0.852**       -0.843**      
 (0.346)       (0.347)      
Beds  0.010       0.009      
 (0.010)       (0.010)      
Physicians  -0.049       -0.048      
 (0.039)       (0.042)      
Decentralization 
x Legislative 
  -0.080       0.386     
  (0.494)       (0.346)     
Decentralization 
x Federal Const. 
   -0.357       0.366    
   (0.524)       (0.366)    
Decentralization 
x Elected Bottom 
Tier 
    -0.391       -0.419*   
  
  (0.316)   
  
  (0.246)   
Decentralization 
x Heterogeneity 
     0.008       1.177  
     (3.595)       (1.604)  
Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
      0.247       0.012 
      (0.210)       (0.116) 
Constant 6.775*** 11.17*** 8.557*** 8.499*** 8.535*** 8.580*** 9.217*** 6.791*** 10.89*** 8.781*** 8.759*** 8.675*** 8.738*** 8.665*** 
(0.806) (1.623) (1.214) (1.237) (1.236) (1.305) (1.315) (0.793) (1.611) (1.176) (1.174) (1.150) (1.200) (1.221) 
Observations 321 181 318 321 321 321 321 321 181 318 321 321 321 321 
Groups 40 33 39 40 40 40 40 40 33 39 40 40 40 40 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Overall, there is very limited evidence that fiscal decentralization is associated with infant 
mortality.  The initial significance in the cross-sectional OLS estimates, is not robust to 
IV estimation.  The random effects estimations provide only one statistical effect of 
autonomous spending decentralization on infant mortality, through interactions with the 
electoral decentralization dummy variable. 
 
4.5.2. Public Education 
 
I estimate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public education in 8 tables 
(41-48).  Estimates for primary enrolment are in tables 41-44 and estimates for classroom 
size are in tables 45-48. 
 
4.5.2.1. Primary Enrolment 
 
The cross-sectional estimates provide no evidence of an association between spending 
and autonomous spending and primary school enrolments.  Education expenditure is 
omitted due to data limitations48.  Fiscal decentralization has no effect in any of the 
specifications.  The next set of estimates are produced using the cross-sectional 
instrument variable model.  The first stage estimates are presented in table 42 and the 
second stage in table 43.   
 In the first stage estimates, legal origins remain effective as instruments of 
decentralization, though perhaps not as strong as they were in the vaccination and infant 
mortality regressions (34 and 38).  The legal origins are often statistically significant 
individually.  However, in specifications 4 and 9, when decentralization is interacting 
with electoral decentralization in the corresponding second stages, legal origins are 
neither individually, nor collectively significant, according to the f-test p-value. 
                                                 
48 Including education expenditure as a control in the cross-sectional estimations, OLS or IV, would 
reduce observation count from 30 to 18. 
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Table 41: Cross Sectional OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Primary Enrolment, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Primary Enrolment and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Primary Enrolment and Subnational Government Autonomous 
Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Decentralization -0.044 -0.025 -0.021 -0.043 0.083 -0.032 0.019 0.066 -0.019 0.143 
(0.065) (0.061) (0.065) (0.090) (0.230) (0.080) (0.080) (0.105) (0.119) (0.272) 
Income 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.024** 0.021** 0.024** 0.020** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.021** 0.022** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Population 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007* 0.005 0.005 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Heterogeneity -0.077 -0.058 -0.057 -0.077 0.069 -0.085 -0.066 -0.044 -0.087 0.015 
(0.066) (0.078) (0.088) (0.066) (0.271) (0.067) (0.078) (0.100) (0.068) (0.168) 
Decentralization x 
Legislative 
 -0.032     -0.074    
 (0.045)     (0.071)    
Decentralization x 
Federal Constitution 
  -0.034     -0.125   
  (0.058)     (0.109)   
Decentralization x 
Elected Bottom Tier 
   -0.000     -0.015  
   (0.060)     (0.104)  
Decentralization x 
Heterogeneity 
    -0.356     -0.437 
    (0.630)     (0.643) 
Constant 4.374*** 4.351*** 4.342*** 4.374*** 4.306*** 4.381*** 4.344*** 4.297*** 4.373*** 4.329*** 
(0.083) (0.085) (0.106) (0.094) (0.158) (0.085) (0.084) (0.113) (0.098) (0.122) 
Observations  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared  0.429 0.441 0.438 0.429 0.441 0.422 0.448 0.464 0.422 0.437 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  
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Table 42: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (1st Stage), Dependent Variable: Decentralization, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Primary Enrolment and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Primary Enrolment and Subnational Government Autonomous 
Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Instrument Variables 
UK Legal Origins -0.138* -0.160** -0.150** -0.058 -0.067*** -0.149*** -0.173*** -0.158*** -0.031 -0.070*** 
(0.072) (0.070) (0.063) (0.048) (0.022) (0.047) (0.034) (0.030) (0.047) (0.018) 
Germany Legal Origins -0.096 -0.132* -0.150** -0.041 -0.043* -0.077 -0.127*** -0.142*** -0.024 -0.042** 
(0.078) (0.068) (0.065) (0.050) (0.024) (0.057) (0.037) (0.029) (0.036) (0.017) 
French Legal Origins -0.159** -0.183** -0.172** -0.026 -0.049** -0.122** -0.153*** -0.131*** 0.008 -0.055*** 
(0.070) (0.069) (0.062) (0.055) (0.021) (0.048) (0.036) (0.025) (0.044) (0.014) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
Income 0.029 0.004 -0.016 -0.016 -0.010* 0.022 -0.010 -0.031* -0.027 -0.006 
(0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) (0.005) (0.023) (0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.004) 
Population 0.013 0.006 0.003 -0.010 0.010** -0.001 -0.008 -0.013 -0.019* 0.002 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) 
Heterogeneity 0.715*** 0.422* 0.244 0.451** -0.835*** 0.733*** 0.396* 0.137 0.335 -0.326*** 
(0.239) (0.240) (0.261) (0.210) (0.142) (0.214) (0.214) (0.199) (0.224) (0.080) 
Decentralization x 
Interaction 
 0.333*** 0.456*** 0.550*** 2.429***  0.541*** 0.749*** 0.755*** 2.145*** 
 (0.115) (0.116) (0.177) (0.208)  (0.137) (0.115) (0.171) (0.144) 
Constant -0.155 0.190 0.437 0.222 0.441*** -0.181 0.248 0.533** 0.276 0.249*** 
(0.297) (0.271) (0.258) (0.258) (0.081) (0.256) (0.247) (0.192) (0.204) (0.048) 
F-test (p-value) for 
instruments 0.138 0.086 0.076 0.516 0.043 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.532 0.004 
Observations  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared  0.468 0.606 0.668 0.675 0.952 0.412 0.701 0.831 0.736 0.963 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  
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 The corresponding second stage estimates in table 43 provide some evidence of 
an association between decentralization and primary school enrolment.  This is in contrast 
to the OLS estimates in table 41, where spending decentralization had no effect on 
enrolment.  Spending and autonomous spending decentralization are found to be 
positively associated with primary school enrolment in unitary countries (specifications 
3 and 8), and negatively associated with primary school enrolment in specification 8.  This 
could reflect one of two things.  Either that countries that are less decentralized, unitary 
countries, can benefit from greater decentralization with respect to primary enrolment.  
This result could also signify that other aspects of decentralization reflected in the 
constitution, could have a bearing on the relationship between spending decentralization 
and enrolment.  The strength of the effect depends on the indicator of spending 
decentralization.  A 1% increase in spending decentralization, increases primary school 
enrolment by 0.15% and 0.17% (spending and autonomous spending respectively). 
 The second significant result is observed in interactions with heterogeneity.  
Spending decentralization is negatively associated with enrolment when the degree of 
heterogeneity is greater (5 and 10), and autonomous spending decentralization is 
positively associated with primary school enrolment (10).  This result is counter-intuitive 
– Oates (1972) among others argue that greater heterogeneity strengthens the case for 
decentralization.  However, what this indicates is that it is better to centralize when the 
degree of heterogeneity across the national population is greater.  One interpretation of 
this result may be that central government prioritises primary enrolment and basic 
education when the demands of the population are heterogenous. 
 Of the control variables, only income and heterogeneity have some effect on 
primary school enrolment in the cross-sectional estimations.  Income has a positive effect 
in all specifications and is robust to IV estimation.  Heterogeneity observes a negative 
effect on primary school enrolment in specifications 1 and 6 only, and only appears in IV 
estimations.  The negative coefficient suggests that when citizen preferences are 
heterogeneous, primary school enrolment is lower. 
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Table 43: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Primary Enrolment, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Primary Enrolment and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Primary Enrolment and Subnational Government Autonomous 
Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Decentralization 0.107 0.111 0.151* 0.379 0.440 0.101 0.122 0.166** 0.232 0.380* 
(0.108) (0.090) (0.092) (0.417) (0.269) (0.117) (0.084) (0.074) (0.340) (0.216) 
Income 0.015* 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.029** 0.028*** 0.017** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.029** 0.024*** 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) 
Population 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.001 0.005 0.007* 0.009** 0.009 0.004 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) 
Heterogeneity -0.164** -0.101 -0.085 -0.232 0.420 -0.156** -0.090 -0.046 -0.159 0.128 
(0.072) (0.080) (0.097) (0.152) (0.292) (0.061) (0.076) (0.096) (0.110) (0.160) 
Decentralization x 
Legislative 
 -0.072     -0.123*    
 (0.053)     (0.073)    
Decentralization x 
Federal Constitution 
  -0.105     -0.193**   
  (0.072)     (0.093)   
Decentralization x 
Elected Bottom Tier 
   -0.235     -0.199  
   (0.267)     (0.279)  
Decentralization x 
Heterogeneity 
    -1.258*     -0.976* 
    (0.744)     (0.590) 
Constant 4.423*** 4.360*** 4.315*** 4.273*** 4.145*** 4.412*** 4.335*** 4.261*** 4.296*** 4.269*** 
(0.087) (0.075) (0.098) (0.172) (0.155) (0.076) (0.073) (0.093) (0.150) (0.111) 
DWH Test (p-value) 0.127 0.080 0.037 0.138 0.179 0.240 0.215 0.240 0.459 0.335 
Hansen J-statistic (p-
value) 0.502 0.532 0.748 0.459 0.492 0.454 0.534 0.777 0.239 0.497 
Observations  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
R-squared  0.277 0.337 0.296   0.356 0.331 0.411 0.441 0.296 0.412 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous Expenditure 
are instrumented using federal constitution dummy and ethnic fractionalisation, from the first stage.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen J-statistic are provided. 
  
181 | P a g e  
 
The final estimates are produced using the random effects panel estimator.  The use of 
the panel dataset allows for the inclusion of education expenditure as a control and as an 
interaction.  The results in table 44 indicate that autonomous spending decentralization 
can increase primary school enrolment over time. 
First, autonomous spending decentralization is positively associated with primary 
school enrolment (specification 7).  A 1% increase in autonomous spending 
decentralization can increase primary school enrolment by 10%.  Decentralization 
remains positively associated with decentralization when subnational governments do not 
have legislative autonomy (8), in unitary countries (9) and when the local government 
executive is appointed by the central government (10).  However, when the local 
government executive is elected, greater spending decentralization reduces primary 
enrolment.  This result suggests that for spending decentralization to produce positive 
effects on primary school enrolment, central governments should maintain control over 
local government through appointed local government executives. 
Second, spending decentralization leads to higher primary school enrolment when 
total education spending is lower (12), and reduces primary school enrolment as 
education spending increases.  One explanation for this result could be that when total 
education spending is lower, primary school enrolment and universal basic education are 
a top priority of government.  By devolving spending to subnational governments, when 
the total level of spending is low, subnational governments allocate resources specifically 
to boost primary school enrolment.  This would also suggest that decentralization could 
increase primary school enrolment in low and middle income countries.   
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Table 44: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Primary Enrolment, with Additional Interactions  
 PANEL A: Primary Enrolment and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Primary Enrolment and Subnational Government Autonomous 
Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Decentralization -0.028 -0.010 -0.016 -0.149 0.156 -0.675 0.109* 0.126*** 0.140*** 0.247*** -0.011 0.738*** 
(0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.105) (0.182) (0.483) (0.060) (0.039) (0.038) (0.053) (0.173) (0.100) 
Income -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 -0.026** -0.025** -0.024** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.034*** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Population -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Heterogeneity -0.108* -0.079 -0.094 -0.113* 0.135 -0.077* -0.166*** -0.157** -0.148* -0.160** -0.229* -0.136** 
(0.061) (0.070) (0.076) (0.066) (0.233) (0.045) (0.063) (0.069) (0.077) (0.065) (0.128) (0.057) 
Education 
Expenditure 
0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.030* 0.038*** 0.017 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.055*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.027) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Decentralization 
x Legislative 
 -0.035      -0.027     
 (0.040)      (0.055)     
Decentralization 
x Federal Const. 
  -0.020      -0.045    
  (0.045)      (0.060)    
Decentralization 
x Elected Bottom 
Tier 
   0.120      -0.171***   
 
  (0.093)   
 
  (0.055)   
Decentralization 
x Heterogeneity 
    -0.602      0.338  
    (0.599)      (0.525)  
Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
     0.072      -0.077*** 
     (0.054)      (0.015) 
Constant 4.529*** 4.506*** 4.518*** 4.566*** 4.419*** 4.674*** 4.578*** 4.562*** 4.552*** 4.556*** 4.618*** 4.470*** 
(0.100) (0.104) (0.112) (0.089) (0.165) (0.136) (0.082) (0.084) (0.094) (0.098) (0.094) (0.092) 
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
Groups 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Overall, the results for fiscal decentralization and primary enrolment are mixed and often 
statistically insignificant.  The initial cross-sectional OLS estimates provide no evidence 
of a link between decentralization and primary school enrolment.  The cross-sectional IV 
estimates however provide some evidence.  Spending decentralization boosts primary 
school enrolment in unitary countries, but reduces enrolment in federal countries.  
Spending decentralization also reduces enrolment when there is a greater degree of 
heterogeneity, and boosts enrolment when the demands of citizens are more homogenous. 
 Finally, the random effects estimations provide evidence that autonomous 
spending is associated with primary school enrolment.  The effects are often positive.  
When subnational governments do not have legislative autonomy, in unitary countries, 
and when the local government executive is appointed, increases in autonomous spending 
decentralization can boost primary school enrolment over time.  Greater spending 
decentralization can also increase primary school enrolment when total education 
spending is lower.  This result may suggest that autonomous spending decentralization 
could be beneficial in low and middle income countries. 
 
4.5.2.2. Classroom Size 
 
In the first set of estimates for the cross-sectional regressions there is no evidence that 
fiscal decentralization has any effect on classroom size.  Public expenditure is excluded 
from these regressions due to data limitations, which may have had an effect on role of 
decentralization; however, I include this control for the remaining estimations.   
The second set of estimates are produced using the cross-sectional instrument 
variable model.  The first stage estimates are presented in table 46.  Similar to the primary 
enrolment first stage results (table 42), legal origins are a suitable instrument in all 
specifications, apart from the specification featuring interactions between 
decentralization and elected bottom tier, in the second stage.  All legal origins dummies 
are individually statistically significant, and collectively significant at the 1% level, with 
the exception of specifications 4 and 9. 
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Table 45: Cross Sectional OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Classroom Size, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Classroom Size and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Classroom Size and Subnational Government Autonomous 
Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10When  
Decentralization 0.091 0.161 0.538 -0.174 1.100 -0.689 -0.845 -0.804 -0.889 0.307 
(0.336) (0.543) (0.530) (0.559) (1.199) (0.499) (0.689) (0.760) (0.660) (2.121) 
Income -0.125*** -0.116*** -0.095** -0.148*** -0.107*** -0.115*** -0.120*** -0.122*** -0.128*** -0.103*** 
(0.028) (0.033) (0.043) (0.036) (0.035) (0.028) (0.036) (0.044) (0.041) (0.033) 
Population -0.036 -0.036 -0.025 -0.049 -0.045 -0.035 -0.042 -0.038 -0.043 -0.039 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.032) (0.038) (0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.031) (0.036) (0.030) 
Heterogeneity 1.266* 1.324* 1.320* 1.348* 2.212* 1.754** 1.775** 1.736** 1.798** 2.230* 
(0.723) (0.688) (0.679) (0.771) (1.222) (0.630) (0.633) (0.655) (0.651) (1.226) 
Decentralization x 
Legislative 
 -0.098     0.179    
 (0.367)     (0.456)    
Decentralization x 
Federal Constitution 
  -0.520     0.144   
  (0.471)     (0.613)   
Decentralization x 
Elected Bottom Tier 
   0.329     0.267  
   (0.510)     (0.569)  
Decentralization x 
Heterogeneity 
    -2.586     -2.331 
    (2.716)     (4.501) 
Constant 3.577*** 3.470*** 3.179*** 3.795*** 3.093*** 3.453*** 3.513*** 3.544*** 3.583*** 3.167*** 
(0.359) (0.358) (0.536) (0.352) (0.641) (0.310) (0.387) (0.525) (0.386) (0.661) 
Observations  30 29 30 30 30 30 29 30 30 30 
R-squared  0.569 0.566 0.602 0.577 0.579 0.608 0.610 0.609 0.611 0.616 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis  
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Table 46: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (1st Stage), Dependent Variable: Decentralization, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Classroom Size and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Classroom Size and Subnational Government Autonomous Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Instrument Variables 
UK Legal Origins -0.103** -0.174*** -0.135*** -0.047 -0.065*** -0.140*** -0.207*** -0.176*** -0.042 -0.072*** 
(0.043) (0.052) (0.040) (0.034) (0.015) (0.036) (0.025) (0.019) (0.039) (0.014) 
Germany Legal Origins -0.096** -0.150*** -0.157*** -0.038 -0.041*** -0.090*** -0.144*** -0.152*** -0.025 -0.045*** 
(0.037) (0.032) (0.028) (0.038) (0.012) (0.030) (0.026) (0.020) (0.033) (0.010) 
French Legal Origins -0.134*** -0.191*** -0.172*** -0.033 -0.050*** -0.115*** -0.173*** -0.151*** -0.012 -0.056*** 
(0.030) (0.034) (0.025) (0.035) (0.012) (0.024) (0.026) (0.019) (0.035) (0.009) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
Income 0.019 -0.016 -0.022 -0.024 -0.012*** 0.013 -0.022 -0.030** -0.025 -0.008** 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.015) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.003) 
Population 0.011 -0.002 -0.003 -0.019 0.008** 0.001 -0.012 -0.014 -0.023* 0.003 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) 
Heterogeneity 0.760*** 0.390 0.363 0.585*** -0.720*** 0.702*** 0.363 0.248 0.460** -0.310*** 
(0.219) (0.254) (0.212) (0.192) (0.103) (0.219) (0.240) (0.187) (0.201) (0.075) 
Decentralization x 
Interaction 
 0.450*** 0.475*** 0.570*** 2.307***  0.636*** 0.709*** 0.686*** 2.092*** 
 (0.139) (0.114) (0.160) (0.159)  (0.174) (0.134) (0.183) (0.124) 
Constant -0.100 0.383 0.455** 0.247 0.423*** -0.088 0.388 0.511*** 0.233 0.263*** 
(0.226) (0.247) (0.190) (0.187) (0.049) (0.197) (0.261) (0.180) (0.172) (0.041) 
F-test (p-value) for 
instruments 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.539 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.655 0.000 
Observations  30 29 30 30 30 30 29 30 30 30 
R-squared  0.511 0.711 0.733 0.716 0.961 0.422 0.741 0.789 0.701 0.966 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  
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Table 47: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Classroom Size, with Additional Interactions 
 PANEL A: Classroom Size and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Classroom Size and Subnational Government Autonomous Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Decentralization 1.489* 0.747 1.697** -1.839 -1.813 -0.597 -0.434 0.039 -4.349 -0.844 
(0.767) (0.547) (0.785) (5.115) (4.121) (1.630) (1.148) (1.032) (4.156) (3.293) 
Income -0.162*** -0.113*** -0.084** -0.190 -0.147*** -0.116*** -0.111*** -0.098** -0.229* -0.115*** 
(0.039) (0.026) (0.035) (0.139) (0.057) (0.033) (0.034) (0.040) (0.130) (0.038) 
Population -0.046 -0.034 -0.018 -0.079 -0.020 -0.035 -0.037 -0.027 -0.115 -0.035 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.035) (0.106) (0.043) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029) (0.104) (0.029) 
Heterogeneity 0.192 1.089* 0.823 2.275 -0.072 1.698 1.660*** 1.567** 3.211* 1.779 
(0.733) (0.571) (0.681) (2.799) (3.424) (1.045) (0.630) (0.676) (1.716) (1.428) 
Decentralization x 
Legislative 
 -0.332     -0.049    
 (0.255)     (0.659)    
Decentralization x 
Federal Constitution 
  -1.035***     -0.420   
  (0.379)     (0.707)   
Decentralization x 
Elected Bottom Tier 
   1.282     2.650  
   (3.027)     (2.958)  
Decentralization x 
Heterogeneity 
    4.207     0.150 
    (9.755)     (6.880) 
Constant 3.960*** 3.394*** 2.982*** 4.184*** 4.292** 3.466*** 3.416*** 3.243*** 4.502*** 3.458*** 
(0.458) (0.329) (0.424) (1.332) (1.719) (0.368) (0.422) (0.546) (1.255) (0.850) 
DWH Test (p-value) 0.090 0.534 0.162 0.763 0.458 0.954 0.646 0.328 0.361 0.620 
Hansen J-statistic (p-
value) 0.208 0.163 0.197 0.131 0.143 0.102 0.104 0.142 0.388 0.104 
Observations  30 29 30 30 30 30 29 30 30 30 
R-squared  0.367 0.541 0.516 0.423 0.500 0.608 0.601 0.581 0.118 0.607 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous Expenditure 
are instrumented using federal constitution dummy and ethnic fractionalisation, from the first stage.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen J-statistic are provided.   
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In the second stage results, spending decentralization is found to be statistically associated with 
classroom size (panel A).  Greater spending increase the size of classrooms between countries.  
An increase of 1% in spending decentralization, results in a 1.5% increase in classroom size.  
Spending decentralization is also found to be statistically associated classroom size through 
interactions with federal constitution in specification 3.  Spending decentralization increases 
classroom size in unitary countries, and reduces them in federal countries.  This result is harder 
to explain intuitively.  As unitary countries are generally less decentralized (Altunbas and 
Thornton, 2011), this result does not suggest that greater decentralization in countries that are 
typically more centralized, will lead to smaller classroom sizes.  It is also hard to explain when 
considering the effect of federal constitution on classroom size, or rather, the mechanisms by 
which decentralization affect classroom size.  This result may indicate correlation between 
federal constitution and another determinant of cross-sectional variations in classroom size. 
 Of the control variables, once again income and heterogeneity explain cross-sectional 
variations in provision.  Income is, as expected, negatively associated with classroom size.  
Heterogeneity is consistently, positively associated with classroom size in the OLS estimations.  
The IV estimations remove most significance, though in some specifications heterogeneity 
continues to be positively associated with classroom size. 
 The final estimates for the random effects panel estimates observe greater statistical 
significance of spending decentralization on classroom size.  There are also differences in the 
effects of decentralization between the cross-sectional IV estimates and the random effects 
panel estimations.  First, when accounting for cross-sectional variation in the random effects, 
greater spending decentralization over time helps to reduce the size of classrooms.  A 1% 
increase in spending decentralization reduces classroom size by 0.32% (1).  Spending 
decentralization continues to be negatively associated with classroom size when local 
governments have no legislative autonomy (2), and in unitary countries (3).  On the other hand, 
when subnational governments do have legislative autonomy, greater spending 
decentralization increases classroom size.   
Second, autonomous spending decentralization is also associated with classroom size 
in specification 10.  When the local government executive is appointed, greater decentralization 
increases the size of classrooms.  However, when the local government executive is elected, 
the opposite is true. 
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Table 48: Random Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Classroom Size, with Additional Interactions  
 PANEL A: Classroom Size and Subnational Government Expenditure PANEL B: Classroom Size and Subnational Government Autonomous 
Expenditure 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Decentralization -0.323* -0.571* -0.530* -0.144 -2.952** 1.102 0.050 -0.566 -0.392 0.333** -1.095* 0.944* 
(0.168) (0.293) (0.283) (0.344) (1.401) (1.800) (0.149) (0.490) (0.459) (0.169) (0.577) (0.497) 
Income -0.104** -0.091* -0.104** -0.095* -0.107** -0.096* -0.140*** -0.142*** -0.147*** -0.147*** -0.148*** -0.139*** 
(0.047) (0.055) (0.045) (0.054) (0.044) (0.052) (0.050) (0.048) (0.046) (0.053) (0.048) (0.053) 
Population -0.020 -0.038 -0.030 -0.022 -0.037 -0.025 -0.036 -0.041* -0.044* -0.028 -0.033 -0.031 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Heterogeneity 1.373** 0.843 1.322* 1.350** -1.757 1.294* 1.285** 1.113* 1.260* 1.270* 0.833 1.309** 
(0.648) (0.706) (0.738) (0.663) (1.933) (0.670) (0.647) (0.648) (0.649) (0.676) (0.798) (0.652) 
Education 
Expenditure 
-0.181*** -0.209*** -0.184*** -0.182** -0.193*** -0.145** -0.167** -0.168** -0.162*** -0.148** -0.155** -0.145* 
(0.064) (0.072) (0.062) (0.075) (0.062) (0.073) (0.066) (0.065) (0.063) (0.075) (0.062) (0.079) 
Decentralization 
x Legislative 
 0.619**      0.686     
 (0.306)      (0.492)     
Decentralization 
x Federal Const. 
  0.311      0.495    
  (0.290)      (0.466)    
Decentralization 
x Elected Bottom 
Tier 
   -0.134      -0.450**   
 
  (0.381)   
 
  (0.216)   
Decentralization 
x Heterogeneity 
    8.364*      2.773**  
    (4.323)      (1.303)  
Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
     -0.157      -0.120* 
     (0.202)      (0.062) 
Constant 4.914*** 5.228*** 5.015*** 4.832*** 6.049*** 4.547*** 5.130*** 5.265*** 5.216*** 5.034*** 5.276*** 4.930*** 
(0.403) (0.438) (0.454) (0.435) (0.813) (0.525) (0.427) (0.472) (0.468) (0.445) (0.459) (0.471) 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
Groups 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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This result suggests a difference in government priorities between central and local 
government.  Therefore, local citizens may put a greater weight on classroom sizes and 
the quality of education.  On the other hand, the central government may prioritise 
universal access to education.  This theory is supported in the primary school enrolment 
estimations, in table 44, specification 10.   
Third, fiscal decentralization reduces classroom size when the degree of 
heterogeneity is lower, as observed in specifications 5 and 11.  However, increases in the 
degree of heterogeneity reverse the effects of decentralization, particularly when 
subnational governments do not have autonomy over that expenditure (5).  Finally, 
autonomous spending decentralization leads to larger classroom sizes when education 
spending is lower (12) 
When controlling for random effects, income and education expenditure are 
negatively associated with classroom size over time.  The effect of income on classroom 
size is consistent with cross-sectional estimates also.  Heterogeneity is also positively 
associated with classroom size, which confirms cross-sectional results that greater 
heterogeneity of citizen demands leads to higher classroom sizes.   
Overall the results for the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
classroom are mixed.  There is no evidence in the cross-sectional OLS estimations, though 
IV estimation produces some significance.  Spending decentralization is positively 
associated with classroom size between countries, and in unitary countries especially.  
Federal countries observe the opposite effect.  The strongest evidence is in the random 
effects panel estimates.  Spending decentralization is negatively associated with 
classroom size, which is in contrast to the cross-sectional IV estimates.  Greater spending 
decentralization is also negatively associated with classroom size when heterogeneity is 
lower, and when spending is higher.  This suggests that decentralization will not lead to 
smaller class sizes in countries where public spending on education is lower.  Combined 
with results in the primary school enrolment estimations, greater spending 
decentralization when education spending is lower, will produce mixed results – leading 
to higher primary school enrolment, but bigger classroom sizes.  
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4.5.3. Results Summary 
 
After producing estimates for each of the indicators for public healthcare and public 
education, there are several key findings: 
1. Fiscal decentralization does not share a robust positive or negative association 
with any of the indicators for public healthcare or education.  Also, the results are 
not robust to estimation technique.  Furthermore, there is very little evidence that 
decentralization has an effect on infant mortality.  Instead, decentralization shares 
stronger links with health and education outputs, such as vaccination coverage 
and primary school enrolment. 
2. Fiscal decentralization has different effects depending on the degree of autonomy 
subnational governments have over expenditure.  This effect is noticeable in 
random effects estimations for vaccination coverage (table 36) and primary 
enrolment (table 44).  When controlling for random effects, greater autonomous 
spending decentralization increases vaccination coverage and primary enrolment. 
3. The effects of spending decentralization are sensitive to other forms of 
decentralization.  The strongest example of this is in interactions between 
decentralization and local government accountability.  Depending on whether the 
local government executive is elected, the effects of spending decentralization 
differ.  This is particularly relevant to education indicators.  In random effects 
estimations (tables 44 and 48), greater autonomous spending decentralization 
leads to higher primary school enrolment, but higher class sizes, when the 
executive is appointed.  However, if the executive is elected, the opposite is true 
for the two education indicators. 
4. Fiscal decentralization performs differently depending on the level of total 
spending on healthcare and education.  In estimations for decentralization and 
education, Spending decentralization improves vaccination coverage when total 
government spending is higher, but leads to lower vaccination coverage when 
total government spending is more limited.  This may suggest that centralized 
administration can improve public service provision in developing countries. 
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4.6. Conclusion and Closing Remarks 
 
In this chapter I have examined the effects of fiscal decentralization on public healthcare 
and public education.  Using the decentralization dataset outlined in chapter 2 and 
indicators for vaccination coverage, infant mortality rates, primary enrolment and 
classroom size that have been used in similar research previously, I investigated whether 
tax and spending decentralization had a positive or negative effect on the provision of 
public healthcare and public education.  I included in my estimations interactions between 
tax and spending decentralization and other aspects of decentralization.  Finally, I 
examined whether fiscal decentralization had different effects depending on the degree 
of heterogeneity (of need between citizens) and total public spending on healthcare and 
public education.  The main findings of my empirical research are as follows: 
1. Generally, there is limited evidence that spending decentralization provides 
consistent benefits or risks to public healthcare and public education at the 
national level.  Instead, the effects of decentralization are sensitive to the 
degree of autonomy of subnational governments; other types of 
decentralization, and the level of total public spending on healthcare and 
education. 
2. There is evidence that decentralization of autonomous spending can improve 
healthcare outputs, such as vaccination.  In the random effects estimations, 
autonomous spending is positively associated with vaccination coverage, and 
this effect is consistent for when subnational governments do not have 
legislative powers, in unitary countries, and when the local government 
executive is appointed.  However, there is very little evidence that fiscal 
decentralization improves healthcare outcomes.  This result may be expected 
due to the large number of factors that determine general healthcare of the 
population (mortality, expectancy).  However, as vaccination coverage is 
negatively associated with mortality, decentralization would benefit 
healthcare generally indirectly through improvements to essential services. 
3. Whether the local government executive is elected (accountable to local 
citizens) or appointed (answering to central government), has a bearing on the 
relationship between decentralization and public services, particularly public 
education.  The contrast in effects of spending decentralization on education 
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suggest that local governments will make different decisions, with respect to 
the allocation of government expenditure, depending on who they are 
accountable to.  The strongest evidence of this is in random effects 
estimations, where greater spending decentralization increases enrolment, 
with larger classroom sizes, when the executive is appointed.  The opposite is 
true when the executive is elected. 
4. Fiscal decentralization observes different effects depending on the level of 
total public expenditure on education.  This is evident in vaccination, primary 
enrolment and classroom size estimations.  For example, spending 
decentralization is positively associated with vaccination coverage when total 
healthcare spending is higher, but negatively associated with vaccination 
coverage when total healthcare spending is limited.  This may indicate that 
different effects will be observed between developing and developed 
countries. 
Though my results are inconclusive, this reflects previous studies in this area.  Previous 
research has produced qualified conclusions on the relationship between decentralization 
and the provision of public services.  Khaleghian (2004) finds that the relationship 
between decentralization and vaccination coverage is sensitive to the selection of 
countries studied (i.e. low, middle or high income countries).  Falch and Fischer (2012) 
provide evidence that decentralization is conducive to school performance, but argue that 
more work must be done to investigate transmission effects, for example, total 
government spending and decentralization.  Finally, Treisman (2000) finds that the 
relationship between decentralization and the provision of public services is sensitive to 
the chosen indicator of decentralization, or rather, the aspect of decentralization being 
measured.   
 
To conclude, fiscal decentralization is neither universally good, nor universally bad for 
the provision of public healthcare and public education.  Instead, the relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and public services depends on: i) the public service in question, 
ii) other aspects of decentralization, iii) the degree of heterogeneity, and iv) the total level 
of public spending on healthcare and education. 
 Further work is needed to establish what effect fiscal autonomy has on the 
relationship between decentralization and the provision of public services as my results 
were largely mixed between the two indicators.  Future research should consider 
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expanding the dataset, particularly in the country dimension.  In this research, I was 
unable to compare the effects of decentralization on provision according to different 
income groups (low, middle and high) due to limited data.  Finally, the interactions 
between the panel decentralization indicators and other aspects of decentralization 
produced some interesting results.  However, I chose only three of the available 
qualitative indicators for different concepts of decentralization, and the Treisman 
dataset (2002), and a new local government dataset from Ivanyna and Shah (2014) 
provide a broader range of qualitative indicators.  Further examination of the effects of 
interactions between decentralization and qualitative indicators for electoral, 
administrative and fiscal decentralization available in these datasets could produce more 
conclusive results on the role of autonomy and administrative decentralization.  
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5. Trust in Government and Fiscal 
Decentralization 
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In this chapter I investigate whether citizens trust governments more the greater the 
degree of subnational government responsibility.  We may think of trust in government 
as depending on the ‘integrity’ of government to do what is right (Keele, 2007) and the 
‘capability’ of government to deliver an efficient public sector and a stable economy 
(Porumbescu, 2016).  Essentially, citizens will trust government more when government 
is motivated to serve citizens, and when government is competent to deliver.  In this 
chapter I consider how fiscal decentralization might affect citizen trust in government 
overall, specifically through these two channels. 
 The literature on interpersonal trust and trust in government includes research on 
the effect of trust.  Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) find that higher 
trust is conducive to stronger economic development.  One such argument is that trust 
helps to reduce transactions costs, therefore reducing overall cost and enhancing 
economic development (Dincer, 2010).  Higher trust in government can also promote 
long term investments in infrastructure, as citizens are more willing to pay for such 
investments (Oh and Hong, 2012).   
 In the most related piece of research, Ligthart and Oudheusen (2015) explain that 
the fiscal decentralization literature often focuses on the relationship between 
decentralization and economic growth, public sector efficiency, the quality of 
government, but there is little investigation of the more direct effects of fiscal 
decentralization, such as citizen satisfaction in government performance and citizen trust 
in government.  Indeed, only two pieces of empirical research examine the effects of 
government decentralization on trust in government.  Ligthart and Oudheusen examine 
the effects of revenue and expenditure decentralization49 on trust in government in a 
selection of countries between 1994 and 2007.  The relationship is positive between 
decentralization and trust in government, but there is no effect on trust in other 
institutions50.  Similar work by Dincer (2010) investigates the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and interpersonal trust in the US.  The relationship between SCG 
Revenue and SCG Expenditure is positive and robust.     
I contribute to this new area of research by expanding on the empirical work of 
Ligthart and Oudheusen (2015).  My contributions are several: 
i) I explain the link between fiscal decentralization and trust in government 
through specific channels, such as government capability at the local and 
                                                 
49 Equivalent of SCG Revenue and SCG Expenditure 
50 Parliament, political parties and civil services 
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national level, and the integrity of local government decision making.  I 
raise specific arguments regarding electoral decentralization and 
government structure that may explain how fiscal and other forms of 
decentralization could have an effect on trust. 
ii) I use the extensive dataset for fiscal and other aspects of decentralization 
outlined in chapter 2 to examine specific effects of government 
decentralization on trust.  In previous research in this area, indicators for 
SCG Revenue and SCG Expenditure were used by Ligthart and 
Oudheusen (2015)51.  I include in my research additional measures of 
electoral decentralization, government structure, and a measure of the 
proximity of local government to citizens (average local population size).  
Through interactions between these indicators and the panel 
decentralization indicators, I may establish specific effects of 
decentralization 
iii) I use two sources of data for citizen trust in government: The World Values 
Survey and the Eurobarometer dataset.  Ligthart and Oudheusen (2015) 
used the World Values Survey only.  However, as Keele (2007) explains, 
the determinants of trust over a longer period of time may not be the same 
as year on year changes.  The World Values Survey data is measured in 
blocks of years; however, the Eurobarometer dataset is available year on 
year.   
The results produced in this research demonstrate that fiscal decentralization often has a 
negative effect on trust, though the initial negative effects are sensitive to electoral 
decentralization and the number of tiers of government.  I also provide additional 
evidence that fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on trust when government 
spending is lower, perhaps benefiting poorer countries more.  Furthermore, further 
decentralization can improve citizen trust in when local governments are responsible for 
a smaller number of people.  Hence any positive effects of fiscal decentralization appear 
to be driven by the specific effect of bringing governments closer to people.  However, 
fiscal decentralization can damage trust in government through other channels, such as 
the efficiency of government, particularly in public spending. 
                                                 
51 Ligthart and Oudheusen (2015) explain data limitations restrict their research on fiscal autonomy and 
trust in government 
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This research is organised as follows.  In section 5.1 I provide a literature 
discussion on the determinants of trust, and how fiscal decentralization fits into this 
discussion.  After the key arguments are established, I outline the data that I will use in 
this research to investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and other 
concepts of decentralization, and trust in government.  In section 5.3, I provide a brief 
overview of this data, including differences in measurements of trust between two 
sources, and correlations between the key variables.  In section 5.4, I explain the various 
methods used in this empirical research to identify the strength of any relationship 
between decentralization and trust in government.  I split results into two sections.  In 
section 5.5, I provide the main body of results, concerning the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and trust in government.  In section 5.6, I provide further estimations for 
additional interactions between decentralization and: i) the quality of government, ii) total 
government expenditure (government size) and iii) the proximity of government to 
citizens.  Finally, in section 5.7 I provide a conclusion to this research and include 
suggestions for future work in this area.  
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5.1. Related Literature 
 
In this literature survey, I establish how fiscal decentralization could impact on citizen 
trust in government.  I focus on two aspects of the trust literature.  One, trust in 
government depends on the integrity of government decision making (Keele, 2007).  
Two, trust in government is a matter of confidence in the competence of government 
decision making (Porumbescu, 2016).  Various arguments in the decentralization 
literature, addressed in chapter 1, may provide some idea of how fiscal decentralization 
could affect the integrity of government decision making and how fiscal decentralization 
may affect the administrative effectiveness of government decision making at the central 
and local government level.  Despite a potential link between government 
decentralization and citizen trust in government, there has been only one study to my 
knowledge that has studied this (Ligthart and Oudheusen, 2015).   
 This literature survey is organised into two halves.  In the first half I provide a 
brief overview of the trust literature, where I refer to commonly used definitions of trust 
(in government); I summarise the benefits of higher trust on economic development and 
public sector performance; and finally, what are the determinants of trust.  In the second 
half I connect themes in the decentralization and trust literature that could explain a 
relationship between decentralization and trust, in practice.  
 
5.1.1. Trust Literature: An Overview  
 
I begin this overview by briefly defining citizen trust in government for the purposes of 
this research.  The trust literature is a sub-section of the social capital literature, which 
encompasses civic engagement, citizen participation in democratic governance and trust: 
interpersonal trust and trust in government (Putnam, 1993; Keele, 2007).  In my research 
I focus on citizen trust in government.  
 Citizen trust in government is defined in two ways.  First, citizens must trust that 
government is motivated to serve.  This argument focuses on the integrity of government 
decision making (Keele, 2007).  Simply put, do citizens have trust that government will 
do the right thing? 52 Second, citizens must have confidence that government is competent 
                                                 
52 This is the exact wording of several surveys, including the Edelman Trust Barometer, and surveys cited 
in Nye’s analysis of trust data (1997) 
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and effective (Porumbescu, 2016).  Government is seen as capable (competent) when they 
deliver on key policies, such as the efficiency of public sector spending and taxation; 
ensure economic stability and economic development (Barnes and Gill, 2000).  The 
measures of trust are often closely linked to citizen confidence (Alesina and Ferrara, 
2002), which focuses more on the degree of competence of government, rather than 
simply whether governments are motivated by a desire to serve their citizens. 
Citizens base their trust in government on a range of representatives at the national 
and local level, and in related institutions, such as parliament and the civil service 
(Mishler and Rose, 2001).  Bannister and Connolly (2011) explain that “government” 
encompasses individuals (executives) and agencies of government at the local and 
national level.  Hence the trust that citizens have in government will depend on the 
performance of local government and national government, and the decisions made by 
local and national executives.   
 
5.1.1.1. The Benefits of Trust 
 
Most of the work carried out in the trust literature has focused on the practical 
implications of trust, specifically on economic development.  Studies in this area (see 
Knack and Keefer, 1997 and Zak and Knack, 2001) find that higher trust is conducive to 
stronger economic development.  One such argument is that trust helps to reduce 
transactions costs, therefore reducing overall cost and enhancing economic development 
(Dincer, 2010).  Knack and Keefer (1997) also argue that trust helps to reduce costs, but 
for a different reason.  They explain that distrust acts as a tax on innovation, where 
businesses (entrepreneurs) allocate more of their time to monitoring (employees), and 
consequently, less time on innovation.   
 Another area of study, albeit smaller, focuses on the relationship between trust in 
government and public sector performance.  Porumbescu (2016) explains that the relevant 
literature tends to find that lower levels of trust have a negative effect on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the public sector.  One such argument is that low trust reduces citizen 
compliance with taxation and expenditure decision making of government.  Oh and Hong 
(2012) provide theoretical evidence for a positive association between citizen trust in 
government and willingness to pay (WTP).  They explain that lower trust leads citizens 
to underestimate the economic value of government expenditure, which in turn reduces 
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their willingness to contribute, in taxes, to finance public expenditure.  Governments may 
seek to improve citizen trust (or reduce distrust) by focusing on short-term expenditure 
to produce immediate benefits, rather than long term investment projects (i.e. 
infrastructure).  Lower investment in infrastructure and productivity enhancing goods and 
services may lead to weaker economic development 
The empirical research provides robust support in favour of the view that trust is 
good for growth.  Knack and Keefer (1997) identify a positive relationship between trust 
and economic growth for a selection of 29 market economies.  Dincer and Uslaner (2010) 
investigate the relationship between trust and economic and manufacturing sector growth 
in the US.  Regions where trust is higher exhibit faster economic growth.  Ahlerup et al. 
(2009) show that trust is positively associated with economic growth across a range of 
countries and that the effect is even stronger in low income countries. 
 
5.1.1.2. The Determinants of Trust 
 
Some of the arguments regarding the benefits of trust appear to be compelling, so much 
so that new research has focused on how trust may be strengthened in places where it is 
low (Warner, 2001).  Many studies have attempted to analyse the changes in trust over 
time and between countries, particularly when statistical evidence shows a consistent 
decline in trust leading up to the 21st century.  Nye (1997) provides a summary of 
statistical evidence for the decline in trust.  In the US, trust in government53 between the 
1960s and 1990s fell from 75% to 25%.  Similar declines in trust were also observed in 
Canada, Japan and most of the European continent.  Nye also identifies cross-sectional 
variations in trust, where low income countries exhibit higher levels of trust than high 
income countries.  He explains that trust is higher in low income societies because citizens 
are more willing to accept governmental authority.  Finally, Nye explains that whilst there 
has been a decline in trust over a long period of time, around this trend there have been 
fluctuations, which suggests that there are factors which can improve trust year on year.   
Keele (2007) seeks to explain the decline and trust, over shorter and longer periods 
of time.  Keele considers the factors that may explain short term (intra-year and year on 
year) fluctuations in trust, and the factors which help build trust over a longer period of 
                                                 
53 Question: do you trust the government to do the right thing? (Nye, 1997).  Government includes federal, 
state and local definitions.  The responses were consistent between the different tiers of government 
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time.  Factors which are expected to explain short term fluctuations include economic 
performance: development and stability, political corruption and quality of public 
services (Kim, 2010).  Factors which explain changes in trust over a longer period of time 
include the degree of civic engagement and the quality of institutions that enable citizen 
participation in democratic governance (Yang and Holzer, 2006; Keele, 2007).  In this 
brief overview I consider a selection of these factors that have been covered in the 
literature. 
First of all, economic outcomes such as growth, unemployment and inflation, are 
expected to have an effect on citizen trust in government.  Brehm and Rahn (1997) find 
that changes in trust over time typically follow economic upturns and downturns.  Citrin 
and Green (1986) observe the close link between other economic outcomes, such as 
inflation and unemployment (measured collectively in the Misery Index) and citizen’s 
confidence in the government.  Trust will also depend on the distribution of income 
(individual circumstance).  Zak and Knack (2003) explain why income distribution may 
explain some of the variations in trust, alongside the macroeconomic variables above.  
They explain that those earning lower wages are more sensitive to income changes, and 
therefore more sensitive to economic instability.  Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008) provide 
empirical evidence that individual earnings and inequality have a significant effect on 
trust.  Income distribution (Gini coefficient) has also been used as a control in various 
studies on trust (interpersonal and government) (see Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and 
Knack, 2001; Alesina and Ferrara, 2002).   
Second, citizen trust in government may also depend on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government spending.  Citizens could perceive higher taxation and 
spending as a sign of inefficient government, which would lead to lower trust.  
Alternatively, higher taxes may indicate that the government is seeking to maximise 
rents54.  There is some evidence that higher taxes are associated with lower trust and 
greater dissatisfaction.  Nye (1997) observes a strong link between survey responses on 
government spending and taxation, and trust in government.  When respondents were 
asked why they do not trust their government, 80% responded saying they believe 
government is wasteful and inefficient, spending on the wrong things.  Keele (2007) 
constructs a trust indicator and identifies a strong positive correlation between citizens’ 
view of wasteful expenditure and trust in government.  Bjørnskov et al. (2007) examine 
                                                 
54 The ‘Leviathan’ hypothesis (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), see Chapter 1, sub-section 1.2.3 (page 17)  
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the effects of government spending on citizen satisfaction (in life), and provide evidence 
to support the theory that government spending is negatively associated with satisfaction.  
I expect their arguments to be relevant to citizen trust, as there is a strong link between 
trust and satisfaction in their empirics.  Whatever the cause of higher taxes, there is good 
reason to expect that higher taxes might be negatively associated with citizen trust in 
government. 
Third, citizens’ view of the quality of their government is expected to have a 
strong effect on citizen trust in government.  The perception that public funds are being 
used for private ends is expected to have a strong negative effect on citizen trust in 
government (Jang et al., 2015).  Corruption will matter to the public on how they assess 
the functioning of government in general (Easton, 1965).  Corruption also means there 
are obstacles to accountable government and citizen participation in government decision 
making (Dahl, 1971; Sun and Wang, 2012).  The empirical evidence on corruption and 
trust in government appears to justify the expectations in the literature of a negative effect 
of corruption on trust.  Chang and Chu (2006) provide empirical evidence that the 
perception of corruption has a negative effect on trust in a selection of Asian countries.  
Della Porta (2000) using Eurobarometer data, find a negative relationship between the 
perception of corruption and trust in Italy, France and Germany.  Seligson (2002) observe 
the same relationship in Latin America countries.  Anderson and Tverdova (2003), using 
ISSP (International Social Survey Program) data, showed that corruption had a negative 
effect on trust in civil servants.  Clausen et al. (2011), using Gallop World Poll data, show 
that confidence in military, judicial system and national government is negatively affected 
by corruption. 
 
5.1.2. Fiscal Decentralization and Trust in Government 
 
The connection between the decentralization of governments and citizen trust in 
government has received only limited attention in the literature.  Warner (2001) and 
Bannister and Connolly (2011) consider fiscal decentralization as a way to build trust at 
the local level, specifically through increased citizen participation in government decision 
making.  Citizen participation in democratic governance is increasingly important as the 
role of subnational governments is expanding to cover the delivery of basic and essential 
public services, in education and healthcare, and social welfare (Weitz-Shapiro, 2008).  
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Walker and Andrews (2015) observe that local governments are considered to be the 
public face of the state, and therefore by strengthening ties between local government and 
local citizens, this could potentially improve citizen trust in government overall.   
 In this literature review I consider how fiscal decentralization could affect trust in 
government according to the definition of trust provided at the beginning of this literature 
survey.  Specifically, I consider how fiscal decentralization could improve the integrity 
of government decision making (1.2.1) and why fiscal decentralization may improve or 
reduce the capability of governments to deliver an efficiency and effective public sector 
(1.2.2) 
  
5.1.2.1. Fiscal Decentralization, Government Capability and Trust 
in Government 
 
On the one hand, local governments may be more effective at providing goods and 
services to the local area (Oates, 1972).  Local government may possess an advantage 
over central governments that they can focus on local demands and are better placed to 
know what those demands are (Tanzi, 1996).  On the other hand, local governments may 
lack the resources (human, financial and technical) to provide for local demands (see 
Evans, 1996; Boadway and Shah, 2009).  
 Supporters argue that fiscal decentralization brings governments closer to citizens 
enabling governments to better address local needs (Musgrave, 1983; Faguet, 2014).  
Local governments are better able to address local needs because they know what they 
are (Tanzi, 1996).  Therefore, if the demands for public goods and services differ from 
one subset of the population to the next, local governments will be better able to allocate 
expenditure according to demands, compared with a centralized administration that may 
tend towards a more regionally-uniform public policy (Oates, 1972).  By increasing the 
role of local governments, local citizens are encouraged to participate in democratic 
governance at the local level, and in doing so, express their demands to government more 
effectively (Bratton, 2012).   
 Fiscal decentralization could also lead to lower taxes.  Bjørnskov et al. (2008) find 
that satisfaction is negatively associated with government size (taxes).  If fiscal 
decentralization reduces taxes, then this could also boost citizen trust in government.  
Oates (1972) and Tiebout (1956) explain that fiscal decentralization reduces the cost of 
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providing public goods and services to the minimum point along the cost curve.  Citizens 
may observe a fall in taxes, or an increase in government output for the taxes they pay. 
 
On the other hand, detractors argue that local governments may simply be unable to 
address local need due to resource constraints (fiscal, human, technical), or local 
governments may face incentives to address some local needs, but not others.   
First, local governments may lack the capability to address local demands.  Faguet 
(2004) points out that in order for government to be responsive, there needs to be 
sufficient resources to provide for citizen demands in the local area.  Rodden and Rose-
Ackerman (1997) argue that the benefits of centralization, such as economies of scale and 
scope, may outweigh the benefits of decentralization in poorer countries, where tax 
resources are more limited.  Fiscal decentralization could also risk reducing minimum 
standards of public services (Garcia-Valinas, 2005).  Citizens may feel that despite the 
advantages of local government, ultimately they are not getting value for their taxes from 
local government that they would get from a robust central government (Evans, 1996).   
Second, fiscal decentralization may actually change the composition of 
expenditure in a way that is undesirable to citizens, who may then have a negative view 
of the capability of government.  Keen and Marchand (1997) provide evidence that shift 
from parks, recreational facilities and social services, to infrastructure and productivity-
enhancing investments.  As a consequence, fewer resources may go to essential non-
productive public goods, which could reduce trust in government for two reasons.  The 
allocation of spending to public goods and services may be inefficient, thereby reducing 
the capability of government at the local level, and reducing trust in government overall.   
 Third, fiscal decentralization could lead to inequality in local government 
performance.  For example, in wealthier areas of the country, local governments will have 
greater resources (Boadway and Shah, 2009).  Hence, some local governments may be 
better able to respond to local citizens than national government, but for other local 
governments, the opposite may be true.  On a similar point, Cai and Treisman (2005) 
show how areas that have better quality infrastructure, more human capital, and other 
advantages, could observe higher levels of growth.  If economic performance has an effect 
on trust in government, then a decentralized government may lead to inter-regional 
differences in trust.   
 All of these arguments suggest that fiscal decentralization could be bad for the 
poor (Prud’homme, 1995).  This is particularly important if the poorest have a lower 
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degree of trust in government55.  If fiscal decentralization leads to lower spending on 
welfare (Hoyt, 1991; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2004) and if fiscal decentralization leads to 
inter-regional inequality then the poorest may be negatively affected by the 
decentralization of governments.   The most effective way to increase trust may be to help 
the poorest.  Fiscal decentralization could reduce citizen trust in government for the 
poorest, or at least fail to improve trust.  However, it is important to note that my own 
evidence in chapter 3 suggests that fiscal decentralization does not necessarily harm the 
poorest in society.  Chu and Yang (2012) also note that fiscal decentralization can enhance 
economic growth because of the arguments above, which could ultimately improve the 
public’s opinion of government.   
 
Overall, fiscal decentralization could increase the responsiveness of government to 
citizen needs, thereby improving links between citizens and government and increase 
trust.  However, there is also the risk that fiscal decentralization could reduce the 
efficiency of the public sector, reduce the quality of public services, and lead to inter-
regional inequality – all of which will reduce the ability of governments to help the 
poorest, who in turn have the lowest degree of trust in government.   
 
5.1.2.2. Fiscal Decentralization, Government Integrity and Trust in 
Government 
 
Fiscal decentralization could also improve citizen trust in government by making 
government more accountable to local citizens, thereby improving government integrity.   
 Supporters argue that decentralization can improve the accountability of local 
government decision making.  Tabellini (2000) argues that fiscal decentralization 
empowers citizens to hold local politicians to account, specifically by enabling citizens 
to compare and contrast the performance of local government. Besley and Case (1995) 
demonstrates how yardstick competition between local governments forces government 
officials to serve their citizens, rather than themselves.  Boadway and Shah (2009) explain 
that local citizens are better able to monitor the activities of local governments, which 
makes it harder for local governments to pursue their own interests at the cost of their 
citizens.   
                                                 
55 See Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008) for empirical evidence that income distribution has an effect on trust. 
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 Fiscal decentralization also strengthens the accountability of government through 
local government decision making.  Local politicians have a specific remit to attend to 
local issues, hence can be judged and held to account for the decisions they make 
concerning one area of the country (Kyriacou and Roca-Sagales, 2011).  As Seabright 
(1996) demonstrates, local governments must satisfy local citizens, but central 
governments must satisfy only a sufficient number of local regions.  Essentially, fiscal 
decentralization can improve the integrity of government decision making as citizens are 
empowered to hold local autonomous governments to account better than they would be 
able to a central government. 
 There is evidence that local governments do address local needs more effectively 
than the central government.  Bratton (2012) provides evidence that in practice, local 
governments (local leaders) are more responsive than national government and national 
leaders.  First, Bratton identifies a more positive view of local councillors in African 
countries.  In a survey, citizens were asked whether local representatives (councillors) or 
national representatives were more responsive56, and almost all responses were more 
favourable with regards to the local representatives.  Faguet (2004) examines the effects 
of decentralization reform in Bolivia in 1994 on expenditure decision making of 
government.  After the reforms in 1994, government allocated more expenditure 
according to need.  In areas of the country where literacy rates are lower, decentralization 
led to an increase in education spending in those areas.  Similar effects were observed for 
spending on sanitation, urban development and water management.  Faguet’s evidence 
may indicate greater local government capability, or greater responsiveness.  Either way, 
local governments appear to satisfy local needs more.   
 Another reason why fiscal decentralization may improve trust in government is 
that it may simply generate a perception of improved government responsiveness.  Faguet 
(2014) argues that the decentralization of fiscal powers and decision making is intended 
to improve civic participation, by moving from a “hierarchical, bureaucratic mechanism 
of top-down management to a system of nested self-governments characterized by 
participation and cooperation” (page 2).  In contrast, further centralization could be 
perceived as self-serving: taking power from more accountable, local governments, and 
instead increase the powers and control of a distant, centralized administration (Weitz-
Shapiro, 2008).   
                                                 
56 Responsive defined as the length of time that government representatives at different tiers of governments 
listen to their citizens (page 518, table 2) 
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Detractors argue that fiscal decentralization does not necessarily improve local 
government integrity, and presents certain risks and challenges, specifically in 
implementation of fiscal decentralization. 
First, for fiscal decentralization to improve accountability, local executives must 
be directly elected by.  When explaining the link between fiscal decentralization and the 
accountability of local government, Faguet (2014) assumes that fiscal decentralization 
means locally elected governments.  As explained above, if local governments and 
representatives are elected directly by the local constituency, they then face incentives to 
improve local government performance (increasing likelihood of re-election).  However, 
if local executives are appointed by central government, then they are accountable to 
central government.  However, the central appointments of local executives create a 
principal-agent problem.  Central government would need to monitor the performance of 
local executives, whilst citizens can only hold the central government to account.  Bratton 
(2012) states this point specifically, saying that the lack of political accountability of local 
officials leads to dissatisfaction with service delivery, which in turn would lead to lower 
citizen trust in government.   
 Second, in order for citizens to hold government to account they must be clear 
about the responsibilities that are assigned to different tiers of government.  However, 
Treisman (2002, 2008) shows that some government structures are more complicated than 
others, containing more tiers of government, and that the clear assignment of decision 
making between the different tiers of government becomes increasingly important.  
Bratton (2012) explains that citizens are often uncertain about the roles of central, 
subnational and local government, citing an example where citizens in African countries 
over-estimated the role of local governments, specifically regarding income tax.  In the 
decentralization literature, a few academics have raised the issue of complex government 
structures on the relationship between decentralization and government accountability.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) explain that more complex government structures also make 
it harder to hold government officials to account, as citizens are simply unsure who is 
responsible.  Fukasaku and de Mello (1999) explain that decentralization could lead to 
more corruption if expenditure and revenue functions are not clearly assigned between 
the different tiers of government.  Treisman (2002) also examines the effect of 
complicated government structures on various dependent variables for the quality of 
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government, and concludes that governments with more tiers lead to increased levels of 
corruption.   
Third, even if local government executives are elected at the local level and are 
clearly assigned, there is still the risk that local governments may not serve the local 
citizens.  Seabright (1996) shows that when the welfare of the local politician depends on 
being re-elected they will seek to maximise their own welfare by serving local citizens 
and increasing the probability of being re-elected to office.  However, local governments 
are closer to citizens, which also include wealthy elites, who may seek to capture 
governments at the local level (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996).  Elites may provide 
incentives for local politicians to serve a small group of people in the local area.      
  The empirical research in the area of fiscal decentralization and government 
accountability often examines the effects of fiscal decentralization on corruption.  Fisman 
and Gatti (2002) and Altunbas and Thornton (2011) both provide positive relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and the perception of corruption, though in the case of the 
latter, local government autonomy and vertical administration appear to mitigate against 
the initial positive effects.  Treisman (2000) observes mixed results between 
decentralization and corruption, depending on the chosen indicator of decentralization.  
Specifically, the number of tiers in a government structure has a negative effect on the 
quality of government (i.e. increasing corruption).     
 
5.2. Data Definitions 
 
In this section I outline the indicators for citizen trust in government and institutions, the 
quantitative and qualitative indicators of fiscal decentralization, and the selection of 
control variables.  At the end of this section I provide a full list of the variables used in 
this research. 
 
5.2.1. Citizen Trust in Government Indicators 
 
In order to measure citizen trust in government I use measures of trust in government and 
institutions from two datasets.  The first set of data is from the World Values Survey.  The 
World Values Survey data is the most commonly used dataset for research on the trust in 
government (Ligthart and Oudheusden, 2015), but also interpersonal trust as well (see 
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Knack and Keefer, 1997).    The original data is available per individual response to the 
survey.  Each participant is asked how much confidence they have in government and 
other institutions57.  I interpret citizen confidence in organizations as a representation of 
citizen trust in institutions (see Alesina and Ferrara, 2002; Ligthart and Oudheusen, 
2015).  After excluding all “don’t know” responses from the survey, I produced a simple 
scale from 0-3, where 0 represents no confidence, and 3 represents a great deal of 
confidence. I constructed aggregated data (national level) as an average of all responses58 
for each period of time that data is available.  The World Values Survey data comes in 
waves of between 4 and 6 years.  Between 1990 and 2009 there are four waves: 1990-
1994 (wave 1), 1995-1998 (wave 2), 1999-2004 (wave 3) and 2005-2009 (wave 4).   
The country level data from the World Values Survey contains three indicators 
covering a maximum a 45 countries between 1990 and 2009.  The three indicators are: i) 
trust in national government, ii) trust in national government, parliament, civil service 
and political parties (averaged across the four indicators)59, and iii) public mood (average 
trust in church, armed forces, press and television) 
 The main limitation of the World Values Survey is that data is not available 
annually.  Instead, the data which is available in waves of 4-6 years reflects longer term 
changes in trust in government, in related institutions, and public mood.  Therefore, data 
in waves is not suitable for examining short term changes in trust (i.e. year on year) and 
consequently, the factors that explain year on year changes in trust.  For this reason, I 
include an additional dataset from the Eurobarometer trust survey.  The Eurobarometer 
dataset has been used previously by Zak and Knack’s (2001) in their empirical research 
on trust and economic growth. 
The question in the Eurobarometer survey is slightly different to that of the World 
Values Survey.  Participants were asked whether they trust government and other 
institutions60.  There were three possible responses: yes, no or don’t know.  After 
removing the “don’t know” responses, I produced aggregated data calculated as the 
percentage of the population who gave a positive (yes) response to the question.  Hence 
                                                 
57 For the exact wording of the questions in each survey, see Appendix A data definitions 
58 The average number of responses per single observation is 1479, with a minimum of 650 and a maximum 
of 3025.   
59 Mishler and Rose (2001) define trust as the average of trust in political parties, parliament, military and 
other institutions.  My average is for national government, parliament, civil service and political parties.  
Data is not always complete for each country, each wave.  The average is from at least 2 variables.   
60 Respondents could also reply “don’t know”, as in the World Values Survey.  I removed these responses 
from the individual level data, and construct aggregated (national) data based on trust and do not trust 
responses 
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the data does not measure the degree of trust people have in government, but the 
proportion of the population who trust their government.     
Data is available yearly61 from 2003 and 2009 (7 years in total).  I use two 
indicators: i) trust in government and ii) public mood (average trust in television, armed 
forces, religion and business).  The dataset covers 26 countries.  For some countries data 
is not available for the entire time period – the total number of observations in the panel 
data is 168 (roughly 6.22 observations per country).  Trust in government is complete for 
the entire dataset, but there are some gaps in the public mood data.  
I also examined a third dataset from the Edelman Trust Barometer publications.  
The data is similar to the Eurobarometer Survey, measuring positive responses to a typical 
question of trust in government decision making62.  However, the quantity of data 
available before 2010 is rather limited and the two datasets provided very contrasting 
views of the level and changes in trust over time.  For example, according to the 
Eurobarometer dataset, trust in France between 2007 and 2008 declined by 30%.  
However, according to the Edelman dataset, trust actually rose in France over the same 
period.  In Poland, between 2007 and 2008, trust rose by 28% in the Eurobarometer 
dataset, but declined by 43.5% in the Edelman dataset.  There are several reasons why 
these two sources of trust data, which intend to measure the same thing, produce such 
contrasting results.  One possible reason may be timing, and that within the year a 
significant event may have occurred that affected citizen trust in government be a 
substantial amount.  A second reason may be that different samples of people asked in 
these surveys have very different views of government.  The World Value Survey and 
Eurobarometer data is based on samples containing a wide range of people.  On the other 
hand, the Edelman Trust Barometer collected data from a specific group of people: more 
educated and wealthier63.  Though it may be worthwhile to examine differences in trust 
and the factors of trust between different income groups, in this research the limited 
quantity of data provided no prospect of a valuable analysis.  Instead I focus my research 
                                                 
61 In some cases, it is available bi-annually.  I calculate the average across the two observations to produce 
annual data for the entire dataset 
62 The wording of the question and the possible responses are different to the Eurobarometer dataset (see 
appendix for full details).  However, the publication provides country level data as a percentage of positive 
responses, which is similar to that of the Eurobarometer dataset 
63 Edelman Trust Barometer state that respondents are what are referred to as ‘elites’.  Respondents are 
between 25 and 4 year olds, college educated, with household income in top quartile, and reported 
significant interest in/engagement in media, business news and policy affairs 
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on the two more common datasets to examine changes in trust for a wider range of people 
who participated in those surveys.   
A complete list of the countries covered in this research is available in appendix 
D.  Furthermore, cross-sectional data for the trust indicators is available in appendices E 
(World Values Survey) and F (Eurobarometer and Edelman Barometer). 
 
5.2.2. Decentralization Indicators 
 
In this chapter I include a different selection of decentralization indicators to capture 
important effects.  I include SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG Expenditure share 
to capture share of subnational government activity and subnational government 
autonomy.  In addition to panel decentralization indicators, I also include some of the 
qualitative indicators of other concepts of decentralization.  I include legislative 
decentralization and electoral decentralization indicators from previous chapters.  I also 
include an indicator for the number of tiers of government (chapter 2, section 2.3.4).  The 
original data in Treisman’s (2008) decentralization dataset describes the number of 
government tiers for a range of countries.  In the selection of countries covered in this 
empirical research, Slovenia has the least complex government, with two tiers of 
government (central and local).  India and China have the most complex government 
structure, each with five tiers of government.  Using Treisman’s original data for the 
number of tiers of government, I construct a dummy variable to split the same between 
those countries with 3 or fewer tiers of government, and those countries with 4 or more 
tiers of government.  Finally, I include local government population size to capture the 
degree of local government responsiveness to local citizens.   
In initial estimates I examined the effect of federal constitution (used in previous 
chapters) and local government size (average area size of local government).  However, 
I chose not to include these indicators in the final results after the estimations were found 
to be largely insignificant. 
 
5.2.3. Control Variables 
 
I include a selection of control variables based on the relevant literature and previous 
empirical research in this area.  The first control is public mood, which captures the degree 
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of trust the public have in other organisations.  Ligthart and Oudheusen (2015) in the most 
comparable research to my own also control for trust in other organisations from the 
World Values Dataset.  The Eurobarometer dataset also contains information on trust in 
other organisations.   
The remaining controls used in this empirical research are based on the literature 
themes and previous empirical research on interpersonal trust and trust in government.  I 
control for economic development and stability: income (logarithm of real GDP/capita), 
growth (annual growth rate of GDP) and unemployment (share of labour force that are 
unemployed).  I initially included a control for inflation to capture economic stability, 
alongside unemployment (i.e. the Misery index utilised in Citrin and Green, 1986), 
however results were almost always insignificant across a number of specifications.  I 
control for government size (general government expenditure as a % of GDP) (see 
Bjørnskov et al., 2007) and the quality of government (Corruption Perception Index), 
used in previous chapters.  Finally, I control for heterogeneity (ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, from Alesina, et al., 2003), previously incorporated in research on 
interpersonal trust (see Alesina and Ferrara, 2002; Gustavsson and Jordahl, 2008).  I also 
included a control for income inequality (GINI coefficient), using the same data from 
chapter 3.  Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008) and Dincer (2010) also included the GINI 
coefficient in their research.  However, the data had many gaps, and despite some 
significance in a selection of regressions featuring different decentralization indicators, 
different controls and the different econometrics techniques (section 5.4), the inclusion 
of inequality did not change the significance of the decentralization indicators in those 
regressions.  The gaps in the data had a significant effect on the power of the results, 
particularly for World Values Survey.  Hence I omitted inequality from the empirics in 
section 5.5.  Finally, I control for institutional democracy.  The indicator from the 
POLITY IV datasets computes the difference between scores applied to countries on the 
strength of their democracy and autocracy indicators.  This variable has been previously 
used in Ljunge (2014) to examine the relationship between trust and the strength of 
democracy.  This research concluded stronger democratic political institutions were 
positively associated with trust. 
 
A complete list of the indicators used in this research is provided in table 49 below.  I 
include my expectations of the relationship between trust and the control variables based 
on the arguments presented in the literature review in chapter 1.  
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Table 49: List of Control Variables 
Determinant of Poverty Expected Coefficient Sign 
(for controls and interactions) 
Income (logarithm of real GDP per capita) Positive 
Economic Growth (annual growth in nominal GDP 
per capita) 
Positive 
Unemployment (Percentage of work force currently 
unemployed) 
Negative 
Government Expenditure (general government 
expenditure as a % of GDP) 
Negative 
Governance (corruption perception index) Positive 
Heterogeneity (ethnolinguistic fractionalization index) Negative 
Democracy (institutional democracy score) Positive 
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5.3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  
In this section I provide a few descriptive statistics for the datasets I use in this research.  
As in previous chapters, I include statistics for the cross-sectional datasets.  In contrast to 
the previous research I measure the dependent variable with more than one source of data.  
I provide descriptive statistics for the World Values Survey dataset and the 
Eurobarometer Trust dataset.  The datasets contrast in the measurement of trust and the 
coverage (country and time period), hence it is important to identify differences in the 
features of the dataset prior to empirical examination.  I also provide pairwise correlation 
coefficients for the key variables in Eurobarometer dataset 
 
5.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics are for the cross-sectional datasets from the World Values 
Survey (table 50) and the Eurobarometer Survey (table 51).     
 
5.3.1.1. Trust in Government, Government related Institutions and 
General Trust  
 
World Values Survey: 
In table 50, panel A, trust in government is only slightly above “a little bit of confidence”, 
at a value of 1.366.  The maximum confidence is 2.426 (Jordan), which represents 
between a lot and a great deal of confidence.  In contrast, South American countries 
(Argentina and Peru) observe the lowest degree of confidence in government – average 
confidence is below 1, representing very little confidence overall.  Most countries observe 
lower citizen confidence than the average across the sample.   
 Public mood is more positive.  The confidence that citizens have in the church, 
armed forces and media is greater than confidence in government.  Argentina still 
observes the lowest degree of confidence, whilst public mood is lower in high income 
European countries.  Netherlands, France, United Kingdom and Sweden all have lower 
than the average degree of general trust.  Public mood is most positive in Asian countries, 
China and India, and African countries, South Africa and Morocco.   
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Eurobarometer Survey 
The Eurobarometer survey responses also demonstrate the limited trust that citizens have 
in government.  In the majority of countries, fewer participants would trust their 
government than those that did not – most countries observe an aggregate level value of 
less than 0.5 in the Eurobarometer dataset.  Citizens in Poland have the lowest trust in 
government across the entire dataset, at 18.5% positive responses.  At the other end of the 
range, the wealthiest country in the sample, Luxembourg ($74132.06 average real 
income) has the highest positive response rate of 71.2%.  As with the World Values 
Survey data, trust in general is higher than trust in government.  The lowest positive 
response rate is 55% (Slovenia), which is higher than the average trust in government.  
The range and standard deviation of the public mood indicator is considerably smaller 
than trust in government.  The difference in the summary statistics between the two trust 
indicators for the Eurobarometer dataset suggest that there is greater variation in citizen 
trust in government, than trust overall (public mood).   
 
5.3.1.2. Decentralization and Controls 
 
The decentralization data is similar to previous datasets used in this research, though there 
are some interesting differences between the two cross-sectional samples in table 50 and 
table 51.  First, SCG revenue is greater than SCG expenditure in both datasets.  Only 7 of 
45 countries observe higher SCG expenditure than SCG revenue in the World Values 
Survey dataset, and 3 of 27 in the Eurobarometer dataset.  Second, there is a significant 
difference between the measures of SCG revenue and SCG expenditure decentralization, 
and the measure of fiscal autonomy in SCG autonomous expenditure decentralization.  
This is a feature of previous studies, with Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) identifying that 
traditional measures of decentralization (SCG revenue/SCG expenditure) overestimate 
the degree of fiscal decentralization.  When comparing the datasets, it is noticeable that 
decentralization is higher in the WVS dataset.  This is due to the inclusion of federal 
countries (USA and Canada) in the WVS dataset, which observe some of the highest 
levels of decentralization. 
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Table 50: Descriptive Statistics: World Values Survey (cross-sectional dataset)   
Panel A: Trust 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Trust in Government 44 1.366 0.346 0.907 2.426 
Trust in Government and 
Institutions 45 1.237 0.271 0.696 2.235 
Public Mood 45 1.531 0.258 0.696 2.279 
 
Panel B: Decentralization 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
SCG Revenue 45 28.24 13.87 6.41 66.05 
SCG Expenditure 44 25.17 12.77 3.42 60.68 
SCG Autonomous Expenditure 41 17.53 10.74 0.95 46.92 
Average Population (Local 
Government) 45 46.0765 74.914 1.59603 381.986 
Average Size (Local Government) 45 0.08001 0.07486 0.01365 0.39416 
 
Panel C: Selection of Covariates 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Real GDP/capita 44 16728 12862 2123.641 42462 
Economic Growth 45 3.387 2.469 -2.825 11.419 
Unemployment 41 9.237 4.455 3.600 23.793 
Government Expenditure 45 17.764 4.081 10.772 25.176 
Governance (Corruption 
Perception) 36 5.596 2.426 2.359 9.460 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 45 0.335 0.193 0.063 0.808 
 
Table 51: Descriptive Statistics: Eurobarometer Survey (cross-sectional dataset)   
Panel A: Trust 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Trust in Government 27 40.485 14.204 18.500 71.200 
Public Trust 27 63.148 5.051 55.300 73.800 
 
Panel B: Decentralization 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
SCG Revenue 27 23.575 11.104 1.533 46.947 
SCG Expenditure 26 21.425 11.346 1.230 48.844 
SCG Autonomous Expenditure 24 11.980 7.828 0.280 29.236 
Average Population (Local 
Government) 27 36.227 73.385 1.596 381.986 
Average Size (Local Government) 27 0.048 0.037 0.008 0.144 
 
Panel C: Selection of Covariates 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Real GDP/capita 27 27879 13505 74132 6477 
Economic Growth 27 2.626 1.777 -0.053 7.182 
Unemployment 27 8.693 5.691 3.743 34.350 
Government Expenditure 27 19.529 2.416 15.913 25.175 
Governance (Corruption 
Perception) 27 6.271 1.989 3.300 9.500 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 27 0.22835 0.165568 0.033269 0.587096 
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In addition to the tax and expenditure decentralization indicators, I include descriptive 
statistics for the average size of local government, with respect to population (per 1000s) 
and area size (per 1000 square kilometres).  There are large variations in population and 
area size within this dataset. 
First, the average number of people local governments are responsible for is 
46,000 (WVS) and 36,000 (Eurobarometer).  The average size of the local government 
area is 0.080 (WVS) and 0.048 (Eurobarometer).  Second, the average size of local 
government is much smaller in the European dataset (Eurobarometer), than in the World 
dataset (World Values Survey).  This is also the case in population size of local 
governments.  Third, there is a large range of local government sizes, in both respect, in 
the World Values Survey sample.  The largest local government size (Australia, 394 
square kilometres) is just under 300 times larger than the smallest (India, 13.7 square 
kilometres), whilst the largest average population count at the local government level is 
in the United Kingdom (380,000)64.  In contrast, many countries have a much smaller 
population size at the local government level – 10 (WVS) and 11 (Eurobarometer) 
countries observe fewer than 10,000 people on average.  Fourth, and unsurprising given 
the largest sizes above, there is a positive skew in the distribution of countries in both 
datasets.  In the World Values Survey 27 out of the 45 countries observe smaller local 
government size than the sample average.  There are, however, only two outliers in the 
WVS dataset (Australia and South Africa).  In the Eurobarometer dataset the countries 
are more clustered.  18 out of 27 countries observe smaller local government size than the 
average, but there are no outliers.  In terms of population, there are two outliers in WVS 
(United Kingdom and South Africa) and one outlier in Eurobarometer (United Kingdom) 
Finally, the descriptive statistics for the control variables in panel C demonstrate 
variations between and within the samples.  For example, the Eurobarometer dataset 
contains European countries, all of which are in the middle to high income category.  
Within this sample, countries are characterized by economic stability – lower 
unemployment and steady, lower average growth.  In the World Values Survey, countries 
from South America, such as Argentina and Brazil, observe higher levels of 
unemployment, which provides a greater range of observations in the World Values 
                                                 
64 The figure, 381,000 per local government is significantly higher than the next largest (105,000 in 
Denmark).  I verified the figure in the Ivanyna and Shah (2014) dataset and corresponding paper.  When 
producing estimates later on I tested the effect of local government population size with and without the 
United Kingdom.  The results were consistent in sign and significance, though the magnitude of the effects 
did change.   
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Survey dataset.  Real income also observes large variations within the datasets, and 
between them, as WVS countries has lower incomes, but faster growth.  Similar 
differences appear in the other control variables.  Government expenditure and quality of 
government is greater in the Eurobarometer dataset.  These variations could explain the 
differences in the trust indicators between the two samples, and the variation within the 
samples could explain variations in trust between countries. 
 
5.3.2. Correlations 
 
In tables 52 and 53 I provide the pairwise correlation coefficients for the Eurobarometer 
and World Values Survey dataset.  The correlation coefficients are based on the panel 
datasets.  The Eurobarometer data contains a larger number of observations, but covers a 
narrower range of countries.  On the other hand, the World Value Survey data covers 
fewer observations, but a wider range of countries. 
 There are several interesting observations.  First, public mood is positively 
correlated with trust in government.  The size of the coefficient is fairly similar between 
the two datasets, just over 0.5.  This size of this coefficient suggests that whilst public 
mood is aligned with trust in government to an extent, trust in government may be driven 
by other factors than those driving the general mood of the public.  Second, in the 
Eurobarometer data (table 52), each of the decentralization indicators is positively 
correlated with government trust.  SCG expenditure is also positively correlated with 
public mood.  Third, the local government population size is positively associated with 
trust in the World Values Survey (table 53).  This is a rather odd finding, as this suggests 
the trust in government is higher when the population size of the local jurisdiction is 
increasing.  However, there is no association in the Eurobarometer dataset.  Fourth, the 
correlation between decentralization and local government area and population size 
provide some interesting observations.  In the Eurobarometer data local government area 
is positively correlated with the decentralization indicators.  This means that 
decentralization of revenue and expenditure is greater when local governments cover a 
larger area of land.  In the World Values Survey data local government population size is 
negatively correlated with each of the decentralization indicators.  Together, this suggests 
that subnational governments account for more revenue and expenditure (as a proportion 
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of total government revenue and expenditure) when local governments are responsible 
for a larger area of land and a smaller number of people (i.e. smaller population density).   
Of the control variables, between the two datasets there are some significant 
correlations with trust in government.  Real income has a strong positive correlation with 
trust in government in both datasets, economic growth also shares a positive correlation 
in the World Values Survey dataset (table 53), whilst unemployment shares a strong 
negative correlation in the Eurobarometer dataset (table 52).   Government spending also 
shares no correlation with trust in government, but quality of government does share a 
positive correlation with trust in government (table 52).  Finally, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization is positively correlated with trust.  This is a surprising result.  Though 
correlation does not indicate causality, it is interesting that countries with higher levels of 
fractionalization also have higher trust. 
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Table 52: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients (Eurobarometer Trust Dataset)  
 Trust in 
Gov’t 
Public 
Mood 
SCG 
Revenue 
SCG 
Expenditure 
SCG 
Autonomous 
Expenditure 
Real 
Income 
Growth Unemploy. Gov’t 
Exp. 
Corruption Ethno- 
linguistic 
 LG Area 
LG 
Pop 
Trust in 
Gov’t 
1.000                         
Public 
Mood 
0.3388*** 1.000                       
SCG Rev. 0.1391* 0.092 1.000                     
SCG Exp. 0.188** 0.1788** 0.9851*** 1.000                   
SCG Aut. 
Exp. 
0.198** 0.103 0.8470*** 0.8631*** 1.000                 
Real Income 0.5468*** 0.004 0.240*** 0.2083*** 0.1496* 1.000               
Growth 0.089 0.061 -0.104 -0.065 -0.017 -0.271*** 1.000             
Unempl. -0.397*** -0.1510* -0.078 -0.087 0.051 -0.491*** -0.077 1.000           
Gov’t Exp. 
0.014 -0.066 0.3183*** 0.2670*** 0.066 0.1935** 
-
0.3848*** 
-0.080 1.000         
Corruption 
0.5717*** 0.1866** 0.4902*** 0.4822*** 0.3612*** 0.7780*** -0.1758** 
-
0.4586*** 
0.4245*** 1.000       
Ethno- 
linguistic 
0.5113*** 0.5132*** -0.013 -0.040 -0.089 -0.427*** 0.181 0.245 -0.348*** -0.2426* 1.000     
Local 
Government 
Population 
-0.085 0.120 0.3357*** 0.2742*** 0.053 -0.052 0.080 -0.029 0.2033*** 0.1985*** 0.093 1.000   
Statistical significance of the pairwise correlation coefficients: 0.10 (*), 0.05 (**), 0.01 (***) 
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Table 53: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients (World Values Survey Trust Dataset) 
 
Trust in 
Gov’t 
Trust in 
Gov't (+) 
Public 
Mood SCG Rev. 
SCG 
Exp. 
SCG Aut. 
Exp. 
Real 
Income Growth Unemp. Gov’t Exp. Corrupt. 
Ethno- 
ling. LG Area 
LG 
Pop 
Trust in 
Gov’t 1.0000              
Trust in 
Gov't (+) 0.879*** 1.0000             
Public 
Mood 0.542*** 
  
0.514*** 1.0000            
SCG Rev. -0.014 0.174 -0.069 1.0000           
SCG Exp. -0.089 0.085 -0.140 0.984*** 1.0000          
SCG Aut. 
Exp. 0.080 0.140 -0.091 0.826*** 0.857***  1.0000         
Real 
Income 0.196* -0.102 
-
0.508*** 0.166 0.277**  0.354*** 1.0000        
Growth 0.392*** 0.257** 0.355*** -0.112 -0.203* -0.090 -0.270** 1.0000       
Unemp. 0.038 -0.040 0.165 -0.037 -0.036 -0.234* -0.234* 0.054 1.0000      
Gov’t Exp. -0.164 -0.011 -0.145 -0.070 -0.031 -0.148 0.340*** -0.30*** 0.222* 1.0000     
Corrupt. 0.050 0.164 -0.42*** 0.214* 0.350***  0.382*** 0.796*** -0.309** -0.28** 0.3495*** 1.0000    
Ethno- ling. 0.511*** 0.467*** 0.513*** -0.013 -0.040 -0.089 -0.43*** 0.181 0.245* -0.358*** -0.243* 1.0000   
LG Area 0.140 0.022 -0.023 -0.104 -0.075 -0.024 0.241* 0.005 0.194 0.083 0.241* 0.093 1.0000  
LG Pop 0.269** 0.142 0.218* -0.385*** 
-
0.388*** -0.413*** -0.034 0.071 0.425*** 0.065 -0.050 0.337*** 0.771*** 1.00 
Statistical significance of the pairwise correlation coefficients: 0.10 (*), 0.05 (**), 0.01 (***) 
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5.4. Methodology 
 
The methods outlined in this section are used to produce estimations for the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and trust in government.  The methods used are similar to 
those in the previous two chapters, examining changes in trust between countries and over 
time.  I provide initial estimates for a cross-sectional model.  To counter potential 
endogeneity bias in the initial estimations, I employ a cross-sectional instrument variable 
model.  To examine variations in trust over time, I use a fixed effects panel estimator is 
used to examine variations in trust and decentralization over time. 
 
5.4.1. Cross-sectional Estimates: 
 
The first estimations are produced using a cross-sectional ordinary least squares model, 
in function 5.1. 
 
𝑇𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 5.1 
 
In the cross-sectional estimations, each of the dependent and independent variables are 
averaged across the period for which data is available.  The WVS dataset spans a 
maximum of 20 years between 1990 and 2009, whilst the Eurobarometer Survey cross-
sectional dataset covers 7 years from 2003 to 2009.  The averaging of the WVS dataset is 
weighted according to the length of each wave65 
The dependent variable is the average level of trust in government and trust in 
government and related institutions (WVS dataset only).  The independent variables 
include the average level of decentralization (𝐷𝑖), with interactions
66 (𝐷𝑖 . 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖).  I also 
include a selection of control variables contained in vector𝑋𝑖, also averaged for the 
corresponding time period. 
 
                                                 
65 There are four waves in total: 2 cover a period of 5 years, 1 a period of 4 years and 1 a period of 6 years.  
The averaged value is weighted according to the length of the waves for which data is available.  
66 Interactions include: legislative decentralization, electoral decentralization, tiers of government, local 
government population size, government size and governance index (CPI). 
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5.4.2. Endogeneity: de Mello (2004), Dincer (2010) and Ligthart and 
Oudheusen (2015) 
 
I consider the possibility that decentralization, 𝐷𝑖, is endogenous in 5.1.  The potential 
issue of endogeneity bias in ordinary least squares estimations has been raised in previous 
research in this area (see de Mello, 2004; Dincer, 2010; Ligthart and Oudheusen, 2015).  
There are two reasons why decentralization may be endogenous in function 5.1, and why 
the estimation of the effect of decentralization on trust in government, 𝛽1, may be biased 
and inconsistent in OLS estimations.   
The first reason is possible reverse causality or simultaneity in function 5.1.  
Ligthart and Oudheusen (2015) explain that it is difficult to establish clear causality 
between fiscal decentralization and trust in government.  They explain how the trust that 
citizens have in government may influence the political processes that affect 
decentralization policy.  De Mello (2004) also alludes to reverse causality between social 
capital (confidence in government) and fiscal decentralization.  Essentially, 
decentralization may be affected by changes in trust, which would bias the estimation of 
the effects of decentralization on trust in government.  If this is the case, then the 
explanatory power of decentralization in function 5.1, 𝛽1, may be overstated and 
consequently, statistical tests of the significance of 𝛽1 would be invalid.   
 The second reason why decentralization may be endogenous in function 5.1 is 
omitted variable bias.  Any unobserved factors of trust will be contained in the residuals 
in function 5.1.  If decentralization shares some correlation with those unobserved factors, 
then this would bias the estimation of the effects of decentralization on trust in 
government. 
Ligthart and Oudheusen (2015) investigate whether decentralization is 
endogenous in their research using the Durbin Wu-Hausman test, and find sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis (exogeneity of decentralization data).  To tackle the 
potential endogeneity problem in function 5.1, I produce two further estimations using a 
cross-sectional IV model, and a fixed effects panel estimator. 
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5.4.3. Cross-sectional Instrument Variables Estimates: 
 
The second set of estimations are produced using a cross-sectional instrument variable 
model.  In previous research in this area a selection of instruments has been used.  De 
Mello (2004) uses initial values of the decentralization data and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation.  Earlier work by Oates (1972) and Tiebout (1956) cite the benefits of 
decentralization when there is greater heterogeneity of demands.  Furthermore, empirical 
research by Wallis and Oates (1988) and Panizza (1998) suggests that fractionalisation 
explain variations in decentralization. 
 However, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation may not be a suitable instrument for 
decentralization in this research.  Dincer (2010) points out that a correlation exists 
between ethnic diversity and trust in government.  Furthermore, research by Alesina and 
Ferrera (2002) explains how ethnic diversity can affect interpersonal trust and their 
empirical research confirms their hypothesis.  Interpersonal trust may be strongly 
correlated with trust in government and for this reason, I have included ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation as a control.  Therefore, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation is not a suitable 
instrument variable. 
 Dincer (2010) proposes alternate instrument variables: land area and population 
size.  Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) explain that, all other things equal, the larger 
the country, the stronger the case for decentralization.  This is also supported by the 
arguments discussed in chapter 1 (see Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972 and Seabright, 1996).  
Furthermore, the empirical research conducted by Wallis and Oates (1988) and Panizza 
(1998) provide some evidence of a link between size (area and population) and 
decentralization.  They also provide evidence that urbanisation and capital population, 
are associated with the degree of decentralization. 
 It is also important to discuss the exogeneity of the instruments.  Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation is not suitable because it could share a direct link with the dependent 
variable.  It is important that any chosen instruments affect the dependent variable 
indirectly, through the endogenous explanatory variable.  Though Dincer (2010) uses area 
and population, and provides diagnostic tests that support their use as instruments (strong 
and valid), he does not provide a discussion on exclusion restriction and instrument 
exogeneity.  Instead. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) discuss exogeneity restriction 
with respect to country size (area and population) in their research.  They explain area 
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size could only be endogenous in the long run.  Over time countries can break up or 
reform based on various political factors, which could be linked to citizen trust in 
government.  However, they argue that their period of study, 25 years, is sufficiently short 
horizon to treat the instruments as exogenous.  In my research, the periods covered at 20 
years (WVS) and 7 years (Eurobarometer).  An argument could be made that population 
size, and capital population as a percentage of national population, may affect trust, for 
example, through interactions of heterogenous groups (Alesina and Ferrara, 2003).  
However, as ethnolinguistic fractionalisation is included in the model as one of the 
covariates, there is no plausible explanation how land area, population size of capital 
population would be associated with trust directly.  Instead, land area, population size and 
the percentage of the population living in the capital are expected to explain variations in 
trust in government, through variations in decentralization. 
 
Therefore, the first stage estimations are outlined in function 5.2, below. 
 
𝐷𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛿1𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝛿3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 5.2 
 
As before, the results of the first stages are provided alongside their second stage 
counterparts in the result sections (5.5 and 5.6).  I provide a discussion of instrument 
strength alongside my results.  I discuss the coefficients for each of the instruments in the 
first stage and consider whether the signs of those coefficients (𝛿1, 𝛿2, 𝛿3) are what we 
would expect based on the literature.  Area and population are expected to be positively 
associated with decentralization, whilst capital population is expected to be negatively 
associated with decentralization.  I also provide the p -value for the f-test of collective 
significance of the instrument variables.  In second stage estimations, I also provide the 
p-value for the Durbin-Wu Hausman test and Hansen J-statistic for each of the 
estimations. 
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5.4.4. Fixed Effects Panel Estimator 
 
The final set of estimations are produced using a Fixed Effects Panel model, outlined 
below in function 5.3. 
 
𝑇𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖,𝑡 +   𝛽2𝐷𝑖,𝑡 . 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖 +  𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  5.4 
 
In the fixed effects estimator, each country has its own intercept term, which captures any 
time invariant features that could explain trust between countries (culture, institutional 
quality etc.).  For example, cultural effects may explain variations in trust between 
countries (Fukuyama, 1995).  Fukuyama explains that different cultures may observe 
lower levels of trust.  These time invariant factors could be accounted for using fixed 
effects.  Failure to capture variables that explain cross-sectional variability in trust, could 
bias estimates of the relationship between decentralization and trust in government in the 
ordinary least squares estimates.  Unfortunately, data does not exist to capture all of these 
factors. A fixed effects panel estimate captures cross-sectional variability in the individual 
intercept terms.  Consequently, the explanatory variables, including decentralization, 
could explain variations in trust in government over time. 
One of the disadvantages of using the fixed effects estimator is that it does not 
allow for the inclusion of time invariant independent variables, such as ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, due to collinearity with the fixed effects.  Another option would be to 
use a random effects estimator.  However, the specification test (see Hausman, 1978) 
rejects the null hypothesis – the random effects is not a valid estimator67.  Though the use 
of the fixed effects panel estimator will generate problems of efficiency, due to the large 
number of countries and the very short time span68, by rejecting the null hypothesis in the 
Hausman specification test, the random effects estimator is unsuitable due to inconsistent 
estimates of the effects of the explanatory variables.  Consequently, fractionalisation is 
dropped as an explanatory variable in the fixed effects panel estimates. 
 
                                                 
67 I compared the estimates for a Fixed Effects and Random Effects panel estimator using the Hausman 
specification test.  For each indicator of tax and spending decentralization, the null hypothesis was rejected 
for both datasets: at the 5% (SCG revenue), 1% (SCG expenditure) and 10% (SCG autonomous 
expenditure) level.  Therefore, the model is correctly specified using the Fixed Effects estimator, and not 
the Random Effects estimator. 
68 Though the World Values Survey dataset covers 20 years, there are only 4 waves, hence 4 time periods.  
The Eurobarometer dataset covers 7 years, though this is still short compared to the number of countries. 
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5.4.5. Time Dummies 
 
In addition to fixed effects, I also consider the possibility of time effects.  Alesina and 
Ferrara (2002) include time dummies in their empirics, citing previous research on the 
declining trend of trust.  They include year dummies for their panel dataset from 1974 to 
1994.  In my research I include time effects: i) wave dummies (WVS), and ii) year 
dummies (Eurobarometer).  Prior to including time effects I examined the average level 
of trust per wave (WVS) and per year (Eurobarometer).  Only the last two years of the 
Eurobarometer dataset observed noticeable declines in trust across the dataset.  This could 
suggest a global shock due to the financial crash and consequent economic shock.  Hence, 
I included time effects in some of the regressions69 to investigate whether this would 
affect the results. 
In producing further estimations, I found evidence that controlling for wave 
effects (Ligthart and Oudheusen, 2015) had no impact on the estimations.  In the World 
Values Survey, wave 4 (2005-2009) would occasionally be statistically significant, but 
this did not have an effect on the controls or decentralization coefficients.  In the 
Eurobarometer dataset, the dummy variable for year 2008 was negatively associated with 
trust, reducing trust by 5% or more across the entire dataset.  The size of the coefficients 
did change when including year dummies, but the significance and sign were unchanged, 
and the overall narrative unaffected.  I chose not to include time effects in the final results 
for this reason.  
                                                 
69 In order to test the effect of time based dummies in the estimations, I included wave dummies (WVS) 
and year dummies (Eurobarometer Survey) in certain specifications.  Specifically, I included time dummies 
in OLS estimations featuring all controls and the tax or spending decentralization indicators. 
228 | P a g e  
 
5.5. Main Results 
 
In the main results section, I provide a wide selection of estimations for the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and trust in government.  Each of the estimations is for 
the same specification containing all of the control variables outlined in section 5.2.370.  
In each table I examine the effects of fiscal decentralization (three indicators) and trust in 
government, and for each decentralization indicator there are three interactions with 
legislative powers of subnational governments, electoral decentralization and government 
structure (tiers of government).  Estimates are organised according to the methods 
outlined in section 5.4, beginning with cross-sectional analysis (OLS and IV) and moving 
onto panel econometrics. 
 
5.5.1. Cross-Sectional Estimations 
 
The first set of cross-sectional estimates is for the World Value Survey dataset.  In table 
54, estimations for decentralization and trust in government are largely insignificant.  Tax 
and spending decentralization is not associated with trust in government, except when 
interacting with other decentralization indicators.  SCG revenue has a positive or negative 
effect on trust in government depending on whether the local executive is elected or not 
elected (3).  The effect is positive when the local executive is not elected by local citizens, 
and negative when the local executive is elected.  This suggests that direct accountability 
of local government to local citizens is bad for trust in government at the local level.  The 
size of the coefficients is very small however (either +0.006 or -0.007 depending on 
appointment or election of local executives).   
 SCG expenditure and autonomous expenditure decentralization can reduce trust 
in governments which feature 4 or more tiers of government (8, 12).  The size of the 
coefficients remains fairly small; however, the effect is twice as strong when subnational 
governments have autonomy over expenditure (12).  The final significant estimate is 
when subnational governments have legislative powers, further fiscal autonomy and 
spending of subnational governments can reduce trust.  A one percentage point increase 
                                                 
70 I tested specifications featuring decentralization and: i) public mood, ii) public mood and economic 
variables, iii) public mood, economic variables and government spending and governance, and iv) all 
variables.  If fiscal decentralization were insignificant with all variables included, it would often be 
insignificant in specifications featuring only public mood etc.   
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in SCG autonomous expenditure would reduce trust in government by 0.01 within the 
scale.   
The second set of estimations in table 55 is for a broader definition of government, 
which includes related institutions (civil service, parliament and political parties).  Fiscal 
decentralization appears to have a stronger effect in the second set of results, though the 
strength of the relationship remains very weak.  First, SCG revenue has a positive direct 
effect on trust in government (1), though neither SCG expenditure nor SCG autonomous 
expenditure have an effect (5, 9).  Second, SCG revenue and SCG autonomous 
expenditure has different effects on trust in government depending on whether the local 
executive is appointed or elected locally.  The effect is stronger for SCG autonomous 
expenditure (11) than for SCG revenue (3).  Third, fiscal decentralization has an effect 
on trust when accounting for the number of tiers in government.  SCG revenue can 
improve trust when there are 3 or fewer tiers of government (4), SCG expenditure 
damages trust when there are 4 or more tiers (8), and SCG autonomous expenditure has 
a positive effect if the government contains 3 or fewer tiers, but an equal, negative effect 
otherwise (12).  
Finally, there is little evidence of an association between decentralization and trust 
in the Eurobarometer dataset (table 56).  SCG revenue increases trust if subnational 
governments do not have legislative.  A one percentage point increase in fiscal 
decentralization reduces trust by 0.5 percent 
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Table 54: Cross Sectional OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Trust in Government (WVS) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -1.381 -1.539 -1.247 -1.597 -1.420 -1.465 -1.351 -1.728* -0.442 -1.418 -0.491 -1.059 
(1.069) (1.064) (0.869) (1.018) (0.967) (0.946) (0.909) (0.888) (1.268) (1.184) (0.967) (1.060) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 0.001 0.002 0.006* 0.003         
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.000     
     (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        -0.001 0.008 0.012 0.004 
         (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Legislation 
 -0.001    0.000    -0.010*   
  (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.006)   
 Decentralization 
x Election 
  -0.007*    -0.004    -0.012  
   (0.004)    (0.006)    (0.009)  
 Decentralization 
x Tiers 
   -0.003    -0.004**    -0.008*** 
    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 0.713*** 0.697** 0.782*** 0.646** 0.809*** 0.758*** 0.820*** 0.748*** 0.670*** 0.583* 0.661*** 0.590** 
  (0.191) (0.258) (0.185) (0.232) (0.200) (0.259) (0.201) (0.254) (0.214) (0.281) (0.203) (0.248) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
0.289 0.334 0.291* 0.366 0.282 0.302 0.287 0.382* 0.112 0.444 0.169 0.290 
 (0.212) (0.219) (0.164) (0.213) (0.193) (0.194) (0.177) (0.186) (0.258) (0.264) (0.192) (0.245) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.056** 0.056 0.021 0.061* 0.027 0.032 0.018 0.026 0.006 -0.010 -0.006 0.006 
 (0.025) (0.041) (0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.039) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.037) (0.026) (0.028) 
 Unemployment 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.015 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
 Government 
Size 
0.002 0.002 -0.013 0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.010 -0.017 -0.020 -0.005 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) 
 Governance 0.049** 0.045 0.064*** 0.036 0.057** 0.052* 0.062*** 0.040 0.063** 0.022 0.070*** 0.035 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.020) (0.029) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.006** 0.001 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
 POLITY -0.029** -0.029** -0.030** -0.031** -0.022* -0.021* -0.025** -0.023* -0.015 -0.021* -0.021** -0.016 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 34 32 34 33 33 31 33 32 31 29 31 30 
R-squared 0.809 0.801 0.834 0.818 0.778 0.768 0.784 0.807 0.625 0.635 0.664 0.713 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
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Table 55: Cross Sectional OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Trust in Government and Institutions71 (WVS) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -1.447 -1.816* -1.230* -1.674 -1.496 -1.649* -1.353* -1.860** -0.636 -1.283 -0.708 -1.275 
(1.110) (1.054) (0.701) (1.088) (0.942) (0.898) (0.742) (0.841) (1.219) (1.191) (0.806) (1.067) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 0.005** 0.007 0.014*** 0.006**         
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    0.000 -0.001 0.009 0.002     
     (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        0.002 0.006 0.020*** 0.006** 
         (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Legislation 
 -0.002    0.000    -0.005   
  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.006)   
 Decentralization 
x Election 
  -0.011***    -0.008    -0.018***  
   (0.003)    (0.005)    (0.006)  
 Decentralization 
x Tiers 
   -0.002    -0.003*    -0.006*** 
    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 0.482** 0.453* 0.593*** 0.388* 0.622*** 0.524** 0.643*** 0.515** 0.557** 0.445* 0.545*** 0.433* 
  (0.181) (0.224) (0.149) (0.194) (0.179) (0.216) (0.170) (0.203) (0.204) (0.237) (0.181) (0.217) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
0.336 0.439* 0.340** 0.417* 0.329 0.384* 0.338** 0.449** 0.136 0.358 0.218 0.330 
 (0.222) (0.211) (0.135) (0.225) (0.203) (0.188) (0.157) (0.188) (0.253) (0.267) (0.154) (0.249) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.048* 0.045 -0.008 0.056* 0.004 0.014 -0.013 0.010 -0.012 -0.013 -0.029 -0.005 
 (0.026) (0.037) (0.021) (0.030) (0.024) (0.032) (0.022) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.022) (0.029) 
 Unemployment -0.000 0.002 0.018* 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.016* 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.020* 0.010 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
 Government 
Size 
0.008 0.008 -0.016 0.011 0.002 0.007 -0.012 0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.016 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.011) 
 Governance 0.028 0.016 0.051** 0.014 0.038 0.026 0.048** 0.017 0.049* 0.018 0.059*** 0.019 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.020) (0.030) (0.023) (0.025) (0.019) (0.024) (0.028) (0.031) (0.020) (0.030) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.002 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.004* 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
 POLITY -0.020 -0.020 -0.020** -0.020 -0.009 -0.007 -0.014 -0.009 0.000 -0.003 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 34 32 34 33 33 31 33 32 31 29 31 30 
R-squared 0.720 0.710 0.822 0.720 0.681 0.670 0.725 0.722 0.609 0.594 0.718 0.685 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
                                                 
71 See Appendix A for definitions of the dependent variables, including “trust in government and institutions”, and all other variables 
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Table 56: Cross Sectional OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable: Trust in Government (EB Survey) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -314.147** -276.620* -285.615* -287.908** -318.589** -296.834** -307.011** -290.059* -332.875** -331.176** -235.610 -290.764* 
(131.269) (134.423) (140.003) (133.510) (130.145) (134.280) (142.704) (136.121) (143.262) (142.846) (170.524) (147.839) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.100 -0.527* 0.045 0.025         
 (0.194) (0.288) (0.664) (0.248)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.087 -0.431 -0.016 0.075     
     (0.196) (0.346) (0.732) (0.253)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        0.060 0.013 1.022 0.493 
         (0.336) (0.557) (0.972) (0.470) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Legislation 
 0.409    0.339    0.057   
  (0.268)    (0.316)    (0.589)   
 Decentralization 
x Election 
  -0.131    -0.062    -0.927  
   (0.550)    (0.602)    (0.868)  
 Decentralization 
x Tiers 
   -0.064    -0.080    -0.276 
    (0.198)    (0.215)    (0.394) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 1.191** 1.225** 1.117** 1.074** 1.301** 1.365** 1.274** 1.118* 1.247* 1.253 0.970 0.991* 
  (0.437) (0.465) (0.459) (0.411) (0.555) (0.568) (0.572) (0.530) (0.673) (0.725) (0.653) (0.536) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
37.696 23.501 34.144 39.454 38.171 26.363 36.900 41.325 43.402 42.737 29.014 46.139 
 (26.245) (24.173) (25.071) (27.261) (26.531) (24.317) (25.494) (27.883) (29.104) (27.920) (31.542) (31.857) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.294 1.782 0.251 0.128 -0.129 1.064 -0.162 -0.141 -0.235 -0.085 -0.532 -0.006 
 (1.324) (2.061) (1.372) (1.464) (1.785) (2.518) (1.853) (1.912) (2.164) (2.661) (2.307) (2.936) 
 Unemployment 0.183 -0.075 0.230 -0.567 0.189 -0.033 0.210 -0.593 0.266 0.247 0.433 -0.905 
 (0.347) (0.347) (0.370) (0.987) (0.360) (0.374) (0.407) (0.980) (0.455) (0.490) (0.391) (1.495) 
 Government 
Size 
1.121 2.586 0.901 0.748 1.009 2.359 0.898 0.562 1.023 1.139 0.557 0.443 
 (1.365) (1.808) (1.644) (1.698) (1.457) (2.185) (1.860) (1.816) (1.478) (2.019) (1.828) (1.718) 
 Governance 1.128 2.641 1.462 0.509 0.822 2.080 0.928 0.114 0.205 0.288 1.493 -0.764 
 (2.735) (2.429) (2.766) (2.955) (2.812) (2.523) (2.859) (3.030) (3.398) (3.350) (3.618) (3.772) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.538** 0.524** 0.493* 0.476* 0.557** 0.568** 0.537 0.474* 0.548** 0.548** 0.418 0.415 
 (0.224) (0.218) (0.280) (0.249) (0.236) (0.233) (0.305) (0.264) (0.223) (0.233) (0.254) (0.247) 
 POLITY 7.387 6.462 6.778 6.320 7.336 6.943 7.050 6.009 6.851 6.665 5.337 5.510 
 (5.933) (5.440) (6.389) (6.234) (6.236) (5.978) (7.066) (6.507) (6.651) (7.146) (6.226) (7.578) 
Observations 26 26 26 25 25 25 25 24 23 23 23 22 
R-squared 0.717 0.752 0.719 0.736 0.716 0.737 0.717 0.737 0.692 0.692 0.722 0.737 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
 
233 | P a g e  
 
The control variables often have no effect on trust in government.  Public mood has a 
strong, positive effect on trust in government, which is an expected result.  The strength 
of the explanatory power of public mood is weakened when the dependent variable is 
trust in government and institutions (table 55).  In the Eurobarometer dataset the 
relationship is strong – a change in public mood results in a larger change in trust in 
government.  For the remaining controls, the estimates if significant are not robust.  The 
quality of government is positive in most specifications, whilst institutional democracy 
has a surprising negative effect on trust between countries.  However, this result may 
confirm the view of Nye (1997) that citizens in less developed countries are more trusting 
of governmental authority than in more developed (wealthier) societies.  Finally, 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is positively associated with trust in government in the 
Eurobarometer dataset.  One explanation could be that greater fractionalization means 
more representation of minority groups, and minority groups may be more trusting of 
governments.   
 Previous research in this area has found that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is 
negatively associated with inter-personal trust (see Alesina and Ferrara, 2002; Gustavsson 
and Jordahl, 2008). 
 
5.5.2. Cross-sectional instrument variable estimator  
 
The second set of estimates are produced using a cross-sectional instrument variable 
model.  There are three sets of IV estimations: two for the World Values Survey for the 
two dependent variables, and one for the Eurobarometer Survey.  The instruments are the 
same for both datasets: land area, population size and the proportion of the nation’s 
population living in the capital. 
 The first stage estimates for the World Values Survey are presented in table 57.  
The first stage is the same for the both dependent variables in the World Values Survey, 
and the corresponding second stages in tables 58 and 59. 
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Table 57: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (First Stage), Dependent Variable: Decentralization (World Values Survey) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 1.008** 0.716* 0.385 0.847 0.799* 0.530 0.332 0.695 0.464 0.602 0.419 0.736 
(0.434) (0.409) (0.363) (0.519) (0.425) (0.342) (0.296) (0.478) (0.686) (0.510) (0.268) (0.666) 
Instrument Variables 
 Country Size 
(Land Area) 
0.015*** 0.006 0.000 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.011** 0.003 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.008* -0.001 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
 Country 
Population 
0.034*** 0.028*** 0.044*** 0.032** -0.023 -0.033 0.015 -0.030 -0.012 -0.031 0.019* -0.028 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.037) (0.020) (0.018) (0.040) (0.037) (0.019) (0.010) (0.038) 
 Capital 
Population (%) 
-0.006** -0.002 -0.001 -0.005** -0.006** -0.002 -0.002 -0.005** -0.004* -0.001 -0.000 -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
 Public Mood -0.063 -0.163* -0.077 -0.102 -0.015 -0.093 -0.058 -0.038 -0.007 0.074 -0.036 0.038 
  (0.064) (0.088) (0.056) (0.081) (0.071) (0.072) (0.053) (0.087) (0.103) (0.053) (0.029) (0.116) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.207* -0.147 -0.122 -0.162 -0.153 -0.099 -0.103 -0.124 -0.070 -0.201 -0.128* -0.144 
 (0.101) (0.086) (0.090) (0.135) (0.100) (0.077) (0.075) (0.124) (0.156) (0.125) (0.069) (0.179) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.001 0.026* 0.016 0.004 -0.009 0.016 0.011 -0.005 -0.002 0.013 0.004 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.006) (0.019) 
 Unemployment 0.004 -0.002 -0.007* 0.005 0.004 -0.001 -0.006* 0.005 0.000 -0.002 -0.004** -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
 Government 
Size 
-0.003 0.009 0.012** -0.001 -0.006 0.005 0.010* -0.005 -0.007 0.004 0.007** -0.009 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.003) (0.011) 
 Governance 0.034** 0.013 0.007 0.027 0.032** 0.013 0.006 0.027 0.023 0.030* 0.005 0.033 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.006) (0.021) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.001 0.000 0.002** 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.002** 0.001 0.001 -0.002** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
 POLITY 0.013** 0.011** 0.007 0.013** 0.013** 0.011*** 0.007* 0.013*** 0.005 0.006* 0.004** 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
 Decentralization 
(Interaction) 
 0.468*** 0.675*** 0.040  0.488*** 0.696*** 0.087  0.796*** 0.957*** 0.186 
  (0.126) (0.154) (0.127)  (0.099) (0.160) (0.116)  (0.127) (0.098) (0.194) 
F-test (p-value) for 
instruments 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.361 0.000 0.000 0.231 0.251 0.004 
Observations 32 30 32 31 31 29 31 30 29 27 29 28 
R-squared 0.736 0.860 0.895 0.741 0.726 0.875 0.900 0.732 0.627 0.896 0.956 0.647 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
. 
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The first stage estimates indicate that the instrument variables chosen in this 
research are good predictors of the variation in the decentralization variable.  In all but 
three specifications, the f-test for collective strength of the instrument variables is rejected 
at the 10% level.  Furthermore, the instruments exhibit effects on decentralization that the 
literature expects.  Fiscal decentralization is increasing with country size and population, 
and decreasing as the percentage of the nation’s population living in the capital increases.  
The other explanatory variables are often statistically significant in the first stage, with 
exception of POLITY, the indicator for democracy.  Democracy is found to be statistically 
associated with decentralization in most specifications.  Other aspects of decentralization 
are also found to be associated with decentralization, as expected. 
 There are two sets of second stage estimates produced from the first stage.  The 
first, in table 58, is for the dependent variable: trust in government.  The results here are 
consistent with those in the OLS cross-sectional estimations.  SCG revenue is positively 
associated with trust in government when the local government executive is appointed, 
and negatively associated when the local government executive is elected (3).  The only 
other statistically significant effect is in specification 12, where an increase in 
autonomous spending is negatively associated with citizen trust in government when 
there are 4 or more tiers of government.  The magnitude of these effects is also close to 
that observed in the cross-sectional estimations in table 54. 
 The diagnostic tests are not ideal however.  In a few specifications, the Hansen J-
statistic (p-value) is below 0.1.  This means that the null hypothesis of instrument 
exogeneity could be rejected at the 10% level.  However, this is limited to only a handful 
of specifications, restricted to the SCG revenue indicator.  Furthermore, the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test provides evidence that decentralization may not be endogenous, and given 
the similarity between the OLS and IV estimations for the cross-sectional dataset, this 
suggests that instrumenting decentralization may be unnecessary.  Nevertheless, the 
results in the IV estimations support those in the OLS estimations. 
 When the dependent variable is trust in government and institutions, in table 59, 
the effects are also fairly consistent with the corresponding estimates in the OLS cross-
sectional model, in table 55.  SCG revenue is positively associated with trust in 
government in specifications 1-4.  SCG revenue shares a positive relationship with trust 
in government when subnational government does not have the power to legislate; when 
the local government executive is appointed, and when the number of tiers of government 
are less than 4.  
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Table 58: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Trust in Government (WVS) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -0.843 -1.104 -0.915 -1.033 -0.995 -0.907 -0.819 -1.268* 0.345 -0.244 2.659 -0.065 
(0.890) (0.882) (0.794) (0.864) (0.762) (0.826) (1.205) (0.746) (0.871) (0.875) (1.758) (0.684) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 0.001 0.005 0.006* 0.004         
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.0045 -0.004 -0.035 -0.002     
     (0.003) (0.008) (0.024) (0.004)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        -0.002 0.010 -0..056 0.004 
         (0.004) (0.010) (0.044) (0.004) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Legislation 
 -0.003    0.001    -0.011   
  (0.005)    (0.006)    (0.009)   
 Decentralization 
x Election 
  -0.006*    0.027    0.055  
   (0.003)    (0.020)    (0.044)  
 Decentralization 
x Tiers 
   -0.002    -0.003    -0.006*** 
    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 0.673*** 0.755*** 0.765*** 0.644*** 0.788*** 0.722*** 0.636*** 0.730*** 0.621*** 0.540*** 0.462** 0.572*** 
  (0.152) (0.241) (0.158) (0.183) (0.165) (0.226) (0.233) (0.199) (0.166) (0.194) (0.204) (0.184) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
0.174 0.228 0.206 0.229 0.199 0.182 0.054 0.282* -0.050 0.179 -0.743 0.056 
 (0.179) (0.176) (0.151) (0.179) (0.156) (0.165) (0.269) (0.157) (0.179) (0.244) (0.473) (0.150) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.045** 0.024 0.017 0.048* 0.010 0.022 0.051 0.015 -0.016 -0.038 -0.000 -0.014 
 (0.022) (0.043) (0.025) (0.026) (0.022) (0.036) (0.046) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.036) (0.018) 
 Unemployment 0.006 0.011 0.014 0.006 0.010 0.010 -0.016 0.011 0.013* 0.017*** -0.011 0.014** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.023) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.023) (0.006) 
 Government 
Size 
-0.001 -0.008 -0.013 0.001 -0.005 -0.002 0.035 -0.003 -0.015 -0.025** 0.020 -0.011 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.031) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.028) (0.008) 
 Governance 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.073*** 0.055** 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.060* 0.057*** 0.087*** 0.055 0.108*** 0.065*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.022) (0.034) (0.020) (0.016) (0.034) (0.030) (0.018) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003* 0.003 0.009 0.004** 0.002 0.004* 0.005 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
 POLITY -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.025** -0.025** -0.011 -0.026** -0.019*** -0.026*** 0.004 -0.019*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) 
DWH test 0.740 0.921 0.925 0.944 0.316 0.622 0.049 0.498 0.394 0.828 0.160 0.853 
Hansen J-statistic  0.067 0.068 0.213 0.038 0.177 0.158 0.855 0.147 0.274 0.320 0.796 0.244 
Observations 32 30 32 31 31 29 31 30 29 27 29 28 
R-squared 0.827 0.824 0.841 0.831 0.788 0.783 0.549 0.812 0.680 0.737 0.286 0.754 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure are instrumented using land area, population size and capital population as % of national population, from the first.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen J-statistic are 
provided. 
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Table 59: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Trust in Government and Institutions (WVS) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -0.870 -1.558* -1.089 -1.111 -1.067 -1.058 -0.974 -1.455** 0.147 -0.047 0.985 -0.429 
(0.972) (0.855) (0.718) (0.957) (0.733) (0.808) (0.966) (0.704) (0.810) (1.085) (1.003) (0.732) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 0.006** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.008**         
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.002 -0.006 -0.018 -0.001     
     (0.003) (0.007) (0.017) (0.003)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        0.001 0.002 -0.017 0.003 
         (0.003) (0.007) (0.030) (0.004) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Legislation 
 -0.008*    0.003    -0.001   
  (0.004)    (0.005)    (0.008)   
 Decentralization 
x Election 
  -0.017***    0.014    0.018  
   (0.003)    (0.014)    (0.029)  
 Decentralization 
x Tiers 
   -0.0020    -0.002    -0.004 
    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 0.434*** 0.589** 0.605*** 0.366** 0.578*** 0.410** 0.497** 0.458*** 0.484*** 0.398** 0.426*** 0.387** 
  (0.145) (0.237) (0.137) (0.160) (0.150) (0.178) (0.203) (0.160) (0.160) (0.165) (0.152) (0.172) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
0.210 0.363** 0.305** 0.285 0.252 0.271 0.175 0.375** -0.019 0.053 -0.268 0.149 
 (0.198) (0.174) (0.147) (0.205) (0.162) (0.170) (0.215) (0.154) (0.163) (0.273) (0.288) (0.159) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.037 -0.007 -0.016 0.044* -0.009 0.018 0.013 0.003 -0.029 -0.023 -0.024 -0.019 
 (0.024) (0.039) (0.020) (0.026) (0.019) (0.027) (0.037) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) 
 Unemployment 0.004 0.013 0.021** 0.005 0.010 0.009 -0.004 0.012* 0.013* 0.014** 0.005 0.014** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) 
 Government 
Size 
0.005 -0.008 -0.018 0.008 -0.001 0.009 0.020 0.004 -0.006 -0.004 0.005 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.023) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.021) (0.008) 
 Governance 0.044* 0.037 0.057*** 0.030 0.053*** 0.041* 0.046 0.032 0.071*** 0.057 0.078*** 0.045** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.019) (0.029) (0.020) (0.022) (0.029) (0.020) (0.018) (0.036) (0.021) (0.020) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.003* 0.003* 0.006 0.004** 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
 POLITY -0.025* -0.030** -0.022** -0.025* -0.011 -0.006 -0.004 -0.010 -0.003 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) 
DWH test  0.748 0.303 0.460 0.538 0.215 0.407 0.070 0.360 0.376 0.424 0.337 0.461 
Hansen J-statistic 0.007 0.003 0.209 0.005 0.355 0.244 0.838 0.182 0.596 0.382 0.617 0.205 
Observations 32 30 32 31 31 29 31 30 29 27 29 28 
R-squared 0.737 0.713 0.813 0.728 0.689 0.662 0.471 0.721 0.666 0.654 0.544 0.711 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure are instrumented using land area, population size and capital population as % of national population, from the first.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen J-statistic are 
provided. 
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In contrast, when subnational governments have legislative powers, and when the local 
government executive is elected, SCG revenue has a negative effect.  The main difference 
between the OLS and IV estimations is the loss of significance for SCG expenditure and 
autonomous expenditure.  This may indicate that decentralization was subject to 
endogeneity bias, and the effects of decentralization were overstated in the OLS 
estimations.  However, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis 
in all but one specification, therefore decentralization could be treated as exogenous.  
Another explanation could be that the instruments are not precise in explaining variations 
in decentralization.  The instruments are found to be exogenous however, as the p-value 
for Hansen J-statistic is found to be above 0.10 in most specifications. 
The final set of cross-sectional instrument variable estimates are produced for the 
Eurobarometer dataset.  Table 60 presents the first stage estimates, and table 61 the 
second stage estimates.  In the first stage estimations it is clear that the instrument 
variables: land size, population and capital population (%) are not as effective in capturing 
variations in decentralization between European countries, as they are capturing 
variations in the World Values Survey dataset.  The f-tests for collective significance are 
mixed across all specifications.  In four specifications, the f-test of instrument strength 
rejects the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level.  For some specifications it is 
borderline, and in other specifications the instruments are unsuitable for predicting 
variations in decentralization.  Furthermore, when population is statistically associated 
with decentralization, the relationship is not as expected.  In specifications 9 and 12 for 
example, the coefficient is in fact negative, not positive (as it was for the WVS first 
stages).  On the other hand, land area and capital population (%) exhibit expected effects. 
 Given the disappointing first stage estimations, it may be difficult to read much 
into the second stage estimations in table 61.  The cross-sectional OLS estimates were 
almost entirely insignificant, and there is not much evidence in the cross-sectional IV 
either.  However, the evidence of statistical significance is limited to a single interaction, 
and consistent between the decentralization indicators.  When the local government 
executive is appointed, tax and spending decentralization are negatively associated with 
trust in government, but when the local government executive is, the opposite is true.  
This effect is strongest for SCG autonomous expenditure – a 1% increase in autonomous 
spending decentralization results in a 3% increase (appointed) or decrease (elected) in 
citizen trust in government 
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Table 60: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (1st Stage), Dependent Variable: Decentralization (EB Survey) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 0.425 0.527 -0.754 0.415 0.141 0.317 -0.741 0.030 0.404 0.031 -0.278 0.282 
(1.602) (1.694) (0.698) (1.725) (1.479) (1.544) (0.617) (1.711) (1.399) (1.418) (0.220) (1.339) 
Instrument Variables 
 Country Size 
(Land Area) 
0.245 0.075 -0.046 0.231 0.289 0.125 -0.013 0.256 0.406** 0.274** 0.008 0.223 
 (0.205) (0.178) (0.095) (0.226) (0.204) (0.162) (0.094) (0.218) (0.138) (0.102) (0.047) (0.192) 
 Country 
Population 
-0.084 -0.005 0.020 -0.072 -0.115 -0.047 -0.005 -0.110 -0.292* -0.155 -0.025 -0.232* 
 (0.153) (0.093) (0.076) (0.184) (0.153) (0.082) (0.078) (0.178) (0.132) (0.093) (0.056) (0.100) 
 Capital 
Population (%) 
-0.003 -0.001 -0.002* -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002* -0.003 -0.005** -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
 Public Mood 0.230 0.144 0.157 0.216 0.650 0.485 0.224 0.705 1.041 0.975 0.091 0.818 
  (0.669) (0.569) (0.256) (0.745) (0.656) (0.574) (0.298) (0.804) (0.679) (0.549) (0.126) (0.671) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.164 -0.242 0.087 -0.169 -0.166 -0.254 0.067 -0.168 0.031 -0.040 0.051 -0.038 
 (0.271) (0.289) (0.131) (0.291) (0.259) (0.273) (0.117) (0.302) (0.246) (0.241) (0.044) (0.241) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.014 0.013 0.001 -0.014 -0.027 0.003 -0.002 -0.024 -0.052** -0.010 -0.004 -0.042* 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.009) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.008) (0.020) 
 Unemployment -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005* -0.002 -0.000 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.014 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.014) 
 Government 
Size 
-0.003 0.016 0.008 -0.003 -0.001 0.019 0.009* 0.002 -0.013 0.012 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.005) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.005) (0.022) (0.013) (0.010) (0.003) (0.013) 
 Governance 0.033 0.034 0.005 0.034 0.027 0.030 0.006 0.027 -0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.012 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.012) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024) (0.011) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.004) (0.024) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.002 0.001 0.002** 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003** 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001* 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
 POLITY 0.033 0.015 0.021 0.034 0.035 0.016 0.022 0.034 -0.066 -0.056 -0.000 -0.050 
 (0.047) (0.039) (0.022) (0.052) (0.050) (0.038) (0.022) (0.053) (0.058) (0.037) (0.013) (0.047) 
 Decentralization 
(Interaction) 
 0.437* 0.623*** -0.014  0.463* 0.619*** 0.073  0.687** 0.828*** 0.267 
  (0.237) (0.099) (0.193)  (0.248) (0.089) (0.209)  (0.211) (0.082) (0.282) 
F-test (p-value) for 
instruments 0.051 0.909 0.112 0.288 0.020 0.813 0.062 0.326 0.011 0.129 0.295 0.176 
Observations 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 21 20 20 20 19 
R-squared 0.703 0.788 0.951 0.673 0.735 0.820 0.961 0.713 0.713 0.862 0.988 0.787 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Table 61: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Trust in Government (EB Survey) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -2.455* -1.238 -4.165*** -2.476* -2.606** -2.159 -4.120*** -2.684* -2.593* -2.673* -4.178*** -2.216 
(1.282) (2.436) (1.246) (1.315) (1.303) (1.474) (1.275) (1.379) (1.378) (1.531) (1.572) (1.796) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.142 -1.981 -1.296** -0.225         
 (0.289) (1.723) (0.509) (0.355)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.092 -1.032 -1.191** -0.129     
     (0.268) (0.871) (0.505) (0.361)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        0.098 0.672 -3.466*** 0.930 
         (0.301) (0.673) (1.340) (0.810) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Legislation 
 1.222    0.756    -0.602   
  (1.053)    (0.629)    (0.817)   
 Decentralization 
x Election 
  0.930**    0.914**    3.139**  
   (0.397)    (0.387)    (1.229)  
 Decentralization 
x Tiers 
   0.059    0.065    -0.496 
    (0.167)    (0.197)    (0.544) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 1.099*** 1.247 1.382*** 1.127*** 1.254** 1.593*** 1.372*** 1.330** 1.111** 0.770 1.031** 0.560 
  (0.384) (0.769) (0.362) (0.389) (0.496) (0.583) (0.468) (0.541) (0.551) (0.688) (0.495) (0.875) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
0.246 -0.274 0.450** 0.233 0.272 -0.028 0.437* 0.274 0.290 0.350 0.449* 0.372 
 (0.239) (0.622) (0.214) (0.241) (0.246) (0.356) (0.225) (0.244) (0.267) (0.303) (0.258) (0.299) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.001 0.044 0.003 0.001 -0.005 0.017 0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.021 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.042) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.030) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.012) (0.028) 
 Unemployment 0.004 -0.007 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.006** 0.008* 0.005* -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.018) 
 Government 
Size 
0.014 0.058 0.028** 0.016 0.014 0.044 0.030*** 0.016 0.015 0.001 0.031** 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.044) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.033) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018) 
 Governance 0.023 0.087 0.012 0.024 0.017 0.047 0.011 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.016 -0.002 
 (0.025) (0.073) (0.022) (0.028) (0.026) (0.037) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (0.027) (0.032) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.005** 0.005* 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.005** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.008*** 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 POLITY 0.057 0.063 0.101* 0.060 0.054 0.055 0.097* 0.053 0.050 0.079 0.110** 0.049 
 (0.042) (0.049) (0.059) (0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.056) (0.041) (0.043) (0.072) (0.046) (0.051) 
DWH Test (p-
value) 0.767 0.210 0.359 0.714 0.687 0.505 0387 0.751 0.792 0.438 0.622 0.408 
Hansen J-statistic 
(p-value) 0.096 0.185 0.232 0.045 0.085 0.115 0.193 0.041 0.040 0.048 0.153 0.018 
Observations 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 21 20 20 20 19 
R-squared 0.687 0.288 0.694 0.680 0.680 0.602 0.687 0.677 0.672 0.638 0.701 0.594 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG 
Autonomous Expenditure are instrumented using land area, population size and capital population as % of national population, from the first.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and 
Hansen J-statistic are provided. 
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5.5.3. Fixed Effects Panel Estimator 
 
The final set of estimations are produced using a fixed effects panel estimator.  The 
estimates for the World Values Survey are provided in table 62 (trust in government) and 
63 (trust in government and institutions).  The estimations provide no evidence of a 
statistical association between decentralization and trust in government or trust in 
government and institutions.  Of the control variables, public mood continues its strong 
association with citizen trust in government and related institutions.  Unemployment is 
found to explain negative changes in trust in government over time, and POLITY, is 
positively associated with trust in government over time as well.  This result is interesting.  
This suggests that improvements in democracy and participation result in falls in trust 
over time, rather than increases as expected.  This may raise questions about the direction 
of causality here, as the strengthening of democratic processes may occur in response to 
declining trust, for example.  Or, as a consequence of greater democratic participation of 
citizens, trust falls as citizens raise their expectations of government. 
 The final set of estimates are for the Eurobarometer dataset, in table 64.  When 
including country fixed effects in the panel estimator, there is some evidence that fiscal 
decentralization is associated with trust in government.  This evidence is mostly limited 
to interactions between tax and spending decentralization, and local government 
accountability.  When the local government executive is appointed, greater tax and 
spending decentralization reduce citizen trust in government.  When the local government 
executive is appointed, greater tax and spending decentralization improves citizen trust 
in government by a similar magnitude.  This effect is strongest in specification (7) for 
spending decentralization – a 1% increase in SCG expenditure decentralization results in 
a 12.7% fall in trust (appointed) or 12.5% increase in trust (elected), year on year.  This 
result was also observed in the cross-sectional IV estimates in table 62.   
Finally, spending decentralization also improves trust when the number of tiers of 
government is greater than 4.  This result is an anomaly compared with other tax and 
spending indicators in the same estimation set, and with previous estimates in different 
models and for the World Values Survey dataset. 
242 | P a g e  
 
Table 62: Fixed Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Trust in Government (WVS)  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -0.663 -0.648 -0.674 -0.614 0.636 0.626 0.629 0.637 0.408 2.203 -5.844 0.753 
(1.302) (1.329) (1.426) (1.494) (1.218) (1.248) (1.340) (1.267) (2.071) (2.533) (6.845) (1.541) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008         
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.087) (0.008)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003     
     (0.009) (0.011) (0.086) (0.012)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        -0.000 -0.021 0.124 0.009 
         (0.008) (0.023) (0129) (0.013) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Legislation 
 -0.001    0.002    0.029   
  (0.002)    (0.014)    (0.028)   
 Decentralization 
x Election 
  -0.003    -0.002    -0.138  
   (0.093)    (0.007)    (0.143)  
 Decentralization 
x Tiers 
   -0.002    -0.007    -0.017 
    (0.019)    (0.016)    (0.017) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 1.486*** 1.485*** 1.481** 1.477*** 1.570*** 1.574*** 1.568*** 1.570*** 1.812** 1.733** 2.407*** 1.670* 
  (0.459) (0.470) (0.594) (0.487) (0.383) (0.406) (0.473) (0.452) (0.699) (0.606) (0.814) (0.802) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.103 -0.106 -0.102 -0.109 -0.524* -0.523* -0.523* -0.524* -0.546 -0.767 -0.251 -0.562 
 (0.290) (0.289) (0.307) (0.299) (0.276) (0.279) (0.296) (0.273) (0.418) (0.490) (0.577) (0.448) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 -0.035** -0.035* -0.035* -0.035* -0.016 -0.024 -0.011 -0.016 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.036) 
 Unemployment -0.037** -0.037** -0.037** -0.037* -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.034 -0.053*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.012) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.044* 0.029 0.148 0.050* 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.043) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.037) (0.021) (0.023) (0.031) (0.114) (0.025) 
 Governance 0.061 0.063 0.061 0.062 0.032 0.027 0.032 0.032 0.013 -0.043 0.200 0.016 
 (0.107) (0.118) (0.111) (0.108) (0.098) (0.106) (0.101) (0.107) (0.107) (0.122) (0.216) (0.098) 
 POLITY 0.021** 0.021** 0.021 0.021** 0.014 0.015* 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.146 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.142) (0.127) (0.183) (0.157) 
Observations 42 42 42 42 40 40 40 40 36 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.559 0.559 0.559 0.559 0.695 0.695 0.695 0.695 0.733 0.752 0.756 0.748 
Groups 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18 18 18 18 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
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Table 63: Fixed Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Trust in Government and Institutions (WVS) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 0.651 0.600 0.538 0.647 1.398 1.346 1.238 1.296 2.866 4.017 5.523 3.265** 
(1.128) (1.105) (1.087) (1.303) (1.083) (1.109) (0.977) (1.297) (2.084) (2.321) (4.346) (1.286) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.002 -0.003 0.024 -0.002         
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.057) (0.006)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    0.003 -0.001 0.043 0.002     
     (0.007) (0.010) (0.0586) (0.011)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        0.001 -0.012 -0.051 0.011 
         (0.006) (0.010) (0.078) (0.009) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Legislation 
 0.005    0.008    0.018   
  (0.010)    (0.011)    (0.017)   
 Decentralization 
x Election 
  -0.027    -0.041    0.058  
   (0.060)    (0.062)    (0.086)  
 Decentralization 
x Tiers 
   0.000    0.004    -0.019 
    (0.013)    (0.014)    (0.012) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 1.281*** 1.284*** 1.227** 1.282*** 1.298*** 1.320*** 1.237*** 1.331*** 0.955* 0.904* 0.702 0.791 
  (0.349) (0.352) (0.432) (0.373) (0.323) (0.342) (0.373) (0.398) (0.491) (0.447) (0.531) (0.498) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.220 -0.213 -0.211 -0.220 -0.450** -0.443** -0.433** -0.437** -0.203 -0.345 -0.329 -0.222 
 (0.171) (0.166) (0.171) (0.187) (0.174) (0.177) (0.171) (0.196) (0.274) (0.307) (0.356) (0.275) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.017 0.032 0.026 0.030 0.032* 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) 
 Unemployment -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.060*** -0.061*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
-0.004 -0.003 0.006 -0.004 0.009 0.013 0.023 0.010 0.038** 0.029* -0.006 0.046** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.031) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.029) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.069) (0.017) 
 Governance -0.016 -0.025 -0.014 -0.016 -0.035 -0.056 -0.033 -0.042 -0.154* -0.191* -0.234 -0.151** 
 (0.074) (0.081) (0.075) (0.074) (0.071) (0.077) (0.072) (0.072) (0.076) (0.092) (0.136) (0.054) 
 POLITY 0.014** 0.015*** 0.011 0.014** 0.011** 0.013*** 0.006 0.010** -0.179** -0.179** -0.235** -0.199** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.084) (0.078) (0.105) (0.086) 
Observations 42 42 42 42 40 40 40 40 36 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.668 0.671 0.672 0.668 0.727 0.734 0.734 0.728 0.842 0.854 0.848 0.873 
Groups 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18 18 18 18 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  
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Table 64: Fixed Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Trust in Government (EB Survey) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 0.992 1.041 1.345 1.092 1.096 1.057 1.917** 1.262 -0.048 -0.146 0.025 0.063 
(0.904) (0.938) (0.870) (0.984) (0.941) (0.943) (0.893) (0.937) (0.709) (0.694) (0.686) (0.672) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.210 -0.242 -3.947*** -0.275         
 (0.268) (0.285) (0.980) (0.304)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.135 -0.184 -12.681*** -0.309     
     (0.189) (0.213) (2.420) (0.278)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        -0.263 -0.717* -3.143 -0.609 
         (0.404) (0.410) (2.962) (0.433) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Legislation 
 0.305    1.365    1.565**   
  (1.168)    (1.417)    (0.705)   
 Decentralization 
x Election 
  3.814***    12.531***    2.962  
   (0.905)    (2.328)    (2.963)  
 Decentralization 
x Tiers 
   0.463    2.439**    0.797 
    (1.025)    (1.169)    (0.782) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 0.423*** 0.424*** 0.392*** 0.427*** 0.425*** 0.411*** 0.380*** 0.397** 0.376** 0.383** 0.367** 0.385** 
  (0.143) (0.142) (0.140) (0.144) (0.142) (0.146) (0.130) (0.144) (0.150) (0.150) (0.147) (0.148) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.288* -0.300* -0.348** -0.322 -0.328* -0.342** -0.414** -0.431** -0.216 -0.233 -0.220 -0.233 
 (0.159) (0.162) (0.151) (0.192) (0.164) (0.164) (0.149) (0.180) (0.173) (0.162) (0.171) (0.167) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004* 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Unemployment -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
 Governance -0.017 -0.016 -0.015 -0.013 -0.017 -0.014 -0.023 -0.011 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
 POLITY 0.061 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.063 0.065 0.074 0.070 0.125*** 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.120*** 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.065) (0.065) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
Observations 162 162 162 161 156 156 156 155 146 146 146 145 
R-squared 0.316 0.317 0.340 0.318 0.328 0.332 0.391 0.347 0.344 0.368 0.356 0.351 
Groups 26 26 26 25 25 25 25 24 24 24 24 23 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.   
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Of the control variables, public mood shares a strong positive association with trust in 
government, as expected.  The strength of the association is not as high as expected, and 
suggests that other factors explain variations in trust in government than simply the 
general mood citizens.  Economic performance indicators observe mixed results.  
Unemployment is consistently, negatively associated with citizen trust in government – a 
result observed in the WVS estimations.  Income is negatively associated with trust, but 
economic growth observes a positive association in some specifications.  Unemployment 
and income results may indicate that citizens put a greater weight on employment 
statistics than income.  Particularly as increases in unemployment are likely affect the 
poor more, whilst increases in income does not necessarily indicate increases in income 
for the low paid. 
 
5.5.4. Main Results Summary 
 
Across the selection of estimations provided in this section, there is some evidence that 
decentralization has an effect on citizen trust in government and related institutions.  This 
effect is often observed through various interactions with other aspects of 
decentralization.  The key results are outlined below: 
1. In the World Values Survey, there is only evidence that decentralization explains 
cross-sectional variations in trust in government.  These findings are fairly robust 
to IV estimations, and indicate that decentralization, particularly SCG revenue, is 
positively associated with trust in government when subnational governments do 
not have the power to legislate, when the local government executive is appointed, 
and when the number of tiers of government are fewer than 4.  Spending 
decentralization, is found to be negatively associated with trust in government, 
when there are 4 or more tiers of government. 
2. Fiscal decentralization can explain variations in trust over time, but only for the 
Eurobarometer dataset.  This indicates that decentralization only affects trust over 
time in shorter intervals (annual), rather than in waves (several years at a time).  
When including fixed country effects, greater tax and spending decentralization 
is negatively associated with trust in government when the local government 
executive is appointed, and positively associated with trust, when the executive is 
elected. 
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Overall, the results indicate that decentralization can affect trust, though mostly through 
certain interactions.  The results are not robust, varying between WVS and Eurobarometer 
datasets and between different estimations. 
 
5.6. Additional Interactions 
 
In this section I perform three further interactions so that I can better understand the merits 
and dangers of decentralization regarding citizen trust.  The interactions are between 
decentralization and i) the quality of government (CPI), ii) total government expenditure 
(% of GDP), and iii) local government population size (LG Population).  Estimates are 
provided for a cross-sectional instrument variable estimator and a fixed effects panel 
estimator, for both dataset. 
 
5.6.1.  Cross-Sectional Instrument Variable Estimator 
 
The first set of estimates are for the cross-sectional instrument variable model.  The first 
stage estimates for the World Values Survey dataset are presented in table 65.  Land area 
is found to be consistently associated with the degree of tax and spending decentralization 
in the first stage, exhibiting the expected positive correlation (see Wallis and Oates, 1988; 
Panizza, 1998).  Population size is also found to be statistically significant in some 
regressions, but with mixed effects on tax and spending decentralization.  Capital 
population (%) is found to be negatively associated with decentralization, which is the 
expected relationship based on the literature. 
The p-value for the f-tests are often less than 0.10, thereby rejecting null 
hypothesis that he instruments do not collectively explain variations in decentralization.  
This would indicate that the instruments are good predictors of variation in the 
decentralization variable.  In specifications 7 and 11, when interacting decentralization 
and total government expenditure, the instruments are weaker however.  This may be 
important to note when reflecting on second stage estimates in tables 66 and 67. 
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Table 65: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (1st Stage), Dependent Variable: Decentralization, with Additional Interactions (WVS) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 1.008** 0.612*** 0.237 0.977** 0.799* 0.571*** 0.264 0.756* 0.464 0.384* 0.075 0.477 
(0.434) (0.201) (0.243) (0.390) (0.425) (0.198) (0.239) (0.401) (0.686) (0.190) (0.238) (0.593) 
Instrument Variables 
 Country Size 
(Land Area) 
0.015*** 0.005* -0.002 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.007** -0.002 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.007** -0.002 0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
 Country 
Population 
0.034*** 0.028*** 0.009* -0.136 -0.023 0.006 0.009 -0.224 -0.012 0.009 0.010 -0.270* 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.158) (0.037) (0.018) (0.018) (0.186) (0.037) (0.018) (0.013) (0.146) 
 Capital 
Population (%) 
-0.006** -0.000 0.000 -0.006** -0.006** -0.001 0.000 -0.005** -0.004* -0.000 -0.000 -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
 Public Mood -0.063 0.003 0.001 -0.044 -0.015 0.017 0.002 -0.034 -0.007 -0.014 -0.022 -0.009 
  (0.064) (0.037) (0.032) (0.068) (0.071) (0.039) (0.032) (0.078) (0.103) (0.040) (0.037) (0.089) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.207* -0.104** 0.015 -0.158 -0.153 -0.093** -0.000 -0.096 -0.070 -0.047 0.046 -0.028 
 (0.101) (0.045) (0.064) (0.106) (0.100) (0.044) (0.061) (0.107) (0.156) (0.037) (0.053) (0.128) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.001 -0.009* -0.002 -0.011 -0.009 -0.013** -0.002 -0.013 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.012 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.017) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) 
 Unemployment 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
 Government 
Size 
-0.003 -0.001 -0.017*** -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 -0.015*** -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 -0.011** -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.002) (0.004) (0.010) 
 Governance 0.034** -0.020*** -0.000 0.029* 0.032** -0.017*** 0.002 0.024 0.023 -0.014** -0.003 0.017 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
 POLITY 0.013** 0.005** -0.001 0.010* 0.013** 0.005** -0.000 0.008 0.005 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) 
 Decentralization 
(Interaction) 
 0.115*** 0.058*** 0.256  0.111*** 0.057*** 0.469  0.112*** 0.055*** 0.734* 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.238)  (0.007) (0.005) (0.385)  (0.008) (0.005) 0.734* 
F-test (p-value) for 
instruments 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.003 0.000 0.015 0.755 0.005 0.000 0.048 0.509 0.011 
Observations 32 32 32 32 31 31 31 31 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.736 0.973 0.966 0.756 0.726 0.968 0.961 0.748 0.627 0.960 0.965 0.693 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients. 
. 
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There are two sets of second stage estimates: i) trust in government (table 66), and ii) trust 
in government and institutions (table 67). 
 In table 66, the results are either mostly insignificant, but there is some evidence 
that government spending and local jurisdiction population size have some bearing on the 
relationship between decentralization and trust in government.  First, SCG revenue is 
positively associated with trust when government spending is lower.  However, as total 
government spending rises, trust in government is decreasing with SCG revenue (3).  
Total government spending is also found to be positively associated with trust in 
government in specification 3.  This suggests that a greater degree of decentralization, 
combined with higher levels of spending, reduces citizen trust in government overall. 
 Second, SCG revenue and autonomous spending have contrasting effects on trust 
in government, when the population size of local jurisdictions is higher (4 and 12).  SCG 
revenue increases citizen trust in when the average population size of the local jurisdiction 
is larger (4).  However, the opposite is true for SCG autonomous spending (12).  When 
the size of the local jurisdiction is increasing, higher levels of SCG autonomous spending 
reduces trust in government.  The contrast in results between SCG revenue and SCG 
autonomous spending may indicate that citizens have a different response to 
decentralization depending on whether it is tax or spending. 
 In table 67, any evidence of a link between decentralization and trust in 
government and institutions is limited to SCG revenue only.  In specification 2, SCG 
revenue improves trust when the quality of the government is lower.  Governance is found 
to be positively associated with trust in government, as we would expect.  This indicates 
that when the quality of government is lower, citizens prefer to see greater 
decentralization of revenue functions.  Therefore, decentralization mitigates against the 
negative consequences of low government quality and higher (perceived) corruption.  
Once again, revenue decentralization is positively associated with trust in government 
when total government spending is lower.  As government spending rises, the positive 
response citizens have initially declines (3).  Finally, citizens trust government more when 
revenue functions are devolved to larger local government sizes (4). 
 In the cross-sectional IV estimates for the WVS dataset, the Hansen J-statistics 
often do not reject the null hypothesis, therefore instruments are suitable in most 
specifications.  Furthermore, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not reject the null 
hypothesis, therefore decentralization could be treated as exogenous. 
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Table 66: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Trust in Government, with Additional Interactions (WVS) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -0.843 -1.307 -2.289* -0.789 -0.995 -0.487 1.176 -1.099 0.345 0.704 0.705 0.332 
(0.890) (0.942) (1.185) (0.802) (0.762) (1.053) (2.225) (0.839) (0.871) (0.885) (1.069) (0.901) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 0.001 0.008 0.050*** -0.004         
 (0.234) (0.005) (0.018) (0.003)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.004 -0.011 -0.083 0.001     
     (0.003) (0.014) (0.082) (0.004)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        -0.002 -0.008 -0.038 -0.007 
         (0.004) (0.013) (0.042) (0.007) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
 -0.001    0.001    0.001   
  (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.002)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
  -0.003***    0.004    0.002  
   (0.001)    (0.005)    (0.002)  
 Decentralization 
x LG Population 
   0.001**    -0.002    -0.003* 
    (0.000)    (0.002)    (0.002) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 0.673*** 0.691*** 0.735*** 0.732*** 0.788*** 0.805*** 0.828*** 0.830*** 0.621*** 0.605*** 0.552*** 0.624*** 
  (0.152) (0.142) (0.162) (0.161) (0.165) (0.188) (0.319) (0.183) (0.166) (0.176) (0.199) (0.173) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
0.174 0.231 0.135 0.154 0.199 0.117 0.195 0.219 -0.050 -0.098 0.096 -0.027 
 (0.179) (0.181) (0.248) (0.163) (0.156) (0.175) (0.364) (0.161) (0.179) (0.153) (0.388) (0.201) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.045** 0.043** 0.034 0.019 0.010 0.001 -0.011 0.011 -0.016 -0.022 -0.030 -0.019 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.030) (0.048) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) 
 Unemployment 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.016 0.010 0.013* 0.014** 0.014 0.013** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
 Government 
Size 
-0.001 -0.001 0.083** -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.131 -0.008 -0.015 -0.015 -0.058 -0.019* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.033) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.140) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.042) (0.011) 
 Governance 0.066*** 0.095*** 0.066** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.048 0.088* 0.065*** 0.087*** 0.068** 0.078** 0.093*** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.029) (0.019) (0.018) (0.038) (0.048) (0.019) (0.016) (0.031) (0.031) (0.018) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.002 0.003 0.004* 0.003* 0.003* 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
 POLITY -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.027* -0.027** -0.025** -0.024* -0.027* -0.029*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.017** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
DWH test  0.740 0.450 0.180 0.495 0.316 0.126 0.080 0.940 0.394 0.172 0.127 0.641 
Hansen J-statistic  0.067 0.085 0.608 0.082 0.177 0.202 0.541 0.074 0.274 0.358 0.572 0.179 
Observations 32 32 32 32 31 31 31 31 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.827 0.845 0.787 0.836 0.788 0.776 0.080 0.817 0.680 0.662 0.431 0.597 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure are instrumented using land area, population size and capital population as % of national population, from the first.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen J-statistic are 
provided. 
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Table 67: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Trust in Government and Institutions, with Additional Interactions (WVS) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -0.870 -1.770* -3.141** -0.849 -1.067 -0.696 -0.270 -1.097 0.147 0.357 0.368 0.186 
(0.972) (0.911) (1.482) (0.768) (0.733) (0.915) (1.130) (0.770) (0.810) (0.811) (0.870) (0.841) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue 0.006** 0.018*** 0.081*** -0.004         
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.021) (0.003)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.002 -0.005 -0.027 -0.001     
     (0.003) (0.010) (0.049) (0.003)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        0.001 -0.0019 -0.018 0.002 
         (0.003) (0.008) (0.037) (0.003) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
 -0.002***    0.000    0.000   
  (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
  -0.004***    0.001    0.001  
   (0.001)    (0.003)    (0.002)  
 Decentralization 
x LG Population 
   0.001***    -0.000    -0.001 
    (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.001) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 0.434*** 0.458*** 0.523** 0.516*** 0.578*** 0.585*** 0.584*** 0.589*** 0.484*** 0.473*** 0.445*** 0.487*** 
  (0.145) (0.120) (0.220) (0.153) (0.150) (0.160) (0.186) (0.161) (0.160) (0.161) (0.169) (0.169) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
0.210 0.331* 0.163 0.205 0.252 0.186 0.227 0.258 -0.019 -0.058 0.050 -0.031 
 (0.198) (0.197) (0.385) (0.172) (0.162) (0.174) (0.181) (0.168) (0.163) (0.146) (0.331) (0.163) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.037 0.035* 0.021 -0.002 -0.009 -0.013 -0.013 -0.008 -0.029 -0.031 -0.036** -0.029 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.028) (0.020) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
 Unemployment 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
 Government 
Size 
0.005 0.005 0.136*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.042 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.029 -0.007 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.037) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.079) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.038) (0.009) 
 Governance 0.044* 0.098*** 0.043 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.036 0.058** 0.051** 0.071*** 0.064** 0.066** 0.069*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.045) (0.022) (0.020) (0.030) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.025) (0.028) (0.020) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.001 0.003* 0.005 0.003** 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
 POLITY -0.025* -0.024** -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
DWH test  0.748 0.846 0.006 0.188 0.215 0.200 0.451 0.343 0.376 0.197 0.259 0.551 
Hansen J-statistic 0.001 0.012 0.410 0.252 0.355 0.246 0.255 0.338 0.594 0.555 0.587 0.523 
Observations 32 32 32 32 31 31 31 31 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.737 0.787 0.309 0.784 0.689 0.689 0.520 0.704 0.666 0.665 0.519 0.683 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure are instrumented using land area, population size and capital population as % of national population, from the first.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen J-statistic are 
provided. 
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The final set of cross-sectional IV estimations are for the Eurobarometer dataset.  The 
first stage estimates in table 68 are similar to those in the section 5.5 for this dataset.  
Country size, population and capital population (%) are not as effective in capturing 
variations in decentralization for the Eurobarometer dataset, and are collectively 
significant in only half of the specifications, as indicated by the p-values for the f-tests.  
Land area exhibits the expected effect on decentralization, though population size is 
negatively associated with the degree of decentralization, which is an unexpected result.  
Capital population is also negatively associated with decentralization, though this is 
expected. 
 The second stage estimates in table 69 suggest that the relationship between tax 
and spending decentralization and trust in government depends on government quality, 
government spending and local jurisdiction population size.  First, SCG revenue and 
expenditure are negatively associated with trust when the quality of government is lower, 
but positively associated with trust when quality of government is higher.  Therefore, 
citizens prefer functions to be decentralized when they have greater confidence in the 
integrity of their government overall.  This result is in contrast to the corresponding results 
in the WVS estimates and may indicate that citizens in European countries have a 
different view on decentralization and corruption, with respect to trust in government. 
 Second, SCG revenue and autonomous spending increase trust when total 
government spending is higher (3 and 11).  If government spending is very low, citizens 
trust government less when those limited resources are distributed between subnational 
and local governments (11). 
Third, a consistent result across all indicators of tax and spending decentralization 
is that citizens trust government more when tax and spending is devolved to smaller 
government units.  On the other hand, as the size of the local jurisdiction (population) 
increases, higher tax and spending decentralization reduce trust (4, 8 and 12). 
 Finally, the Hansen J-statistic confirms the validity of the chosen instruments in 
the IV estimations.  In only one specification (9) is the null hypothesis rejected at the 10% 
level.  Furthermore, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test suggest that decentralization could be 
treated as exogenous.  In only the last two specifications (11 and 12), is the null hypothesis 
rejected at the 1% level.   
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Table 68: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (1st Stage), Dependent Variable: Decentralization, with Additional Interactions (EB Survey) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 1.618* 0.741 0.432** 0.551 1.843** 0.841 0.518** 0.800 1.197 0.401 0.249 0.712 
(0.878) (0.568) (0.166) (1.083) (0.790) (0.549) (0.197) (0.965) (0.835) (0.400) (0.151) (0.627) 
Instrument Variables 
 Country Size 
(Land Area) 
0.191 0.018 0.037 0.144 0.234 0.029 0.056* 0.220 0.393** -0.012 0.001 0.320* 
 (0.215) (0.051) (0.031) (0.133) (0.240) (0.039) (0.027) (0.138) (0.142) (0.047) (0.028) (0.139) 
 Country 
Population 
-0.128 0.037 0.005 -0.667*** -0.189 0.029 -0.007 -0.669*** -0.362*** 0.006 0.011 -0.456** 
 (0.175) (0.057) (0.023) (0.194) (0.195) (0.049) (0.022) (0.179) (0.103) (0.046) (0.027) (0.158) 
 Capital 
Population (%) 
-0.004* 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005* 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.006*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
Second Stage Controls 
 Public Mood -0.134 -0.216 -0.058 0.001 0.050 -0.343* -0.115 0.001 0.830 -0.210* -0.095 0.496 
  (0.603) (0.163) (0.080) (0.439) (0.672) (0.172) (0.072) (0.470) (0.553) (0.109) (0.063) (0.390) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.276 -0.090 -0.024 -0.109 -0.333 -0.116 -0.046 -0.187 -0.021 -0.007 -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.195) (0.115) (0.040) (0.214) (0.191) (0.112) (0.043) (0.203) (0.202) (0.073) (0.033) (0.161) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.015 0.001 -0.003 0.004 -0.025 0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.057** -0.001 -0.001 -0.029 
 (0.020) (0.008) (0.003) (0.018) (0.024) (0.008) (0.003) (0.024) (0.018) (0.007) (0.005) (0.018) 
 Unemployment -0.001 -0.003** -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003** -0.001 -0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) 
 Government 
Size 
-0.013 -0.007* -0.017*** 0.009 -0.013 -0.007** -0.016*** 0.010 -0.019 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.003) (0.001) (0.015) (0.016) (0.003) (0.002) (0.017) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) 
 Governance 0.050*** -0.023* 0.003 0.024 0.053** -0.016 0.005 0.031 0.008 -0.011 0.001 0.007 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.004) (0.021) (0.019) (0.012) (0.004) (0.020) (0.018) (0.007) (0.003) (0.014) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.001 0.012 0.004 -0.010 -0.007 0.017 0.007 -0.008 -0.095 -0.006 0.003 -0.065 
 (0.054) (0.017) (0.007) (0.036) (0.058) (0.015) (0.006) (0.037) (0.062) (0.010) (0.007) (0.044) 
 POLITY -0.134 -0.216 -0.058 0.001 0.050 -0.343* -0.115 0.001 0.830 -0.210* -0.095 0.496 
 (0.603) (0.163) (0.080) (0.439) (0.672) (0.172) (0.072) (0.470) (0.553) (0.109) (0.063) (0.390) 
 Decentralization 
(Interaction) 
 0.131*** 0.046*** 2.156**  0.129*** 0.046*** 2.033**  0.130*** 0.050*** 1.282** 
  (0.011) (0.002) (0.856)  (0.009) (0.002) (0.805)  (0.012) (0.003) (0.490) 
F-test (p-value) for 
instruments 0.062 0.326 0.045 0.019 0.053 0.127 0.078 0.011 0.005 0.798 0,618 0.068 
Observations 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 20 20 20 20 
R-squared 0.673 0.969 0.995 0.817 0.680 0.978 0.995 0.824 0.694 0.978 0.994 0.813 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.   
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Table 69: Cross Sectional IV Estimates (2nd Stage), Dependent Variable: Trust in Government, with Additional Interactions (EB Survey) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -0.110 2.582 1.129 -1.143 -0.227 2.948 0.754 -1.324 -0.555 3.929 6.914** -0.964 
(1.443) (2.368) (1.712) (1.571) (1.499) (2.524) (1.896) (1.499) (1.561) (3.230) (3.514) (1.491) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.239 -4.377* -4.133 0.780***         
 (0.434) (2.410) (2.555) (0.278)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.111 -4.322** -2.859 0.875***     
     (0.394) (2.121) (2.129) (0.218)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        0.256 -11.745 -29.924* 1.520*** 
         (0.382) (8.674) (16.526) (0.267) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
 0.618*    0.608**    1.588   
  (0.324)    (0.280)    (1.134)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
  0.200*    0.144    1.533*  
   (0.119)    (0.098)    (0.834)  
 Decentralization 
x LG Population 
   -0.959***    -1.049***    -2.258*** 
    (0.279)    (0.252)    (0.481) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 0.434 -0.502 0.158 0.669* 0.427 -1.244 0.007 0.520 0.480 -2.526 -3.082 0.067 
  (0.494) (0.891) (0.603) (0.365) (0.528) (1.078) (0.610) (0.361) (0.578) (2.099) (1.887) (0.456) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.056 -0.237 0.009 0.248 -0.035 -0.321 -0.008 0.319 0.048 -0.060 -0.340 0.219 
 (0.294) (0.377) (0.306) (0.343) (0.301) (0.416) (0.321) (0.324) (0.308) (0.464) (0.665) (0.320) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.004 0.001 -0.005 -0.017 0.006 0.018 0.004 -0.013 0.002 0.002 -0.034 -0.029 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.030) (0.039) (0.018) 
 Unemployment 0.005** -0.005 0.004* 0.010*** 0.005** -0.007 0.004* 0.010*** 0.006** -0.005 0.006 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Government 
Size 
-0.001 -0.037* -0.071 -0.009 0.002 -0.035* -0.046 -0.010 0.005 -0.039 -0.243* -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.048) (0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.039) (0.012) (0.013) (0.032) (0.131) (0.012) 
 Governance 0.060* -0.077 0.051* 0.014 0.056 -0.050 0.051 0.009 0.039 -0.097 0.076 0.019 
 (0.034) (0.072) (0.028) (0.033) (0.034) (0.054) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.118) (0.070) (0.031) 
 Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
0.011 0.048 0.021 -0.008 0.008 0.072 0.020 -0.009 -0.002 -0.015 0.122* 0.032 
 (0.036) (0.048) (0.029) (0.043) (0.037) (0.047) (0.030) (0.042) (0.045) (0.076) (0.070) (0.057) 
 POLITY 0.434 -0.502 0.158 0.669* 0.427 -1.244 0.007 0.520 0.480 -2.526 -3.082 0.067 
 (0.494) (0.891) (0.603) (0.365) (0.528) (1.078) (0.610) (0.361) (0.578) (2.099) (1.887) (0.456) 
DWH test  0.470 0.136 0.168 0.342 0.447 0.192 0.268 0.283 0.759 0.173 0.003 0.009 
Hansen J-statistic 0.218 0.523 0.299 0.485 0.165 0.203 0.150 0.446 0.055 0.188 0.753 0.517 
Observations 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 20 20 20 20 
R-squared 0.553 0.347 0.516 0.663 0.557 0.472 0.553 0.691 0.553   0.650 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  SCG Revenue, SCG Expenditure and SCG Autonomous 
Expenditure are instrumented using land area, population size and capital population as % of national population, from the first.  The p-values for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and Hansen J-statistic are 
provided. 
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5.6.2. Fixed Effects Panel Estimator (WVS) 
 
The final set of estimates are produced using a fixed effects panel estimator.  In the first 
set of estimations in table 70, tax and spending decentralization are associated with trust 
in government through interactions with the quality of government and the size of the 
local jurisdiction.   
First, when the quality of government is lower, citizens prefer functions to be 
centralized, and when the quality of government is higher, greater decentralization of 
revenue functions improves trust (2).  This result did not appear in the cross-sectional IV 
estimations however, and contrasts with the results in table 67 (trust in government and 
institutions). 
The second, and perhaps strongest result, is in interactions between spending 
decentralization and local jurisdiction population size.  When the population size of the 
local jurisdiction is smaller, higher levels of spending and autonomous spending 
decentralization improve trust (8 and 12).  Conversely, as local population size increases, 
greater decentralization begins to reduce citizen trust in government.  This result is 
consistent with previous estimations, and suggests that citizens have a different response 
to decentralization depending on how small or large the local population is. 
 In the second set of estimations for the relationship between tax and spending 
decentralization and trust in government and institutions, there is more evidence of a link 
between decentralization and trust (table 71).  As before, revenue decentralization only 
affects trust in government through interactions with the governance indicator.  However, 
in these estimates spending and autonomous spending also observe the same effect (6 and 
10).  Spending decentralization also affects citizen trust in government through total 
government spending (7 and 11) and through local jurisdiction population size (12).  
When total spending is lower, greater spending decentralization improves trust, but as 
total spending increases, greater decentralization starts to reduce citizen trust.  The effect 
of government spending on trust in government, in specifications 7 and 11, is positive.  
Therefore, a combination of higher spending and greater decentralization reduces citizen 
trust in government. 
 Finally, the result in specification 12 supports the finding in table 70, where 
decentralization increases trust for smaller local populations, and decreases trust when 
devolved to local governments responsible for larger local populations 
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Table 70: Fixed Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Trust in Government, with Additional Interactions (WVS)  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant -0.663 -0.145 -0.541 -0.535 0.636 0.743 1.394 1.586 0.408 1.806 1.197 2.165 
(1.302) (0.920) (1.297) (1.520) (1.218) (1.152) (1.384) (1.265) (2.071) (2.831) (1.818) (1.980) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.008 -0.040** 0.006 -0.003         
 (0.677) (1.412) (4.217) (2.345)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    0.003 -0.0184 0.047 0.041*     
     (0.009) (0.016) (0.045) (0.021)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        -0.000 -0.019 0.023 0.036* 
         (0.008) (0.031) (0.041) (0.020) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
 0.005**    0.003    0.003   
  (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.005)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
  -0.001    -0.003    -0.001  
   (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)  
 Decentralization 
x LG Population 
   -0.004    -0.031*    -0.037* 
    (0.017)    (0.016)    (0.020) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 1.486*** 1.558*** 1.432*** 1.441** 1.570*** 1.585*** 1.455*** 1.279*** 1.812** 1.612* 1.625** 1.586** 
  (0.459) (0.442) (0.474) (0.526) (0.383) (0.375) (0.329) (0.368) (0.699) (0.845) (0.635) (0.632) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.103 -0.092 -0.162 -0.113 -0.524* -0.476 -0.772* -0.614** -0.546 -0.596 -0.649 -0.705 
 (0.290) (0.237) (0.334) (0.306) (0.276) (0.275) (0.405) (0.283) (0.418) (0.426) (0.480) (0.474) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.005 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.035** -0.031* -0.047*** -0.044** -0.016 -0.020 -0.020 -0.017 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.026) (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) 
 Unemployment -0.037** -0.034** -0.040** -0.037* -0.037*** -0.033** -0.049** -0.033** -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.053** -0.054*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.011 0.023 0.032 0.011 0.033 0.038* 0.100 0.037 0.044* 0.034 0.068 0.050* 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.057) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.063) (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.046) (0.027) 
 Governance 0.061 -0.103 0.042 0.057 0.032 -0.060 -0.047 -0.008 0.013 -0.052 -0.028 -0.050 
 (0.107) (0.135) (0.111) (0.109) (0.098) (0.109) (0.119) (0.107) (0.107) (0.149) (0.114) (0.115) 
 POLITY 0.021** 0.031*** 0.020** 0.022** 0.014 0.021** 0.010 0.022** 0.014 -0.018 -0.003 -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.142) (0.169) (0.142) (0.140) 
Observations 42 42 42 42 40 40 40 40 36 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.559 0.622 0.563 0.560 0.695 0.714 0.718 0.730 0.733 0.737 0.738 0.771 
Groups 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18 18 18 18 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.   
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Table 71: Fixed Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Trust in Government and Institutions, with Additional Interactions (WVS) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 0.651 1.057 0.795 0.682 1.398 1.508 2.357** 2.094 2.866 6.840*** 5.066*** 4.815*** 
(1.128) (1.039) (1.192) (1.381) (1.083) (1.116) (1.115) (1.231) (2.084) (1.770) (0.837) (0.951) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.002 -0.026** 0.015 -0.001         
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.030) (0.019)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    0.003 -0.018 0.059** 0.031     
     (0.007) (0.015) (0.028) (0.020)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        0.001 -0.052*** 0.066*** 0.041*** 
         (0.006) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
 0.004**    0.003*    0.008***   
  (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.003)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
  -0.001    -0.003*    -0.004***  
   (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.001)  
 Decentralization 
x LG Population 
 
  -0.001 
 
  -0.023 
 
  
-
0.0405*** 
    (0.014)    (0.016)    (0.008) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 1.281*** 1.337*** 1.217*** 1.270*** 1.298*** 1.314*** 1.153*** 1.085** 0.955* 0.387 0.433 0.704** 
  (0.349) (0.336) (0.396) (0.421) (0.323) (0.322) (0.300) (0.379) (0.491) (0.533) (0.328) (0.322) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.220 -0.211 -0.289 -0.223 -0.450** -0.400* -0.763*** -0.516** -0.203 -0.345 -0.492** -0.380* 
 (0.171) (0.150) (0.218) (0.190) (0.174) (0.191) (0.244) (0.184) (0.274) (0.222) (0.215) (0.187) 
 Economic 
Growth 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.018 -0.014 -0.034*** -0.025* 0.032 0.021 0.020* 0.030** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) 
 Unemployment -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.053*** -0.034*** -0.054*** -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.062*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
-0.004 0.005 0.021 -0.004 0.009 0.014 0.094* 0.012 0.038** 0.011 0.106*** 0.045*** 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.043) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.048) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.013) 
 Governance -0.016 -0.145* -0.038 -0.017 -0.035 -0.128 -0.134 -0.064 -0.154* -0.339*** -0.270*** -0.225*** 
 (0.074) (0.076) (0.083) (0.077) (0.071) (0.088) (0.087) (0.075) (0.076) (0.086) (0.063) (0.065) 
 POLITY 0.014** 0.022*** 0.013** 0.014*** 0.011** 0.017*** 0.005 0.016*** -0.179** -0.270*** -0.227*** -0.210*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.084) (0.090) (0.061) (0.060) 
Observations 42 42 42 42 40 40 40 40 36 36 36 36 
R-squared 0.668 0.731 0.676 0.668 0.727 0.758 0.783 0.755 0.842 0.896 0.906 0.913 
Groups 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 18 18 18 18 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.   
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Table 72: Fixed Effects Panel Estimates, Dependent Variable: Trust in Government, with Additional Interactions (EB Survey) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constant 0.992 0.976 1.347 1.063 1.096 1.196 1.512 1.150 -0.048 -0.049 -0.042 0.014 
(0.904) (0.872) (1.020) (0.920) (0.941) (0.899) (1.034) (0.929) (0.709) (0.712) (0.731) (0.712) 
Decentralization Indicator 
 SCG Revenue -0.210 -1.598 -1.125 1.084         
 (0.268) (1.325) (0.676) (1.682)         
 SCG 
Expenditure 
    -0.135 -2.219* -1.317* 3.435     
     (0.189) (1.212) (0.716) (2.054)     
 SCG Autonom. 
Expenditure 
        -0.263 -0.159 -0.355 0.523 
         (0.404) (1.630) (1.601) (1.198) 
Decentralization Interactions 
 Decentralization 
x Governance 
 0.201    0.286    -0.013   
  (0.164)    (0.170)    (0.176)   
 Decentralization 
x Expenditure 
  0.048    0.067    0.004  
   (0.035)    (0.043)    (0.068)  
 Decentralization 
x LG Population 
   -0.882    -2.370*    -0.567 
    (1.005)    (1.353)    (0.607) 
Controls 
 Public Mood 0.423*** 0.426*** 0.417*** 0.404*** 0.425*** 0.439*** 0.411*** 0.384** 0.376** 0.375** 0.376** 0.367** 
  (0.143) (0.145) (0.130) (0.138) (0.142) (0.146) (0.127) (0.138) (0.150) (0.151) (0.150) (0.149) 
 Real GDP per 
capita 
-0.288* -0.235 -0.316* -0.308* -0.328* -0.292 -0.366** -0.365** -0.216 -0.217 -0.215 -0.221 
 (0.159) (0.175) (0.174) (0.158) (0.164) (0.171) (0.177) (0.156) (0.173) (0.176) (0.174) (0.171) 
 Economic 
Growth 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004* 0.004* 0.003 0.003 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Unemployment -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 Government 
Expenditure 
0.004 0.004 -0.009 0.003 0.005 0.008 -0.010 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) 
 Governance -0.017 -0.066 -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.081* -0.013 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.019) (0.049) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.043) (0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019) 
 POLITY 0.061 0.069 0.061 0.061 0.063 0.074 0.063 0.063 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.122*** 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.061) (0.063) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.066) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Observations 162 162 162 162 156 156 156 156 146 146 146 146 
R-squared 0.316 0.325 0.323 0.321 0.328 0.344 0.339 0.348 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.349 
Groups 26 26 26 26 25 25 25 25 24 24 24 24 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively.  White robust standard errors are in parenthesis below the coefficients.  
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The final set of estimates are for the Eurobarometer dataset in table 72.  There is very little 
evidence that decentralization affects trust in government over time in the Eurobarometer 
dataset.  What evidence there is, is limited to spending decentralization only, in specifications 
6 to 8.   When government quality is lower (6) and government spending is lower (7), higher 
decentralization reduces trust in government.  Finally, when local population size is larger, 
higher spending decentralization also reduces trust in government.  Though the coefficients are 
only statistically significant at the 10% level, this result is consistent with previous estimates 
in the Eurobarometer and WVS estimations. 
 
5.6.3. Additional Interactions Summary 
 
Additional interactions provided in this section produce some interesting results.  The main 
findings are: 
1. Fiscal decentralization appears to improve government trust when the quality of 
government is greater (according to the CPI).  This is the case in all fixed effects 
estimations for at least one of the decentralization indicators, and in the cross-sectional 
IV estimates for the Eurobarometer survey.  There is one contradictory result, in the 
WVS estimates, in table 67.  This is the exception however.   
2. Interactions between fiscal decentralization and total government spending observe 
contrasting effects between WVS and Eurobarometer datasets.  In the WVS, SCG 
revenue, combined with higher levels of total spending, leads to lower trust in 
government in cross-sectional estimations.  Furthermore, spending decentralization 
observes the same effect in fixed effects panel estimates (trust in government and 
institutions).  However, in the Eurobarometer dataset, and specifically the cross-
sectional IV estimates, decentralization has a negative effect on trust when spending is 
lower.  Though the IV estimations may suffer from weak instrumentation, this result is 
also observed in the fixed effects panel estimations for SCG expenditure (table 72).  
This could indicate that the response of citizens to decentralization and government 
spending in European countries, differs from citizens in other countries. 
3. Fiscal decentralization appears to have different effects on trust in government 
depending on the population size of the local jurisdiction.  The results are mixed in the 
cross-sectional IV estimations, with different effects between the WVS and 
Eurobarometer dataset.  However, in the fixed effects panel estimations, spending 
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decentralization leads to greater trust in government over time, when the size of the 
local jurisdiction is smaller.  However, as the size of the local jurisdiction increases, 
greater decentralization reduces trust in government. 
 
5.7. Conclusion and Closing Remarks 
 
In this chapter I have examined empirically the relationship between fiscal decentralization on 
citizen trust in government.  As this is a relatively new area of research, I began this chapter 
by establishing how fiscal decentralization may affect citizen trust in government, and why this 
is important.  Using the decentralization dataset outlined in chapter 2 and two datasets for trust 
in government (World Values Survey, Eurobarometer), I produced estimations for the effects 
of tax, spending and other forms of decentralization on trust in government.  The main findings 
of my empirical research are: 
1. Tax and spending decentralization has little effect on trust.  This is in contrast to the 
most comparable piece of research by Ligthart and Oudheusen (2015).  I included more 
controls for economic performance, government spending, government quality and 
democracy, which may explain the difference in the results.  Instead, interactions 
between tax and spending decentralization and other forms of decentralization generate 
some interacting effects.   
2. In the World Values Survey, there is evidence that tax decentralization in particular 
explains variations in trust between countries.  SCG revenue is found to be positively 
associated with trust in government in institutions, and this is robust to IV estimations.  
There is no evidence in the fixed effects panel estimator however, which may reflect 
on the quality of the estimations (due to inefficiency).  All evidence of an association 
between decentralization and trust in government for the Eurobarometer dataset is 
restricted to interactions with other types of decentralization.  Specifically, legislative 
autonomy and elected local government executives improves trust. 
3. The relationship between decentralization and trust in government also depends on 
other conditions examined in section 5.6.  Decentralization improves trust in 
government when the quality of government is greater.  The results for interactions 
between decentralization and government spending and local jurisdiction population 
size are mixed however.  The WVS and Eurobarometer survey observe different effects, 
specifically in the cross-sectional IV estimates.  This may indicate weak 
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instrumentation, or that the effects of decentralization on trust through various 
interactions depends on the frequency of data and the time period covered.  For 
example, over longer periods of time in the World Values Survey, higher levels of 
decentralization to larger local governments (in terms of population), reduces trust. 
Overall, the evidence here suggests that whilst the degree of tax and spending decentralization, 
and the degree of local government autonomy, have very little impact on citizen trust in 
government, the complexity of decentralized government and the closeness of local 
government to citizens does have some bearing on this relationship.  This is particularly 
important as it may be evidence that fiscal decentralization does indeed bring government 
closer to people (Musgrave, 1983), which is often cited as one of the main motivations behind 
the decentralization of government.  Ultimately further work is required to examine the effects 
of government decentralization on trust.  In my work I provide some ideas of how 
decentralization may affect citizens’ view of government, but more data, and data that 
specifically focuses on local government (share, autonomy), could provide greater insight into 
the relationship between decentralization and trust.  Future empirical research should also 
consider different instrumentation of decentralization.  Though area and population size have 
been used as instruments previously, even with an additional instrument (capital population %), 
the instruments were sometimes weak in the cross-sectional IV estimations.    
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6. Thesis Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I have examined several aspects of fiscal decentralization, from tax and spending 
decentralization, to local government accountability and local jurisdiction area and population 
size. The aim of this thesis was to examine the effects of these aspects of fiscal decentralization 
on several key areas of public policy: poverty and income distribution (chapter 3), public 
healthcare and public education (chapter 4) and trust in government (chapter 5).  The key results 
of my research are as follows: 
1. The overarching result from my thesis is that the effects of fiscal decentralization 
depend on more than whether subnational governments account for a greater (or 
smaller) proportion of total government taxation and spending.  Further tax and 
spending decentralization rarely has consistent effects in the topics covered in this 
research.  Instead, tax and spending decentralization, in tandem with other forms of 
decentralization, such as the degree of local government autonomy and accountability 
to local citizens, produce more consistent effects. 
2. Fiscal decentralization appears to reduce income inequality in high income countries, 
but increase absolute poverty in low and middle income countries.  Furthermore, greater 
decentralization has a positive effect on the poor and poorest when the size (area) of 
local jurisdiction is smaller. This result contradicts some of the decentralization theory 
discussed in chapter 1, specifically, that fiscal decentralization may lead to a race to the 
bottom in taxation (Hoyt, 1991) and lower spending on essential public services (Keen 
and Marchand, 1997; Besley and Coate, 2003). Instead, this finding may suggest that 
greater tax and spending decentralization when the size of local government is smaller 
may empower the poorest, leading subnational governments to be more responsive to 
the needs of the poor. Therefore, this finding is more in line with the theories of Oates 
(1972) and Tiebout (1956). 
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3. Fiscal decentralization has neither a positive or negative effect on public services. 
Instead, certain public services may benefit from greater fiscal decentralization, whilst 
others may not. The main conclusions from chapter 4 is that greater fiscal 
decentralization can improve public healthcare where subnational governments have 
autonomy over spending and when total public healthcare expenditure is higher.  This 
suggests that developing countries may benefit from greater centralization, at least with 
respect to public healthcare. Secondly, local government accountability affects the 
relationship between decentralization and public education.  There is also evidence that 
fiscal decentralization may be stronger when there is a greater degree of heterogeneity 
between citizens, which supports a widely-held view in the literature (see Oates, 1972, 
and Khaleghian, 2004). 
4. Citizens appear to be indifferent towards the arrangement of tax and spending decision 
making between central and subnational governments. Instead, citizens trust 
government more when there are fewer government tiers and when the local 
government is closer to local citizens. Citizens trust government less when tax and 
spending is devolved between many tiers of subnational governments. Finally, where 
fiscal decentralization brings government closer to local citizens, further tax and 
spending decentralization can improve trust in government overall. 
Overall, the main finding from the empirical research in this thesis is that tax and spending 
authority of subnational governments may be less important than other aspects of 
decentralization.  Often tax and spending decentralization has mixed or no significant effect on 
the topics covered in this research.  Therefore, decentralization policy and reform should focus 
on other aspects of fiscal decentralization.  The evidence in this research supports the views 
expressed by Bahl (1999) and Treisman (2000) that the effects of decentralization depend on 
the design of decentralized government, and the different aspects of fiscal decentralization.  
The implications of these findings, with respect to decentralization policy and reform, are 
important. 
 First, decentralization reform should not be limited to the devolution of tax and 
spending.  Instead, reform packages should consider a range of different types of 
decentralization, and developing countries should not seek to expand subnational government 
activity and autonomy in the hope that this alone will bring about the supposed benefits of 
fiscal decentralization. 
 Second, there is limited evidence that fiscal decentralization has consistent positive 
effects on any of the subjects covered in this research, and there is the risk that further 
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decentralization may actually harm provision of public services, for example, vaccination 
coverage.  Therefore, there should be no expectation that decentralization reform will lead to 
lower poverty, less inequality, better public healthcare and public education or stronger links 
between citizens and government (represented by trust in government).  Countries that have 
implemented decentralization reforms, particularly with a focus on tax and spending 
decentralization, as reported by Dillinger (1994) and Stein (1998), are unlikely to produce 
universal effects. 
 Third, empirical research on the effects of fiscal decentralization should consider other 
aspects of decentralization.  The research carried out here demonstrates that the effects of tax 
and spending decentralization are often sensitive to the design of fiscal decentralization (Bahl, 
1999).  Only recently has research begun to include other aspects of fiscal decentralization (see 
Altunbas and Thornton, 2011).  Treisman (2000) among others has provided evidence that 
effects of government decentralization can differ between the different aspects of 
decentralization.  It is important that when suggesting policy on fiscal decentralization, that we 
consider all forms of decentralization as well.  Future research in the area of fiscal 
decentralization should incorporate measures of different aspects of decentralization so that 
more insightful conclusions can be made on the effects of fiscal decentralization. 
 
Finally, I will reflect on some of the shortcomings of my work and will make suggestions for 
how future studies can build on the research in this thesis. 
First, further work should be done to examine the effects of fiscal decentralization on 
absolute poverty.  This area of study is in its infancy, yet there is a great deal of value in research 
on the distributional effects of fiscal decentralization.  My empirical research produces little 
evidence of any association between fiscal decentralization and absolute poverty.  It may be 
that fiscal decentralization has no effect on absolute poverty.  However, if more data becomes 
available, then further evidence may provide different results and robust conclusions on the 
effects of fiscal decentralization on absolute poverty.  Furthermore, the limited quantity of data 
available for tax and spending decentralization in low and middle income countries prevented 
an investigation into the long-term effects of fiscal decentralization.  It is likely that fiscal 
decentralization will produce long term effects, as well as the short term effects examined here.  
This is relevant to each of the topics covered in this research. 
Second, I also suggest that future decentralization research should focus on local 
government.  Wallis and Oates (1988); Treisman (2002) and more recently, Ivanyna and 
Shah (2014), have all discussed to some extent vertical decentralization – the idea that tax 
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and spending functions devolved to local governments indicate greater decentralization than 
the same functions devolved to subnational governments.  In my research I used indicators 
for subnational government share of total government responsibility.  However, some of the 
stronger results in my research concern local government accountability, government 
structure and the characteristics of local government (local jurisdiction area size and local 
population).  Ivanyna and Shah (2014) provide an extensive dataset on local government, 
however the data is cross-sectional only.  Local government tax and spending share and 
autonomy, combined with measures of local government size and so forth, could provide an 
insight into the effects of fiscal decentralization on the various topics covered in this research.  
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Appendix A: Variable Data, Definitions and Sources 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE 
Poverty and Income Distribution Indicators 
Income Distribution 
(Gini Coefficient) 
Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of 
income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) 
among individuals or households within an economy 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.  A Gini index 
of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 1 implies 
perfect inequality. 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators; OECD, 
Income Distribution 
Database; UNU-
Wider 
Absolute Poverty Absolute Poverty is the percentage of the population living 
on less than $1.25 a day at 2005 international prices. As a 
result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates for 
individual countries cannot be compared with poverty 
rates reported in earlier editions. 
World Bank, Poverty 
and Inequality 
Database 
Public Healthcare Indicators 
Vaccinations Average of two vaccinations: i) DPT, ii) Measles, for 12-
23 months old.  (World Bank definition: Child 
immunization measures the percentage of children ages 
12-23 months who received vaccinations before 12 
months or at any time before the survey.) 
 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
Infant Mortality Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before 
reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given 
year. 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
Public Education Indicators 
Classroom Size 
(primary) 
Primary school pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pupils 
enrolled in primary school divided by the number of 
primary school teachers (regardless of their teaching 
assignment). 
 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
Primary Enrolment Net enrolment ratio is the ratio of children of official 
school age based on the International Standard 
Classification of Education 1997 who are enrolled in 
primary school to the population of the corresponding 
official school age 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators; UNESCO 
Education Indicators 
Trust in Government and Institutions Indicators 
Trust (World Values 
Survey) 
“I am going to name a number of organisations. For each 
one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in 
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” 
 
I convert the qualitative responses into a scale: 0 (none at 
all), 1 (not very much), 2 (quite a lot) and 3 (great deal).  
Country data is constructed as the average response from 
all participants in the survey.  Data is provided in waves: 
1990-1994, 1995-1998, 1999-2004 and 2005-2009.  Trust 
in government is a single variable in the dataset, whilst 
trust in government and institutions is calculated as the 
average of four separate indicators for trust in government, 
parliament, political parties and civil service.   
World Values 
Survey,  
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Trust 
(Eurobarometer) 
“I would like to ask you a question about how much trust 
you have in certain institutions. For each of the following 
institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not 
to trust it?”.  
 
Responses are in three categories: trust, do not trust, and 
don’t know.  The original data contains percentages for 
each of these categories.  My data is the ratio of those who 
said they trust, to those who said they either trust or do not 
trust.   
Eurobarometer Trust 
Dataset 
Trust (Edelman 
Barometer) 
“How much do you trust each of these institutions to do 
what is right?”.   
 
Respondents are aged between 35-64 years old, college-
educated, household income in top quantile.  Data is 
provided per country, as a percentage of the positive 
responses.  I construct a panel dataset from annual 
publications of the work, between 2005 and 2009. 
Annual Edelman 
Trust Barometer 
(2005-2009) 
Panel Decentralization Indicators 
Subnational 
Government 
Revenue 
Decentralization 
SCG (state and local government) revenue as a % of 
general government revenue (central and SCG), not 
including transfers 
World Bank Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Indicators 
Subnational 
Government 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
SCG (state and local government) expenditure as a % of 
general government revenue (central and SCG), not 
including transfers 
World Bank Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Indicators 
Subnational 
Government 
Autonomous 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
Fiscal Decentralization is a constructed variable from 
existing World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicators 
dataset.  It is calculated as Expenditure Decentralization * 
Fiscal Gap (Subnational Government Own-Source 
Revenue as a percentage of Subnational Government 
Expenditure) 
World Bank Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Indicators 
Other Decentralization Indicators 
Legislative 
Decentralization 
Sub-central legislatures have autonomy in certain 
specified areas--i.e. constitutional authority to legislate--
not explicitly subject to central laws (1) 
Treisman (2008) 
Federal Dummy 
 
Dummy variable: countries with federal government (1), 
countries with unitary government (0) 
Treisman (2008) 
Electoral Dummy Executive at bottom tier directly elected (1) or chosen by 
directly elected assembly (0) 
Treisman (2008) 
Tiers Dummy variable: if country has 4 or more tiers of 
government (1); if countries has fewer than 4 tiers of 
government (0) 
Treisman (2008) 
Local Government 
Average Area Size 
The logarithm of the average size of the smallest 
jurisdiction (local government).  Original data was 
recorded in square kilometres 
Ivanyna and Shah 
(2014) 
Local Government 
Average Population 
Size 
The logarithm of the average number of citizens living in 
the smallest jurisdiction (local government).  Original data 
was recorded in 1,000s 
Ivanyna and Shah 
(2014) 
Control Variables 
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Logarithm of Real 
Income 
The logarithm of GDP per capita based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP). Data are in constant 2011 
international dollars. 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
Economic Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based 
on constant local currency.  
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
Inflation Annual change in prices as measured by the consumer 
price index  
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
 
Unemployment Rate 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labour force that 
is without work but available for and seeking employment. 
Definitions of labour force and unemployment differ by 
country. 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
Trade Ratio of total trade (imports and exports) to Gross National 
Product (GDP) 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
General Government 
Expenditure 
General government final consumption expenditure 
(formerly general government consumption) includes all 
government current expenditures for purchases of goods 
and services (including compensation of employees). Data 
are in current U.S. dollars. 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
Governance The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) represents the 
perception of corruption in the public sector.  Several 
sources (three or more) are included in any given value 
within the CPI, including information on bribery of public 
officials, embezzlement of public funds, and questions 
probing the effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption 
efforts.  The index ranges from 0 (very high corruption 
perceived) to 10 (very low corruption perceived). 
Transparency 
International (TI) 
Population Total population is based on the de facto definition of 
population, which counts all residents regardless of legal 
status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently 
settled in the country of asylum, who are generally 
considered part of the population of their country of origin. 
The values shown are midyear estimates. 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
Fractionalization 
Ethnolinguistic 
The average of ethnic and language fractionalization 
indices.  Ethnic fractionalization is the probability that two 
randomly selected people from a given country do not 
belong to same ethnolinguistic group.  Language 
fractionalization is the probably that two randomly 
selected individuals speak different languages 
Alesina et al. (2003): 
Fractionalization 
Database 
Heterogeneity Index 
(cross-sectional) 
The heterogeneity index is based on the average area of 
local government unit, ethno-linguistic, age, income, 
urbanization composition of the country’s population, as 
well as its geographical features (relief, versatility of 
climate zones, etc.) 
Ivanyna and Shah 
(2014) 
Democracy Computation: subtraction of the AUTOC score (autocracy 
indicator) from the DEMOC score (institutional 
democracy scale).  Score ranges from 10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) 
Polity IV Project: 
Political Regime 
Characteristics and 
Transitions 
Public Health 
Expenditure, per 
capita 
Public Healthcare Expenditure per capita is the public 
current spending on healthcare divided by the population.  
This indicator is constructed using three available 
indicators: i) public healthcare expenditure as % GDP, ii) 
private healthcare expenditure as % of GDP, iii) total 
healthcare spending (public and private) per capita.     
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
Public Education 
Expenditure, per 
student 
Public expenditure per student is the public current 
spending on education divided by the total number of 
students by level, as a percentage of GDP per capita.  
UNESCO Education 
Statistics 
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Hospital Beds 
Hospital beds include inpatient beds available in public, 
private, general, and specialized hospitals and 
rehabilitation centres. In most cases beds for both acute 
and chronic care are included. 
World Health 
Organization, 
supplemented by 
country data. 
Physicians (per 1,000 
people) 
Physicians include generalist and specialist medical 
practitioners. 
World Health 
Organization, Global 
Atlas of the Health 
Workforce.  
Hospital Beds 
Hospital beds include inpatient beds available in public, 
private, general, and specialized hospitals and 
rehabilitation centres. In most cases beds for both acute 
and chronic care are included. 
World Health 
Organization, 
supplemented by 
country data. 
Instrument Variables 
Land Area Total land area in square kilometres World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
Capital Population 
(%) 
The percentage of the nation’s population living in the 
capital city.  This variable is constructed from two 
variables from the data source: urbanisation and capital 
population.  Urbanisation is the percentage of the nation’s 
population living in urban areas, and capital is the 
percentage of the urban population living in the capital. 
World Bank, World 
Development 
Indicators 
Direct Democracy Qualitative variable: 1 - legislative provisions for public 
approval (in form of local referendums),  in case of certain 
council or executive decisions; 0.5 - legislative provisions 
for public approval (in forms of public hearings, citizen 
assemblies) in case of certain council or executive 
decisions; 0.25 - legislative provisions for other forms of 
citizen participation (civil councils, open sessions of LG 
councils, possibility to initiate local referendum, 
possibility to submit citizens' petitions and initiatives to 
council); 0 - no legal provisions for direct democracy 
Ivanyna and Shah 
(2014) 
Legal Origins Dummy variable: countries classed according to legal 
origins (laws of land origination), based on the data 
provided by La Porta et al. (1999) 
La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, 
Vishny (1999) 
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Appendix B: Chapter 3 Poverty Country List 
COUNTRY CONTINENT INCOME 
CLASSIFICATION 
DATA IN CROSS-SECTIONAL 
Income Distribution 
(57) 
Absolute Poverty 
(26) 
Bolivia S.A. Low   
Georgia EU Low   
Moldova EU Low   
Mongolia AS Low   
Tajikistan AS Low   
Argentina S.A. Middle   
Armenia EU Middle   
Belarus EU Middle   
Bulgaria EU Middle   
Chile S.A. Middle   
Colombia S.A. Middle   
Costa Rica N.A. Middle   
Croatia EU Middle   
El Salvador N.A. Middle   
Estonia EU Middle   
Honduras N.A. Middle   
Hungary EU Middle   
Kazakhstan AS Middle   
Latvia EU Middle   
Macedonia EU Middle   
Malaysia AS Middle   
Mexico N.A. Middle   
Paraguay  S.A. Middle   
Peru S.A. Middle   
Poland EU Middle   
Romania EU Middle   
Russia AS Middle   
Serbia EU Middle   
Slovakia EU Middle   
Slovenia EU Middle   
Thailand AS Middle   
Ukraine EU Middle   
Australia OC High   
Austria EU High   
Belgium EU High   
Canada N.A. High   
Czech Republic EU High   
Denmark EU High   
Finland EU High   
France EU High   
Germany EU High   
Greece EU High   
Iceland EU High   
Ireland EU High   
Israel AS High   
Italy EU High   
Luxembourg EU High   
Malta EU High   
Netherlands EU High   
Norway EU High   
Portugal EU High   
South Korea AS High   
Spain EU High   
Sweden EU High   
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Switzerland EU High   
United Kingdom EU High   
United States N.A. High   
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Appendix C: Chapter 4 Public Healthcare and Public Education Country List 
COUNTRY CONTINENT INCOME 
GROUP 
DATA IN CROSS-SECTIONAL 
Vaccinations Infant 
Mortality 
Primary 
Enrolment 
Classroom 
Size 
Albania EU Low     
Australia OC High     
Austria EU High     
Azerbaijan EU Low     
Belarus EU Middle     
Bolivia S.A. Low     
Bulgaria EU Middle     
Canada N.A. High     
Cyprus EU Middle     
Denmark EU High     
Estonia EU Middle     
Finland EU High     
Georgia EU Low     
Germany EU High     
Iceland EU High     
India AS Low     
Indonesia AS Low     
Ireland EU High     
Israel AS High     
Italy EU High     
Kazakhstan AS Middle     
Latvia EU Middle     
Lithuania EU Middle     
Luxembourg EU High     
Moldova EU Low     
Mongolia AS Low     
Netherlands EU High     
Norway EU High     
Poland EU Middle     
Portugal EU Middle     
Romania EU Middle     
Russia AS Middle     
Slovakia EU Middle     
Slovenia EU Middle     
South Arica AF Middle     
Spain EU High     
Switzerland EU High     
Tajikistan AS Low     
Ukraine EU Low     
United States N.A. High     
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Appendix D: Chapter 5 Trust in Government and Institutions Country List 
COUNTRY CONTINENT 
INCOME 
CLASSIFICATION 
TRUST 
WVS (45) Eurobarometer (26) 
Albania EU Low   
Argentina SA Middle   
Australia OC High   
Austria EU High   
Azerbaijan EU Low   
Belarus EU Middle   
Brazil SA Middle   
Bulgaria EU Middle   
Canada NA High   
Chile SA Middle   
China AS Middle   
Colombia SA Middle   
Croatia EU Middle   
Cyprus EU High   
Denmark EU High   
Estonia EU Middle   
Finland EU High   
France EU High   
Georgia EU Middle   
Germany EU High   
Greece EU High   
Hungary EU High   
India AS Low   
Iran AS Middle   
Ireland EU High   
Italy EU High   
Jordan AS Middle   
Latvia EU Middle   
Lithuania EU Middle   
Luxembourg EU High   
Macedonia EU Middle   
Malta EU High   
Mexico NA Middle   
Moldova EU Low   
Morocco AF Middle   
Netherlands EU High   
New Zeal OC High   
Norway EU High   
Peru SA Middle   
Poland EU Middle   
Portugal EU High   
Romania EU Middle   
Russia AS Middle   
Serbia EU Middle   
Slovakia EU Middle   
Slovenia EU High   
South Africa AF Middle   
Spain EU High   
Sweden EU High   
Switzerland EU High   
Ukraine EU Middle   
United Kingdom EU High   
United States NA High   
274 | P a g e  
 
Appendix E: Chapter 5 Trust in Government Cross-Sectional Data (World Values 
Survey) 
Country Trust in… Public 
Mood Government and 
Institutions 
Government Parliament Political 
Parties 
Civil Service 
Albania 1.260 1.388 1.615 1.051 0.986 1.364 
Argentina 0.719 0.907 0.696 0.579 0.696 0.696 
Australia 1.191 1.191 1.191 1.191 1.191 1.191 
Azerbaijan 1.777 2.297 1.923 1.554 1.334 1.419 
Belarus 1.170 1.489 1.121 0.895 1.177 1.586 
Brazil 1.100  0.788  1.411 1.649 
Bulgaria 1.176 1.360 1.082 0.924 1.336 1.702 
Canada 1.299 1.316 1.288 1.069 1.521 1.537 
Chile 1.314 1.575 1.287 1.049 1.346 1.648 
China 2.235 2.316 2.308 2.187 2.128 1.805 
Colombia 1.065 1.457 0.942 0.791 1.072 1.688 
Croatia 1.318 1.527 1.373 1.047 1.324 1.456 
Cyprus 1.467 1.582 1.536 1.181 1.567 1.574 
Estonia 1.321 1.430 1.316 0.931 1.608 1.564 
Finland 1.333 1.462 1.399 1.025 1.446 1.620 
France 1.106 1.006 1.160 0.803 1.455 1.347 
Georgia 1.169 1.239 1.085 0.968 1.382 1.697 
Germany 1.031 0.987 1.014 0.849 1.275 1.189 
Hungary 1.039 1.004 0.997 0.762 1.394 1.259 
India 1.573 1.549 1.696 1.373 1.674 2.059 
Iran 1.500 1.745 1.701 1.209 1.347 1.734 
Italy 1.109 1.075 1.175 0.889 1.297 1.445 
Jordan 1.778 2.426 1.816 1.071 1.799 2.279 
Latvia 1.053 1.196 0.988 0.678 1.348 1.438 
Lithuania 1.213 1.314 1.169 1.012 1.357 1.677 
Mexico 1.123 1.155 1.208 1.029 1.101 1.644 
Moldova 1.112 1.188 1.127 0.891 1.240 1.582 
Morocco 1.249 1.647 1.076 0.917 1.356 1.882 
Netherlands 1.098 1.064 1.121 1.041 1.164 1.225 
New Zealand 1.241 1.338 1.253 0.981 1.391 1.393 
Norway 1.521 1.605 1.683 1.243 1.553 1.501 
Peru 0.819 1.054 0.782 0.681 0.760 1.371 
Poland 0.979 1.101 0.989 0.715 1.112 1.664 
Romania 0.923 0.984 0.868 0.745 1.095 1.828 
Russia 1.112 1.159 0.994 0.863 1.431 1.565 
Serbia 0.914 1.011 0.899 0.767 0.980 1.275 
Slovakia 1.176 1.306 1.103 1.001 1.295 1.565 
Slovenia 1.001 1.189 0.980 0.788 1.047 1.313 
South Africa 1.570 1.703 1.674 1.371 1.534 1.862 
Spain 1.256 1.258 1.310 1.164 1.293 1.338 
Sweden 1.398 1.341 1.481 1.228 1.542 1.427 
Switzerland 1.450 1.621 1.477 1.126 1.577 1.311 
Ukraine 1.043 1.074 0.905 0.834 1.360 1.566 
United 
Kingdom 1.193 1.182 1.240 0.948 1.402 1.368 
United States 1.265 1.289 1.204 1.068 1.498 1.614 
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Appendix F: Chapter 5 Trust in Government Cross-Sectional Data (Eurobarometer 
Survey) 
Country Eurobarometer Survey Edelman Barometer 
Trust in 
Government 
Public Mood Trust in 
Government 
Public Mood 
Austria 53.0 66.0   
Bulgaria 26.1 61.7   
Croatia 21.6 61.5   
Cyprus 64.0 67.9   
Denmark 59.1 68.9   
Estonia 54.4 63.8   
Finland 65.2 73.8   
France 30.1 55.8 31.7 38.1 
Germany 37.1 66.4 29.0 36.6 
Greece 41.9 61.8   
Hungary 29.4 57.3   
Ireland 36.9 65.7 36.0 47.3 
Italy 30.6 57.0 32.0 45.6 
Latvia 23.4 58.8   
Lithuania 26.2 65.6   
Luxembourg 71.2 58.8   
Macedonia 41.8 64.8   
Malta 51.6 64.1   
Netherlands 49.0 62.3 65.0 58.2 
Poland 18.5 65.8 14.0 43.3 
Portugal 35.4 66.7   
Romania 32.7 73.8   
Slovakia 33.7 64.5   
Slovenia 37.3 55.3   
Spain 47.8 55.8 38.5 50.4 
Sweden 45.7 57.1 60.0 36.5 
United Kingdom 29.4 64.0 30.0 39.4 
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